

PARLIAMENT OF ZIMBABWE

SECOND REPORT

**OF THE PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE ON LANDS
AGRICULTURE WATER DEVELOPMENT RURAL
RESOURCES AND RESETTLEMENT**

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1.0 Executive Summary

- 1.1 The Portfolio Committee on Lands, Agriculture, Water Development, Rural Resources and Resettlement of the Parliament of Zimbabwe undertook an assessment/audit of the country's ongoing land reform program with technical assistance from the Center for Applied Social Sciences (CASS)-Land Tenure Center (LTC) land reform and resettlement collaborative research project. The assessment was set against the stated policy objectives of the land reform program and the review itself sought to specifically pursue the objectives outlined in paragraph 2.5 below. The assessment was undertaken between January and March 2003 and saw the Committee visiting all the eight administrative provinces of Zimbabwe. The Committee held meetings at both provincial and district levels with key stakeholders in the Land Reform Programme notably the Provincial and District Land Identification Committees. The Committee also conducted field visits over a two-day period per province enabling it to observe developments and discuss with beneficiaries in selected sites/schemes.
- 1.2 Time constraints, in part arising from the squeezed programme necessitated by the decision to visit all provinces, the possibility that some of the site visits could have been stage-managed and therefore not fully representative of the province or country-wide picture with regard to the programme and the Committee's inability to engage in any discussions with former commercial farmers notwithstanding the inherent complexities of the Land Reform Programme itself exerted their influence on an otherwise successful assessment study. While acknowledging these constraints, it is also critical to note that the Committee learnt a lot and gathered considerably credible evidence upon which the policy recommendations offered in this report are based.
- 1.3 The Land Reform Programmes being executed and managed by both new and existing institutions. Some of the new institutions specifically created to manage the programme include the Land Identification Committees (national, provincial and district) and committees of seven at farm level. While the composition of these structures reflects the institutions ordinarily associated with the management of land reform it is the functions and the manner in which these were performed which was considerably and radically different from previous land reform phases. The study observed serious weak inter-institutional coordination between national and sub-national structures as well as interference from political players especially with regard to listing and de-listing of properties/farms and beneficiary selection. Consequently it is recommended that;

- 1.3.1 The Ministry of Lands Agriculture and Rural Resettlement (Head Office) reviews the way it works, devolving appropriate functions to lower level autonomous structures.
 - 1.3.2 Coordination be enhanced and that at local level the authority overlaps be removed and institutional functions be streamlined.
 - 1.3.3 Information flow and management from the national to local level be both strengthened and better managed using processes that will see provinces and their districts participating in and sharing experiences including application of relevant lessons.
- 1.4 Regarding aspects of land acquisition, planning and allocation, the review acknowledges the unprecedented levels of property gazetting, which are however proceeding against sluggish legal confirmations amidst a flurry of contestations. Related to this are isolated cases of properties caught in the acquisition net especially those which were in the process of changing hands from white to black commercial farmers. It is recommended that government;
- 1.4.1 Facilitates blacks who have resources to acquire farms on their own to free up resources for the acquisition of land for those with few resources.
 - 1.4.2 Legislates the one-household-one farm policy and applies it across the board to obviate concentrating ownership of land in a few blacks with resources.
 - 1.4.3 Gives autonomy to provincial leadership to conclusively negotiate with farmers for land to avoid confusion and limit farm contestations stalling the programme currently.
 - 1.4.4 Offers white farmers land released through low A2 plot uptake as part of the negotiations/settlement for land acquired while also using the Maximum Farm Size Regulations to leave portions of land for white farmers in order to speed up confirmations and avoid the costly and time-consuming litigation processes.
- 1.5 The review showed that allocation of land between A1 and A2, and between war veterans and ordinary people has been largely according to government policy. However, there were very low allocations to farm workers and to women in both scheme types. It is therefore recommended that:
- 1.5.1 In the remaining allocations women and farm workers be given greater priority.

- 1.5.2 Final registration of land rights should force co-ownership for those beneficiaries who are married.
- 1.5.3 Better communication between District and Provincial Land Committees be practised to avoid multiple allocations.
- 1.6 The assessment noted that plot uptake levels especially in A2 schemes were very low for a number of reasons including lack of clarity in land rights, lack of resources and poor match between farmers and land resources given. It is therefore recommended that government;
 - 1.6.1 Speedily concludes the legal acquisition of land.
 - 1.6.2 Clarifies the tenure arrangements on both A1 and A2 schemes.
 - 1.6.3 Gives the flexibility of replanning schemes to match beneficiary capabilities and preferences.
 - 1.6.4 Gives an allowance for beneficiaries in different schemes to negotiate plot swaps so that beneficiaries can move to schemes they feel are closely matched to their ability and their physical and human resource endowments.
- 1.7 There is very high demand for tillage services in the resettlement areas, particularly in the A1 scheme and this demand is directed to DDF and DDF-facilitated tillage services, which are very inadequate and unreliable. It is therefore recommended that government;
 - 1.7.1 Provides more funding to resuscitate non-operational DDF tractors.
 - 1.7.2 Strictly enforces policy of DDF only supporting A1 and communal area farmers.
 - 1.7.3 Facilitates acquisition of animal draught power in schemes with enough provision of grazing land.
 - 1.7.4 Facilitates the setting up of private tillage hire services stationed within schemes through financial assistance as well as training services.
- 1.8 The country has experienced serious droughts over the years resulting in serious food deficits. This has resulted in rain-fed agricultural (food) production being increasingly unreliable with the irrigation strategy gaining widespread policy and practical treatment in both communal and commercial production regimes. The current land reform was also accompanied with support through the irrigation fund, which the review

found, unfortunately to be too centralized and biased against A1 farmers. There was also widespread ignorance of ZINWA regulations as well as vandalism of irrigation equipment especially in areas awaiting settlement. Group irrigation schemes have had problems in managing and sharing costs of irrigation (water, electricity and other costs). It is therefore recommended that:

- 1.8.1 Part of the irrigation fund be specifically earmarked for support to A1 schemes with the funds being (decentralized) managed at provincial and district levels.
 - 1.8.2 Each land user group should be allocated a fixed limit of water for irrigation through ZINWA to ensure fair distribution of water and that such allocations and obligations be part of the agreement between the land reform beneficiary and the government.
 - 1.8.3 Training and setting up of irrigation management structures should be speeded up in A1 irrigation schemes to ensure fairness and sustainability of the schemes.
 - 1.8.4 Local authorities must ensure security of irrigation equipment in farms awaiting resettlement.
- 1.9 The review found that input distribution, despite the drought, was very limiting to the realization of good harvest and that the GMB is failing to deliver the correct inputs, in adequate amounts and at the right time. Administering the scheme is also diverting the GMB from its core business of crop marketing and relief food distribution. In addition, the government input scheme has starved the established input dealership network of inputs and that significant amounts of the inputs are leaking to the parallel market and sold at excessive prices. It is recommended therefore that:
- 1.9.1 The monopoly enjoyed by GMB in the distribution of inputs should be phased out with time, while in the interim, allowing the existing Agri-dealership network to complement GMB.
 - 1.9.2 In the long run inputs should be channeled through existing input dealership networks and that government helps needy farmers through a targeted input voucher scheme to avoid non-farmers diverting inputs to the black market. This would enable government to withdraw from subsidizing inputs without leaving a vacuum in the input distribution system when farmers become self-sufficient.

- 1.10 Prices being offered to farmers are not viable considering they have to source the bulk of their inputs on the black market. By trying to keep consumer food prices low through keeping producer prices low, the government is pushing farmers to grow nonfood crops and endangering national food security. We commend the government for moving away from such a policy in the recently announced producer prices, which give production incentives, and explicitly subsidizes consumers by offering a lower price to millers. However, the GMB debt is a cause for concern to the Committee and, therefore, the Committee recommends that adequate steps should be taken to address this problem as a matter of urgency.
- 1.11 Because of an increased farmer base arising from the placement of land reform beneficiaries on land hitherto used by fewer commercial farmers, extension personnel need to be increased. Despite this swelling demand for extension services, the department (AREX) has had trouble attracting people into its service as few candidates apply notwithstanding the lack of resources to hire and equip staff (transport, accommodation and communication hardware). In addition, the current extension style is also poorly matched to the class of new farmers especially those coming into the A2 scheme. It is therefore recommended that government;
- 1.11.1 Institutes an aggressive extension worker-training programme to increase supply of appointable extension staff.
- 1.11.2 Significantly increases the budgetary allocation to extension to cover staff and operational expense needs.
- 1.11.3 Facilitates the placing of high priority by local authorities on accommodation of extension staff in existing farmhouses and other relevant infrastructure.
- 1.11.4 Facilitates the institution of crash farm production training programmes especially for A2 farmers through sale of crop and livestock production manuals, workshops and seminars for urban-based A2 farmers and facilitating linkages with financial managers, input dealers as well as marketers.
- 1.12 The review encountered a lot of dissatisfaction with the sizes of farms earmarked for livestock and game ranching. Recognizing that there is a critical land mass for a viable livestock or game ranching operation in the drier parts of the country and the need to benefit as many indigenous blacks as possible, it is recommended that resettlement farms falling in this category be replanned and scaled up with beneficiaries forming syndicates for joint ownership and management on an equal share basis.

- 1.13 The state of the environment in fast track schemes is affected by a lack of clear land rights to the new settlers, weak natural resource management institutions if any and conflict between livelihoods, as is the case between gold panning and farming. In several of the resettlement schemes visited, fences have already been pulled down. In trying to solve environmental problems in the schemes, there is need to clarify the roles of and strengthening of the local level institutions. The institutions also operate using their little financial resources if any and hence remain weak in making and implementing decisions. To help in addressing the cited environmental problems, it is recommended that the state;
- 1.13.1 Clarifies the position (policy) on which local level institutions are responsible for the environment between chiefs and village heads, committees of seven, war veterans or others.
 - 1.13.2 Adequately equips (materially and legislatively) the appropriate institutions with the required training in environmental management for onward application in conscientizing new settlers on the importance of conserving the environment.
 - 1.13.3 Designates clear land rights to the new settlers under both A1 and A2 schemes to enable better management of natural resources.
 - 1.13.4 Facilitates an all stakeholders dialogue process to deal with the gold panning and farming conflict including engaging gold panners positively and constructively, broadening understanding of regulations that control mining, particularly the registering of mining claims.
- 1.14 Another major challenge to the programme, which the assessment observed relates to the provision and equipping of social-physical and economic infrastructure that will make the scheme areas both productive and habitable from a social amenities point of view. In this respect it is therefore imperative that the government;
- 1.14.1 Creates a policy and legislative environment supportive of strategic public-private and public-private-voluntary partnerships where business including outgoing commercial farmers, NGOs and international donors find space for working in the new schemes complementing state resources and efforts.
 - 1.14.2 Facilitates the drawing of clear plans and policy positions for the use of and protection of existing infrastructure where it is in place to obviate problems of vandalism, conflicts over access and general obsolescence.

- 1.14.3 RDCs be supported in planning for and providing services to the new schemes and thus be brought in to spearhead the management of the Land Reform Programme and related processes.
- 1.15 Former farm workers have attracted attention in part because of the sheer numbers and because of concerns over their welfare. Generally, the case of farm workers is not properly understood because of non-availability of appropriate information. Some have been absorbed and integrated into the current programme either as beneficiaries in their own right or as employees. However, few farm-workers have either been given land or employed as employment creation by new A2 farmers is still very low and in this respect it is recommended that;
- 1.15.1 A quota be established for this segment of the population as has happened to the war veterans with their 20% land allocation.
- 1.15.2 Support be rendered to selected A2 farmers with the hope that this would generate more employment for this category of an already experienced labor force. This also entails working towards improving the plot take-up rates by the A2 farmers.
- 1.15.3 The government can speed up the payment of compensation to the white commercial farmers so that they (farmers) can pay retrenchment packages allowing farm-workers to move on.
- 1.15.4 Support be extended to provincial and district structures in keeping records on, *inter alia*, details of the affected farm-workers in their respective areas and how farm-workers have been assisted . This will help in the future in terms of monitoring and evaluation of the Land Reform Programme.
- 1.16 The success of the land reform requires both focus and hard work. Some of the policy instruments already exist to make it a success but implementation is relatively weak in part because of political interests and inertia. On the other hand there is a considerable need for both new policy innovations and heightened implementation. Audits of this nature need to feed into reformulation of policies essential in dealing with some of the untidy aspects of the current Land Reform Programme while formalizing/regularizing other aspects e.g. land rights, environmental management etc.

2.0 Introduction

- 2.1 Up until mid 2000, post-independent land redistribution programme which sought to offload land from white commercial farmers to the congested black peasant sector, developed slowly and, even slower in the Inception Phase

Framework Plan (1998-2000) emanating from the 1998 Land Donors Conference. When it appeared that donor funding for land acquisition and beneficiary emplacement was not forthcoming to supplement its own effort, Zimbabwe Government evolved a radical and expedited land reform program premised on the principle of paying for the improvements made on acquired land – as and when finances become available - rather than for land itself, while at the same time resettling people on the acquired land. The government reasoned, and in fact modified legislation, reflecting that Britain as the former colonial power should pay for compensation. Since then, and in spite of legal, political, local and international complaints on the feasibility and acceptability of this form of land acquisition, government went ahead and is still implementing this reform program interchangeably referred to as the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme Phase II or Fast Track Resettlement Programme. In addition to getting a minimum of 5 million hectares of land, the reform program sought to plan, demarcate and emplace new farmers on all acquired land.

- 2.2 The programme is well under way. As the table 1.1 below suggests, by the mid March, 2002 the programme had resettled, on 4,387091 hectares about 114 901 households on a villagized model called A1, the figures supplementing those 14 286 households previously settled on 416 807 hectares. As for the A2 model, 19677 plots were planned, demarcated, subdivided and settlers selected and emplaced.

Table 1.1: Fast Track Resettlement as at March 2002

Province	Formal Settlement			Informal settlement			Totals	
	No. of farms	Area (ha)	No. of settlers	No. of farms	Area (ha)	No. of Settler	Settlers	Area (ha)
Manicaland	178	157 363	9874	9	21934.20	1842	11716	179297.2
Mash-East	298	321552.50	17 549	43	28790.00	2038	19587	350342.5
Mash-Central	264	324726	10649	4	4936.30	203	10852	329662.3
Mash-West	406	565569.68	18741	53	67879.97	1805	20546	633449.65
Midlands	217	463819.55	16708	19	37042.75	1382	18090	500862.3
Masvingo	226	1139108.10	25933	9	129395.8	4377	30310	1268503.9
Mat. South	253	890507.58	8080	16	118913.7	2474	10554	1009421.2
Mat North	186	524443.85	7367	3	7915.0	165	7532	532358.85
Totals	2028	4387091.10	114901	156	416807.8	14286	129187	4803897.8

Source: GoZ 2002

- 2.3 Concern abound on how and whether indeed the government has been able to resettle farmers and provide these with the required infrastructure necessary to kick start or sustain inherited land-use in ways that are environmentally and socially sustainable.
- 2.4 There has been some media and secondary focus on the effect of the programme on farm workers, environment and production just as there has been concern about a perceived lack of focus on the challenges the programme faces. There has been, however, limited independent review of

these multiple dimensions of the Fast Track Resettlement Programme to provide answers to these concerns. It is for this reason that the Parliament of Zimbabwe's Portfolio Committee on Lands, Agriculture, Water Development, Resources and Resettlement, resolved to undertake such a review. It is about assessing/ auditing of the performance of the current resettlement programme against stated policy objectives with regard to beneficiary selection, infrastructure development and land suitability, using case studies of selected sites.

2.5 Objective of the Review

To guide its review process the Committee adopted the following objectives:

1. Gather information on the socio-economic characteristics (area of origin, selection process, asset base etc) of the new farmers and their general preparedness for undertaking farming.
2. Analyze the rate of up-take of allocated plots on selected schemes vis-à-vis the official figures of farmers settled under fast track.
3. Investigate the level of provision of socio-physical and economic infrastructure on selected schemes benchmarked on planning standards.
4. Undertake an assessment of the suitability of settled land to the new farmers' proposed land use patterns.
5. Investigate the status of farm workers who were displaced by the resettlement programme through the acquisition of farms on which they were employed.
6. Examine the state of the environment in selected resettlement schemes, with a particular focus on wildlife and forest resources, and to
7. Draw policy recommendations for improved management of the remaining aspects of the LRRPII to ensure agricultural productivity and enhanced natural resource management.

2.6 Methodology of the Review

- 2.6.1 To gather information and perspectives, the Committee with the help of independent researchers spent an average of two days in each province. High-level meetings and interviews were held with the Provincial and District Land Identification Committees. In addition, these committees were also requested to prepare written descriptive documentations on the progress of the resettlement program in their jurisdiction. These proved useful in providing a general picture about what was taking and not taking place in the respective provinces. The team never thought the detailed and voluminous documents to be infallible and it is for this reason that it insisted on personal visits to identifiable schemes where collective meetings and interviews were held on site with statements also collected from available and accessible single individuals.

2.6.2 The Committee recognizes that due to time constraints and the desire to cover the whole country, its method had some weakness. While it visited all the provinces, the Committee made up of four alternating parliamentarians (i.e. Committee members), an anthropologist, rural and urban specialist, sociologist and an agricultural economist, never made a decision about which place to be visited for ground testing. The respective provincial committees made the decision. While getting guidance from the people who operate in the area made logistical sense to the team, there still remains the hidden but critical possibility that the team could have been disproportionately directed to success stories that do not represent the norm. Secondly, the Committee rarely, if at all, talked to commercial farmers, farm workers and women's groups, to see the degree to which these respective groups' concerns were reflected upon. As in the above, there remains a possibility that these players would have provided important corrective information on the degree to which the programme is open to all groups. Third and finally, the team spent very limited time in the field. Resettlement is a complex process, and fast track is even more so. How institutions work or evolve in schemes, how partners and groups in resettlement relate to each other, these are issues requiring a great deal of time to capture. This 'fast-track' methodology most likely was inadequate to help uncover the complex emerging relationships in the programme. Nevertheless, the Committee is confident that the wide-ranging discussions held provided enough information to provide a broad picture of what is happening on the ground.

3.0 Institutions in Fast Track Resettlement

3.1 Even if these never functioned perfectly, Fast Track Land Resettlement, unlike its predecessor programmes had what may be termed executive and management institutions, all technically supported by the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, Rural Resources and Water Development and coordinated by Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing.

3.2 Executive Institutions for Fast Resettlement Programme

3.2.1 Executive institutions are those which were necessary in the creation of schemes. These institutions, which were intended to formalize and regularize land distribution, were spelt out in government policy and operated from the local to the national level. These institutions were;

- (i) The District Land Identification Committees

Chaired by the DA and drawing its members from district level government leadership, the army, police, ruling party, war veterans as well as traditional leadership. The committee had a number of functions, the most important being the identification of farms for acquisition.

(ii) The Provincial Land Identification Committees

Chaired by the Governor and composed of provincial level government leadership, district administrators, war veterans, police, Central Intelligence Organization and the ruling party. The committee has a technical subcommittee chaired by the Provincial Administrator. It was among other things, a receiving institution, compiling all identified farms for onward transmission to the National level as well as appraising applications especially for the A2 model. This committee (and the former) all report to the National Land Committee.

(iii) The National Land Committee

Chaired by the Vice President, this was the supreme institution whose function included overseeing the gazetting of the farms identified by the lower level committees for acquisition and resettlement.

3.2.2 In some instances, it is very clear that senior politicians do not respect these institutions resulting in some of these politicians appropriating the functions of the Identification Committees by deciding what farm must be settled. A case in point was in Matabeleland South where a prominent politician directed that small pieces of land owned and used by a businessman as a filling station and hotel be acquired for settlement by his spouse. In some cases they also decided who must be settled. The properties had not been identified for resettlement.

3.2.3 These appropriations of and bypass of legitimate institutions by these powerful politicians confuse resettlement. They result in double and competing allocation, cases in which the same piece of land is given to two or more people. They also give rise to the secondary problem of congestion, which resettlement authorities must painfully deal with. Matabeleland South's Insiza district urgently requires a new round of decongestion because certain people gave land without conferring with the legitimate institution.

3.3 Management Institutions in Fast Track Resettlement

3.3.1 Unlike executive institutions, management institutions are those necessary for the regeneration of the set up schemes. Thus at the local level,

management committees made up of seven people were responsible for scheme management. The composition of the committees is as follows: chairperson and the vice, secretary and the vice, treasurer and two committee members. Generally, management committees have been set-up in all of the schemes that were visited. The membership is composed of war veterans, village head, the youth among others. These derive their power from the executive institutions to whose structures they may answer to. Management institutions create upward links with the state and other outsiders and may be important in sensitizing local development needs to those tasked with development. Institutions may also help to regulate daily lives among communities, ensuring order within the resettlement communities

- 3.3.2 The problem therefore is not whether the new resettlement schemes have committees but whether these committees are functioning or not. While in some places the committee is fully constituted and operational, in other parts it is in state of slumber. In Rouxedale and Kenap farm in Bubi District, office bearers are resident elsewhere and are therefore absent to attend to meetings with their communities as required.
- 3.3.3 There seems to be a multiple of institutions that are developing in resettlement schemes. Thus the functions of the management committee of seven, those of the traditional authority (chiefs and *sabhukus*) and the war veterans are not clearly defined. In some cases there has been an evolution and consolidation of traditional leadership especially *sabhuku* who in most cases are young people drawn from the ranks of war veterans. In Igava farm the *sabhuku* is a young war veteran. Where they emerge, they begin to run the scheme single handedly and without checks and balances. War veterans also represent another key institution that operates at the local level. It is generally acknowledged that war veterans spear-headed the Fast Track Resettlement Programme and in some situations they have remained in control of all activities at the scheme level. For example, as reported by the respective District Administrators, this situation was evident in Kadoma, Chegutu, Makonde and Zvimba districts, all in Mashonaland West Province. One headman in Zvimba registered his complaint in relation to how one group of war veterans in his area was defying his authority.
- 3.3.4 While the management committees are activists with strong convictions in favour of land reform, they have little legitimacy and are yet to consolidate themselves among the diverse people making resettled community. Even more importantly they are men upon whose tender shoulders leadership has been unexpectedly and without training thrust on them. In short they are hardly equipped to be an effective link with those tasked to provide development function. In Whendedzo Farm in Masvingo

district, the village head had no idea where to demand another borehole or tillage services.

3.4 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

The coordination between national, provincial, district and local level structures is weak in most instances. The Governor of the Midlands lamented how Head Office of the Lands Ministry reverses the decisions that would have been made at the provincial levels without any consultations with them. For example, it was observed that after negotiating with some white farmers for peaceful co-existence at the farms, Head Office was accused of unilaterally over-riding such decisions. In Matabeleland North, the Governor was also concerned with how Head-Office de-lists farms without even consulting the provincial structures. It is therefore important that Head Office should improve its image in terms of how it makes certain decisions whose effects are only felt at provincial, district and local levels. The lack of coordination was one problem leading to multiple farm allocations. The situation becomes even worse when the matter is dealt with as an inter-provincial issue. As an illustration, many applicants made multiple farm applications to enhance their chances of getting land. However, there is no mechanism that allows co-ordination across provinces so as to avoid multiple farm allocations. Your Committee recommends the following:

- 3.4.1 Head Office needs to review its function in relation to the delisting of farms. At least if it does not want decentralize that function, it must make decisions in consultation with provincial structures.
- 3.4.2 There is also need for improved coordination among the various structures that include the Head Office, Provincial Land Identification Committees, District land Identification Committees and Management Committees.
- 3.4.3 At the local level, it is important that there be a clarification of roles amongst the different institutions that include the traditional authority, the committee of seven and the war veterans. Currently, there is confusion and at times conflicts amongst these institutions. These need to be ironed out by the responsible authorities.
- 3.4.4 The Ministry should design an information flow and management process that brings all the provinces and their districts together to discuss and share experiences in various components of the land reform programme.

4.0 Land Acquisition and Redistribution: An Assessment of Progress

4.1 Land Acquisition

4.1.1 There has been a tremendous progress in gazetting, planning and distribution of land under fast track. For example, in Mashonaland West Province 997 farms measuring 1.2 million hectares have been gazetted and planned. In Matabeleland South, more than 1.2 million hectares has also been gazetted, planned and distributed (see Table 3.1). Inadequate information prevents us from making a full national assessment of progress made. Information made available was from the three Mashonaland Provinces, Manicaland and Matabeleland South. These Provinces prior to Fast Track had 6558 farms covering more than 7.9 million hectares of land. 3693 of these farms covering about 5.4 million hectares, or 68 percent of the area, have since been gazetted and distributed. The remaining 2.5 million hectares includes land left in the white Large Scale Commercial Farmers (LSCF) areas, land belonging to indigenous commercial farmers, state farms and land belonging to church and other NGO organizations.

Table 3.1: Progress in the Land Acquisition Process

	Farms in Province		Farms Gazetted and planned		% Farms Gazetted and planned		Farms Compensated	Farms Confirmed
	No.	Area (ha)	No.	Area (ha)	No	Area		
Mash C	857	800517.3	612	552106.1	71	69	23	N/A
Mash E	1364	1967656	1093	1799184	80	91	N/A	79
Mash W	2349	1954304	997	1215605	42	62	53	N/A
Manicaland	1192	806095	619	559632	52	69	N/A	64
Midlands	1116	1363282	475	N/A	43	N/A	N/A	73
Mat South	796	2390416	372	1258196	47	53	N/A	N/A
Mat N	808	1301836	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Masvingo	787	2492794	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

4.1.2 However, a couple of problems still beset the farm acquisition process. The first is lack of progress in legal transfer of land from white farmers to government. For example Midlands with 475 farms allocated, only 73 have been confirmed in the Administrative Courts. In Manicaland, of the 619 farms allocated to beneficiaries only 64 have been confirmed while in Mashonaland East, of the 1093 farms allocated just 79 have been confirmed. When it comes to compensation, even fewer of the farms have been paid for. In Mashonaland West only 53 of the 997 farms, and in Mashonaland Central only 23 of 612 farms allocated have been compensated by December 2002(see Table 2). Because so many of the farms are still under litigation, a significant number of farms allocated have yet to be vacated by former owners. In Mashonaland Central for instance, about 51 percent of the farms are still to be vacated (PA's

Report, Mashonaland Province). In Mashonaland East 349 have not been vacated. A number of reasons explain this slow vacation including extension of stay by the magistrates court, farms covered by country-to-country agreements, technical oversights in gazetting (e.g. Bondholders not being served or spelling mistake in gazetting). According to the Mashonaland Central Provincial Administrator a critical issue stalling negotiation for vacating properties and confirmation has been caused by lack of clarity on implementation of the Maximum Farm Size regulations. The farmers are expecting to be allocated a portion of their farm satisfying the Maximum farm size regulations.

- 4.1.3 The second problem affecting the acquisition process has been that pertaining to properties that were caught-up in the process of transfer between white farmers and indigenous blacks. There are cases in which farms with a Certificate of No Present Interest (CONPI) are negotiated for sale between whites and blacks which have been gazetted following rescinding of the certificates and before land is transferred to blacks. However, there have been suspicions that some blacks have connived to have a CONPI issued well after government has expressed an interest to acquire the properties (see Box 3.1). This problem can become magnified in the case the properties in question are planned, demarcated and distributed, in which case the plight of the beneficiaries becomes an issue. There seems not to be a clear-cut dispute resolution mechanism without recourse to courts.

4.2 Land Allocations and Distribution

- 4.2.1 In the Mashonaland provinces, Manicaland, Midlands and Matabeleland South, a total of 97134 beneficiaries were settled under the A1 model type with average land holdings ranging from 16 hectares in Manicaland to 34 hectares in Mashonaland Central to 174 hectares in Matabeleland South. Given the need for grazing for a reasonable number of livestock these holdings indicate an over-stretching of the carrying capacity of the land unless the need for carrying livestock is mitigated by high degree of mechanization of farming processes. The allocation intensity tends to indicate that in response to the high demand for land, provinces readjusted planning figures to allocate as many beneficiaries as possible in the A1 programme.

Box 3.1: An Example of Problematic Land Acquisition

In Matabeleland North Province, a very prominent civic leader, Dr Ibbo Mandaza, was accused of trying to prevent the acquisition of more than five farms measuring some 17 000 hectares (Induba Farm, Mucklenuck Farm and Block 19 and 20 of Roberts). The story is that the farms belonged to a white farmer and had been acquired and distributed to 24 plot holders under A2 and 96 plot holders under the A1 self-contained units. The farms were settled in April 2001. It is alleged that sometime in 2002, the well-known civic leader approached the province and revealed that he was the owner of the properties and hence the farms could not be acquired as they belonged to an indigenous person. This has created friction between the civic leader, farm-workers and the newly settled farmers. It is alleged that Dr Mandaza at one time enlisted the services of the Army to evict the settlers. The civic leader had already taken legal action to ensure that the settlers would be evacuated while the new settlers had mobilized resources to defend their case. In the meantime, the farm-workers were also being accused of sabotaging the engine that supplies water to the new settlers while the civic leader's cattle were also destroying the crops of the new settlers. The civic leader also produced the certificate of no present interest for the farms, meaning that the Ministry of Lands and Agriculture had allowed the land to change hands. Generally, the provincial leadership and the new settlers are bitter about the civic leader. When the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement appeared before the Committee he confirmed that Certificates of No Present Interest were issued with regard to the above mentioned farms. He also informed the Committee that the farms in question have not been allocated to anybody, contrary to the situation on the ground. The Committee was keen to interview Dr Mandaza with regard to the above- mentioned dispute but could not do so because the issue was still subjudice.

Table 3.2: Land Allocations in A1 Schemes in Selected Provinces

PROVINCE	FARMS	TOTAL AREA (HA)	BENEFICIARIES	AREA PER BENEFICIARY (HA)
Mash C	344	382320	11325	34
Mash E	358	391239	22377	17
Mash W	573	683760	25561	27
Manicaland	227	181179	11587	16
Midlands	431	N/A	16944	N/A
Mat S	246	1638498	9390	174
Mat N	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Masvingo	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

4.2.2 In the three Mashonaland Provinces, Manicaland and Matabeleland South 19582 A2 beneficiaries have been allocated plots covering about 1.166 million hectares and the exercise is still continuing in most provinces especially for Peri-Urban plots.

Table 3.3: Land Allocation in the A2 Scheme in selected Provinces

Province.	NO of farms.	Area (HA)	Peri-Urban	Small -Scale	Medium-Scale	Large Scale	Total Units
Mash C	295	200319		1066	448	157	1712
Mash E	350	251338	3141	1753	1496	636	7026
Mash W	424	451656	3371	2439	2615	1064	9489
Manicaland	140	75996	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1113
Mat S	64	187188	N/A	145	42	55	242
Mat N	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Mid	142	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	342
Masvingo	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Source: Compiled from Provincial Reports

4.2.3 A number of concerns have been raised on the distribution of land between schemes, by gender and by special interest groups. Government policy has been that as much as possible 20% of land should go to war veterans and that at least 60 percent of land should go to A1 model plots. In general, these policy guidelines have roughly been followed in provinces that provided information. Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland East, Manicaland and Matabeleland South allocated between 60 and 80 percent of land to the A1 scheme (see table 5). Only Mashonaland West among the provinces reviewed allocated more than 40 percent of land to the A2 model. Only two provinces – Mashonaland Central and Matabeleland South - gave a breakdown of beneficiaries by gender and special interest groups of those allocated lands. In both provinces the allocations were heavily skewed towards males with about 87 percent of plots allocated to men (see table 6).

4.2.4 Generally, war veterans managed to get more than what the government promised. In both A1 and A2 in Mashonaland Province, and in the A2 scheme in Matabeleland South, war veterans and war collaborators received 22 to 26 percent of the land allocated. Only in the Matabeleland South Province did they receive less than 20 percent (14%). Farm workers generally fared badly in the land distribution exercise. In Mashonaland Central they managed to get only 2 percent of the land while in Matabeleland South they received 4 percent (Table 3.6).

Table 3.4: Distribution of Land between A1 and A2

	% AREA IN A1	% AREA IN A2
Mashonaland Central	65.62	34.38
Mashonaland East	60.89	39.11
Mashonaland West	56.25	43.75
Manicaland	70.45	29.55
Matabeleland South	81.87	18.13
Matabeleland North	N/A	N/A
Midlands	N/A	N/A
Masvingo	N/A	N/A

Source: Compiled from Provincial Reports

Table 3.5: Gender Distribution of Beneficiaries in Mashonaland Central and Matabeleland South

	MASHONALAND CENTRAL		MATEBELELAND SOUTH	
	A1	A2	A1	A2
Men	86.6	91	86.9	81
Women	13.4	9	13.1	19

Source: Compiled from Provincial Reports

Table 3.6: Distribution of Beneficiaries by Interest Grouping: Mashonaland Central and Matabeleland South

	MASHONALAND CENTRAL		MATEBELELAND SOUTH	
	A1	A2	A1	A2
Ordinary	76	74	82	78
War vets & collaborators	22	26	14	22
Farm worker	2	0	4	0

Source: Compiled from Provincial Reports

4.3 Plot Up-take

4.3.1 In all provinces visited, provincial staff lamented the low plot uptake especially in A2 schemes. In the A1 scheme plot uptake has been estimated to be generally above 90 percent. In the A2 schemes however district administrators' estimates of uptake range from 45 to 70 percent. During the time of the study visits all provincial teams were planning more in-depth assessment of uptake and so were more guarded in their estimates. Evidence from scheme visits generally supported the sentiments expressed by administrators of high up-take in A1 and poor uptake in the A2 schemes. Two A1 schemes visited in Mashonaland Central – Wise Acre in Bindura and Slimish near Glendale- both showed 100% uptake. The situation was poor in the A2 schemes visited. The worst was at the Audura scheme near Glendale in which of all the four plots curved out of Audura Extension none of the beneficiaries had taken up. Interestingly, one A1 scheme beneficiary settled in the neighboring farm had planted an excellent soybean crop on 20 hectares of one of the idle plots. In Guruve, the Mabobo A2 scheme had 13 of 28 plot holders doing something on their land. Making matters worse, of the six plots with irrigation infrastructure, only three had taken up their plots by the time of the review.

4.3.2 The A1 scheme visited in Marondera presented a different type of problem. Made up mainly of former land occupiers from Chief Svosve area and land occupiers from Marondera town, Igava scheme has 89 registered settlers. 62 settlers are currently resident on the farm and the rest either did not come, had come but had not farmed this season. Of

those who have not shown up, the majority are war veterans. Asked what could be the reason, Mr. Marangano the scheme chairman explained that in allocations it was the general practice that 20 percent of beneficiaries should be war veterans and that the war veterans association proposed names for each scheme. The Scheme Chairman speculated that it could have happened that proposed war veterans may have made their own successful independent applications in the A2 schemes. Poor communication between the institutions administering the two schemes might have slowed the rationalization of allocations. During the visit at Monte Cristo A2 scheme in Marondera, the AREX officer estimated that 36 of 54 plot holders had taken up their land. However, interview with Mr. Angirai Mavunga, a worker on one of the plots revealed only 18 plots had so far been taken up.

4.3.3 According to Governor Msipa (Midlands Province) five constraints may have led to poor uptake of allocated plots including:

- (i) Lack of resources by farmers: “...What we are seeing on the ground is that those with the best cash flows (in applications) were the ones with little resources to do farming.” (Mr. Zhou, Chief Lands Officer for Midlands). Most AREX officers interviewed felt a significant number of A2 beneficiaries have no idea where to start in farming. This has been exacerbated by unclear tenure conditions preventing access to financial resources.
- (ii) Lack of water on resettled plots especially in Midlands in the current season. Thus to enable settlement of staff and the farmers there is need to invest in water sources which is expensive and availability of drilling rigs has been poor.
- (iii) Poor infrastructure. Recounting an appeal by a woman beneficiary to be allocated somewhere else, the Governor recalled a woman who complained for being settled in the forest (“*mandiisa musango*”). Most beneficiaries live in cities and applied for plots closer to their rural homes, which are usually a long distance from their places of work and normal residences. This season this was worsened by the shortage of fuel.
- (iv) Prevailing drought conditions; and
- (v) Poor land-use match between beneficiary and plot allocated when beneficiaries are given land not suited to the kind of enterprises they prefer and have comparative advantage in producing. An example of this can be found at Mabobo Farm in Guruve where soils are suited to tobacco farming and there is sophisticated infrastructure to support it. However, most beneficiaries professed no knowledge of tobacco growing or the preference for tobacco production.

4.3.4 Yet another source of uncertainty for A2 beneficiaries is the issue of legal problems besetting the acquisition process. “Land allocation is going on

in the face of farms in different levels of litigation. Some new farmers are hesitant to invest heavily under these uncertainties” Acting Chief Lands Officer, Mashonaland Central. To date very few of the demarcated and allocated farms had been fully confirmed in the Administrative Courts nor the former owners been compensated (see Table 3.1).

4.4 Land Acquisition and Allocations: Conclusions and Recommendations

4.4.1 Land Acquisition:

The review recorded unprecedented level of gazetting, planning and demarcation of land throughout the country. However, little progress in legal confirmation of acquisition were accomplished by the provinces due to contestation by farmers as well as problems with farms which were in the transition of being bought by black farmers. A number of recommendations can be made to speed up the process including:

- i) Government should not prevent blacks who have resources to acquire farms on their own, as that would free up resources for the acquisition of land for those with few resources. However Government should come up with a clear-cut policy with regard to holding companies.
- ii) Government should legislate the one-household-one-farm policy and apply it across the board. This should avoid the situation where a few blacks with resources concentrating ownership of land.
- iii) Central government should give more autonomy to provincial leadership to negotiate with farmers for land to avoid situations where an agreement with provincial leadership with a white farmer are over ridden by government leading to farmers maintaining contestations of farms.
- iv) Given the slow uptake of A2 plots there is ample lands that can be offered to white farmers as part of the negotiations/settlement for land acquired. Government should use the Maximum Farm Size Regulations to leave portions of land for white farmers in order to speed up confirmations and avoid the costly and time-consuming litigation processes.

4.4.2 Land Allocation and Distribution

The review showed that allocation of land between A1 and A2, and between war veterans and ordinary people have been largely according to

government policy. However, there were very low allocations to farm workers and to women in both scheme types. It is therefore recommended that:

- i) In the remaining allocations women and farm workers be given greater priority;
- ii) Final registration of land rights should force core ownership for those beneficiaries who are married; and
- iii) There should be better communication between District and Provincial Land Committees to avoid multiple allocations.

4.4.3 Uptake

The review found low plot uptake levels especially in A2 schemes. It is felt that a number of issues including lack of clarity in land rights, lack of resources and poor match between farmers and land resources given may be at the heart of the problem. It is therefore recommended that:

- i) Speedily conclude the legal acquisition of land;
- ii) The government with speed clarifies the tenure arrangements on both A1 and A2 schemes;
- iii) Gives the flexibility of replanning schemes to match beneficiary capabilities and preferences; and
- iv) Gives an allowance for beneficiaries in different schemes to negotiate plot swaps so that beneficiaries can move to schemes they feel are closely matched to their ability and their physical and human resource endowments.

5.0 Agricultural Production

5.1 Tillage

- 5.1.1 Land preparation was confronted by a number of constraints. As a general observation, more land was cultivated in cases where the settlers were on land that was previously cultivated by the white farmer and was already cleared. Minimal progress in land preparation was however prevalent in situations where new farmers had plots in virgin and uncleared land. Worse still, the new settlers were not able to de-stump their fields to the level required if one were to seek the services of a tractor. Most beneficiaries of the A1 scheme do not have animal draught power and as Table 4.1 shows, the area allocated in some districts is too small to support livestock production. As the DA for Guruve observed, “... tillage shortage is particularly acute in A1 models since most beneficiaries were used to sharing draught power in the Communal areas”. Another problem is the ability to work heavy clay soils using draught animals. One

beneficiary Wilfred Kakurira (Wise Acre A1 scheme, Bindura) is in favour of tractor services scheme over draught power. His argument is that even though he is fortunate enough to have cattle for draught, the heavy soils they are currently farming are difficult to work using ox-drawn ploughs.

5.1.2 In all the provinces of Mashonaland West, Midlands, Matabeleland North and South, the provision of DDF tillage was hindered by the high breakdown of farming equipment that included tractors, ploughs, disc harrows and planters. In Mashonaland West, for example, the percentage of those who received tillage ranged between 2.6% to 7.0% in each of the districts. Except in Matabeleland South and Manicaland, the number of beneficiaries has been very low and in all provinces reviewed the area ploughed by DDF has been less than 11 percent (see table 4.2). The province with most tractors operational was Mashonaland Province where 72.3% of the tractors were working. In all other areas few tractors were in working order. For example, only 6 of the 16 tractors (37.5%) in Bubi district were operational while 10 of the 21 tractors in Umguza district were working. Breakdown of tractors and unavailability of diesel were cited as the main factors that led to a varied low delivery of tillage services. This situation seems to be repeated in most provinces as table 4.1 indicates. In Manicaland only 39% of DDF tractors were operational compared to 44 % in Mashonaland East and 48% in Mashonaland Central. In some cases, white farmers assisted in providing tillage services to the new farmers. However, DDF contract tillage operations in which private tractor owners provide tillage services and received their payments through the DDF and ARDA, have largely failed due to poor fuel supplies and perceived low tillage fees offered.

5.1.3 Even though government policy was to assist only A1 scheme beneficiaries and Communal farmers with tillage services, in almost all the A1 schemes visited, A2 farms were accused of monopolizing access to DDF tillage services. Thus, there was intense competition for tillage and other inputs amongst and between A1 and A2 farmers. For example, at one scheme in Mashonaland West province, it was retorted, “we just see tractors running around, but we do not know what they are doing”.

Table 4.1: DDF Tractor Availability in Selected Provinces

Province	Number of Tractors	% Operational
Manicaland	89	39
Mashonaland W	65	72
Mashonaland E	81	44
Mashonaland C		48

Source: compiled from Provincial Land Reports

Table 4.2: DDF Fast Track Performance in the 2002-03 Season

Province	Number of Beneficiaries	Hectares Ploughed	Beneficiaries as % of Settlers	Area Ploughed as % of Arable Resettlement
Mat South	4342	4362.7	45	8
Manicaland	4486	9079.6	35	11
Mashonaland W	1574	7723.9	5	3
Mashonaland E	1752	7514.1	6	3
Mashonaland C	908	3077.1		
Midlands		8000		

Assume arable areas in A1 and A2 are 5 and 20 ha, respectively.

Source: Compiled from Provincial land Identification Reports

5.2 Irrigation

5.2.1 In an effort to boost agricultural production, the government initiated the irrigation fund. Thus in some schemes, new settlers were settled on farms with irrigation schemes. The approach that has been adopted in assisting the new farmers to start irrigation seemed to differ from province to province. For example, at Chifundi farm in Makonde district, about 44 farmers were involved in irrigation as a cooperative activity while other schemes like the Devilwood Resettlement in the Midlands, farmers were allocated individual irrigation plots (see Boxes 4.1 and 4.2).

Box 4.1: The Case of Chifundi Farm Irrigation

Chifundi farm is located 40kilometres from Chinhoyi along the Lions Den – Mhangura Road. It lies in Natural region II and measures 824 hectares. The farm owner used to own two other farms namely Gordonia and Emily Park farms. The farmer was offered to retain one farm but refused the offer opting to be compensated and left for Australia. The farmer sold all the equipment including irrigation equipment, which was purchased by the Government through ARDA. The farmer was paid a total of \$48 million for the irrigation equipment on the three farms, including a center pivot, which now irrigates 80 hectares at Emily Park Farm.

The Farm was turned into an A1 scheme. The farm was demarcated in September 2001 and arable land was divided into six-hectare plots. Initially, there were 41 settlers with an average 20-29 hectares per settler. At a later stage three more new farmers came in and this left settlers with 18 hectares each, including the 6 hectares arable land.

Generally, the new farmers had limited knowledge and experience in farming. The composition of the settlers include formally employed farmers whose plots are manned by their wives or workers who are responsible for the day to day running of their plots. Six former farmer workers were also allocated land, including the former farm manager, electrician, and drivers, pump minder and guards.

The scheme settled for a cooperative irrigation system because of the centralization of the irrigation equipment, which made it impossible to irrigate individually. An irrigation committee has been put in place, to run the irrigation. Four other sub committees that include wheat production, maize production, soya production and security sub-committee support it. Water is mainly supplied from boreholes. The settlers involved in irrigation have 3-hectare plots on the dry land.

When the farmers first settled, they immediately went into wheat production as directed by the government. Land was prepared as a group and they also hired tractors for tillage services at \$10 000.00 per hectare. The group harvested about 400 tones of wheat (which was lower because of the delayed harvests). All the produce was sold to GMB and deductions were made for all the associated costs like tillage and electricity bills.

During hot periods, the electricity bills went as high as \$570 000 per month. After total costs were deducted, the group remained with some \$13.5 million and on average each farmer got around \$400 000.00 each. A fund has also been created to take care of repairs and maintenance of the scheme and a balance of \$1.5 million was left in the account. The scheme is generally facing problems relating to vandalization of irrigation equipment and thefts.

Source: Field Survey 2003

Box 4.2: The Case of Devilwood Resettlement, Kwekwe District

Delvillewood was acquired and allocated to 42 families in June 2001 on an area of 1418.8 hectares. The white farmer was left with 450 hectares of which 310 hectares is under irrigation. The new farmers have 82 hectares under irrigation. Each plot measures around 30 hectares and the uptake rate is 96%. It is the hilly areas, which require a high capital injection to enable farming to start that, have not been taken up. Another farm, Lindale is part of Dellvillhood was also acquired in 2002 and the 1430 hectare plots have been allocated out of the total 22 plots. Lindale has 40 hectares under irrigation whose irrigation system extends to Delvillehood.

Before being officially resettled in 2001, a group of seven people embarked on winter crop production (barley on a trial basis). The war veterans chairman and the Commercial Farmers District Representative made the arrangement. The white farmer assisted in preparing 6 hectares of land while the other 20 hectares could not be prepared and hence the white farmer was allowed to use it. The group produced 42 tones of barley and the 7 members got a profit of \$67 000.00. All the tillage and inputs were provided by the white farmer on a cost recovery basis on harvesting and was collected through the National Breweries.

For the summer crop, all irrigable land was put under maize. However, they failed to irrigate the crop as they had no pipes and other irrigation equipment. An agreement was later worked with the white farmer but this was already late to serve the crop. The major problem is therefore the shortage of irrigation equipment while drinking water also remains a problem.

Source; Field Survey, 2003.

- 5.2.2 From the two examples, it is evident that success for agricultural production for the 2002/2003 season relied mainly on the availability of irrigation services. In the case of Chifundi in Makonde, the return for farmers seems quite impressive. However, it is important to be cautious about the sustainability of the scheme if it continues to operate as a cooperative. The high returns could be attributed to the fact that the irrigation equipment inherited was still in good condition. At another scheme at Rishmore Farm, 15 farmers had been allocated 55-hectare plots in self-contained units. Although the farmer is still there, he has removed his irrigation equipment for security reasons, as he no longer has any land to cultivate. The farm also had a centralized center pivot irrigation system and hence some tasks are performed as a group. However, some members made open remarks about their dislike for working as a cooperative. In this context, sustainability of cooperative farming can be viewed as unsustainable in the medium to long-term.

5.3 Input Distribution

- 5.3.1 The programme of inputs supply was also riddled with problems. Table 4.3 samples views of respondents to the study. Inputs supply was

described as erratic and inappropriate in several of the visited schemes. For example, seed distribution did not take into account the ecological disparities of the provinces and hence in some cases seed varieties were distributed to areas where they were not suitable. At the same time, the distribution of fertilizers did not correspond with the progression of the season. Thus, when the study team visited the schemes in February, farmers complained that they were receiving compound D fertilizers at a time when they needed AN fertilizer. At least from the discussions held with Provincial Administrative Structures, it was not clear whether farming inputs were being distributed on a cost-recovery basis.

Table 4.3: Views on Input Distribution.

Province	Remarks
Mashonaland Central	<p>“As we progress more and more into the agricultural season our farmers are having serious problems with sourcing inputs for the summer cropping. It is essential to note that this month both seed and fertilizer were very scarce at GMB. The issue of inputs has become a problem because of the fact that in our province most of the farms that were formerly growing seed for maize and soybean were gazetted and planned for settlement purposes and very few if any new farmers have ventured into that kind of business.”(PA Mashonaland Central)</p> <p>“We have a problem of shortages of seeds and fertilizers. When available in shops it is being sold at very high prices”, DA Guruve.</p> <p>“There are no inputs on the shop shelves because the government has taken all the fertilizers to distribute through the GMB”, (DA from Mazowe responding to the suggestion that A2 farmers should not depend on GMB for inputs but should buy direct from agri-dealers)</p>
Manicaland	<p>“...GMB, ARDA and private agro inputs outlets were found wanting with regards to supplying adequate quantities of the inputs at the right time to farmers. As a result cropping was further affected by this shortage of inputs across all farming sectors”.</p> <p>“Inputs being distributed through GMB and ARDA are mainly for the production of maize. Growing of small grains was therefore affected.” PA’s Report, Manicaland.</p>
Mashonaland West	<p>“The availability of fertilizers continues to be cause for concern as supplies have generally been erratic.... The reports so far received indicate that inputs are being distributed but there is a general shortage of supplies to the GMB depots and general retail shops of seeds of all crops and fertilizers.” Governor’s Report, Mashonaland West Province.</p>

5.4 Crop Prices

5.4.1 Another problem facing farmers are the uneconomically low crop prices especially for maize and wheat. Farmers and some DAs interviewed felt basing prices of crops on controlled prices of seed and fertilizers is unrealistic since most of the inputs used by farmers is not available in open markets except through black market at prices more than double official prices. They speculate that GMB is not receiving most of the winter wheat due to these non-viable prices.

5.5 Land Tenure

- 5.5.1 The issue of uncertain land rights especially in A2 schemes also comes up in discussions with Provincial officials particularly with regards to access to finance and incentives to invest on farms. “There is need to look at secure tenure to enable A2 farmers to get credit”, according to Mr. Zhou, Chief Lands Officer, Midlands. These sentiments were echoed by the Governor of Midlands Province, who felt that “...financial support is the key. Farming is a very expensive business. Financial institutions do not consider the offer letter given to A2 farmers as indicating a secure right to land. There is a need to look at tenure.... Banks are not with us on this issue. We need to provide finance through e.g. ADAF and ARDA”.

5.6 Extension

- 5.6.1 Lack of farming skills has been identified as a major impediment to realization of the goals of the land resettlement programme. Progress is being made to address this issue. In Mashonaland Central, based on a rough planning figure of 4 officers per ward and given that the province has 167 wards, has a gross need of 668 officers for the province. At the moment the province has 140 officers in post leaving a deficit of 428. To fill this deficit the province has to date interviewed 129 people, 100 of whom were found appointable. So far they have managed to recruit all 100, 40 of whom are already in post with the remainder still serving their notices with the Ministry of Education, their previous employer. Midlands province on the other hand has managed to recruit 100 officers of which 47 have been allocated to the Fast-Track Resettlement Areas.
- 5.6.2 However, a number of problems beset expansion of extension services to cover the new resettlement areas. These include:
- i) Lack of transport: Mashonaland Central only managed to get 58 new motorbikes. This coupled with the shortage of fuel has made covering the scattered resettlement areas very difficult.
 - ii) Another problem is the obsolete field communication devices.
 - iii) Accommodation in the new areas.

5.7 Ranching

- 5.7.1 In Matabeleland North province, it was observed that crop based production was of little value. As such, livestock and game ranching were identified as the main appropriate land-use. As such, the call was for more support for the development of these land uses. For example, it was mentioned that some farmers were venturing into wildlife related land-uses. However, the new farmers were finding it tough, as wildlife is an expensive form of land-use. Worse still, incoming black farmers have no experience in the new form of land-use and have no contacts with tourists markets in the developed world. Also, it was the general feeling in the

province that more support on livestock development should have been channeled to these dry areas as crop based production is largely inappropriate.

- 5.7.2 The current resettlement models were largely seen as unsuitable for the dry regions of Matabeleland North and South, parts of Masvingo and the Midlands. Even the regulation of maximum size was seen as inappropriate as the stipulated 1500 hectares was considered insufficient for large-scale commercial ranching (see Boxes below).

Box 4.3: A2: Settlement at Ocardale Farm, Bubi District

Ocardale Farm has been divided into three farms measuring 1500 hectares, 1600 hectares, and 1200 hectares. Two new settlers were settled on the farm whilst the white farmer remained with another portion. The farm is being used exclusively for cattle ranching. One of the new settlers revealed that he had over 155 cattle on the farm. This new farmer is a businessman who is based at Figtree and runs a butchery and a supermarket. Water is accessed from the white farmer's premises and he pays for the water used. He settled on the land in October 2002 and employs a few of the former farm-workers, most of which remained with the white farmer. He does cattle spray for the control of ticks. The major problem noted was the limitation presented by the carrying capacity of the land given the dry nature of the area.

Source: Field Survey 2003

Source: Field Survey, 2002

Box 4.4; A2 Settlement at remainder of Burnt Kraal.

The farm measures 1964 hectares and has been allocated to the Gwanda Rural District Council Chairman. The farm was originally settled under the A1 settlement in 2001 and had three farmers. It was later re-planned as a model A2 farm. The new farmer has 146 cattle and has three paddocks. He employs two workers and water is pumped from Umzingwane by ZINWA onto the farm. The former owner used to own 11 farms and is contesting the acquisition of all his farms. He does cattle spraying for the control of ticks. Poaching and gold panning were identified as serious problems.

Source; Field Survey 2003

5.8 Agricultural Production: Conclusions and Recommendations

5.8.1 Tillage:

The review shows that there is very high demand for tillage services in the resettlement areas, particularly in the A1 scheme. The DDF tillage service is very inadequate and unreliable. It is recommended therefore that:

- i) Government provide more funding to resuscitate non-operational DDF tractors;

- ii) Strictly enforce policy of DDF only supporting A1 and Communal area farmers;
- iii) In schemes with enough provision of grazing land, the government should set up a fund to support draught animal acquisition; and
- iv) Government should facilitate setting up of private indigenous tillage hire services stationed within schemes through financial assistance as well as training services.

5.8.2 Irrigation:

The review found that the irrigation fund was too centralized and biased against A1. There was also widespread ignorance of ZINWA regulations as well as vandalism of irrigation equipment especially in areas waiting settlement. Also group irrigation schemes have had problems in managing and sharing costs of irrigation water and costs. It is therefore recommended that:

- i) Part of the irrigation fund be specifically earmarked for support of A1 schemes with the funds being managed at provincial and district level;
- ii) Each land user group should be allocated a fixed limit of water for irrigation through ZINWA to ensure fair distribution of water and that such allocations and obligations be part of the agreement between land reform beneficiary and the government;
- iii) Training and setting up of irrigation management structures should be speeded up in A1 irrigation schemes to ensure fairness and sustainability of the schemes; and
- iv) Local authorities must ensure security of irrigation equipment in farms awaiting resettlement.

5.8.3 Input Distribution:

The review found that input distribution, despite the drought, was very limiting to realization of good harvest and that the GMB is failing to deliver the correct inputs, in adequate amounts at the right time. Administering the scheme is also diverting the GMB from its core business of crop marketing and relief food distribution. In addition, the government input scheme has starved the established input dealership network of inputs and that significant amounts of the inputs are leaking to the parallel market and sold at excessive prices. It is recommended, therefore, that:

- i) The monopoly enjoyed by GMB in the distribution of inputs should be phased out with time, while in the interim, allowing the existing Agri-dealership network to complement GMB.
- ii) In the long run inputs should be channeled through existing input dealership networks and that government helps needy farmers through a targeted input voucher scheme to avoid non-farmers diverting inputs to the black market. This would enable government to withdraw from subsidizing inputs without leaving a vacuum in the input distribution system when farmers become self-sufficient.

5.8.4 Output Marketing:

The review found that prices being offered farmers are not viable considering they have to source the bulk of their inputs on the black market. By trying to keep consumer food prices low through keeping producer prices low, the government is pushing farmers to grow non-food crops and endangering national food security. We commend the government for moving away from such a policy in the recently announced producer prices, which give production incentives, and explicitly subsidizes consumers by offering a lower price to millers. However, the GMB debt is a cause for concern to the Committee and, therefore, the Committee recommends that adequate steps should be taken to address this problem as a matter of urgency.

5.8.5 Extension Services:

The review found that extension needs have exponentially grown due to the fast track resettlement program but few candidates as well as lack of resources to hire staff have affected recruitment of new staff. The needed expansion in staff will also need transport, accommodation and communication hardware. In addition, current the extension style is also poorly matched to the class of new farmers coming into the A2 scheme. It is therefore recommended that:

- i) The government institute an aggressive extension worker training program to increase supply of appointable extension staff;
- ii) Significantly increase the budgetary allocation to extension to cover staff and operational expense needs;
- iii) High priority be placed by local authorities on accommodation of extension staff in existing farm infrastructure; and
- iv) Institution of crash farm production training programs especially for A2 farmers through sale of crop and livestock production manuals; workshops and seminars for A2 farmers and facilitating

linkages with financial managers, input dealers as well as marketers.

5.8.6 Ranching:

The review encountered a lot of dissatisfaction with the sizes of farms earmarked for livestock and game ranching. Recognizing that there is a critical land mass for a viable livestock or game ranching operation in the drier parts of the country, and that the need to benefit as many indigenous blacks as possible it is recommended that resettlement farms falling in this category be replanned and scaled up with beneficiaries forming syndicates for joint ownership and management on an equal share basis.

6.0 Fast Track & Natural Resources Management.

The Fast Track Land Reform Programme has resulted in huge tracts of land having been redistributed and are being brought under new and different production and natural resource exploitation regimes/systems by new users and managers. The new farmers are interacting with new ecological systems, managing and modeling them to suit their livelihood systems. In some of the areas virgin land is being brought into production for the first time and therefore ecosystems in such areas are interacting intensively with human activity and traffic for the first time. Land and land-based resources like water bodies, public streams, wetlands, forests and forestry products, minerals and wildlife resources, among others, are being affected in some areas negatively. Mindful of the dynamics and implications of the interaction and conversion as well as concerned about reports of environmental degradation attributed to the new farmers the audit team sought to investigate the extent and nature of degradation as well as conservation measures being put in place by the new farmers. This section of the report captures some of the key observations and issues with regard to natural resource management practices, their effectiveness and sustainability. Critical challenges are discussed with reference to some case studies.

6.1 Fast Track Resettlement and Forest Resources

There is an evident loss of forest cover in most new resettlement schemes as the new farmers clear their land for crop production, build houses and for domestic energy needs as well as for the processing of their products especially in tobacco growing areas (particularly in Manicaland and the Mashonaland Provinces). Some of the fuel wood is being sold mainly to the urban market by the new farmers as well as by urban-based wood merchants. Loss of forest cover (especially trees) is a feature of any new resettlement schemes and will continue for the foreseeable future because the principal reasons (land preparation and selling) are likely to remain relevant because of high incidents of poverty. The critical concern however relates to fuel wood extraction for the urban market especially in

areas in close proximity to urban areas. Some conflict is bound to arise as it is not the new farmer benefiting from the resource but only gets blame for the disappearance of the resource. Institutional arrangements for the management of the resource are still unclear. Conservation of tree and other forest resources is therefore a critical challenge that needs addressing.

6.2 Fast Track Resettlement and Wildlife Resources

A second area that is also generating concern amongst land reform planners, policy-makers and other stakeholders relates to the safety of wildlife resources occurring on land that has been redistributed or occupied. While there is a general understanding about the importance of conserving this natural resource for future generations and for CAMFIRE-related exploitation in districts where the programme exists e.g. Bubi and Umguza (Mat North) and Chiredzi (Masvingo) among other districts, the practice on the ground is quite different. Poaching is reportedly on the increase given lack of food and the generally high levels of poverty amongst the new farmers or in some cases employees of urban-based land reform beneficiaries. The methods of hunting/poaching have mainly featured the indiscriminate snare, which in some cases entrap livestock (for both new and old farmers) causing conflicts. Because the method is illegal and the snares are widely set-up frequent checks by the hunters are fewer. Cases of animals that die and rot before being discovered as well as young animals that get snared are rife in some areas, which is a cause for concern. Some new farmers also encroach into wildlife enclosures and other protected areas notably in Masvingo (Chiredzi) and Matabeleland North. Fences are cut and this has often resulted in livestock mixing with wild animals like the buffalo. The recent widespread of foot-and-mouth scourge still ravaging Zimbabwe's southeastern, southern, western and central 'cattle-country' with negative consequences for the beef industry has been attributed to this phenomenon (encroachment). Conflict between wildlife and humans is also on the increase especially with regard to crop damage. At Wiseacre in Mashonaland Central farmers reported that warthogs are a real menace to the near-maturity maize crop while others also made reference to predators like hyenas that threaten their livestock. As fences are destroyed no wildlife enclaves will remain in some areas and coupled with the institutional vacuum regarding natural resource management, the animal counts and diversity is under threat.

6.3 Fast Track Resettlement and Water Resources

Additional environmental concerns relate to the management of existing water bodies and public streams or watercourses and the water-based natural resources like fish in resettled areas. Heavy and indiscriminate cutting of trees, alluvial and open cast gold panning are threatening water and water-based resources. Land clearance is not being guided by any

technical or extension support to protect sensitive and fragile ecosystems since there is a general absence of extension staff and the district and communal area staff are poorly equipped to service their areas let alone the new farming areas. Wetland conservation or sustainable exploitation as an example is therefore left to the new farmers' experimentation. This is not to diminish the knowledge base of the new farmers but to highlight the need for a facilitated and proper management process to ensure the security of the resources. In some cases the number of settlers in schemes has grown beyond the carrying capacities as advised by the technical planners due to either unchecked influxes of people or 'official-bungling' in terms of allocations. A case in point is Hamilton and Mayfair farms in Insiza district (Mat South). Settlement on these properties is threatening Mayfair dam a major source of water for the city of Bulawayo. A2 and A1 (self-contained) were planned on farms on the right shoreline and the upper reaches of the dam. While the dam itself is in a National Parks and Wildlife area (protected area) the land on which farmers have been placed is outside the protected area. At Hamilton farm with 28 planned plots of 90-100 hectares, 56 households have been settled while at Mayfair, 25 plots averaging the same size, a total of 40 farmers have been settled. For the latter the recommended carrying capacity was 8 beneficiaries in A1 self-contained plots but this has since surpassed. Given that a good number of the settlers are poor ex-farm workers removed from other properties, the predominant livelihood will be crop rather than livestock based implying considerable land clearance and given the fragile nature of the environment this will expose the dam to siltation. The Mayfair case illustrates the clear and practical risks that other water bodies and public streams in the country face. Urgent mitigation is therefore a compelling imperative if water and water-based resources are to be secured for the use of both the new farmers and other users.

6.4 Fast Track Resettlement and Gold Panning

- 6.4.1 In areas with mineral resources especially where shallow gold reserves and alluvial deposits are in abundance some farmers have joined traditional gold panners in the trade. This is rife in Mazowe, Shamva, Bindura (Mash Central), Bubi, Umguza (Mat North), Zvishavane, Mberengwa, Gweru, Kwekwe (Midlands) and Makonde, Kadoma, Chegutu (Mash West), among other areas. It is important to note that not all panners are the beneficiaries of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. Existing panners were joined by a host of others who took advantage of the relative confusion that accompanied land occupations. As such there are two main types of panners in the new farming areas. The first is the *traditional panners* operating in the area long before fast track and then there is the *new farmer turned panner*. Subgroups exist but this is not the subject of this discussion but suffice to mention that the *new farmer turned panner* scenario is a function of both opportunity and poverty. It is an opportunity in the sense that gold panning presents a

broadened livelihood base hitherto inaccessible and poverty especially given the drought and unemployment. Alluvial and open cast gold panning are therefore not necessarily the making of fast track but the new dimension relates to coverage and broadened participation arising from access to land. The confusion and weak policing has provided cover for other private sector operators to negate their environmental protection obligations as the case of a mine in Bubi district illustrates. Dump and refuse from Movern Gold Mine is being dumped into a nearby public stream threatening to completely block it and this will be a ready source of silt in the rain season. The private company alongside his informal panning counterparts is jointly destroying the ecosystem of the river through dumping and digging on the banks and bed. Apart from deforestation, gold panning is also threatening water bodies and other related resources.

- 6.4.2 It is therefore important to observe that the new farmers are aware of the need to conserve/manage and sustainably utilize the natural resources occurring on the land they have been allocated. However the harsh economic environment, high levels of poverty and unemployment are forcing them to conveniently ignore some of the central principles of natural resource management. This is also made worse by the absence of institutional arrangements designed to oversee natural resource management either through community-based approaches or through the insertion of technical expertise to assist the new communities in the sustainable pursuance of their livelihoods. The committees of seven, for instance, are generally preoccupied with land redistribution not management and also appreciate their ephemeral nature. Therefore in the absence of recognized natural resource management institutions, proper resource inventories and as the communities bond given the diverse backgrounds of the new farmers (beneficiary socio-economic diversity) natural resource transgressions like tree cutting, animal snaring, inter-alia, are likely to be ignored as people 'look the other side' for fear of offending their neighbors. In some schemes the new farmers are unsure about the security of their landholdings (tenure) and as such they are under no obligation to conserve the resources in these areas. This is a case where land tenure insecurity directly results in environmental or resource tenure insecurity. It is therefore critical that participatory extension, consultation and a review of as well as capacity building (including formal establishment) for natural resource management institutions accompanies the Land Reform Programme if the decline in the country's natural resource base is to be halted. In some areas closer to wildlife enclosures (private or public) an '*Operation Noah*' would be a realistic approach to avert total extermination of wildlife resources.

6.5 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

The state of the environment in fast track schemes is affected by a lack of clear land rights to the new settlers, conflict between livelihoods, as is the case between gold panning and farming and weak natural resource management institutions if any. In several of the resettlement schemes visited, fences have already been pulled down. In trying to solve environmental problems in the schemes, there is need to clarify the roles of and strengthening of the local level institutions. The institutions also operate using their little financial resources if any and hence remain weak in making and implementing decisions. To help in addressing the cited environmental problems, the Committee is making the following recommendations to government that there is a need to:

- 6.5.1 Clarify the position (policy) on which local level institutions are responsible for the environment between chiefs and village heads, committees of seven, war veterans or other.
- 6.5.2 Adequately equip (materially and legislatively) the appropriate institutions with the required training in environmental management for onward application in conscientizing new settlers on the importance of conserving the environment.
- 6.5.3 Designate clear land rights to the new settlers under both A1 and A2 schemes to enable better management of natural resources.
- 6.5.4 Facilitate an all stakeholders dialogue process to deal with the gold panning and farming conflict including engaging gold panners positively and constructively, broadening understanding of regulations that control mining, particularly the registering of mining claims.

7.0 Provision of social and economic services.

7.1 A major challenge was the provision of social services to the new settlers, particularly the A1 farmers. This includes the provision of schools, clinics and shopping facilities. A general trend that was observed was the use of homesteads for housing such social services. For example, in the case of Umguza, the 22 homesteads on the acquired farms were used or were to be used as follows:

- i) Five homesteads were used for schools
- ii) Five homesteads were to be used as clinics
- iii) Three homesteads were to be used for housing AREX extension workers
- iv) Three homesteads were to be used as Guest Houses
- v) Two homesteads were to be used as sub-Police Stations
- vi) One homestead was to be used as a training center

- vii) One homestead was to be used as a Government Office
- viii) One homestead was to be used as a Government Residence
- ix) One homestead was to be used as a rest camp

- 7.2 Generally, equipping the new structures so that they can operate properly is a major constraint. As such, the approach is to establish schools with composite classes while in the case of clinics, the trend is to establish mobile clinics whereas in some cases there is virtually no service at all. As an illustration, Copthal Block A resettlement scheme in Gwanda district was established in January 2002 with only two teachers. Currently, there are four teachers at the school and there are four classrooms. The school has grades one to seven, which are under composite classes. It has 128 pupils of which twenty-eight are females. Gwanda Rural District Council supplied school furniture but the buildings still do not have windowpanes. In Kadoma district about twelve new schools were established while a mobile clinic was being used to service some of the areas.
- 7.3 In some of the most poorly serviced schemes visited by the study team at Goodhope farm in Bubi district, the public transport system is more than 20kilometres away. Established in 2002 with twenty-two farmers, (ten of whom were former farm-workers from the neighboring farms), the shops and clinic that service the area are more than 17 kilometers away. As a result of the poor provision of social services in the fast-track schemes, most households have maintained dual homes as a strategy of ensuring that their children have access to such social services.
- 7.4 Mvuma district had applied for twenty-five new schools but only eleven schools were operating. Kwekwe District was allocated seven primary schools and one secondary school while Mberengwa got five primary schools and two secondary schools. A major constraint that was identified in the dry provinces of Midlands, Matabeleland North and South was that some farms did not have homesteads. A farmer with several properties could have been operating from one homestead. This has therefore affected the provision of social services. Very small tuck shops have mushroomed on most of the schemes and these are assisting in providing limited amounts of commodities.
- 7.5 The sinking of boreholes for the new settlers was largely constrained by the non-availability of funds. The situation was even more critical in the dry parts of the country. Because of the shortage of funds, some of the few boreholes drilled had not been fitted. (See table 6.1) For example in Mashonaland West Province, in Chegutu, out of its eight drilled boreholes, only five (35.7%) had been fitted, while in Makonde only two out of the nine drilled boreholes had been fitted.

- 7.6 In the dry areas of the Midlands and Matabeleland provinces, the success rate of sinking boreholes was more problematic. For instance, in Mberengwa, borehole drilling was affected by the non-availability of ground water. Mvuma also had very few boreholes drilled in the district. In Shurugwi, most farms did not have boreholes and yet DDF drilled only five boreholes. All in all, the Midlands province had an allocation of twenty boreholes. A major challenge also relates to the rehabilitation of derelict boreholes.

Table 6.1: Sinking of Bore-holes in Mashonaland West

District	No. of Boreholes Drilled	No. of Boreholes Fitted	% of Fitted Boreholes
Kadoma	14	5	35.70
Chegutu	8	8	100.00
Zvimba	19	13	68.4
Makonde	9	2	22.2
Hurungwe	9	5	55.5
Totals	59	33	55.9

Source: Mashonaland West Provincial Report

7.7 Conclusion and Policy recommendations.

The provision of social-physical and economic infrastructure that will make the scheme areas both productive and habitable from a social amenities point of view is a major challenge for the programme. The relevant infrastructure in this respect includes boreholes, schools, clinics, roads, public transport and commercial centres. In the rush to occupy properties the existing farmhouses and compounds have been put to or at least earmarked for various community uses (schools, clinics, reserved for AREX officials etc). A related challenge is that of equipping the properties for the new uses to which they are being put, which uses are invariably more intensive than previously. Given the limited resources availed for infrastructure development by national government in view of apparent resource limitations, the success of the land reform program is being threatened. In this respect it is therefore imperative that;

- i) The government creates a policy and legislative environment supportive of strategic public-private and public-private-voluntary partnerships where business including outgoing commercial farmers, NGOs and international donors find space for working in the new schemes complementing state resources and efforts.
- ii) Clear plans and policy positions be established for the use of and protection of existing infrastructure where it is in place to obviate problems of vandalism, conflicts over access and general obsolescence.

- iii) RDCs be supported in planning for and providing services to the new schemes and be brought in to spearhead the management of the land reform programme and related processes.

8.0 Former farm -workers & Fast Track Resettlement.

8.1 Farm-workers communities have attracted attention ever since the fast track resettlement programme started. There is consensus that before the programme started, farm workers constituted communities whose livelihoods were dependent on the commercial farm owner. Especially because some of them were immigrants or descendents of migrants who came to the then Southern Rhodesia colony in search of employment, these communities regarded commercial farms as more than a place to work. To them it was home. Attention and concern, then, was whether the reform programme was actively integrating these communities. A general observation by government officials was that most farm-workers were at first hesitant to request for land for settlement, preferring to be employed. In Mashonaland West province, it was even pointed out that farm-workers did not need to till “a lot of land” and hence the Governor talked of giving 2 ha plots for farm-workers.

8.2 In some cases, farm workers were absorbed and integrated in the land reform programme on an employment basis. In Manicaland Province, the emerging A2 farmers inherited farm communities and continued to employ them as tobacco workers, security guards etc, providing the farm with the required human resources to continue production. The governor and resident minister of Manicaland who retained the services of most farm labourers is an outstanding example in this regard and so is the Livingstone farm in Mashonaland Central where plot holders employed an average of 4 workers drawn from farm labourers. Although no farm workers were allocated land in the A1 self contained units, some farm workers were also absorbed in the villagized A1 model. In Mashonaland Central Province, at least 20% of A1 occupants are former farm workers. In Matabeleland South, farm workers account for 5% of all A1 settlers, as can be inferred from Table 7.1.

Table 7.1: Farm-worker Integration in Matabeleland South Province (A1 Schemes)

District	Total No. of Beneficiaries	No. of Farm-workers settled	% of Total
Beitbridge	1029	7	0.6
Matobo	1923	6	0.3
Bulilimangwe	1060	11	1.0
Insiza	2080	238	11.4
Gwanda	2080	238	11.4
Umzingwane	1880	15	0.8
Totals	10052	515	5.1

Source: adapted from Matabeleland Provincial Land Committee Report

8.3 Again as Table 7.2 suggests, Bubi district in Matabeleland North show the same pattern. An interesting example was identified in Insiza District where there were farm-workers. The scheme, known as Hamilton Scheme, was established in 2001 and had 28 plots. Originally, the farm-workers were settled on another farm but were relocated to make way for other settlers. Altogether there are 56 households who share the 28 plots on the scheme, which measures between 60-70 hectares. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the area is part of a dam catchment and hence the idea was not to make them settle there permanently. According to the farm workers, they have been relocated more than four times and they are quite bitter about any further relocation. They also complained that when they were moved it was raining and hence they lost their property. Further, they are not prepared to demolish their structures and start building on another site.

Table 7.2: Farm-worker Integration in Bubi District, Matabeleland North Province

Farm	Total No. settled	Farm-workers settled	% of Total
Bloxham	8	0	0
Famina	34	12	35.2
Stoney Acres	14	4	28.6
Robins	43	2	4.6
Glenapp	9	2	11.1
Allendale C	40	1	0
Gravesand	36	0	0
Horseshoe	13	0	0
Shilow	59	0	13.5
Paddy	53	8	3.7
Emputshini	24	2	0
Sailor's Hope	25	0	0.16
Retreat	46	20	43.4
Rouxedale	233	0	0
Goodwood	440	0	0
Total	1077	53	4.9

Source Adapted from the Provincial Task Force on Bubi District Resettlement Program

8.4 In most cases few farm workers were allocated land in the land reform process. In Mashonaland West's irrigation based Livingstone Farm, only one farm worker was retained (because he could operate and repair the scheme's water pumps). At Chifundi farm in Makonde district, only the former farm manager was allocated land. Not only were they denied land by those allocating, they were in some cases scattered away out of the farm to give way to distant migrants from the communal lands. Igava farm's 89 plot holders in Marondera district do not include former farm workers. In Matabeleland North Province's Bubi District, at least 50% of the settled farms do not have a single former farm-worker on site.

Table 7.3: Integration of Farm-Workers in Mashonaland Central

District	Total No. of Beneficiaries	No. of farm-workers	% of Total
Bindura	2568	33	1.3
Guruve	22545	48	1.9
Mazowe	3506	80	2.3
Mt Darwin	786	26	3.3
Muzarabani	1881	50	22.6
Shamva	1275	-	-
Total	12 561	237	1.9

Source: Mashonaland Central Provincial Report.

8.5 In Mashonaland Central (Table 7.3 refers), of the 1561 A 1 beneficiaries, only 237 (1.9% of total) of these were farm-workers. In Muzarabani district for example, it was reported that some of the affected ex-farm-workers were being ferried to their places of origin by DDF trucks. A significant number was also reported to be still at the farm.

8.6 It is government policy that upon ‘acquisition’ of a farm for resettlement the outgoing farmer should pay compensation to the retrenched farm-workers. This is subject to the farmer being compensated for the improvements on the farm. In Muzarabani district, five farms namely Trossacks, Chikale, Glen Gyle Estate, Dunsberg and Makwarabeti have paid full compensation to the ex-farm-workers. Two more farms namely Kenwith and Braeborne have only paid partial compensation. Box 7.1 illustrates how the farm-worker retrenchment package is compensated

Box 7.1: Financial package for retrenched farm-workers

Three months severance pay
One month notice pay
Two months salary for every year served
Relocation fees of \$5000.00
Cash in lieu of leave
Gratuity in terms of Agricultural Industry Collective Bargaining Agreement.

Source: Adapted from Muzarabani District Report

8.7 It was not possible for this report to capture national details pertaining to the retrenchment and payment of compensation to former farm-workers. However, what this report has observed is that the number of farm-workers who benefited from the land reform program was minimal in all the cited examples. Employment of former farm-workers by incoming A2 farmers was low and this is associated with the low plot-uptake rates by A2 farmers and that agricultural activities by the new farmers are just

starting while resources also remain a major constraint. For example Bindura had 30200 farm workers and of these only 133 were resettled (Mr. Chiraya, DA Bindura). At Slimish A1 Irrigation Scheme near Glendale in Mazowe district the 29 plot holders currently employ 33 former farm workers (paid \$10000/month). The new farmers at Mabobo A2 farm in Guruve, employed only 4 people out of 66 ex-farm workers. However, there were some A2 farmers who had started very well. For example, a Mr. Mudavanhu of Plot 11 (measuring 125 hectares) on Monte Cristo A2 scheme in Marondera district and is engaged in tobacco farming, employing 26 permanent farm workers and 'several' casuals

8.8 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Former farm workers have attracted attention in part because of the sheer numbers and because of concerns over their welfare. Generally, the case of farm workers is not properly understood because of non-availability of appropriate information. Some have been absorbed and integrated into the current programme either as beneficiaries in their own right or as employees. However, few farm-workers have either been given land or employed as employment creation by new A2 farmers is still very low and in this respect it is recommended that;

- i) Since few farm-workers have been given land, there is a need to establish a quota for this segment of the population as has happened to the war veterans with their 20% land allocation.
- ii) Since employment creation by new A2 farmers is still very low government should support the A2 farmers with the hope that this would generate more employment for the already experienced labour force in the form of former farm-workers. This also entails working towards improving the plot take-up rates by the A2 farmers.
- iii) The government should speed up the payment of compensation to the white commercial farmers so that these can also be able to pay the retrenchment packages of their farm-workers.
- iv) Since the case of farm workers is not properly understood because of non-availability of appropriate information it is therefore important for provincial and district structures to keep records on, *inter alia*, details on the affected farm-workers in their respective areas and how farm-workers have been assisted. This also helps in the future in the monitoring and evaluation of the land reform program.

9.0. Conclusion.

- 9.1 Zimbabwe's Fast Track Resettlement Programme is officially viewed as part and parcel of the country's land reform programme initiated against a background of frustrations with an unsuccessful Inception Phase Framework Plan of 1998-1999 to acquire and redistribute some 1 million hectares of private commercial farmland. The government introduced fast track resettlement in the year 2000 with the objective of acquiring not less than 5 million hectares and the overall strategy was the resettlement of people with minimal or non- provision of basic infrastructure. In this respect the planning and demarcation of plots was done in retrospect while at the same time infrastructure would be provided to beneficiaries already emplaced. Implementation of the current programme started in July 2000. The ultimate programme thrust was the acceleration of both land acquisition and land redistribution.
- 9.2 The rapid progress under fast track has raised more questions than answers in relation to the discourse on agricultural production, environmental protection and land rights. For instance, farm occupations and the fast track resettlement that followed created an environment of uncertainty with regard to the land rights of the affected large-scale farmers whilst those of the incoming settlers largely remain unclear. Further, the legitimization of land occupations by the Rural Land Occupiers Act has made freehold title for rural land in Zimbabwe one of the most insecure forms of land tenure. Associated with these sorts of uncertainties was the plight of the former farm-worker both from a welfare point of view and with regard to employment of skills acquired over the years. Availability of infrastructure to support productive and reproductive activities in the new schemes is also a cause for concern in view of limited state resources for the mammoth task.
- 9.3 Critics of fast track resettlement program have largely argued that the programme has destabilized the rural social fabric, threatened productivity (food security, export earnings, agri-business etc) and actually exposed the new farmers to start up hardships with minimal state support. On the other hand those in support of the programme have dismissed these as arguments from people inherently opposed to land reform in whatever form while acknowledging the start-up hardships as an unavoidable albeit passing phase. This has basically made land issues very highly charged resulting in a polarization of discourse on the pace and manner of the Land Reform Programme in the country with unfortunate consequences like international isolation. Not all criticisms of the land reform are founded on factual observations and similarly all those in defense of the program often do so from positional entrenchments that blind them from some apparent follies in the programme.

9.4 Having come after the official end of the Fast Track Resettlement Programme (August 2002), the assessment by the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee ought to be viewed as part of the possible solutions to the current impasse through the presentation of policy recommendations based on a national review of the programme. The polarization is unhealthy and unproductive for the country's present and future both for critics and supporters of the current land reform programme. The work of the Committee has arguably shown that the fast track land reform and resettlement programme can and should be analyzed against stated policy objectives with a high degree of professional and policy focus. Such analysis would provide a basis for government to implement some of its laudable policies like the 'one household one farm policy', communal area decongestion, maximum farm size regulations, adherence to strict service levels to enhance the standards of living of people as well as provide space for coherent planning and transparent management of the programme with space for broader participation. This, together with providing for an appropriate land tenure system will enhance the attainment of the overall quest for economic viability, social justice and environmental sustainability.