



PRESS AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN MOZAMBIQUE 1990 - 2000

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The historical evolution of the Mozambican press: from its origins to the liberalization of the social communication sector

I POLITICAL ELITES

The historical role of the Mozambican press, well-known for its ambiguous relations with the authorities, constitutes a good guide to the context of national political evolution.

■ 1. THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALIST ELITES

Mozambique is a former Portuguese colony that became independent in 1975. The fight for decolonisation was mainly spearheaded by the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (Frelimo). A strategic country in Southern Africa, Mozambique provides access to the sea for five hinterland countries: Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Swaziland and a part of South Africa. With approximately eighteen million inhabitants, the pattern of settlement in the country remains very uneven. The coastal zone of the Mozambique Channel has a high population density, whereas in the vast areas in the interior of the country (provinces of Gaza, northern half of Manica, Sofala, Tete and Niassa) population densities are low (less than five inhabitants per km²). The role of thoroughfares in district planning clearly appears in the central part of the country where the population is highly concentrated along the corridor of Beira, towards Harare (capital of Zimbabwe)¹ Michael CAHEN, Philippe WANIEZ & Violette BRUSTLEIN, «Pour un atlas social et culturel du Mozambique» in: «Les ONG en Lusophonie, terrains et débats», *Lusotopie* 2002/1, p.314. On the other hand, the corridor of Nacala does not attract many inhabitants because it is less developed than that of Beira and it leads to Malawi, a country of less economic importance.

Mozambique is a very culturally diverse society both at religious and ethnic levels. A population census in 1980 identified twenty-three languages. *Núcleo de Estudo de Línguas Moçambicanas* (NELIMO) of the Eduardo Mondlane University questioned this information. In 1989, it suggested a new linguistic classification incorporating thirteen languages: Emakhuwa, Kimwani, Shimaconde, Xitsonga, Ciyao, Echuwabo, Cinyungwe, Cisena, Cibalke, Cishona, Gitonga, Cicopi, Cinyanja.² NELIMO considered the remaining ten languages listed in the 1980

¹Michael CAHEN, Philippe WANIEZ & Violette BRUSTLEIN, «Pour un atlas social et culturel du Mozambique» in: «Les ONG en Lusophonie, terrains et débats», *Lusotopie* 2002/1, p.314.

²Gregório FIRMÍNIO, A «Questão Linguística» na África post-colonial: o caso do Português e das Línguas autoctones em Moçambique, Maputo, PROMEDIA, 2002.

Census dialects of these thirteen principal languages. However, this proposal is far from being a consensus among researchers. The country offers a mosaic of languages reflecting each ethnic group. Portuguese is the official language but native languages, such as Bantus language, represent the mother tongue of most of the population, and they remain highly used in daily communication.

Colonial legacies still prevail in religious practices throughout various geographical areas. Catholicism and Protestantism are, in general, dominant in the urban environment, whereas Islam is strongly present in the interior of the northern part of the country. This is due to the Arab presence in that part of the country long before the arrival of the Portuguese in the 16th century. Apart from these three religious persuasions, there are Hinduism, Zionism, Jehovah's witnesses and animism that is a host of traditional African religions. According to a 1997 Census, nearly 24 per cent of the population belong to Catholic faith, 17.8 per cent to Moslem confession, 17.5 per cent are Zionist, 7.8 per cent are Protestant, 2.1 per cent are animist. The percentages of Jehovah's witnesses and Hindi were not given. Once again, these figures were disputed. For example, Islam is predominant in the most populated areas in the country, particularly in the provinces of Nampula and Zambezia, which led some commentators to suggest that the number of Moslems was superior to that of Catholics.

Since 1907 the capital has been Maputo, formerly known as Lourenço Marques that succeeded Ilha de Moçambique, located in the province of Nampula. The Portuguese colonial administration carried out this change in order to benefit from the development in neighbouring South Africa. Lourenço Marques, as all the southern areas, became a work area for the South African mines in Witwatersrand. Thanks to its geographical position, Lourenço Marques benefited from a railway line constructed between South Africa and Maputo and from the infrastructures around it. Hence, it profited from the growth of the South African economy, leaving the rest of the country in a deep economic backwardness. The fast economic development of the other provinces in the South, Centre and North of the country to correct this imbalance currently constitutes the principal challenge of the country and will continue to be in the years to come.

The transfer of the capital city from the decadent Ilha de Moçambique to Lourenço Marques created economic imbalances but also marginalized the elite and the small Creole middle-class of the provinces of Nampula and Zambezia. Thanks to the establishment of the Portuguese colonial administration, the former Lourenço Marques became a favourable place to the emergence of a new elite and a nationalist consciousness, to which belonged the great majority of the individuals who made up Frelimo, a movement that led the country to national independence.

Frelimo was formed in 1962 after the merging of three nationalist movements: the National Democratic Union of Mozambique (Udenamo) created in Salisbury in 1960, the Mozambican African National Union (Manu) a sort of amalgamation of some previously

existing groups operating in Tanganyika and Kenya and founded in 1961, and the African Union of Independent Mozambique (Unami) founded by some Mozambicans from the area of Tete, in the central part of the country, who were exiles in Malawi. The history of the development of Frelimo is prone to several interpretations. The objective here is not to reconstitute it but rather to show the conditions that supported the predominance of certain ethnic groups over others, the genesis and the bankruptcy of the socialist project and the internal contradictions that, in some cases, caused the ousting, and even the death, of some members.

One can begin to wonder what link could be found between these historical analyses and the press. First of all, the new political and social contexts at the end of 1980 obviously influenced the Mozambican press. Secondly, the press began by insisting on the past, trying to reconstitute the history of Frelimo and by extension that of the country. Lastly, the press kept an eye on the democratic transition process in Mozambique, mainly characterized by a rupture with the previous policy led by Frelimo.

Luís de Brito, a political analyst, sees Frelimo as a movement that developed thanks to a generation of nationalist activists who did not belong to any of the three movements that preceded Frelimo. According to Brito, Frelimo seemed to be the only nationalist political party in which a small group of workers, and especially students from the southern area of Mozambique (assimilated, half-castes and blacks), played a fundamental role in the spreading of a national consciousness, the liberation struggle and the mobilization of the peasants for war.³ This was possible with the abandonment by the chiefs and leaders of the three nationalist parties that merged to form Frelimo, since they felt marginalized within the movement. Frelimo, then chaired by Eduardo Mondlane⁴ relied on the traditional authorities of the northern area (the traditional elite who acted as an interface between the colonial administration and the population) to win over the peasants for the liberation struggle and its project of independence. Armed struggle, like other forms of protest against the colonial authorities, created conditions that toughened the nationalists (urban groups essentially located in the South) and conducted to an increasing intervention of the army in the conception and implementation of political, economic and social development programmes. However, this small group that held power within Frelimo neglected social reality by imposing, thanks to the logic of a monopoly of force, a process of forced communalisation (communal villages) in their zones of influence.

³Luís de BRITO, «Une relecture nécessaire: La genèse du Parti Etat FRELIMO», in *Politique Africaine* n°29, March 1988.

⁴First President of Frelimo, Mondlane was born in the province of Gaza, south of Mozambique. He made his primary studies thanks to the support of Swiss and US missionaries from Presbyterian and Methodist Churches. In Lourenço Marques, Mondlane took part in a nationalist group of African students before he went to South Africa where he continued his higher education. Prosecuted because of his nationalist activities, Mondlane arrived in the United States of America where he studied social sciences and anthropology in Oberlin and Western Universities. In 1961, he went to Mozambique as a United Nations researcher and he had clandestine contacts with the nationalist movements while calling for their unity.

This created a second division within Frelimo, because its members from traditional authorities and other commercial sectors were opposed to this social model of communalisation. As a result, the traditional chiefs of Niassa, particularly Metarica and Mataca, alienated themselves from the Portuguese.

If a simplistic comparison is made between his work and that of Eduardo Mondlane, quoted below, one could say that Luís de Brito did not add anything new to the natural evolution of nationalism in colonial Mozambique:

*“The conditions were not favourable to the expansion of the nationalist ideas in all the country due to the prohibition of political association, the need for secrecy it imposed, the dismemberment of traditional society and the lack of modern education in the rural zones, and because it was initially only among a very small minority that the idea of national action in opposition to local action developed. This minority had an urban background made up of intellectuals and workers, essentially individuals who had lost touch with the tribal system, whose majority was assimilated Africans and half-castes, i.e. a very small marginal fraction of the population.... Perhaps, the absence of a tribal environment helped them to promote a national vision, and encouraged them to take Mozambique as a place for all Mozambicans and made them to understand the force of unity”.*⁵

Several authors gave testimony of the extent to which the majority of the students who joined Frelimo in 1962 had a nationalist vision different from that of the members of Manu, Udenamo and Unami.⁵ There was thus a difference in political and organizational perspectives between the nationalists who remained in 1962-1963 in Frelimo and those who left the movement. But this does not totally explain the strong presence of members from the southern areas, to the detriment of the central and northern areas, within Frelimo. Indeed, even if Udenamo was experiencing a division when it joined Frelimo, the pro-Frelimo allies were made up of a group of urban intellectuals from the centre of the country whose best-known figure was Uria Simango. Protesting shepherd, Simango was a vice-president of Udenamo. Following the first congress of Frelimo, he became number two of the movement. At the beginning of the liberation struggle, in 1964, Simango was the only leader of the three former movements within Frelimo. He remained in Frelimo until 1969, the year Eduardo Mondlane was assassinated. According to an official statement, Uria Simango was executed, in 1977, for ‘high treason’ in connection with the assassination of Mondlane.

⁵Eduardo MONDLANE, *Lutar por Moçambique*, Lisbon, Sá da Costa Editions, 1976, p.111.

⁶Yussuf ADAM, «[Historiadores e Ideólogos]» in *Moçambique 16 anos de Historiografia*: *Focos, Problemas, Metodologias e Desafios para a Década de 90*, Alexandrino Jose & Paula Meneses Editions, 1991, p.63.

According to Luís de Brito, after the death of the first president of Frelimo, Simango held the presidency for a three-month interim period. The central committee that met at the beginning of April refused to confirm his appointment but rather instituted a collegiate administration: a presidential council where Simango sat with Marcelino dos Santos and Samora Machel. Deprived of real power, Simango thus became in the minority in the troika. Isolated within administration, he reacted a few months later by publishing a text that attacked the 'Southerners' accusing them of tribal conspiracy and he vowed to dissociate himself from their 'criminal actions'.⁷ Simango was consequently expelled from the movement and some of his co-religionists decided to follow him. These internal crises described as an attempt to seize power and other following quarrels of ideological nature which peaked with assassinations and mysterious disappearances were never publicly discussed by Frelimo. It was the independent press that later forced it to shade more light on several grey areas of persisting concerns.

■ 2. THE ROLE OF THE MIXED-BREED STUDENTS AND ASSIMILATED BLACKS OF THE SOUTHERN AREA

During the formation of Frelimo in 1962, only two members from the southern area played an important role by their positions: Eduardo Mondlane, President, and Marcelino dos Santos, Secretary of Foreign Relations. Although the latter was born in Nampula, in the central part of the country, he spent his adolescence and a part of his youth in Lourenço Marques. Quite early, he left the former capital to Lisbon, and then to Paris where he studied social sciences. While in these two European capitals, he participated in student nationalist movements where he moved closer to nationalist figures from other Portuguese colonies like Amílcar Cabral, from Guinea-Bissau, Agostinho Neto and Mário de Andrade, from Angola. These individuals were largely responsible for the creation of the Conference of the Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP) that held its first congress in Casablanca, Morocco, in 1961. Marcelino dos Santos and Adelino Guambe were then the representatives of Udenamo. The CONCP typified a generation of activists who constituted the 'liberators' of Portuguese colonial Africa.

Eduardo Mondlane did not follow the same course as the other nationalists of the CONCP. He was influenced by Anglo-Saxon culture transmitted by missionaries and consolidated during his stay in South Africa and the United States. However, he was an example of the success of the students and the assimilated from the South (the modern elite that largely drew its legitimacy from its position of depository of Western modernity). His name was also very popular among the members of the Church of the Swiss Mission (Presbyterian) and United Methodist, the only Protestant Churches well established in the South of Mozambique.

⁷Luís de BRITO, *Le Frelimo et la construction de l'Etat national au Mozambique. Le sens de la référence au marxisme (1962-1983)*; PhD thesis, Vincennes Paris 8 University, 1991.

One should not neglect that a very strong nationalist consciousness had been born within the Swiss Mission.⁸

When the first groups of this modern elite composed of students, half-castes and assimilated blacks (Samora Machel, Joaquim Chissano, Armando Guebuza, Mariano Matsinha, Filipe Samuel Magaia, Josina Muthemba, Jorge Rebelo, Sérgio Vieira and Oscar Monteiro) joined Frelimo in Dar Es Salaam in 1962-1965, they did not quarrel with the presence of Eduardo Mondlane. Some, like Josina Muthemba, Mariano Matsinha, Joaquim Chissano and Armando Guebuza, already knew each other in the Association of the African High School Pupils of Mozambique, NESAM, when they met Filipe Samuel Magaia in Tanzania. They exploited their connections in NESAM to form a strong core around Mondlane and Marcelino dos Santos within Frelimo. Luís de Brito explained the formation of this core: “*Having an education much higher than the average, these young people were quickly able, through a process of co-optation, to occupy places of responsibility in the apparatus of Frelimo, in particular those of secretary or assistant-secretary of the various departments*”.⁹ By the creation in 1966 of the Politico-Military Committee, the Defence Department became a key position. Its head, Filipe Samuel Magaia, an officer from the South, had Casal Ribeiro, originally from the centre of the country, as his assistant. Following the death of Magaia, the Central Committee appointed Samora Machel new Secretary of the Defence Department. Casal Ribeiro was thus marginalized.

■ 3. THE TRADITIONAL ELITES FROM THE NORTH

We have seen that since 1966, the liberation army had acted as the principal force of Frelimo. The armed struggle started in the provinces of Cabo Delgado and Niassa, frontier areas with Tanzania, the then stronghold of the movement. Let us add that, thanks to its cooperation with the traditional authorities, Frelimo could co-opt the peasants of these areas to enlarge its military forces.

Lázaro Kavandame was then the central figure of this process of mobilization of the makonde peasants from Cabo Delgado. The leader of the associations of the peasants from northern Mozambique, Kavandame was the provincial secretary of Frelimo in Cabo Delgado. Thanks to his commercial experience acquired in Tanzania where he had spent a few years, he organized the cotton-producing peasants into cooperatives in order to benefit from the exchanges between them. Kavandame aimed at creating conditions of the emergence of black traders in the rural zones that were often dominated by traders of Asian origins.

⁸See Gérard LIESEGANG “Possibilidades do estudo de espaços cognitivos antigos e mais recentes em Moçambique, séculos XV-XX” in *Moçambique 16 anos de Historiografia: focus, problemas, metodologias, desafios para a década de 90*, colecção painel moçambicano 1991. See also Teresa Cruz e SILVA, *Igrejas Protestantes e Consciência Política no Sul de Moçambique – O caso da Missão Suiça (1930-1974)*, Maputo, PROMEDIA, 2001.

⁹Luís de BRITO, *Le Frelimo et la construction de l'Etat*, *op.cit.*

His initiative was a huge success. When in 1966 the Central Committee allotted a great role to the militaries by establishing the Politico-Military Committee, Kavandame, who had then become an influential figure, opposed it. And a section of the traditional elite inside Cabo Delgado (to which Kavandame did not belong but from which he drew his legitimacy since he was a model of social progress) supported him.

Tension thus intensified between the leadership of Frelimo based in Tanzania and Kavandame and his ‘allies’ in Mozambique. Confronted with a crisis of such a magnitude, the leadership convened the second congress of Frelimo to resolve the situation. The congress was held in Matchedje (province of Niassa) but Kavandame did not attend. It seems that he wanted the congress to be held outside Mozambique in order to reduce the participation of the military structure (commanded from then on by the modern elite) that was very active inside the country. Kavandame decided to boycott the congress and to close the border between Tanzania and Mozambique. Following a correspondence between Mondlane and the authorities in Dar Es Salaam, the government of Julius Nyerere ordered to open the border of Cabo Delgado. Without the support of the Tanzanian authorities and prosecuted by the modern elite of Frelimo, Kavandame and some of his collaborators surrendered to the Portuguese at the beginning of the year 1969.

Even though some makonde officers remained in Frelimo until national independence, they constituted a minority in the leadership of the movement, partly due to the departure of Kavandame and his supporters. The increasing prevalence of officers from the South within Frelimo can thus be explained by mainly the result of internal contradictions generated by the movement and the result of the marginalization of Manica and Sofala officers (from the centre of the country) in the context of these conflicts. One should not forget the colonial context that was more favourable to the emergence of a nationalist consciousness in the capital than in the rest of the country.

II ORIGINS OF THE MOZAMBICAN PRESS

The history of the press in Mozambique began on May 13, 1854 with the publication of *Boletim do Governo da Província de Moçambique* in Ilha de Moçambique, the then capital of the country. When the Portuguese authorities equipped the colony with means of reprography, they did not imagine that, a few years later, Africans were going to use them for their own emancipation. At that time, one could distinguish the colonial press from the African press.

■ 1. THE COLONIAL PRESS

During colonial rule, newspapers were often created by Portuguese civil servants who were sent to Mozambique directly from the metropolis to achieve their missions of service. Quickly, the colony became their ‘fatherland’ on which they felt deeply dependent. Their concerns remained however quite different from those of the natives. Their objectives were, according to the editor of *Distrito de Lourenço Marques*,¹⁰ “to fight on all fronts, on any occasion where Germany and England threaten our African possessions, while using every means at our disposal to defend our rights as the older colonial power”.¹¹

At the beginning of the 1880s, the incapacity of the Portuguese administration to promote the social integration of the different African populations created a differentiation within the colonial press. A part of the press supported the colonial administration, unlike the more critical press hostile to the colonial policy. The second group was forged in the province of Zambezia, in an intellectual environment resulting from the missions. This press was ambiguous since its publishers, although they were half-caste, were *filhos da terra*. The latter had in common a religious, educational and military training close to the European cultural identity to which they aspired, but they simultaneously supported the interests of the African population.

In *O Vigilante* periodical, these intellectuals expressed “on behalf of the people of Zambezia” the regret of never having the satisfaction “to see introduced any single advantage of modern civilization”.¹²

The most known figure of this proto-nationalism in Zambezia was Alfredo Augusto de Brito Aguiar. Of Angolan origin, Alfredo Aguiar arrived in Mozambique in 1879 as a conscript in the army. He remained in the colony until the end of his military service. Between 1885 and 1893, he created and inspired many of periodicals in the province of Zambezia: *O Imparcial*, *Correio da Zambezia*, *Gazeta do Sul* and *Clamor Africano*. The autonomy or even independence “of vast Zambezia subjugated in the small Ilha de Moçambique” as well as “the strong presence of Indians in the public administration to the detriment of Africans” were their recurrent subjects. Thus in the first edition of *Gazeta do Sul*, Alfredo Aguiar signed a leading article according to which:

“There is a generalized idea in all Zambezia demanding from the government the separation from Mozambique [Ilha de Moçambique] to form a province with the district of Sofala, of which Quelimane [capital of the province of Zambezia] must be the seat of the government, and wheresome areas, like Chimuara, Morrumbala or Chiramba, will be able to become seats of administration”.¹³

¹⁰The first newspaper in Lourenço Marques which was created in 1888.

¹¹*O Distrito de Lourenço Marques* 1888.

¹²*O Vigilante*, n°1 August 9, 1882.

¹³*Gazeta do Sul*, n°1, 1891.

Two years later, the ‘revolutionary’ evocation persisted in the Zambebian press through the writings of António de Passos Marques Ferreira. Ferreira evoked the covetousness of the south of the country by British interests and saw the possibility for Zambezia to conquer its autonomy:

*“In the past, the assumption that Transvaal wanted to annex Lourenço Marques, thus forming a single Republic, was much considered and [and this would have benefited] Quelimane [that] always wanted to be alone and independent in its progress, by rejecting the honour to belong, like a district, to the influence of the administration of Mozambique”.*¹⁴

The interest in getting autonomy in relation to the colonial administration of the Ilha de Moçambique was an exclusive idea of the *filhos da terra*. Africans did not take part in this fight. Moreover, they were exploited, like labour force, by the large *companhias arrendatarias* installed in the Zambebian valley.

The claims expressed by the press were not inspired by the will of the African population. The appropriation of the press by the colonizers of Ilha de Moçambique and by the *filhos da terra* of Zambezia was a means to amplify their fight and to defend their narrow interests. We had to wait until the year 1908 to see the birth of a press that could defend the interests of Africans.

■ 2. THE APOGEE OF THE AFRICAN PRESS

The pioneers of the African press in Mozambique were brothers João and José Albasini. The assimilated grandsons of a traditional chief, Régulo Maxaquene whose daughter married a Portuguese the Albasini brothers, especially João, the elder one, proposed “*an open, honest fight against the colonists through a combative black press in the image of that of whites*”.¹⁵ Their instrument was *O Africano*, a newspaper that appeared between 1908 and 1918. In the leading article of the only edition in 1908, *Ano Novo-Era Nova*, the newspaper posted its leitmotiv to counter the colonizer:

“Black people of this vast territory, we arrived at the end of the year of grace of 1908 and it is necessary to follow another way [...]. It has been now a hundred years since we accepted the yoke of those we consider civilisers and, with some exceptions, we have not bargained for this yoke. We have reacted against abuses, nothing more. The whole world is

¹⁴ *Clamor Africano*, n°61 August 30, 1893.

¹⁵ Aurélio ROCHA, “Associativismo e nativismo: os fundamentos do discurso ideológico” in *140 anos de Imprensa em Moçambique*, Fatima Ribeiro & António Sopa, AMOLP, 1996, p.32-33.

witness to the fact that for many reasons we dare to say to this corrupted vague: It is enough! In exchange for this submission that astonishes the world, what are we gaining? Nothing! Neither roads, neither water supply, neither workshops, nor schools! [...] It is for this reason, now, we invite the 'civilisers' to look in the mirror... the subjects of Its Majesty the King of Portugal who does not speak Portuguese! And this domination has lasted for now four hundred years".¹⁶

During the year 1909, some journalists at *O Africano* tackled racial discrimination within the Catholic Church in Lourenço Marques. They also denounced the conditions of the Africans in the Catholic colleges and wanted the resignation of the local archbishop. The Catholic Church was so influential at that time that it opposed to the establishment of public schools, considered by the Grémio Africano, an association of journalists at *O Africano*. A newspaper, the *Lourenço Marques Guardian, LMG* (published in Portuguese and English since 1905 and owned by an English journalist, Arthur William Bayly) supported racism in the Catholic schools by preaching the superiority of the white race over the black one. *O Africano* firmly revolted then and entered into an open war against the *LMG*.

By defending the African cause, the newspaper of Albasini made enemies in the society and the colonial administration. Several analysts joined the newspaper in the use of the Xitsonga, an African language spoken in Lourenço Marques, to escape from possible conflicts with the authorities. However, this was only one form of cultural resistance aiming at distinguishing their [journalists] African identity from the European identity.

In 1917, the ownership of *O Africano* changed hands after its sale. The following year, the group of Grémio Africano founded *O Brado Africano*, a newspaper that declared itself defender of the people of the Portuguese colonies:

*"Those who do not fight to win their rights voluntarily condemn themselves as slaves to others. To fall asleep is to die. To the subjugated people then, more than for others, this duty is a religion. In front of the **altar of duty**, let us prostrate ourselves and brandish our claim, our torment? Of what use is it, if we have already done it by creating *O Africano* in 1908? (...) Law applies to all, this is a principle that we do not want to see betrayed (...) because to refuse to be trampled upon is a duty of any man who is aware of his dignity".¹⁷*

¹⁶*O Africano* n°1 December 25, 1908.

¹⁷*O Brado Africano*, December 24, 1918.

O Brado Africano lighted the fuse of Mozambican nationalism. There, the current literary nationalists represented by poets Rui de Noronha, Craveirinha and Noémia de Sousa took their first steps. Combative journalism also made its appearance in the Mozambican press. Even though it had an illusory purpose, as suggested by Mário de Andrade, because its ideologists had not reached the top of their maturity, its ideas were re-appropriated and rebuilt by the modern elite in the 1960s.¹⁸

In 1925, João Albasini passed away. The following year, a coup d' Etat overthrew the republican government in Portugal, ushering in a military dictatorship. In 1928, the new regime, deprived of a political project, invited Professor António Salazar to be its financial adviser. In 1930, Salazar informally assumed the control of the government and became Prime minister in 1932. In collaboration with Marcelo Caetano, his Council President, they rolled out a new repressive legislation for the effective control of the press. The decree n° 22469 of April 11, 1933 instituted a preliminary censorship for Portugal and its colonial territories. In the case of Mozambique, this decree only reinforced the law of João Belo, the then Minister of the Colonies, approved on September 3, 1926 to curtail the freedom of the press in the colony. The 1933 law greatly increased the qualifications of individuals legally entitled to occupy the posts of director and newspaper editor. According to the new law, the director had to be a Portuguese citizen, enjoying full civic and political rights, having higher education, or its equivalent, and residing in the town of publication of the newspaper. Moreover, this law prohibited the public servant civil or military from becoming directors or editors of newspapers. Furthermore, it envisaged a possible criminal prosecution against the directors in the event of a violation of any legal provision.

According to Ilídio Rocha, “*the Mozambican press had fifty-five publications in 1925, when it was subjected to the law of September 1926 imposing difficult conditions, it was reduced to forty-two titles; it however regained its importance later, reaching seventy publications in 1939*”.¹⁹ However, the African press and other moderate editions were increasingly censored by the colonial authorities. New demonstrations for the freedom of speech re-appeared, initially in 1950 through the Catholic press, *Diário de Moçambique* (DM) founded in Beira by Dom Sebastião Soares de Resende, a moderate bishop. A daily newspaper very critical on the abuses by the Portuguese colonial authorities, DM devoted a great part of its articles to the Panafrican movement and the waves of independence in African countries. The newspaper even dedicated some reports to the first military actions led by Frelimo inside the country. In 1969, after several suspensions, the newspaper gave in to the pressures of Jorge Jardim, a Portuguese businessman who had many commercial and political interests in Mozambique.

¹⁸Mário Pinto DE ANDRADE, *Origens do Nacionalismo Africano*, Lisbon, Dom Quixote, 1997, p.39.

¹⁹Ilídio ROCHA, *Catálogo dos periódicos e principais seriados de Moçambique: da introdução de tipografia à independência (1854-1975)*, Porto, Porto Editora, 1985.

Thus the military activities of the nationalist liberation movements reinforced repression against the media. Luis Bernardo Honwana, the editor of *A Voz Africana*, and Domingos Arouca, the director of *O Brado Africano*, were imprisoned by the colonial administration, in 1965, for having devoted reports to Frelimo. Except for *O Brado Africano*, few newspapers deserved to be called ‘African press’. Only two magazines tried to distinguish themselves from the colonial press: *A Tribuna*, very short-lived, and private weekly magazine *Tempo*, founded in 1970, before the revolutionary journalism of national independence.

III SOCIALIST PROJECT AND REVOLUTIONARY JOURNALISM

The press voluntarily supported the socialist project of the Frelimo party after national independence in 1975. To understand this adherence, it is necessary to go back to the creation of the *Tempo* review and to the relations between its journalists and Frelimo, the then liberation movement. It is also question to analyse the involvement of some journalists at the *Agência de Informação de Moçambique*, AIM, and their engagements in the socialist project.

■ 1. THE COMMITMENT OF JOURNALISTS AT *TEMPO* AND *AIM* TO THE SOCIALIST PROJECT

The increasing presence of literary texts inspired by negritude in the press incentivized the revolt for the liberation of the colonies, and reinforced preliminary censorship in Mozambique. Conscious that this incentive of “resurgence of the oppressed people” would continue with well-disguised literary techniques, the Portuguese colonial administration acquired, in 1964, *Notícias*, a moderate daily newspaper of Lourenço Marques founded in 1926 and used as an instrument of propaganda.

In 1968, Marcelo Caetano, who succeeded former Prime Minister Salazar, became the head of the Portuguese government. Caetano tried to initiate a policy of opening of the colonies, with the possibility for Mozambique and Angola to gradually become autonomous States. This opening facilitated the creation of new newspapers. To release themselves from the employers' censorship, five journalists at *Notícias* (Ricardo Rangel, Mota Lopes, Areosa Pena, Rui Cartaxana and Ribeiro Pacheco) left the newspaper and founded *Sociedade de Redactores* to publish a weekly magazine, *Tempo*. Deprived of financial means,

Sociedade de Redactores was disbanded on February 4, 1970 and became a limited liability company with the designation of *Tempográfica*. This enabled new shareholders to entry. Thus, two groups existed within the *Tempográfica* press company. The first comprised of pro-Frelimo elements and the second of conservative officials supporting the colonial interests. As far as the first group is concerned, editors of *Tempo* gave an opinion in one of its leading article:

*“We are a small group of media professionals dissatisfied and frustrated by the information landscape in Mozambique, a group that came together to start a newspaper. But a newspaper that informs and does not obstruct (...) a newspaper that defends what we think as being in the interest of the majority, even if this could be made against the interests of some. In a single word, a newspaper that only engages for Mozambique and its future”.*²⁰

From the year 1971, the journalists at *Tempo*, in particular Mota Lopes and Ricardo Rangel, maintained a confidential relationship with Frelimo. According to Calane da Silva, former journalist at *Tempo*, they regularly received from Switzerland bulletins of propaganda of the movement, *the voice of the revolution*.²¹ Some articles of these bulletins were collected in the liberated zones inside the country by ‘journalists’ of the movement.

Soon, a division appeared within *Tempo* between the sympathizers of Frelimo, that is to say the majority of the journalists, and the opponents, supported by the private shareholders of the review. The great ideological question between these opponents arose during the coup d' Etat on April 25, 1974 in Portugal and centred on the future of Mozambique. One part supported the position of Frelimo for an immediate and unconditional independence for Mozambique, unlike the other part of the journalists, and especially the administration. The recourse to the vote became necessary so that the weekly magazine could give an opinion. According to Albino Magaia, this vote was won by the ‘radical’ pro-Frelimo elements, with the exception of only one vote. As from April 30, 1974, *Tempo* publicly announced its support for the independence of Mozambique. It was the first media organization that had stopped sending its contents to the preliminary censorship commission.²²

In September of the same year, Mota Lopes, a clandestine member of Frelimo, became the first journalist of the capital to go to the liberated zones inside the country and the seat of the movement in Tanzania. When he came back, he published for the first time in the Mozambican press the interviews of Samora Machel and Joaquim Chissano, top leaders of the movement. Thus Frelimo openly touched, for the first time, the black and the white urban elites of the capital. Through *Tempo*, Frelimo reversed the negative image forged by colonial propaganda.

²⁰*Tempo* n°1, September 1, 1970. Emphasis by the author.

²¹Emídio MACHIANA, *A Revista Tempo e a Revolução Moçambicana: Da Mobilização Popular ao Problema da Crítica na Informação*, 1974-1977, Maputo, PROMÉDIA, 2002, p.61.

²²Albino MAGAIA, Maputo, August 2003.

In September 1974, Frelimo gradually settled in the capital and realized that the press that supported it at that time was dominated by the white elite. A great part of the leadership of Frelimo then lived in a universe culturally different from that of the young urban intellectuals. Some of the latter were trained in foreign universities. They were over-represented in the editorial offices. According to Machado da Graça:

*“From the beginning there was no dialogue. The government was wary of these editorial offices formed by young people with a high academic background, without possessing any aspects of military discipline which characterized the zones of combat and with some antecedents of seeking to make critical information and manoeuvres. And of which a high percentage were Whites”.*²³

When Frelimo arrived in Lourenço Marques, at a time when all the indications pointed to a likely disengagement of the new Portuguese authorities, most of the journalists who did not support the Mozambican revolution left the country. Those who remained were in majority fascinated by the Marxist and Maoist ideas. This influence was born in the international context between 1950 and 1960. The recently independent African countries had left the colonial domination by the capitalist countries. The Soviet Union and China, by supporting the African liberation movements, favoured the diffusion of their ideology among these new States. In spite of the prohibition by the colonial authorities, these journalists read Karl Marx and watched films such as *The Mother*. That seems to explain their openly anti-capitalist aspirations, nourished by the ideas of the Portuguese Communist Party which had already circulated at the University of Lourenço Marques, attended by some journalists of *Tempo* such as Miguéis Lopes Júnior. As Paul Fauvet affirmed:

*“To be Marxist, in 1975, is nothing strange nor exotic. Marxism had become the dominant revolutionary ideology. This was not something imposed from outside on the resisting ‘rebellious’ journalists. However, it was regarded in an enthusiastic way as the theory and methodology that helped to understand the world. In addition, no influential journalists questioned the one-party system of the State. Nobody was against the assertion according to which the ‘one-party system’ was not only compatible with democracy, but also that the ‘people’s democracy’ implied a qualitative improvement compared to the ‘middle-class democracy’.”*²⁴

²³Machado DA GRAÇA, “Liberdade de Informação” in *140 anos de Imprensa em Moçambique*, op.cit, p.178.

²⁴Paul FAUVET & Marcelo MOSSE, *Carlos Cardoso e a Revolução Moçambicana*, Maputo, Ndjira, 2003, p.56.

Nothing about this exertion was surprising. Under colonial domination, Mozambique did not know any form of democracy and the principal Western democracies had tacitly supported Portugal's colonial wars. In Mozambique of those days [1974-1975], it was impossible to find out intellectuals who admitted to having liberal or social democratic viewpoints (even less of the right). Indeed, the expression 'social democrat' became pejorative.²⁵

These were the intellectual positions of the journalists in the editorial offices of the Mozambican press in 1974-1975. A part of these journalists, especially at *Tempo*, tried to be identified with the ideological line of the Frelimo party. But between 1974 and 1977, Frelimo did not have a clear ideological tendency. However, the intellectual training of these journalists enabled them to make interpretations on what they meant by Marxism, class struggle, anti-capitalism and socialism that was to be installed. According to Calane da Silva, they were on the left in the Frelimo party, whence the designation of 'leftists'.

The absence of a clear ideology engendered clashes between the press and the new political authority. A national conference of the Department of Information and Propaganda (DIP) was convened on November 26, 1975 in Macomia, in the northern part of the country to clarify the position of the party regarding the media and their future functions. Jorge Rebelo, then Chief of the DIP, took on the 'leftists' at *Tempo* and *Notícias*:

*"Many among us, especially in the press, are still dependent, whether in a conscious way or not, on the capitalist system, where newspapers are private properties, instruments to provide information to the rich about subjects that only interest the rich [...] There are also, in certain sections of the press, attitudes that vary from ideological confusion to the most shameful kind of opportunism, that foster radicalism among the petite bourgeoisie and the far left, and that have nothing to do with the reality of our people and revolution".*²⁶

Indeed, the two large publications of that era, *Tempo* and *Notícias*, were private newspapers. As Leite de Vasconcelos recalled, during the liberation movement, the journalist was also a warrior, a mobilizer and an activist. Luis Cabaço, a former Minister of Information, added that *"information inside the liberation fight had a character that was fundamentally operational, military and political, and consequently, functional in a context of combat"*.²⁷ At independence, Frelimo secured control of the media and imposed its operational military conception on the media: a revolutionary press at the service of the people as imagined by Frelimo. In 1975, Samora Machel, the then President of the Republic, saw the revolution as *"the working-class struggle to reverse the old order"*.²⁸

²⁵*Ibidem.*

²⁶Paul FAUVET & Marcelo MOSSE, *Carlos Cardoso, op.cit.*, p.59

²⁷Leite DE VASCONCELOS, "Algumas reflexões sobre a Imprensa pos-independência" in *140 anos, op.cit.*, p.141.

²⁸See Paul FAUVET, "O novo mundo está ser construído" in *Carlos Cardoso, op.cit.*, p.57.

Indeed, Frelimo needed to impose a new political system: the nation-building project, an idea borrowed from the socialist ideology, according to which a State plays a central role in the economy and in social organization. The new elite, harbinger of modernity, needed “*to create a strong State, the place of its social reproduction, a means of the fast creation of a modern nation of European and Jacobin types, repudiator of ethnicity*”.²⁹ In the conception of the one-party system, the press would serve to spread the arguments of legitimisation of this political project. Vasconcelos suggested that this design would oblige a poor State to support considerable expenditure to maintain and develop a national system of information of a dimension that only a small number of African countries could afford.³⁰ Thus the government created in 1980 *Agência de Informação de Moçambique, AIM*. Most of its journalists, and particularly two of the leading journalists, Mia Couto and Luís Carlos Patraquim, came from the *A Tribuna* newspaper that was pro-Frelimo, as *Tempo*. The intervention of the party in the operations of the media was not well accepted by the ‘leftists’. For its part, the Department of Information and Propaganda (DIP) of the party was persuaded that the intellectual ‘leftists’ were not taking the path dictated by Frelimo for the media. The ‘leftists’ did not remain indifferent to the actions of the authorities. *Notícias* and *Tempo* filled their pages with critical texts ranting against anarchy, abuse and waste practiced by certain leaders of the party. In response, Jorge Rebelo, the then Minister of Information who was often called the Marxist ideologue of Frelimo, carried out a ‘purge’, in 1976, targeted at the ‘leftists’ within *Notícias*:

*“One day, the Minister of Information convened a general meeting with the workers of the organization, without coordinating it with the management of the newspaper. He launched violent attacks on Notícias, the editorial board and the management of the newspaper. The charges were extremely serious. For instance, the journalists were accused of ‘being at the service of the enemy’. The meeting ended in the resignation of Director Pereira Coutinho and his replacement by Arlindo Lopes, a secretary representing the party’s hierarchy within the newspaper. The purge was immediate and, perhaps within one month, more than twenty qualified journalists left the newspaper”.*³¹

The intervention in *Notícias* consolidated ‘revolutionary journalism’ in the local press. Not only did the other newspapers remain passive in the face of this intervention, but they also tried to please the authorities by becoming instruments of mobilization and propaganda for the revolutionary ideology of Frelimo. The press, especially *Tempo*, took part in the project of ‘socialization’, by inviting the people to organize themselves in *communal villages*, in line with the creation of agricultural cooperatives.

²⁹Michel CAHEN, “Une Afrique Lusophone Libérale? La fin des premières Républiques” in *Lusotopie*, Karthala, 1995, p.89.

³⁰Leite DE VASCONCELOS, op.cit, p.142.

³¹Machado DA GRAÇA, op.cit, p.179.

The speeches of Samora Machel, the first President of the independent Republic, were fully reproduced in their pages, and the party's watchwords such as "*Viva a Aliança Operário Camponesa*", "*A Luta Continua*", "*Abaixo O Tribalismo*" flooded the review.

■ 2. THE HOUR OF THE 'LEFTISTS'

The core of President Samora Machel's advisers however soon quickly realized the intellectual ability of the journalists at *Tempo* thanks to the presence of two former journalists in the presidential office: Luis Bernardo Honwana and Aquino de Bragança. The latter was an academic in charge of the Centre of African Studies at the University of Maputo. "*Aquino was always ready to share his knowledge. Journalists attended his courses at the University and he received them in his home. These journalists included Carlos Cardoso, for whom Aquino had much consideration*".³² Aquino de Bragança had become a specialist of African liberation movements because he had followed the evolution of these movements and he was close to leaders like Ben Bella, Amílcar Cabral, Agostinho Neto and Mário de Andrade. On the other hand, Cardoso had attended (without finishing) some political science courses and also took part in the movements of protest against apartheid during the ten years he spent in South Africa. These experiences must have influenced Carlos Cardoso in his leftist convictions. According to Albino Magaia, Cardoso had Marxist convictions and clearly interpreted them to the other members of the editorial board. He was a real expert of Marxist philosophy.³³ That seems to explain why Cardoso and Aquino became close.

Two other intellectuals were close to the President: Sérgio Vieira, formerly Secretary of Eduardo Mondlane, and Fernando Honwana who had just returned to the country after having completed his higher education at the University of York, England. As individuals available for national debate, they found time to discuss the problems of the country with the journalists at *Tempo*. At that time, the group of journalists at *Tempo* was by far the most consistent in terms of professionalism. It was able to undertake political analyses of the world, even if this was not appreciated by the party. This was exactly what happened in 1979, during the extraordinary meeting of the Council for Coordination of Movements of the Non-aligned Countries held in Maputo. The *Tempo* review criticized the participation of the displaced Kampuchean regime of Pol Pot in this meeting, and what it considered the incomprehensible presence of the military dictatorial regime of Argentina in the Movement.³⁴ As a result of these criticisms, the review was forced to withdraw from the market, its manager was axed and some of the journalists transferred their services to other newspapers.

³²Paul FAUVET & Marcelo MOSSE, *Carlos Cardoso, op.cit.*, p.60.

³³Albino MAGAIA, Maputo, August 2003.

³⁴Albino MAGAIA, *op.cit.*

For two years, Frelimo had chosen a Marxist-Leninist orientation, and so these attacks were legitimate according to the 'leftists' at *Tempo*. The party did not adopt the same discourse and thus, the first ideological clash between the two parts ensured. Miguéis Lopes Júnior, a 'leftist' journalist, author of the critical articles, at the centre of the dispute, gave up the *Tempo* review for the *Notícias* daily newspaper.

Mia Couto became, at the age of twenty-four, the new Director of *Tempo*, succeeding Alves Gomes who "had just been removed". Carlos Cardoso went over to *Radio Moçambique*. The DIP was wary about the 'leftists' and it tried to scatter them in various newspapers. Thus the core that had left *Notícias* in 1976 joined Domingo, a weekly magazine created in 1981. Once again, the DIP intervened by recalling Ricardo Rangel, hitherto at *Tempo*, to take on the management of Domingo. Machado da Graça was transferred to *Radio Moçambique*. Miguéis Lopes Júnior, who became sub-editor of *Notícias*, was suspended for having published the Communist Manifesto in form of a strip cartoon. The suspension lasted for a long time and Miguéis Lopes Júnior interpreted this as a 'prosecution' and left the country.

In 1980, Carlos Cardoso was named editor of AIM. Fernando Lima, a 'leftist' who had left *Notícias* during the 'purge' in 1976, was promoted to the post of sub-editor. There was no director at the time, the editor thus became the highest authority. At AIM, Cardoso met Ian Christie, a Scottish journalist close to Frelimo (still a liberation movement then) since 1970 in Tanzania, who became (after independence) responsible for the English language service at *Radio Moçambique*. He recruited Paul Fauvet, an English journalist and member of the British Communist Party. They were all of Marxist tendency. Fauvet became a correspondent for AFP in Mozambique a few years later. Fernando Gonçalves, Maria de Lurdes Torcato and Leite de Vasconcelos (the latter represented the leftists at *Radio Moçambique*) were also at the agency. A new 'leftist' pole was re-formed when Joseph Hanlon, a BBC correspondent in Mozambique and a journalist with leftist convictions who became close to the AIM team arrived.

In 1977, the country found itself in an unfavourable geopolitical position, bounded on one side by the minority regime of Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia and on the other by the minority apartheid regime in South Africa. The two countries then wanted to destroy Frelimo to discourage their own black majority populations from taking the same path of armed rebellion.³⁵ Indeed, some Portuguese colonists did not appreciate the arrival of Frelimo in power and thus they went on 'exile' to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. With the collaboration of these Portuguese colonists, the Rhodesian regime created an armed group inside Mozambique that began its operations in the centre of the country. This group was composed of dissidents from Frelimo and some survivors of the "re-education camps".

³⁵See Victoria BRITAIN & Kevin WATKINS, "La souveraineté menacée des États de l'Afrique Australe: Impossible réconciliation en Angola et au Mozambique" in *Le Monde diplomatique*, February 1994, p.26.

But its base was constituted with what Michel Cahen called the “coalition of the marginalized”, i.e. a segment of a mainly rural population prohibited by Frelimo and guided by its project of authoritative modernization from any expression of the local ethnic and traditional chieftaincy identities. The latter also repressed their religious and animist rites, and obliged this population to gather in communal villages to create “the modern man”.³⁶ This warrior social organ³⁷ was known by the initials, MNR, later Renamo, *Resistência Nacional de Moçambique*.

Following the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, a project in which President Samora Machel invested much energy, MNR came under the control of the secret services of the South African forces. In the subsequent years, MNR intensified its actions and, at the same time, the South African air force undertook air raids inside the Mozambican territory under the cover of pursuing members of African National Congress, ANC. Magnus Malan, Chief of Staff of the South African forces, defended these raids in a major South African newspaper. Simultaneously, MNR multiplied its official statements in the Portuguese press. In the face of such an avalanche of ‘misinformation’, the Mozambican government ‘requested’ AIM to organize counter offensives. In fact, AIM coined the term ‘armed gangsters’ to describe MNR. According to Carlos Cardoso, “to call MNR ‘warriors’ would be an insult to the true warrior armies (...) The term ‘rebel’ was not appropriate either because it is neutral or because it does not sufficiently or clearly describe the nature of the organization and its actions to the international community”.³⁸

President Samora Machel then became even closer to the journalists at AIM. Machel received them in his office to analyse internal and regional events. A close relationship was thus forged between AIM and the presidential office. Privileged, the journalists at AIM became some kind of elites within the media and a class of advisers to the President of the Republic. They were even more privileged in terms of media coverage of the ceremonies and presidential trips. The journalists at AIM highly shared the same view on the engagements of President Samora Machel. They were Carlos Cardoso, Fernando Lima, Ian Christie, Paul Fauvet, Leite de Vasconcelos, Mia Couto (at that time Director of *Notícias* and the *Domingo* weekly magazine, then independent), Alves Gomes, Machado da Graça, and Sol de Carvalho. The three last individuals were not at AIM.

³⁶Michel CAHEN, *Les Bandits: un historien au Mozambique*, 1994, Paris, Fondation Calouste Gulbenkian, 2002, p.4-5.

³⁷By using this term Michel Cahen wanted to express that Renamo was neither a mercenary group depending from external forces nor a political party.

³⁸PAUL FAUVET & Marcelo MOSSE, *Carlos Cardoso, op.cit.*, p.127.

The devotion of these professionals made AIM one of the most respected agencies in Africa during the decade 1980-1990. Cardoso had become a very attentive analyst of the policy of regional destabilization carried out by the apartheid regime. According to Albino Magaia, Cardoso even went on to disapprove publicly, during a meeting of the party chaired by Samora Machel, the idea of signing an agreement with the South African regime.³⁹ According to Graça Machel, the widow of Samora, this confrontation earned him the recognition of the President of the Republic.⁴⁰

At the beginning of the 1980s, in mid Cold War, the political leaders of Frelimo tried to isolate Renamo by reconciling with its former enemies. Mozambican diplomats then approached Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States and finally, the enemy itself, South Africa. Indeed, Samora Machel seemed to have understood that the war was an obstacle to development and that the 'socialist' policy, if confronted with internal, regional and international realities, pointed to an acknowledgement of failure. "*One does not choose its neighbours*", said the President, apparently convinced about the importance of an agreement. The Agreement of Non-Aggression and Good Neighbourliness was signed with South Africa on March 16, 1984, on the riverbanks of Nkomati, divided between the two countries. Mozambique sought to obtain promises on the end of financing for the guerrilla from the apartheid regime. In exchange, it committed itself to never accommodate guerrillas of the African National Congress within its territory.

■ 3. THE ORPHANED LEFTISTS

As Cardoso suspected, the South African government did not keep to its promises. The relations between the two countries did not improve and, following to serious accusations from General Magnus Malan against the authorities in Maputo, the President reunited with his usual team of journalists in his office on October 11, 1986. Cardoso warned that the President himself could be a probable target of the apartheid regime. Four days later, Cardoso wrote an article "*Machel: a probable target*". The article was considered speculative and too alarmist by some journalists. No one accepted to publish it. On October 19, the presidential jet crashed in Mbuzini, inside the South African territory. President Samora Machel and thirty-three other people, among them some individuals very valuable to the journalists at AIM, such as Aquino de Bragança, Fernando Honwana and Muradali Mamadhusen, acting as a manager at *Tempo* between 1976 and 1977, perished in this accident. Following the Mbuzini accident, the 'premonitory' article of Cardoso was published in *Tempo*.⁴¹

³⁹ Albino MAGAIA, Maputo, August 2003.

⁴⁰ See the homage of Graça Machel to Carlos Cardoso and Siba-Siba Macuacua – the latter temporary chairman of one of principal banks in Mozambique, the Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento, both assassinated while they inquired about the fraud in the national bank sector in the country – in *Metical* n°1057 August 22, 2001.

⁴¹ See *Tempo* of November 2, 1986.

Joaquim Chissano, then Foreign Minister, was named President of the Republic by the political leadership of Frelimo. Chissano put into play the ideological departure initiated by its predecessor. Earlier in 1984, the country, at the edge of bankruptcy, had submitted to the IMF and the World Bank. Three years later, in 1987, the country launched a Structural Adjustment Programme and liberalized its economy. In political terms, the abandonment of the Marxist-Leninist tendency was then confirmed. Reconciliation with the West became paramount. AIM, still profiting from its coverage of the conflict in Angola, after another intervention by Cuban and South African forces, remained an undeniable source of information. The local press refused several write-ups on international issues written by the AIM journalists on the ground that it was not convenient to tackle the West when the country was seeking to reconcile with it and that the country was becoming increasingly dependent on it.⁴² Politically, some journalists at AIM felt overwhelmed by the ideological transformation of the party. Thus, Armindo Chavana, journalist/ director of programmes at *Televisão de Moçambique* (TVM) and member of board of the *Mediacoop-jornalistas associados* press group, affirmed that the ‘leftists’ had become ‘orphans’ of the socialist ideology and Samora Machel’s board.⁴³

The new executives in Maputo were no longer close to the journalists at AIM. From then on, it was the rising generation of post-independence journalists who formed the presidential delegation during post-independence ceremonies and State visits. This new generation of journalists, essentially blacks, began to increasingly occupy editorial positions in the press. Felizardo Massimbe, former editor at TVM, was persuaded that the new Minister of Information, Teodato Hunguana, had adopted a deliberate policy of promotion of a rising generation of journalists.⁴⁴

In homage to Carlos Cardoso, after his brutal disappearance in November 2000, Mia Couto confirmed the feeling of orphanage expressed by the ‘leftists’:

*“In the last few years, Cardoso had acknowledged his regrets and to have been on the side of what he had projected as the ideal Samora Moisés Machel. He regretted especially the utopia according to which we thought we would be our own Masters, without having to beg the world for crumbs for our survival”.*⁴⁵

Following the divergences between the authorities and the ‘leftists’, José Catorze was dismissed in 1989 from the editorial board of *Notícias*, and he was accused of “primary anticommunism”. The same year, Calane da Silva was asked to resign from the editorial board of TVM.⁴⁶

⁴²Indeed, the US Embassy in Maputo complained to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to the Ministry of Information about the “leftist” journalists’ articles condemning the US invasion in Granada and the US intervention in Panama and Nicaragua. In response, the authorities ordered the banning on publishing any article condemning the West in the press. The US influence in the internal affairs in Mozambique was such that Ambassador Melissa Wells wrote the entire chapter about the rights and individual freedoms of the Constitutional project submitted to popular debate in 1990.

⁴³Armindo CHAVANA, Maputo, September 2003.

⁴⁴Felizardo MASSIMBE, Maputo, September 2003.

⁴⁵*Mediafax* n°2156, November 27, 2000.

⁴⁶The true reason of these resignations was political affairs. We will analyse it in the second part of this essay.

IV LIBERALIZATION OF THE PRESS

The conquest of a space of freedom by the press represents the consolidation of a political protest.

■ 1. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND THE RIGHT OF PEOPLE TO INFORMATION

The position of the media depends on the level of stability or the presence of a civil war. Political stability and changeover of political power between parties support the role of the media and in fact even that of the political actors.⁴⁷ Right from the independence of Mozambique, ownership of newspapers and broadcasting were monopolized by the State. It was the principal instrument used to inform the masses of the guiding lines of the political authorities. The radio, the only medium that covered the entire territory, occupied a dominant place in this relation with the State, all the more since it profited from its capacity to use African languages easily understood by the population.

By the end of 1980, the war was propagated and consequently reinforced the official control of the media, especially at the editorial level. The instructions of the DIP were more than ever obligatory:

*“The immediate publication by the journalists of a criticism constitutes, in practice, an attack against the Party and the State. [The journalist] while being above all a citizen and having the same duties as a member of the Party, the most correct procedure is to communicate errors and skids noted with the relevant structure of the Party or the State. While acting in this way, the publication of criticism will be done in line with the decisions taken by the Party or by the State in order to solve the problem. Thus, criticism becomes constructive and educational for the masses [people] and prevents it from being re-appropriated by the enemy against the popular power”.*⁴⁸

The journalists, who tried to follow these guidelines, not only did not receive the official version of the facts but they were portrayed as wanting to destroy the popular conquests. Besides, the list of instructions was not restricted to them:

*“The professional writer must be subordinated to the discipline and the guideline of Frelimo with regards to contents and form of his writings”.*⁴⁹

⁴⁷ André-Jean TUDESQ, *Les Médias en Afrique*, Paris, Ellipses, 1999, p.9.

⁴⁸ Extract of the report of the first national seminar on Information, 1978.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*.

The control of the media and of all the means of dissemination of information affected the understanding of the civil war in Mozambique. Indeed, the population did not quickly understand the issues since the powers used the scientific community to forge a favourable image of the regime. We can point out the nomination of Sérgio Vieira, former Minister of Agriculture and Interior Security, at the post of director of *Centro de Estudos Africanos*, the most important research institute in social sciences of the University of Maputo.⁵⁰ If at the beginning the guerrilla was an external creation, it however acquired, in the mid 1980s, organizational autonomy with regards to the South African Defence Forces. At the same time, Frelimo multiplied errors that led to the increasing adherence of the rural populations to the guerrilla. These skids are largely due to the social policy of communal villages that involved “*the massive move of traditional chiefs, members of their lineages and their chieftaincy, obliged to give up their old dwellings and their enclosures with cattle burnt, and also obliged to give up their land, their cultures and a good part of their harvests, their trees and their cemeteries, to go and settle in the local community village*”.⁵¹ Frelimo marginalized the traditional chiefs by subjecting them to the authority of new political administrators who were perceived as ‘impostors’ by the traditional chiefs. Many of the latter, and of their people, allied themselves with Renamo, thus constituting a base of considerable support, since eighty per cent of the Mozambican population lived in the rural zones.

During the period 1984 -1985, disillusionment replaced the hope of the euphoric post-independence years. Official speech increasingly remote from reality and journalists/literary writers began to publish their criticisms in literary pages. Luís Carlos Patraquim writing in 1985 in the *Gazeta de Artes e Letras* (the literary column of the *Tempo* review he edited at that time) contrasted “*between the real country and the fictitious country*”. Patraquim, who made these remarks to a young student, later confirmed that because of this criticism, he was accused of holding a counter-revolutionary speech, and of even belonging to Renamo.⁵² The same charges were intended for another journalist, Rui Zunguze, after he criticized the social policy of the authorities. Zunguze was assassinated in the central station of the capital a few days after the publication of his articles in *Tempo*. Disturbed by these events, Patraquim left the country one year later to Portugal.

At that time, the Renamo guerrilla reinforced its political propaganda transmitted by the radio. From then on, the war was also conducted at the level of the press. On one side, there was the official press and on the other, *A Voz da Renamo* (The Voice of Renamo), the radio of the guerrilla.

⁵⁰About this relation between the authorities and the researchers of *Centro de Estudos Africanos* see Christian GEFFRAY, “Fragments d’un discours de pouvoir 1975-1985: Du bon usage d’une méconnaissance scientifique”, in *Politique africaine* n°29, Paris, Karthala, March 1988, p.71-85.

⁵¹Christian GEFFRAY, *La cause des armes au Mozambique*: *Anthropologie d’une guerre civile*, Paris, Karthala, 1990, p.50

⁵²For more details see Guillaume CABANES, *Le discours politique du Frelimo et de la Renamo à travers la presse écrite au Mozambique 1992-1994*, Master’s degree dissertation, University of Paris VII, 1997, p.102-103

The reinforcement of political propaganda affected the credibility of the national media facing the public. A new phenomenon thus appeared. The population became increasingly interested in foreign press in order to be better informed about what was occurring in the country. Indeed, the censorship in the official media was then characterized by interferences in major editorial decisions, which came from a section of the government. An editorial college met every week with the Ministry of Information to receive guidelines of the regime. Directed by members of the ruling party, the official press, used self-censorship for fear of being prosecuted.

In 1989, the rumours circulated among the journalists that the ruling party had prepared a document on the regulation of the media. The news was badly accepted by the journalists. Indeed, they believed that the DIP was going to give guidelines again, they did not want to receive anymore, especially the liberal journalists known as the ‘leftists’ who felt marginalized by the ruling party.

They rather forwarded a private bill to the party. The idea of revolt against institutional pressure was put into practice. Carlos Cardoso, Albino Magaia, Kok Nam, Fernando Lima and Ricardo Rangel noted the absence of the “right of the people to information” in the new Constitution project.

In February 1990, they prepared a document denouncing the attacks on the freedom of the press:

*“We consider that it is essential to work up a law for the press which is based on the principles established by the Constitution. We also consider that information must have an important role in public discussion on the revision of the Constitution, in order to reflect, in an objective way, the contents of this debate and the social, political, economic and cultural contexts in which the revision is being carried out. In this sense, and because we believe that there are currently serious problems that constitute a constraint to the effectiveness and credibility of information, we propose that certain methods and rules are observed right now to ensure the freedom of the press”.*⁵³

More than one hundred fifty journalists of various media organizations joined this protest. Reactions from some governmental institutions were swift. The document was described as subversive and tension emerged between the two parties. The authorities regarded the document as a “conspiracy by whites”. Among the five journalists who initiated the petition only Albino Magaia was black, while Ricardo Rangel was half-caste.

⁵³Albino MAGAIA, *Informação em Moçambique: A Força da Palavra*, Maputo, Publicações Notícias, 1994, p.136.

This reinforced the distorted idea of a plot orchestrated by white ‘leftists’: Carlos Cardoso, Calane da Silva and Leite de Vasconcelos. Misunderstood, the journalists then decided to take their case to the President of the Republic, Joaquim Chissano, in order to protect their civic rights. On May 29, 1990, a meeting was held between the President of the Republic and the journalists. After a lengthy discussion that prolonged until the middle of the night, Mr. Chissano accepted the inclusion of the freedom of the press in the supreme law. Thus the freedom of the press and the right of the people to information appeared for the first time in the new Constitution project. Teodato Hunguana, a lawyer and then Minister of Information, wrote the whole chapter on the freedom of expression. This episode clearly shows the ambiguity of Frelimo’s ‘party-State’. Indeed, on one hand, it was reluctant to embrace the idea of a law inspired by the ‘leftists’, but on the other hand, it was able to work out a law on the freedom of the press considered the most advanced in Africa.

After one year of debate in the media and of several meetings held by public companies and institutions all over the country, a new Constitution was voted in November 1990.⁵⁴

It highlighted under article 74 “*the right to freedom of expression and freedom of the press as well as the right to information*”. It provided a *Conselho Superior de Comunicação Social* to guarantee the aforesaid rights. The law required all the media organizations to register with the Ministry of Information and stipulated that only Mozambicans could own, fund or manage these organizations. From then on, an independent press was allowed. The liberal journalists who in the last few years had sought a space to express themselves were the first to go into the world of independent press.

■ 2. THE MEDIA IN MOZAMBIQUE DURING THE PERIOD 1990-2000

The decade 1990-2000 will remain in the history of the media a period of rupture with official control and the era of superabundance of official information. From then on, information became a commodity and competition between the media organizations became the norm. Their circulation figures became confidential and the journalists began to go beyond official sources in order to balance them with the results of their own private investigations.

⁵⁴This debate was carried out in the cities. The war prevented their occurrence in the rural areas, which delayed the understanding of political liberalization in the distant areas.

▲ 2.1 THE OFFICIAL MEDIA

For a long time tied to the powers that be, the official media suffers from this connection. Their recent opening came with the competition of the new independent media. Four years after the Constitution of 1990, the official media became relatively free from state control. Only AIM, *Agência de Informação de Moçambique*, remained a state organ.

The principal media in Mozambique is *Radio Moçambique*, founded in 1933. After the independence of the country, this radio had three channels: a national channel, an inter-provincial channel (two provinces), eleven regional radios, and a foreign service, to which the FM *Radio Cidade* was added. *Radio Moçambique* covered nearly sixty per cent of the country and it broadcasted in Portuguese (the official language), English (for one hour and a half) and in eleven African languages.

Since 2000, thanks to the satellite signal, the programmes of *Radio Moçambique* can be followed in all parts of the country. The inter-provincial channel was divided into two: the channels of Maputo and Gaza province. The Foreign Service became *Maputo Corridor Radio* and increased its airtime to twelve hours per day.

The first television network appeared in Mozambique in 1981. In the 1990s, it covered the principal cities. Technical efforts to increase the power of the signal of emission were made. In the following years, this enabled it to widen the ray of its signal around the towns of Maputo, Beira and Nampula. Gradually, new network centres were installed in Lichinga, Îlha de Moçambique, Quelimane, Pemba, Xai-Xai, Chimoio, Inhambane, Vilanculos and Songo. Thanks to the transmission through Intelsat 804 satellite, the quality of the signal improved quickly. Hence, these networks covered more than sixty per cent of the territory. Sixty-five per cent of this public television network was financed by advertising and the remaining thirty-five per cent by State subsidies. Fifty-five per cent of its programmes or productions (news bulletins included) were from local sources, while forty-five per cent were imported.⁵⁵ The imports were essentially serials [Telenovelas] from Brazil. Others, that were free, came from *Transtel*, *Deutsche Welle*, *Radio Televisão Portuguesa Internacional*, as well as *Canal France International (CFI)*.

As everywhere in the world, television is a very powerful medium in Mozambique, what the authorities understood very well. They nominated close confidants to important board positions. For the political opposition, in spite of political pluralism in the country, Frelimo continued to control the media, in particular TVM.⁵⁶ During the period of the general elections, in 1994 and 1999, the Carter Foundation and the US State Department accused TVM of playing the game of the ruling party.⁵⁷

⁵⁵IBAR (Institute of Survey of the BBC) 1995.

⁵⁶See the interview of Manuel Fonseca, legislator of Renamo, in *Savana* n°256 November 11, 1988.

⁵⁷See "In December elections: Partisans Media" on <http://www.mol.co.mz/noticias/mediafax/2000/>

In the press, the average print run for *Notícias* was thirty thousand during the 1990s. *Notícias* is a traditional newspaper of governmental tendency. It is a semi-private organization. It belongs to a commercial company, *Sociedade de Notícias*, of which one of the principal shareholders is the Central Bank. This institution inherited this tradition of involvement in media from the old colonial Central Bank, the *Banco Nacional Ultramarino* that also owned a part of *Notícias da Beira*, currently *Diário de Moçambique*, the daily newspaper of Beira (second city of Mozambique).

Tempo maintained its private status after independence. In spite of the private and semi-private status of the national newspapers, the Ministry of Information took over editorial control after independence and it usurped the prerogative power to name the directors of these organs of social communication. To achieve this goal, the State claimed that the public companies were the major shareholders in these newspapers. Indeed, this interference was carried out without any legal bases. Once the official control was established in these media, the latter had a double status. It was private but also subjected to the State, so much so that some of the representatives of the government belonged to the executive board.

The print-run of *Domingo* is twenty thousand. This semi-private weekly magazine is also under the official shade via *Sociedade de Notícias*. Since 1994, the newspaper has publicly displayed its pro-Frelimo lining. It is necessary to note, however, that sometimes to support government does not necessarily mean to be in favour of the Frelimo party. The pro-government tendency is more common with a rising generation of technocrats who surrounded President Chissano for a few years. This generation did not take part directly in the fight for national liberation and, in a majority of cases, it was formed abroad. The leading light of *Domingo* supports the old guard of the party, i.e. the first post-independence leaders from the military apparatus of Frelimo who are returning in full force thanks to the nomination of Armando Guebuza as presidential candidate in 2004.⁵⁸

There is also *Diário de Moçambique*, a daily newspaper based in Beira. Its publications were often interrupted during the second part of the decade 1990-2000 because of financial but also technical difficulties. In 2001, the State injected funds and acquired two new rotary prints that made it possible to print the newspaper in Beira and Maputo simultaneously.

Tempo had the same difficulty during the same decade. In spite of two attempts of official financings, it was not saved. In 2003, new shareholders (including the State as usual) took on the management of Tempográfica. Presently, *Tempo* is edited in Maputo but it is printed in Lisbon and distributed across five Lusophone African countries, as well as in Portugal.

Sociedade de Notícias also owns *Desafio*, the weekly sporty magazine with the highest circulation rate of twenty-five thousand copies.

⁵⁸ Armando Guebuza has been President of the Republic of Mozambique since January 2005. He became President after the general elections of December 2004. In the past, he was the government negotiator in chief in the peace negotiations in Rome between the government and Renamo. He was also the Chief of the Frelimo party in the multi-party system in the National Assembly. Member of Frelimo, since the latter was created, Guebuza had occupied many governmental positions after the independence of the country and he is often called the representative of Frelimo hard-line.

▲ 2.2 THE INDEPENDENT MEDIA

The appearance of an independent media changed the Mozambican media landscape and offered another vision of journalism hitherto unknown or little known to the general public. The frontal nature of the articles was notable, so were accusations, denunciations, opinions and analyses by experts emerged in the press. About ten publications, with the Mediacoop group as leader, competed for a place within national media environment.

2.2.1 THE MEDIACOOP-JORNALISTAS ASSOCIADOS COOPERATIVE

Journalists who wanted to release themselves from official control formed the *Mediacoop-jornalistas associados* cooperative in 1991, for varied reasons. One must note, in particular, the ‘difficulties’ of the public press in creating spaces of freedom in spite of the political opening in 1989.

Salomão Moyana, former journalist at AIM and at *Domingo*, affirmed that the journalists of the official press wanted to remain in their respective newspapers but “*while being integral part of the historical process of transformation of these media, then controlled by the Frelimo party, in national media, independent and non-partisan, with a competence to intervene in a critical way in the general process of the political transition in Mozambique, from the one-party to the multi-party system*”.⁵⁹ But cleavages between the journalists with a liberal conception of information and the authorities continued to worsen, so much so that the Minister of Information [Teodato Hunguana] at that time [1990] called the former the “*liberal anarchists of information*”.⁶⁰

Thus liberal journalists had to realize their dreams elsewhere by melting into *Mediacoop* that included three newspapers: *Mediafax*, *Mozambique In View* and *Savana*. *Mediacoop* is characterized by the professional links between its founders and Carlos Cardoso, either while at *Tempo* or at AIM. At AIM, Salomão Moyana, Antonio Gumende, Gil Lauriciano, Fernando Lima and Fernando Veloso were ‘disciples’ of Cardoso. The later resigned from the editorial office in 1989 and left the agency the following year. He decided to give up journalistic activities since he had been disappointed by the official system of control of the press in place.

After several invitations, Cardoso subscribed to the project by the end of 1991. The legal registration of *Mediacoop* was done on February 6, 1992. On May 25, *Mediafax* (daily distributed via fax) was born. During the first week, it recorded twenty subscribers, including the Presidency. All the articles that appeared in the first six weeks were entirely written by

⁵⁹Salomão Moyana, “Savana: um projecto em execução” in *140 anos, op.cit.*, p.145.

⁶⁰*Ibidem.*

Cardoso, its first editor. The other members, who were yet to legalize their departures from the ‘public newspapers’, could not immediately make contributions.

The list of the members of the project increased when Ricardo Rangel and Kok Nam, former colleagues of Cardoso at *Tempo*, arrived. The meeting between Carlos Cardoso, Ricardo Rangel, Kok Nam, Fernando Lima and Fernando Veloso just reunited the white left members of Frelimo were reserved about. Two other journalists, Manuel Fernando and António Elias, were from *Tempo*.

Salomão Moyana, recruited by Cardoso at AIM, became the black journalist involved in the greatest number of tensions with the authorities. In 1986, he was ordered by Minister of Information Teodato Hunguana to close the AIM delegation in Nampula province and to join Maputo within forty-eight hours. In spite of the insistence of Cardoso, Moyana was transferred to *Domingo* where he became sub-editor a few months later. Moyana left *Domingo* to *Mediacoop* with two of his colleagues, Lourenço Jossias and Orlando Muchanga, all considered subversive journalists within the weekly magazine.

Gil Lauriciano was ideologically close to Cardoso. In the 1980s, he was a war correspondent for AIM, and he was attached to national army. A young journalist from the Mozambican television and a history student at the University of Maputo, Armindo Chavana, also joined the group in 1992. Mediafax inherited a tradition that was more ‘leftist’ than the Frelimo party. It should be stressed that this daily newspaper was the ‘mirror’ of Carlos Cardoso’s thought. Two years after the newspaper was created, Cardoso edited it with the help of two other journalists, Orlando Muchanga and Arnaldo Abílio.

According to the Information Office (the regulatory organ for the media in Mozambique) the print-run of *Mediafax*, was six hundred. But in fact, *Mediafax* never reached this circulation figure. The highest known figure of this daily was four hundred fifty subscribers in 1995. However, it is the paper much more widely circulated in form of photocopies within public institutions and private companies. Another publication from the *Mediacoop* group is *Mozambique In view*. A twelve-page bi-monthly bulletin created in March 1994, *Mozambique In view* is published in English, under the management of Gil Lauriciano.

Beside these last two publications, there is also *Savana*. The first and largest independent weekly magazine in the country, *Savana* appeared for the first time on January 21, 1994. In the first seven months, it had twenty-four pages and afterwards, thirty-two pages. Fifteen thousand copies were printed in 1994. Kok Nam has been the Managing Director since the newspaper was created. Salomão Moyana was the editor until 2002, when he was replaced by Fernando Gonçalves, former correspondent for AIM in Harare and also a very close confidant of Cardoso. Very critical of the abuses of political power and what is according to the newspaper “*the arrogance of the Frelimo party*”, *Savana* is often regarded as following an anti-party/government tendency.

Following an internal crisis, Salomão Moyana left *Savana* with Fernando Lima, a member of board of the cooperative, and he created in 2003 his own newspaper, *Zambezi*, sympathizer of the PPD, a new political party led by Raúl Domingos, former Chief of the Renamo group in the National Assembly. Moyana left *Savana* with some journalists, Lourenço Jossias and Ercínio de Salema among others.

According to the management of the Mediacoop-jornalistas associados cooperative, Salomão Moyana was dismissed because of his poor commitment to *Savana*, which resulted in the fall in the sales of the weekly magazine. Moyana was said to be more interested in his personal businesses than in the newspaper. He refuted these charges and he rather pointed out the lack of means and the low level of wages as the principal reasons for the lack of motivation among journalists. Indeed, the financial health of *Savana* had not been good for a long time. In the years 1995-1996, the newspaper accumulated losses and it was constantly financed by profits from Mediafax. This situation caused the departure of Carlos Cardoso in 1997, since he did not like to see the newspaper that he edited giving aid to *Savana*. But the true reason for the dismissal of Moyana seems to be his increasingly radical positions against both the ruling party and the Renamo party to the benefit of IPADE, the Democratic Institute for Peace and Development that became an opposition party under the platform of PPD. Since 1999, *Savana* has been a kind of mouthpiece for IPADE, which some board members did not appreciate, particularly Fernando Lima. Another reason seems to be the publication by *Savana* of letters of the convicted in Cardoso's murder and banks fraud trials, which the board members interpreted as an instrumentalization of *Savana* from 'external' interests.

With Fernando Gonçalves as editor, *Savana* rediscovered its status of weekly magazine that is unavoidable, critical but respectful of journalistic equilibrium. Gonçalves restored the printing level of fifteen thousand, making *Savana* the best-seller weekly magazine in the country. Its closest rival, *Zambezi*, has a circulation figure of six thousand.

2.2.2 IMPARCIAL, METICAL AND OTHER BULLETINS

Two other publications appeared in 1994: *Demos* and *Imparcial*. The first is a weekly magazine with a circulation figure of five thousand belongs to the private group, *Coopartes Editorial*. *Demos* was often regarded within the journalistic circle as the representative of the American State Department because of the good relationship between its former editor, Noé Dimande, and the Embassy of the United States in Mozambique and because of its pro-American standpoint. A great part of the initial funding for *Demos* came from the United States Agency for International Development, the USAID.

Imparcial, the other faxed daily bulletin, is supposed to publish two thousand copies, according to official sources. But no faxed daily newspaper is known to exceed the four hundred fifty copies recorded by *Mediafax*, leader of this market in the country. An independent and openly pro-Renamo daily, *Imparcial* found its place among the new bulletins resulting from the liberalization of the social communication sector. This bulletin was edited by Miguéis Lopes Júnior who returned to the country eleven years after his ‘forced’ departure. It should be noted that journalists and observers see his political position after he came back as the result of the marginalization he was victim of.⁶¹

In 1996, two new publications made their appearance: the sporty magazine, *Campeão*, and the bulletin, *Correio da Manhã*. Owned by the *Edisport* group, *Campeão* is a weekly magazine published in six thousand copies according to official sources. *Correio da Manhã*, a faxed daily bulletin founded by the *Sojornal* group, has a subscriber base of two hundred.

O Popular Fim de Semana, a weekly magazine with a leading tendency different from that of the other newspapers, was distributed for the first time in 1997. A sensational paper, this magazine recorded certain success among the readers. Owned by Leandro Paul, former journalist at *Tempo* (1977-1978) and *África Jornal* in Lisbon (1980s), *O Popular Fim de Semana* publishes between three thousand and five thousand copies.

Carlos Cardoso left *Mediafax* in 1997 to form *Metical*, that he owned and edited at the same time, with the same process of diffusion. The formation of this newspaper did not compete with *Mediafax*. On the contrary, the readers subscribed to the two newspapers. The level of subscription or circulation of *Metical* was thus almost the same as that of *Mediafax*. This showed that a certain group of readers can become faithful to several newspapers, provided that the editorial policy meets their needs of information. Indeed, the new publication of Cardoso was, as he affirmed in his first leading article, a “continuity of *Mediafax*”.⁶²

In spite of its competition with other new publications, no newspaper succeeded in attaining the level of quality of *Metical*. Unavoidable, *Metical* marked the peak of the period of denunciation in the history of the Mozambican press’ transition.

In Beira, the second largest city in the country, a faxed paper, *Autarca*, began to circulate in 1998. It is owned by a journalist known as Falume Chabane. According to official sources, this bulletin has about five hundred subscribers. In 1999, another leading faxed paper was born. The paper is part of the daily bulletin, *Expresso da Tarde*, founded by Salvador Raimundo, a former journalist at *Diário de Moçambique*.

⁶¹Miguéis Lopes Júnior died in 2002.

⁶²Carlos Cardoso, *Metical* n° 1 June 25, 1997.

2.2.3 THE RELIGIOUS AND COMMERCIAL MEDIA

In Mozambique, private radios are authorized only on FM. The first such radios to emerge were religious: *Radio Encontro* in Nampula, *Radio Miramar* in Maputo and *Radio Pax* in Beira. The two Catholic radios, *Encontro* and *Pax*, broadcasted only religious news. On the other hand, *Radio Miramar*, a Protestant or Pentecostal station owned by the Brazilian group, *Rede de Comunicação Miramar*, is a more liberal broadcaster. It covers various issues, including politics [in which it does not invest itself so much], religion as well as entertainment. *Rede de Comunicação Miramar* has also run, since 1999, in Mozambique, a TV channel, *Televisão Miramar*.

The Catholic religious press is not restricted to the two radios, *Encontro* and *Pax*. While *Radio Pax* was stopped by the new authorities in 1977, the newspaper *Vida Nova* continued to exist. Printed in Nampula in about twenty thousand copies, this monthly newspaper circulates only among Catholics. The magazine became highly politicised with the hostility of Frelimo towards the Catholic Church in the first years after independence. *Vida Nova* was also used to denounce violations of the human rights in the country.

Apart from the religious radios, there are other channels. The former radio of the guerrilla, *Voz da Renamo*, transmitting from South Africa, became *Radio Terra Verde*. It broadcasts on FM from Maputo. In the 1990s, there was also a radio-television station, RTK, a property of Carlos Pereira Klint, a businessman and a legislator of the Frelimo party. The channel was used as relay for CNN, *C-Span* and *Canal France International-TV*. Presently, due to financial constraints, only the radio station is operational. RTK is the first private commercial radio in the country.

part two

the era of denunciation

The press and the drift towards authoritarianism

**I. MEDIA, PUBLIC DISCOURSE AND
POLITICAL PROTEST**

**II THE PECULIARITY OF THE
POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION IN
MOZAMBIQUE**

The press and the drift towards authoritarianism

I. MEDIA, PUBLIC DISCOURSE AND POLITICAL PROTEST

■ 1. THE ROLE OF FOREIGN MEDIA IN PRO-DEMOCRACY MOVEMENTS IN AFRICA

One of the paradoxes of the monopoly of local media by African authoritarian States is that, while they prohibited local private radios, they conceded frequencies of antenna to foreign radios, the programme contents of which were out of their control. Thus, foreign stations such as *RFI*, *BBC*, *VOA*, *Deutsche Welle* and *Africa n°1* broadcasted in several African countries since the time of the one-party rule. During the period of the one-party rule, more radio broadcasts than television programmes were received in Africa. From the very beginning, there was an “*implicit recognition of their role in domestic political life as both government and opposition forces see them as a major challenge*”.⁶³

In the 1960s and the 1970s, while the Soviet Block seemed to give signs of certain cohesion and while Africanists helped to ‘justify’ their one-party rule, many African leaders were less concerned with the vision of the [Western] international media about their countries. By the end of the 1980s, everything changed. As a result of the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, information released in one country was likely, like a contagious disease, to have repercussions in another. During this era of globalisation supported by the development of new technologies of communication, “*African leaders [were] more sensitive to what the foreign media [said] about them and their country*”.⁶⁴ In some African countries, reproduction and analysis of the events in Eastern Europe alone in the local press were almost prohibited.

In Mozambique, for example, José Catorze, Director of Notícias, was dismissed in 1989 for having devoted an article to the collapse of the Soviet Empire. J. Catorze regarded the ideological turn of the Mozambican authorities as the “end of a farce” while recalling how

⁶³ André-Jean TUDESQ, “L’influence des radios et des télévisions étrangères sur la vie politique en Afrique Subsaharienne” in Cheneau-Loquay (edition) *Enjeux des technologies de la communication en Afrique*: *Du téléphone à Internet*, Paris, Karthala, 2000, p. 357.

⁶⁴ André-Jean TUDESQ, “L’influence des radios ...”, *op.cit.*, 357.

inconsequential and unpopular was the vote of Mozambique in the United Nations aimed at avoiding the international condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

In the face of this “globalisation of problems”, to use the expression of Andre-Jean Tudesq, African leaders resorted to various strategies: to threaten local correspondents [their nationals] and foreign journalists working for these media, to suspend or censor the programmes and/or to cultivate ‘friendship’ with these foreign media. In Kenya, Arap Moi did not hesitate to order a cut in the news programmes of the BBC when the latter criticized his government. In Zambia, private radio stations alleged to be close to the opposition [the MMD] were vandalised. It was the BBC that offered the opposition a platform for self-expression, at a time when access to the public media was restricted. In Angola, local correspondents for foreign media were also victims of persecution within the public media. Thus, the majority of them finally joined the private press.

In terms of political claims, opposition groups in African countries appropriated again international events relayed by the foreign media to legitimise their demands. For example, in 1989, Frederick Chiluba, from Zambia, asked rhetorically: “*If the socialist countries themselves have abandoned the one-party system, who are Africans to maintain it?*”.⁶⁵ In Mozambique, Afonso Dhlakama, the leader of the other armed movement, did not hesitate to declare in 1992 that “*the purpose of the fight of Renamo [that he led] was to establish the democracy in the country*”.⁶⁶ Richard Banégas, in his analysis of the transition in Benin, argued that in re-evaluating “*the influence of ‘world time’ there is no question of denying the psychological effect that the events of the East could have on the internal actors, nor of denying that this new geopolitical gift could modify their ‘structure of international political opportunity’ and thus weigh on their perceptions, their anticipations and the internal relations of power*”.⁶⁷

Indeed, the processes of democratisation in Eastern Europe influenced the anticipations and the behaviour of actors in all sub-Saharan Africa. This influence presupposes a considerable audience for the foreign media. Surveys carried out by some research organizations such as SOFRES, ASA, RIEL (International Research) and IBAR (a survey institute of the BBC) among others on the audience of foreign radio/ television stations in Africa show a strong audience among the urban populations.⁶⁸ According to these surveys, African townsmen listen and watch these foreign radio and television stations since they regarded them as a credible source of information. If we rely on these studies, then African leaders by using the official

⁶⁵Michael BRATTON, “Economic Crisis and Political Realignment in Zambia” in Jennifer A. Widner (ed.), *Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Baltimore and London, John Hopkins University Press, p.116.

⁶⁶*Mediafax* n°57 August 11, 1992.

⁶⁷Richard BANÉGAS, “Retour sur une transition modèle: Les dynamiques du dedans et du dehors de la démocratisation béninoise” in Jean-Pascal Daloz & Patrick Quantin (édition) *Transitions démocratiques africaines*, Paris, Karthala, 1997, p. 27.

⁶⁸See some results in André-Jean TUDESQ, “L’influence des radios...”, *op.cit.*

media as tools of manipulation have ended up paying a very strong political price: the erosion of their credibility.

In countries where independent press was not authorized, popular demands, social movements, such as confederations of trade unions, professional associations, the Church, NGOs, etc., invaded the media space. They published clandestine bulletins, the contents of which reproduced information from non-African sources, and they denounced the authoritarian drift of African regimes. Thus they repeated the democratic demands of the continent. Some examples include the newspaper published by the Association of Malian Teachers and some clandestine bulletins that circulated at the University of Togo at the eve of the democratic movement.

■ 2. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF MOZAMBIQUE

The role of social movements was considered fundamental since in political, ideological and coercive terms, the African authoritarian State did not manage to impose its hegemony on the whole society. Moreover, this weakness underlines the capacity of the society to resist and/ or to escape from official control. During the colonial time alone, the African elites could organize in clandestine associations and political parties to resist occupation. The postcolonial authoritarianism of the African States did not prevent the existence of a flourishing association life. Of course, in the postcolonial era, many of the associations were created by the State.

In Mozambique, after national independence, the party in power endeavoured to create its own social organizations, such as *Organização dos Trabalhadores Moçambicanos* – the trade union confederation (OTM) – *Organização da Mulher Moçambicana* – the women association (OMM) – *Organização da Juventude Moçambicana* the youth organization (OJM) – *Organização Nacional de Professores* – the teachers’ trade union (ONP) – and *Organização Nacional de Jornalistas*, the journalists’ trade union (ONJ). These organizations were closely allied with the authorities and their leaders were appointed by the party. They constituted a kind of extension of the party machinery into the society. Only two independent associations were authorized because of their religious characteristics: *Conselho Cristão de Moçambique* – the assembly of the Christian Churches – and *Caritas*, the humanitarian wing of the Catholic Church. These ‘satellite’ organizations of the regime played an important role in social life but they did not have the right to question the authorities, which undermined any form of political autonomy for these associations. Thus, they remained fragile in the public space.

▲ 2.1 THE CRITICAL ACTION OF THE PRESS DURING THE ERA OF ONE-PARTY RULE

If the foundation of all these organizations obeyed the ideological order of extension of the State into civil society, in 1978, the ONJ that was at the beginning an initiative of the journalists was only an attempt to domesticate the 'leftists'. The party interfered by nominating its confidants in the board of the ONJ. Rafael Maguni, the then Minister of Information, former Head of the Department of Information of Frelimo in Tanzania, became the first director of *Radio Moçambique* after independence.

This attempt to domesticate the 'leftists' was successful since the party succeeded in planting them in various media organizations. Moreover, the 'leftists' did not constitute a homogeneous group. A first group was, as we saw, formed by the founders of the *Tempo* review: Mota Lopes, Areosa Pena, Rui Cartaxana, Calane da Silva, Albino Magaia, Luis David, Catorze, Ricardo Rangel, Ribeiro Pacheco and Kok Nam. It was the oldest group that had witnessed the transition of journalism from the time of colonial Mozambique to that of independence. With a much posted political maturity, this group was very autonomous in relation to the Frelimo party, such an autonomy being however utopian.

A second group, with bonds of friendship more than professional relationship, included Carlos Cardoso, Alves Gomes, Miguéis Lopes Junior, Fernando Lima, Mia Couto, and Machado da Graça. Most of the young people that constituted this group (about twenty years of age) had discovered journalism at the time of independence. Attracted by the ideas of Frelimo, this very active group constituted the core of the 'leftists'.

A third and more moderate group was regarded as 'centrist' by the second group and comprised of journalists at *Radio Moçambique*, such as Leite de Vasconcelos, Sol of Carvalho, Orlanda Mendes and Marcelino Alves. The differences in ages between them were considerable. The bonds that united all these journalists were few. They were Mozambicans of European origins who, in the colonial context, had in their majority the privilege of acquiring some higher education and who were enthusiastic about building a new country after independence.

There were no major initiatives to coordinate the journalists, at AIM and at Notícias for example. This absence of coordination did not benefit the authorities. Indeed, criticisms were present in each media to the extent "*that, in 1982, a Minister [Aranda da Silva, in charge of the Internal Trade], infuriated by criticisms directed against his Ministry, could declare that in Mozambique the press was the opposition to the government. In 1983, another Minister, Sérgio Vieira, in charge of Agriculture, unable to impose control on the journalists within the limits that he wished, prohibited all the civil servants in his Ministry from making statements to the press*".⁶⁹

⁶⁹Leite DE VASCONCELOS, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

These journalists known as ‘leftists’ were able to resist and had a liberal vision of information. This resistance proved to be very solid at AIM under the leadership of Carlos Cardoso in the 1980s. Indeed, thanks to the creation of the agency, the seizure of the Ministry of Information was very strong and the agency was to some extent the “re-education camp” of the journalists from other press organizations who were said to be “undisciplined”. But as we saw, this strategy ended up uniting AIM with the journalists sharing the same democratic values. In 1983, criticisms about the mitigated assessment of the policy of rural development of the State farms and the communal villages precisely came from AIM.

▲ 2.2 PERSECUTIONS AGAINST JOURNALISTS

In 1983, Albino Magaia, then Director of *Tempo*, asked journalist Rui Zunguze to make a series of reports on the running of the *Operação Produção*. This programme was officially conceived by the party as a way to recover and to develop marginal individuals by integrating them in the society and entrusting them with various production and development tasks. But in reality, *Operação Produção* was all about emptying cities in the countryside – particularly in the province of Niassa – of all the citizens who were ‘unproductive’ in the eyes of the authorities, i.e. those “*who did not have jobs in the formal sector*” had to cultivate the fields.

In his article, Rui Zunguze accused the authorities of “*abandoning the deportees even in a worse state than in the re-education camps, without any accompanying or existing infrastructure*”. The article also regretted that “*hundreds died because of hunger and the rise of insecurity in Lichinga [capital of the province of Niassa] perpetrated by a part of the deportees seeking hopelessly for what to survive on*”.⁷⁰ Following the publication of this criticism, Rui Zunguze and his director, Albino Magaia, were summoned by the DIP to the Ministry of Information, in the presence of all the editors of the local press. Both were portrayed as holding counter-revolutionary ideas. Albino Magaia defended himself pleading that he had taken the precaution of showing the article, before its publication, to the Minister of Security, Armando Guebuza in charge of the *Operação Produção*. The argument of the director of *Tempo* did not attenuate the avalanche of criticisms, so much so that the latter suffered a cardiac attack during that meeting. A few days later, Rui Zunguze was assassinated in the central railway station in Maputo.⁷¹ Besides his position as a senior figure within the information sector, the faintness of Albino Magaia was certainly one of the reasons why he was saved from repressive measures.

⁷⁰ Alfredo TEMBE, Paris, July 2004. Alfredo Tembe worked as a journalist at the *Tempo* weekly magazine during the 1980s and he eventually reached the position of Editor in Chief in the same review in 1996-1997.

⁷¹ *Ibidem*.

Three years later, Salomão Moyana, then journalist with the delegation of AIM in the province of Nampula, wrote an article about the former deportees of the *Operação Produção* and the former prisoners of the re-education camps in Niassa. He noted that in the province of Nampula, some of the survivors were exploited as domestic servants by local senior police officers. In exchange, the officers assured them that they returned to their areas of origin (southern part of the country) on military aircrafts stationed in Nacala. But the officers only took advantage of their positions to exploit a voiceless labour force. The news of the preparation of this article was leaked to the commander of the police force in Nampula. The latter threatened to kill the journalist if he published the article. Even the governor of Nampula attempted to prevent the sending of the article to the headquarters of AIM in Maputo. Carlos Cardoso, editor of AIM that followed the Nampula case, managed to receive the article and published it in the *Notícias* daily newspaper in June 1986. S. Moyana's life was in danger. As a result, Carlos Cardoso intervened by pleading the Minister of Information, Teodato Hunguana, to protect the journalist at AIM.⁷²

Thus, at that time, there was a limited social space, structured and formed by liberal journalists who could only gradually invade the political space. By forming a press corporative, these liberal journalists were able to seize vacant public space left by the retreating one-party State.

▲ 2.3 THE CATHOLIC CHURCH: ISOLATED BUT ALWAYS PRESENT

The Stalinist-Marxism that Frelimo had appropriated did not leave a space of assertion to social movements. The project of modernization of the society implied the disappearance of religious movements from public sphere, i.e. religion would soon become a private affair. This justified the principle of secularity in the Mozambican Constitution.

However, even in private sphere, Frelimo did not forget the active role of the Catholic Church in the colonial process. Admittedly, the minority left in the Catholic Church in colonial Mozambique – such as Bishops Dom Sebastião Soares de Resende, Dom Manuel and the Burgos priests – developed a more humanistic approach of African populations. But in the southern area, the Church, near the archbishop's palace, remained very close to the colonial authorities. More present in the area of the South, it constituted an instrument of colonization.

Frelimo mistrusted the 'Catholic right' since the black elite of the party, in particular the founders of the NESAM, in its majority came from Protestant Churches: Presbyterian and United Methodist. Greatly supported by the 'Catholic right', the Portuguese administration resisted the idea of protest and organization of a political struggle against colonial domination championed by the black elite.

⁷²Carlos Cardoso had threatened to resign if the Minister of Information did not intervene in the matter.

THE ERA OF DENUNCIATION

The anti-Protestantism of the Catholic Church manifested itself by the closing of Protestant chapels and schools but also by the imprisonment and the deportation of Protestant pastors, teachers and students.⁷³ This partly explains why after independence, the Catholic Church was kept at arms length by the State, while its facilities that were not directly related to religious worships (schools, hospitals, etc.) were nationalized by the State in July 1977. *Radio Pax*, a Catholic radio station in Beira, was simply closed down. In the official media, talks about the Catholic Church became a ‘taboo’.

In August 1974, during the council meeting of the Catholic Church in Inhambane, Samora Machel repeated some of Eduardo Mondlane’s criticisms on this religious institution. He recalled that a part of the clergies not only considered the self-determination of the Mozambican people an error but also contrary to God’s will because some ‘cultural conditions’ had not been met.⁷⁴ Thus, Frelimo called on the Catholic Church to re-examine its action in independent Mozambique, and a few months later, he stated that “*all the activities of religious institutions had to be in conformity with the laws of the State*”.⁷⁵

The government, instead of trying to find common bases of agreement, continued to emphasize the errors made by the Catholic Church during the colonial era. It refused to send theology students abroad, asserting the risk of an intellectual alienation that was likely to undermine national unity. For Frelimo, sending theology students abroad was a sign that the Catholic Church in Mozambique was still marked by an external philosophical doctrine, i.e. devoid of a national identity. In a veiled statement obviously intended for the representatives of the Catholic Church, Samora Machel wondered: “*Why can’t you create a Mozambican Church [...] Do the Romans, over there, think of the place of the Mozambicans? Why is it that the Mozambican does not think about himself? Why? Why can’t you free yourself from others?*”⁷⁶

The social actions of the Catholic Church were not seen as complementing those of the ruling party, but rather as competing with them. This explains why Frelimo eliminated the opportunities of interventions for religious organizations in the field of education, health and mobilization of the faithful. In 1977, when it became a ‘Marxist-Leninist’ party, Frelimo granted itself the exclusive right to inform, educate, mobilize and organize people. It assumed monopoly in education, information, health and popular mobilization (the conversion of the masses to the ‘socialist’ project). Through the instrumentality of the Ministry of Justice, it

⁷³For more details, see Teresa Cruz e SILVA, *Igrejas Protestantes e Consciência Política no Sul de Moçambique: O Caso da Missão Suíça (1930-1974)*, Maputo, PROMÉDIA, 2001, p. 93-111.

⁷⁴In his book, Eduardo Mondlane cited a letter by Mgr Custódio Alvim Pereira, the auxiliary bishop of Lourenço Marques, affirming that all independence movements that resorted to armed struggle were against natural law because as independence is a *priori* good, it had to be obtained in a peaceful way. Mgr Pereira who argued that the only beneficial revolution for Africans was the ‘evangelic revolution’ was obviously influenced by the doctrines of the Holy See that sorted to prevent the risk of communist expansion. For more details, see Eduardo MONDLANE, *Lutar por Moçambique*, *op.cit.*, 69-76.

⁷⁵See article 19 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Mozambique

⁷⁶Tempo n° 248, July 6, 1975.

instituted a control on the movement of missionaries in the country by strengthening the entrance requirements.

The nationalization of the facilities of the Catholic Church, the continued insistence on its errors and the confiscation of its space of social intervention led this institution to resistance. It reacted as a special interest group or even a political opposition to the ruling party. In 1978, the second conference of the department of the ideological work of the party denounced the creation of *comunidades de base* by the Catholic Church to deal with the political offensive of Frelimo. These *comunidades de base* operated under the cover of missionary activities and they were served to spread the denunciations of the social policy of the ruling party.

▲ 2.4 THE DENUNCIATION BY THE CATHOLIC PRESS

Despite its travails, the Catholic Church continued to participate in politics through its newspaper *Vida Nova* published in Nampula in twenty thousand copies. Curiously, this newspaper was never prohibited, perhaps because it was largely distributed in Nampula, a predominantly Moslem area. Thus, it was only likely to have little impact on the readership. The role played by the bishop of Nampula, Manuel Vieira Pinto, can also explain the constant presence of this newspaper. Though of Portuguese nationality, Vieira Pinto had importantly criticized the Mozambican colonial administration as Sebastião de Resende during the colonial time. Vieira Pinto was openly in favour of the independence of the country and, on several occasions, deported by the Portuguese authorities. The admiration and recognition flowing from his devotion to the sovereignty of the Mozambican people seem to explain partly why Frelimo never prohibited the newspaper that he managed. Emboldened by this recognition, “*Bishop Vieira Pinto protested, in 1984, against the re-education camps, of which he had a direct knowledge, and he presented a very critical report to President Samora Machel on this issue*”.⁷⁷

In *Cartas Pastorais* authored by the Episcopal Conference – the highest governing body of the Catholic Church in Mozambique and published in *Vida Nova*, the Church registered its greatest revolt against “*arbitrary prisons and legalized violence*”.

Indeed, in 1983, Frelimo had reintroduced the capital punishment and it approved the law of the whip – stipulating corporal punishments for a wide range of offenders, from minor offenders to big-time criminals, without excluding acts of smuggling and black market and *Operação Produção*. *Operação Produção* was one of the most disastrous social policies of Frelimo.

⁷⁷ Dom Manuel Vieira PINTO, “O Povo de Moçambique é amante da paz” in *Notas Pastorais*, Porto, 1984, p. 24.

The Episcopal Conference denounced these legislations as infringements of human rights:

*“These measures and laws are inhumane and humiliating. They do not take into account the inalienable dignity of all human being and of the people and they promote the abuse of power by the disregard of the life of the citizens [...]. The law of the whip – law 5/83 – fosters terribly inhuman or even criminal conditions. Moreover, it deeply shocks the sensitivity and the conscience of our people [...]. This operation is a true nightmare for millions of citizens. Indeed, situations of violence and injustice it inflicts are very serious. The men and the women of this country condemned by Operação Produção to contempt, hunger and humiliation, and even to death are already very numerous. Not to mention many separated families who will suffer, much of suffering they do not deserve. If we want peace in our society, we need courage to re-examine this Operação Produção seriously, in order to very quickly eliminate the situations of violence and humiliation in existence, especially in the province of Niassa, and to immediately set the wrongfully deported detainees free”.*⁷⁸

The Catholic dioceses of Quelimane and Nampula also denounced violence in Mozambique through their ‘White Books’ and other publications. They held the governmental forces and the guerrilla movement of Renamo responsible for this violence. The ‘White Books’ were, in theory, intended to inform the hierarchy of the Catholic Church outside the country about the war situation in Mozambique. They were also published in the monthly religious magazine, *Vida Nova*.⁷⁹

Their different understandings of the nature of the war ranging over the country and the way to put an end to the hostilities also divided Frelimo and the Catholic Church. According to Alexandrino José, researcher at *Centro de Estudos Africanos*, the Catholic hierarchy had recognized the existence of a civil war and an opposition force to the ruling party since 1979.⁸⁰ Thus, during a four-day meeting [December 14-17] between the party and the various religious groups in 1982, the Catholic Church, through the President of the Episcopal Conference, Dom Jaime Pedro Gonçalves, Bishop of Beira, described the conflict as a civil war. This position by Bishop J. Gonçalves earned him a negative reputation in the consideration of Samora Machel. The President of the Republic regarded this priest as a kind of head of the political opposition, all the more since as President of the Episcopal Conference of Mozambique, the Bishop resided in Beira, a city known for its hostility towards Frelimo.

Samora Machel was convinced that Renamo was a marginal group in the pawn of the Portuguese colonial army and propped up by racist regimes in the region, such a group having no social base or even political aims. Therefore, to end the war in Mozambique, there was no

⁷⁸Pastoral exhortations of bishops from Mozambique, Maputo, May 7, 1984, p. 6.

⁷⁹Roberto della ROCCA, *Mozambique de la guerre à la paix: Histoire d'une médiation insolite*, Paris, l'Harmattan, 1997, p. 54. The “White Books” were not signed to avoid reprisals from the authorities. They covered massacres committed between 1984 and 1987 against civilians. In their writings, the bishops chose to say “Renamo’s armed men” and not “armed gangsters” as it was often the case in official speeches.

⁸⁰Alexandrino JOSÉ, “Samora Machel e as confissões religiosas: um diálogo inacabado” in *Samora Homem do Povo*, Maputo, Maguezo, 2001, p.117-126.

other option but to dialogue with Renamo's sponsors, the South African apartheid regime. This led to the Nkomati Accord.⁸¹

Whereas people began to suspect a majority of the legally recognized associations, due to political clientelism, the Catholic Church continued to keep its distances with the authorities. Thus, it escaped from 'domestication' by the regime and it earned legitimacy thanks to which it played a considerable role in bringing the government and the guerrilla together.

II THE PECULIARITY OF THE POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION IN MOZAMBIQUE

The genesis of the political liberalization in Mozambique is traceable to the role of the elites of ruling party. From 1982, one could observe a kind of change in politics, first with regards to the isolationist tactics adopted with Renamo, and then, in the search for a new economic breathing space. The joining the Bretton Woods institutions in 1985 and, consequently, liberalization restricted the sphere of activity of the bureaucratic elite in power. Before, the country had just gone through a serious economic crisis resulting cumulatively from drought, the actions of Renamo in the rural zones and the effects of the modernization policy of Frelimo that became increasingly authoritarian.

■ 1. A CRISIS THAT SETTLES GRADUALLY

If the path to economic liberalization in various African countries seemed identical, that of political liberalization presents some distinctive features. To be clear, it is necessary to recall the nature of the political regime in Mozambique after national independence in 1975. Frelimo was a mixed party composed of civilian and military elites emerging from national liberation struggle. A small ideological elite mainly made up of white intellectuals laid down an objective for social modernization which resulted in the implementation of a 'voluntarist' policy of development. At the centre of this policy were the communal villages and a form of collective social production based on the cooperative system: farms and State-owned enterprises. For the rural population, they represented concentrations in new zones, and thus isolation from their native places, and the abandonment of their traditional modes of production. Moreover, from June 26, 1975, in an attempt to adapt the social organization to the needs of the modern State, Frelimo officially abolished the chieftaincy institutions. All these measures had been taken regardless of the consequences of the alteration of the traditional methods of production, habits and social and economic organization of the rural families.

⁸¹ See *Tempo* n°722, August 12, 1984 and n°726, September 9, 1984.

The latter perceived these directives as a forced change in their social and cultural practices, incompatible with their traditions. As a result, the anticipated rise in productivity thanks to this system never occurred.

The spreading of the war towards the rural zones quickly modified the principal objectives of the creation of the communal villages. From then on, they became a popular strategy of control to withdraw all bases of support for the guerrilla of Renamo. That is why the communal villages became a coercive practice. But this authoritarian drift produced an opposite effect: rural populations and marginalized lineage chiefs massively supported Renamo.

In 1977, Frelimo proclaimed itself a 'Marxist-Leninist' party and wanted to be an all-inclusive party with respect to the people. This inclusive characteristic resulted in a strategy of control of all the levels of the society. Marxist-Leninist doctrines 'justified' the deprivations of liberty in the name of national unity and construction of a Mozambican nation. This policy made freedoms of expression and association difficult in the entire territory and the emergence of other forces apart from Frelimo impossible. Thus, opposing tendencies initially appeared only within Frelimo: amongst conservative ideological elite, the moderate and reforming faction, and hard-liners who controlled the military hierarchy. The latter was also over represented within the political committee, the higher structure of the hierarchy of the party.

The rupture of the mechanisms of family production and the war predisposed the country to an economic crisis. At the beginning of the year 1980, agricultural production failed, supplies to urban centres were compromised and exports declined. In order to finance the deficit in the current account, the country got into debt. At the same time, public companies financed by the State through the Central Bank were in a situation of insolvency. To make up the deficits in the productive sector, the Bank resorted to the printing of more currencies and thus inflation rate increased sharply. In 1983, worrying signs of crisis were already obvious. For the first time, debt servicing was higher than exports.

▲ 1.1 INTERNAL REALIGNMENTS

The first call for a retreat from 'authoritarianism' came in 1983 from the moderate alliances: "*The political alliance of Frelimo with the peasants of the rural zones had been gradually weakened since independence. Civil servants within the party and other apparatus of the State, managers of public companies and other public officials had, with the time, been able to establish themselves as the true holders of political power in the country (...) On the other hand, the small farmers had been excluded from the process of development and the population of the rural zones underprivileged*".⁸²

⁸²Hans ABRAHAMSSON & Anders NILSSON, *Moçambique em Transição: Um estudo da história de desenvolvimento durante o período 1974-1992*, Maputo, ISRI, 1994, p. 65.

The most vocal reformist voice was that of Joaquim Chissano. In 1985, Mr. Chissano, the then Foreign Minister, pleaded with the National Assembly to consider the introduction of reforms, especially the liberalization of the economy, having in mind the application of the measures taunted by the Bretton Woods institutions. At this time, his proposals were massively disputed at the Parliament. He had to wait until the year 1986 to see the introduction of important changes in the economy as contained in the structural adjustment programme.⁸³

The ruling party justified the maintenance of the one-party system by affirming that only this option was capable of guarantying the development of Mozambique. As the country did not have many natural resources, Frelimo did not have a lot to redistribute. Access to power constituted one of the principal sources of accumulation but enrichment by this way was not widespread when Samora Machel was President. Since 1983, the country had survived thanks to international financial assistance. One of the resources of Frelimo was the army. Admittedly, Frelimo liberated the country from its colonial yoke. This historical fact remained its principal symbolic resource and its source of legitimacy.

Mozambican diplomacy showed its great mark and ability by securing recognition of the government of Frelimo from western capital cities, without much hostility, even when Marxist-Leninist doctrines weighed heavily on the party. At the internal level, beyond the changes brought by the arrival of Joaquim Chissano at the presidency at the end of 1986, the ongoing internal political protest by wars orchestrated by Renamo powerfully legitimised Frelimo. The population perceived the war as an external aggression because Renamo was supported by South Africa.

When the members of the political committee of the party nominated Chissano to the presidency, they were fully aware that he represented the moderate and reforming wing within the party. Thus the interplay of powers between the actors within Frelimo, conditioned by internal and external pressures and by civil war, explains the political liberalization in Mozambique.

President Joaquim Chissano then started a process of ideological rupture from Marxist-Leninist doctrines. This rupture was achieved in 1989 during the fifth congress of the Frelimo party. Chissano excluded from his government the white ideological elites who were very present in the cabinets of the former President: *“By the reforms, the emerging capitalist classes that were at their formative stages during the final phases of colonization were rejuvenated. The hard-liners and the leftists lost their positions in the new rapport of power (...) The new technocratic elites formed after independence started to grow in importance within the power network, with an increasing substitution of non-black elements.*

⁸³This is not due to the death of Samora Machel in October 1986. Indeed, few months before the crash, President Samora Machel in his confidence to “leftists” Carlos Cardoso and Alves Gomes complained in affirming that the members of the Political Committee reproved systematically his reforms proposals.

The alliance between populism and radical left was replaced by another one in which coexisted the representatives of a social democracy (...) and apparently 'culturalist' activists (...), most of whom were not previously engaged in the phase of 'socialism' and who were in majority black".⁸⁴

The presence in the government of some hard-liners, such as Armando Guebuza and Mariano Matsinha, resulted from a compromise more than the will of Chissano: "*The nomination of Armando Guebuza to the position of Transport and Communications Minister caused some disquiet among the financiers of the 'corridor of Beira' and the railway rehabilitation projects in Nacala and Limpopo; and the Scandinavian countries argued that he was not the ideal man for the job. In fact, this nomination derives more from military reasons (no transport without safety), and that's why it pleased the Zimbabweans. It can also be interpreted as a way to 'hold' what is sometimes described as supporters of the 'Communism of war' by giving him the responsibility of a task where the contacts with the Western financial circles are daily and determine success... Mariano Matsinha bagged again the Ministry of Safety from where he was initially removed by Machel, which marks the need for continuity at the head of the security services very much weakened*".⁸⁵

Frelimo's survival within the country was conditioned on the maintenance of popular legitimacy and support of the army. However, by the end of the 1980s, the disorganization within the army reached a critical point: signs of corruption were obvious and the number of desertions high. Admittedly, there were some vestiges of loyalty since the commanding height and a great majority of the soldiers were originally from the southern part of the country and the province of Cabo Delgado. It was in this province that Frelimo recruited its first soldiers, among the *makonde* ethnic group. This partly explains why, in the history of the country, the coups d'Etat were rare, all the more since the esprit de corps in the army was very weak.⁸⁶

▲ 1.2 POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION: THE LOGIC OF POWER CONSERVATION

As the war progressed, the State only controlled the cities and some peripheral areas while it was deprived of control of the rural zones. Thus, the only city capital of legitimisation which remained under the ruling party was the urban population. Thanks to the structural readjustment, the elite with power went onto business, initially timidly and then quickly. A few years later, the policy of Frelimo did no longer have anything to do with Socialism: economic liberalism was born.

⁸⁴ João MOSCA, *A experiência socialista em Moçambique (1975-1986)*, Lisbon, Instituto Piaget, 1999, p. 161-162. João Mosca underlined that white activists continued to lose their positions at several levels in the apparatuses of the State during the post-reform period.

⁸⁵ Michel CAHEN, *Mozambique la Révolution implosée*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1987, p. 42.

⁸⁶ Besides the serious incident of November 1975, when battalion of the army revolted, the only attempt of coup d'Etat occurred in 1991 during the public sector strike. The supposed instigator of the coup, General Sebastião Marcos Mabote was however discharged by a court for want of evidence. One of the reasons adduced for this attempt was the need to break the peace negotiations between the government and Renamo.

The urban population had the feeling of being abandoned as the social costs of the economic reforms – among other things the dismantling of a part of the public sector – were very heavy. Forced privatisations of the factories were not always successful and so thousands of workers found themselves unemployed. Similarly, the cost of living went up unceasingly and the salaries of the civil servants became insufficient.

In 1989, a wave of public sector strikes almost paralysed the country. The ‘transparent’ coverage of the demonstrations by the press did not go down well with the ruling party. In fact, the popular demands became increasingly political and they seemed to be a form or attempt of democratisation from the bottom. The strike of thousands of workers of the port of Maputo, besides the trade union’s protests spanning the colonial era, increased the risk of a social implosion. When the university students went on strike, all the democratic conditions for a major socio-political change seemed to have been met. And it was exactly the coverage of these two demonstrations by TVM which led to the resignation of its ‘leftist’ director, Calane da Silva.

Michel Cahen suggested that “*it is precisely when these economic policies showed up that it became not only impossible to jumpstart the economy, but that widespread misery among the great majority and the affluence of a few increased considerably. In short, it was when they had failed that policies towards democracies were organized. Political pluralism, a necessary condition for democracy, was granted as a means to avoid a social explosion. It is the consequence of a balance of power between the authorities and the population or of popular pressure. It is a popular victory*”.⁸⁷ Thus, political liberalization in Mozambique is a response to popular dissatisfaction and to protest from the armed rebellion with which the government expected to negotiate so as to put end to the war.

It is the adopted strategy of liberalization, especially the unilateral control of reforms, which gives the impression of anticipation and not of response to disputes. This gave a certain renewed legitimacy to Frelimo. A great part of the reforms’ agenda had not to escape from the control of Frelimo, it was believed. Thus the economic reform programme or structural adjustment programme implemented by Frelimo and imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions was presented like a project of the Frelimo party. This structural adjustment programme was a sort of rejection of the former development policy (cooperative systems of production and communal village farms) very unpopular in the country due to its disastrous social consequences.

The structural adjustment programme appeared, at least at the beginning, as an opportunity for Frelimo to achieve a break from the old development strategy. In the political arena, the demands of the ‘opposition’ were taken into account and established in advance through a constitutional process, while efforts were made at the same time to make any dispute

⁸⁷ Michel CAHEN, “Une Afrique lusophone libérale?”, *op.cit.*, p. 93. With regards to the balance of force, Michel Cahen, has argued that the weakness of the authorities is also due to international pressure. According to him, the international context became by this sense an internal factor for evolution.

with the ‘opposition’ impotent and illegitimate. For Frelimo, only transition could guarantee its legitimacy in power, from where concessions could be made (new Constitution establishing or guaranteeing human rights, multi-party system, freedom of expression, liberal market, among others) even if their political costs were considered very high.

But the originality of the Mozambican case is due to its democratic transition programme that was organized to end the war. The government tried to control the liberalization processes and to anticipate popular demands partly because it feared that the latter could legitimise Renamo. Thus, during the period that preceded negotiations in Rome, and in fact during negotiations, the authorities in Maputo set up a strategy aimed at isolating Renamo in order to undermine its political credibility and to prevent it from establishing international contacts. Renamo, on its part, as a principal political opposition force, made the recognition of its statute a mandatory condition for further talks. Roberto della Rocca summarized this period in the following words: “*While pursuing negotiations, the government in Maputo pursued a parallel strategy towards Renamo to weaken it and to promote its internal contradictions, by keeping it isolated. Such a strategy resulted in blocking the evolution of Renamo from a military movement to a political movement, by constraining it to give up political activity and to insist on the only option of armed confrontation*”.⁸⁸

On the other hand, the Mozambican government understood very early that the socialist system was going to break down at the international level and that consequently a transformation of the regime was inevitable. Thus, when the Berlin Wall broke down in 1989, political changes already occurred in Mozambique. Renamo could thus rejoice because it reckoned that these political changes were the very objective of the war. The absence of political opposition to Frelimo, which would have constituted an internal countervailing power, enabled it to use the end of armed confrontation to legitimise this political change. As Roberto della Rocca noted: “*The internal reforms carried out by Chissano deprived the guerrilla of any reason to fight democracy, multi-party system, private property, liberal market, religious freedom [and yet it did]. The West could not understand why the war continued. Renamo felt misled because [it thought] the government in Maputo was in a certain way appropriating the claims of the guerrilla, avoiding naturally any policy of granting Renamo any specific role in the national event [political liberalization]. [Thus, Renamo] maintained that the reforms of Chissano are nothing more than a little make-up, a political operation to obtain the Western approval, while dictatorial, violent and oppressive actions continue*”.⁸⁹

Admittedly, the Mozambican government underwent internal and external pressures before starting constitutional reforms. But it only started to discuss with ‘clandestine’ parties once changes had been adopted, unlike the national conferences’ model of the francophone African countries or the popular labour-union movements of the Anglo-Saxon countries.

⁸⁸Roberto della ROCCA, *Mozambique de la guerre à la paix*, op. cit, p. 203-204.

⁸⁹*Ibidem*.

Taking into account the absence of opposition or alternative views that would have obliged it to dialogue, the government was inevitably largely favoured. The only counterweight was Renamo, the views of which expressed at the negotiations table were only taken into account after the adoption of a new Constitution. Thus, the electoral law was subjected to the scrutiny of other emerging political parties only after a preliminary agreement had been reached between Frelimo and Renamo.

The two parties were brought together to decide on a rational choice because it became clear that they were both likely to lose if they did not do so. For Frelimo, as Michel Cahen affirmed, the advent of political democracy was a means of avoiding a popular explosion. For Renamo, once the democratic conditions it required were established, we could hope that it was to follow the rules of the game. But external factors also had an important role, particularly the political turn in South Africa, which risked to isolate it in the medium-term and to subject it to a strong international pressure in the long-term.

■ 2. THE STALEMATE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE MEDIATION

The absence of internal political solution to the war initiated by the actors themselves showed more clearly the need for external mediation. The religious groups perceived this need very early and then they tried to bring the two parties together. The first meeting between the Mozambican religious leaders and Renamo took place in Nairobi, capital of Kenya, in 1989 where the first bases for negotiations were launched. Later, the Community of Sant'Egídio, an Italian Christian organization, joined the mediation effort. Its intervention in Mozambique was possible thanks to its close cooperation and friendship with the country, in particular with Frelimo. Perhaps it will be necessary to look back to the pre-independence era in order to explain the relations between Mozambique and Sant'Egídio.

As Roberto della Rocca explained, the Catholic clergy in Mozambique had prevented the formation of an indigenous Church for fear that this could become a vector of indigenous nationalism. Yet, it was not easy for a black to become a priest in the church. Thus, when a young African, Jaime Gonçalves, just as his colleagues, was suspected of harbouring nationalist feelings by the Portuguese, his sacerdotal ordination was deferred several times and at the end of the day, he was sent to Rome to continue his theological studies. There, Gonçalves got in touch for the first time with the Community of Sant'Egídio. After independence, Gonçalves went back to Mozambique where he was finally ordained priest in charge of the city of Beira, in 1976.⁹⁰ When Frelimo started its hostility towards the Catholic Church, Gonçalves appealed to the Community of Sant'Egídio to intervene in favour of the local church. At that time, Italy was the principal economic partner of Mozambique and the brotherhood of Sant'Egídio took

⁹⁰Roberto della ROCCA, *Mozambique de la guerre à la paix*, *op. cit.*, p. 24-25.

advantage of this. It asked the Italian government to put pressure on Frelimo until it conceded religious freedom in the country.

In 1984, in the middle of the serious famine caused by drought and war, Gonçalves launched an emergency appeal to his colleagues in Rome. Thus, the first humanitarian aid came from the Community of Sant'Egídio and it arrived in Mozambique in August of the same year. In connection with this, a two-man delegation composed of Dom Mateus Zuppi and Andrea Riccardi, from the Christian organization, was received in Maputo by senior members of the government. The delegation confirmed the support of the Vatican for the Nkomati Accord that opened the way for a presidential visit to the Holy Sea on September 28, 1985. In May 1987, new President Joaquim Chissano was also received in the Vatican. On that occasion, John Paul II expressed his concern on the persistence of the war in Mozambique. The pope urged Chissano to seek peace in the country. After the visit, Chissano went on to normalize relations between the State and the Church in Mozambique and he called on the religious leaders to help to bring Renamo and Frelimo together. The intervention of the Community of Sant'Egídio in this process seemed to be more or less an initiative of the Vatican that did not want to be directly involved in the negotiation.

When the idea of talks was accepted, a team of mediators was formed. It was coordinated by a former Italian Deputy Secretary of State, Mario Raffaelli, appointed by Rome. The two members of the Community of Sant'Egídio, Andrea Riccardi and Dom Matteo Zuppi, also joined the group. Each person had a specific function: the representative of the Italian government busied himself with the executive in Maputo, while Archbishop Dom Jaime Gonçalves, representative of the local religious groups, was dealing with Renamo, and the two other members of Sant'Egídio were responsible for building bridges between the two parties.

To this first synergy another group of observers from France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Portugal and the United Nations was added that gave their assent to the official negotiations that started in August 1990 in Rome.

■ 3. THE MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

The first divergences in the national press after the establishment of the multi-party system in Mozambique appeared during the coverage of the peace negotiations in Rome. Tomas Vieira Mário, a journalist at AIM, was the first and exclusive correspondent for the Mozambican press in Rome during the peace negotiations. The slow progress of the peace talks constituted a financial constraint for the national media. The State ensured the presence of a journalist at AIM to distribute information to the other local media. Many of these media had agreed to receive the dispatches from AIM. But as the talks advanced, the contents of these

dispatches were criticized. According to Machado da Graça, a journalist at *Radio Moçambique*, the transfer of information from Rome to Maputo through only one source resulted in defects in the media coverage of the peace process.⁹¹ For Salomão Moyana, the former editor of *Savana*, it was not possible to know the actual position of Renamo during the period when the correspondent of AIM was in Rome.⁹² Another critical voice of the AIM coverage was Fernando Lima, a journalist and member of board of the Mediacoop group. According to him, the information transmitted from Rome to Maputo was filtered and in favour of governmental positions. Lima added that some of the disclosed information was not sufficient to educate the public on what was happening in the negotiations.⁹³

Much earlier, *Mediafax* had realized the partiality of the information distributed by AIM and, thus, it decided to send its own journalist, Lourenço Jossias, to Rome to cover the peace negotiations. By offering an alternative vision of the events in Rome, *Mediafax* also contributed to public information. According to Fernando Lima, the presence of a journalist at *Mediafax* also constituted a challenge to the journalist at AIM since he was then obliged to inform with more rigour. Lourenço Jossias was the first journalist to bring to the public Renamo's positions in the peace negotiations. *Mediafax* was also the first to publish a full interview with the Renamo leader, Afonso Dhlakama, in which he offered the group's political vision for the country.

Did Tomás Vieira Mário remain faithful to the Frelimo party to the detriment of 'neutral' information? It should be recalled that Vieira Mário was a 'product' of Frelimo. He studied at the *Instituto Moçambicano*, a school run by Frelimo in Tanzania during the national liberation struggle in the 1960s. He also worked as a teacher and 'journalist' in the Frelimo liberated zones inside the country. While the implications of such links should not be ruled out, it is necessary to consider other reasons for the attitude of the AIM correspondent as well. First, we must not overlook the confidential nature of the talks, and second, Tomás Vieira Mário himself did not have control of his dispatches to the national media.

In peace negotiations in Rome, a climate of mistrust reigned between Renamo and the Mozambican government. The peace negotiations focused on one fundamental question: a new political and governmental system. The two parties were evasive and avoided press statements on unsolved topics. On the other hand, Vieira Mário's dispatches were censored by the public media. Machado da Graça, a journalist at *Radio Moçambique*, described the prevailing situation in his radio station: "*There was a proposal to let Afonso Dhlakama express himself freely about the peace negotiations and other political topics. The proposal was*

⁹¹Machado DA GRAÇA, in Brazão Mazula (edition) *Eleições, Democracia e Desenvolvimento*, Maputo, 1995, p. 253.

⁹²Salomão MOYANA in Brazão Mazula (edition) *Eleições, Democracia e Desenvolvimento*, op. cit, p 268.

⁹³Fernando LIMA in Brazão Mazula (edition) *Eleições, Democracia e Desenvolvimento*, op. cit, p. 243.

regarded as unthinkable”.⁹⁴ There was a similar reaction in a majority of the public media. When Lourenço Jossias went to Rome, he was still a journalist at *Domingo* weekly magazine. The management of the weekly and him both agreed to send dispatches to *Mediafax* and *Domingo*. That did not pose any problem to the *Mediacoop* group, even if it was to seek finance for the trip alone. But only the faxed daily newspaper published the dispatches from Rome. The censorship by *Domingo* was intended to ensure that very ‘delicate’ information did not slip out into the public domain. By breaking this ‘taboo’ *Mediafax* became the pioneer of rigorous information and acquired an unquestioned credibility among the readers.

■ 4. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRESS

At the beginning of the 1990s, Mozambique began to witness the birth of other organizations and social groups created and controlled by the ruling party. This included the NGOs that intervened in several humanitarian areas with the aim of minimizing the effects of the war such as hunger and sufferings of many disabled people because of anti-personal mines. After the humanitarian intervention, many of these organizations reoriented themselves towards not only professional training programmes in order to reconstitute public institutions, but also towards programmes concerning human rights, civic education, and prevention of conflicts. The most prominent among them were the *Liga dos Direitos Humanos* and the *Movimento para a Paz*. The expansion of social movements partly opened the way to the emergence of an independent press in Mozambique. It should be recalled that “*the State owned audio-visual information organs that were often accused of lacking independence and the private press enjoyed a great deal of freedom in Mozambique*”.⁹⁵

The relations between the independent press and social movements appeared to be paramount since, thanks to the plurality of ideas, the independent press could then express itself increasingly freely. On the other hand, social movements considered this independent press an amplified space for intervention. The new publications, profiting from the tagging along and the editorial censorship prevailing in the official press, won public favour easily, even though they had great structural weaknesses. *Mediafax*, *Savana* and *Imparcial*, the first independent publications, fitted into this change of values, thus supporting a democratic public opinion. Contrary to the model of resistance applied while they were working with the official press, professionals within these press organizations no longer used a hidden or ironic language but rather open criticisms. A kind of institutionalisation of dissenting opinion set up.

⁹⁴Machado DA GRAÇA in Brazão Mazula (edition) *Eleições, Democracia e Desenvolvimento*, Maputo, 1995, p. 253.

⁹⁵Extract from a letter by *Reporters Sans Frontières* intended for the Mozambican Prime minister on November 23, 2000 in protest against the assassination of Cardoso.

The fact that the independent media appeared during the transitional period, when the future of the country was at stake, had consequences for the nature of media analysis, the contents of which becoming more political than informative. These media struggled to show the real priorities of the country to the various actors in the ongoing democratic transition. They judged, called, condemned and questioned, as the following titles suggest: “*Let the President work*”⁹⁶; “*Justice for Kavandame*”⁹⁷; “*Information = Frelimo*”⁹⁸ “*Mozambique without opposition?*”⁹⁹

Parallel to the birth of these social organizations, a critical and independent reflection about constitutional state, forms of citizenship and institutions of democracy started to emerge in the press. The advent of multi-party system opened a new forum of debates. But as Achille Mbembe affirmed, in the African countries where transition was negotiated either by national conferences or by other ways, “*the ruling elites, in power since independences, resisted successfully the pressure of the opposition forces and could, unilaterally, impose a rhythm of liberalization. By determining the whole framework, nature and contents, they enacted the rules of the game, even if they sacrificed the most elementary aspects of competition, they could maintain their control on the principal levels of the State and the economy*”.¹⁰⁰ Therefore, being the media a privileged institution in the formation of a public opinion, it could never be left voluntarily in the hands of voices, such as the ‘leftists’, critical of the authorities. The latter did succeed in organizing a strategic plan of action for the media so as to permanently secure control over these channels of communication. For this reason, democratic freedom in the press could not be contemplated in the State that controlled media. The tendency towards pluralism of information, long expressed by liberal journalists, could only be effectively imposed by the creation of new independent publications.

The defence of democratic values, multi-party system, tolerance, freedom of expression and respect for human rights have been, since 1990, the war-horse of the independent media. This tendency marked a new phase of freedom. The public media was exceeded and it had difficulty in using self-criticism as attested by the following statement: “*Freedom of enterprise, in the final analysis, is not a crime. It is a political guideline of Frelimo*”.¹⁰¹

Faced with increasing charges of lack of independence, the official press had to open up its leading lines. Despite its attempts, it was still widely suspected of representing the views of the elites of the ruling party. To deal with the constant migration of qualified journalists towards the independent press, the authorities introduced new welfare packages and improved salaries. For example, intermediate executives were offered houses and cars by the government.

⁹⁶ *Mediafax* n°654 December 15, 1994.

⁹⁷ *Savana* n°98 December 1, 1998.

⁹⁸ *Imparcial* n° 71 August 28, 1994.

⁹⁹ *Mediafax* n°623 November 1, 1994.

¹⁰⁰ Achille MBEMBE, “Esquisses d’une démocratie à l’africaine” in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, October 2000, p. 20-21.

¹⁰¹ Economic Supplement of *Domingo*, March 25, 1991, p. 1.

▲ 4.1 THE INDEPENDENT PRESS: PERCEPTION OF ITS ROLE

The independent press in Mozambique surely has the conviction that it constitutes the only true countervailing power since it refuses to be tamed. It distinguishes itself from public or official press in which “*situations [of appropriation of power] inherited from the past remain inalterable, because they profit from the ‘status-quo’, in the face of silence and complicity by institutions that should champion the strict enforcement of the law, the defence of freedom of the press and the professional activities of journalists*”.¹⁰² Thus, it is not surprising to read *Semanário Independente* (Independent Weekly Magazine) on the top of the first page on *Savana*, making editorial independence its common practice.

The use of the ‘independent press’ label was sharply criticized by the public press and some politicians closely associated with the authorities. In the opinion of such critics, such media could not be regarded as independent given the foreign financing they received. For example, the *Mediacoop* group was bankrolled by Scandinavian countries, while *Imparcial* received ‘subsidies’ from the Renamo party. Fernando Lima, a journalist at *Savana* and member of the *Mediacoop* board, reacted to these charges by explaining the concept of ‘independent journalist’. He first highlighted the financial transparency of *Savana* before recalling its contribution to the nation since the peace agreement, considering that it was “*essential to make the difference in the landscape of the Mozambican press*”. According to him, “to claim to be independent” was not something easy because this implied to agree “*to pay taxes that others do not pay and if newspaper sales were three times the value of political subsidies, it was because they do not wish to be easy pries for the voracious appetites of the enemies of the freedom of the press*”. He concluded by saying that it was “*salutary that problems appear in newspaper columns, that one clarify the small plays of the backhanders, it is for these reasons that newspapers are useful*”.¹⁰³ Thus we can see clearly a real call for resistance to political pressures that characterized the relations between press and government at the beginning of the 1990s.

For the *Imparcial* daily newspaper, the principal function of journalism is “*to control the power in place and to prevent its abuses. It is logical that, with the institution of freedom of expression today, there will be accounts to settle, i.e. a certain dispute with the Frelimo party to be resolved. We cannot be rigorously impartial in our coverage of Frelimo, on the one hand, and of the other parties, on the other, simply because these opposition parties lack visibility. These parties deserve the benefit of the doubt which Frelimo has already lost*”.¹⁰⁴ The role of *Mediafax*, according to the organization, revolves around the continuity of a political protest, embarrassing the government with respect to its responsibilities and guarantees of the freedom of the press. For Fernando Lima, “*the Mediafax project is not only a conquest*

¹⁰² Extract from a *Savana* editorial, May 1, 1998, p. 9.

¹⁰³ Fernando LIMA, *Savana* n°38, October 7, 1994, p. 7.

¹⁰⁴ Miguéis Lopes JÚNIOR, “Discurso contra o poder” in *Savana* July 28, 1995, p. 16-17.

of plurality of opinions but it is also a contribution for democracy in Mozambique, since without freedom of the press, all other freedoms are nothing but illusions".¹⁰⁵ To achieve such a goal, the newspaper opened a broad space to the emerging opposition parties. However, that does not mean adopting the positions advocated by some of them. The assertiveness by opposition parties is one of the fundamental conditions for the advent of democracy.

The ambition of this independent press is to develop itself by extending the borders of the arena of information. This is important because it will enable the public to take part in the collective effort to set up a more active society in the public sphere, in short, to build an alternative public space to that where political manipulation prevails.

By its composition and the interests it advances, the independent press displays the characteristics of a special interest group. Its journalists are recruited from the group it is supposed to represent: the journalistic elite of the left. As any other special interest group, the Mozambican independent press has a considerable degree of autonomy. As Jean-Marie Denquin affirmed, "*when a special interest group is narrowly controlled by another organization and does not enjoy any margin of initiative, it is illusory to regard it as a decision-making centre*".¹⁰⁶ When the editorial boards of these newspapers begin to make their decisions freely, i.e. without any influence from the political and economic establishments, we can assume that they enjoy a considerable autonomy. It will be important to recall that the *Mediacoop jornalistas associados* cooperative and the *Imparcial* daily newspaper do not constitute the annex of an unspecified organization, even if sometimes they had sought financial and technical aids from foreign organizations operating in the country. The fact that they have some editorials echoing the views of Western organizations reflects the international context of democratisation and not an unspecified relation of dependence.

In the face of the increasing importance of the independent press in the society, the authorities found themselves constrained to take into account the views of the press: "*Mediafax daily publications are already regarded as a respected source of information in Mozambique. Read by President Joaquim Chissano, and frequently a subject of discussion at the council of ministers, Mediafax denounces scandals and corruption without sparing either the government or the opposition, and thus contrasting sharply with a manipulated official press*".¹⁰⁷ The New York Times even described Mediafax in one of its editorials as the 'avant-gardist' of free press in Mozambique and a model of freedom of the press in Africa.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ Fernando LIMA, Maputo, August 2003.

¹⁰⁶ Jean-Marie DENQUIN, *Introduction à la science politique*, Paris, Hachette, 2001, p. 140.

¹⁰⁷ Dispatch AFP Mozambique – *Mediafax, Dernier-né turbulent de la presse mozambicaine*, Paris, March 5, 1993.

¹⁰⁸ *The New York Times*, March 23, 1993.

▲ 4.2 THE PRESS AND THE LANGUAGE OF RECONCILIATION

Mozambique has endured one of the most devastating wars in Africa. Even though the violation of the most elementary right is a common occurrence in a conflict situation, several analysts have testified “*to the brutal methods used by the rebels*”.¹⁰⁹ Sixteen years of fratricidal war have left survivors with untold sufferings and losses, both psychologically and materially. One could easily count thousands of people, who took refuge in neighbouring countries, of abandoned orphans and a troop of disabled victims of anti-personal mines. Generally, few families were untouched by this war.

No public policy, economic and political liberalizations included, could possibly achieve success without an end to the war. Peace was a precondition that could not be achieved without national reconciliation. But the path to reconciliation was bound to be long and hard. The first opposition to peace came from the governing party. A hard-line faction within Frelimo still regarded Renamo as a movement created by the Rhodesian security services under the influence of the Intelligence Services of the South African army. According to them, this movement having failed on the battlefield did not and could not have any political weight. These hard-line members of Frelimo made their positions clear in the National Assembly where the majority of them were united. They also had a considerable foothold in other governmental institutions such as the national executive council where Armando Guebuza and Mariano Matsinha were its key leaders.

President Joaquim Chissano therefore considered that the first major task was to convince his own party of the need to talk with the ‘armed gangsters’. One year after the signing of the peace agreements in Rome, *Mediafax*, in one of its editorials, drew attention on this challenge. That was the time when the National Assembly, during the one-party era, criticized the President for having made broad concessions with respects to an electoral law:

*“Chissano has succeeded, during these years, in taking daring decisions. When this Parliament did not want to speak about negotiations with Renamo, the President was able, in a diplomatic way, to change the Parliament’s position (...) but today there are discordant voices that affirm that Chissano has conceded too much to Renamo (...) but was there another alternative?”*¹¹⁰

Reconciliation had a price to be paid by everybody. Initially, the authorities were asked to accept their military adversary as a political party. Then, the population was asked to forgive the crimes committed against them during the war. The government came under

¹⁰⁹ Elaine WINDRICH, *The Cold War Guerilla*, Connecticut, Greenwood Press Westport, 1992. See also Armelle ANDERS, *História da África Lusófona*, Mira Sintra, Inquérito, 1997, p.119.

¹¹⁰ *Mediafax* n°243, December 1993.

strong external pressures, especially from the American government, to sign an agreement with the guerrilla so that it became a political party. Anyway, internal pressures were already building up, so even without external pressures, the government would have probably gone to the negotiations table. In other words, external pressures only amplified the issues at stake.

Politicians as a class, press and civil society – this includes religious organizations – all played important roles in this reconciliation. By accepting the rebels as negotiating partners, the power no longer saw or treated them as ‘armed gangsters’ but as an armed movement about to turn into a political movement, in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution. Consequently, certain media organization that had insisted on the terminology of ‘armed movement’ quickly replaced that label with the *Resistência Nacional de Moçambique* initials, i.e. Renamo. The various religious organizations and social movements had already prepared the public for this change, by organizing prayers for peace, insisting on “the reconciliation between brothers”. The message was broadcasted by various media, including posters, bills, and even dramas acted in local languages.

The most symbolic act of national reconciliation was the landmark meeting between President Chissano and Afonso Dhlakama in Rome. During that meeting:

*“Dhlakama recognized Chissano as the President of all Mozambicans. He expressed confidence in him and in his government; he spoke about peace and democracy in the same tone and as much as Chissano did. The President described Dhlakama as a man whom they have decided to call ‘brother’ and consequently, they will both instruct their respective allies to use this language of reconciliation”.*¹¹¹

The day they were to sign the peace agreement, precisely on October 4, 1992, the two leaders called themselves ‘brothers’ and shook hands while the rest of the country and the entire world watched them on live on television. It was the most symbolic sign of reconciliation that the people had waited for. When back to the country, the President of the Republic was received at the airport by a significant crowd that trouped out to celebrate the new- found peace. In his speech to the crowd, Joaquim Chissano attributed the hardly won peace to neither the government nor Renamo but to the Mozambican people. To the language used by the President of the Republic, the political representative of Renamo in Maputo, Anselmo Victor replied: *“It is a language of reconciliation, we understand this principle”.*¹¹²

¹¹¹ *Mediafax* n° 55 August 7, 1992.

¹¹² *Mediafax* n°96 October 7, 1992.

▲ 4.3 THE PRESS AND THE OBSTACLES TO RECONCILIATION

The two parties were disposed to “reconciliation by omission” for different reasons. For Frelimo, peace was a means of remaining in power by renewing its legitimacy, whereas Renamo was convinced that its survival could only be guaranteed by a political solution, whence the need to be integrated in the political system and, while being there, to fight for power. The language of reconciliation was more a political speech. But the real acts of tolerance and forgiveness were more often demonstrated by the ordinary people than by the political class.

During the two years of negotiations, the press gave the impression that only Frelimo was interested in an agreement to be signed as quickly as possible. This was not just a speculation orchestrated by the independent press or even by the government’s press. It was later proved that Renamo had ceaselessly continued to make changes in its position. In an article entitled “*Change of speech in Rome*”, *Mediafax* recalled that Afonso Dhlakama had assured President Mugabe, in Gaborone in Botswana, that he was ready to sign a peace agreement as soon as the promised security guarantees were established. However, when he appeared in Rome to sign a ceasefire, Dhlakama argued that it was necessary to go “*stage by stage*”, whereas Chissano wanted peace without further delay.¹¹³

On this issue, the analyses of the press were insufficient. The press failed to understand that before it became a political party, Renamo would have to be sure to be recognized by the international community. This recognition implied its survival as a political organization, with an official status and conditions to engage in “*political confrontation in view of elections. An indispensable condition if we are to be sure that it will not leave the process and that pacification succeed*”.¹¹⁴

Peace agreement was finally signed two months later, precisely in October 1992. Even then, Renamo still changed opinion. Indeed, Renamo tried to hide weapons, to retain the control of its strongholds, to delay the demobilization of its combatants and to keep a part of its troops after the elections. Acts of intimidation against civilians even multiplied. The government also kept its forces at alert; it sought to preserve its strongholds, it delayed in demobilizing the paramilitary forces and it reinforced the PIR (Special Forces for the Maintenance of Order).

Before the beginning of the processes of demobilization of forces as envisaged in the peace agreement, each party wanted to maintain under its control the zones it occupied according to the provisions of the peace document signed in Rome. The government was

¹¹³ *Mediafax* n° 55 August 7, 1992.

¹¹⁴ Christine MESSIANT, “La paix au Mozambique: Un succès de l’ONU” in *Les chemins de la paix et de la guerre: Les fins de conflit en Afrique orientale et australe*, Paris, Karthala, 1997, p. 89.

prompt to show that Renamo had violated this principle by hiding behind the ceasefire its intention to occupy five new districts in the central and northern provinces of the country. The government rejected these charges, affirming that it controlled the in question zones before the ceasefire. It responded by using military forces to re-occupy these zones, despite the other conflict resolution mechanisms at its disposal. International condemnations were quick to follow. The representative of the General Secretary of the United Nations in Mozambique, Mr. Aldo Ajello, immediately warned the government that he would not hesitate to report these violations to the Security Council. In addition, the ambassadors of France, the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, Italy and Portugal condemned “*all unilateral military actions taken in order to occupy or re-occupy any zone*”. *Mediafax* reported this tension very well.

While *Mediafax* did not dare to criticize the government directly about its actions or inactions, it became the means for the opposition to make its complaints or feelings known:

*“Renamo wants to see the government carrying out its responsibilities and starting to disarm the popular militia in accordance with the new calendar of the Mozambican peace process (...), the new calendar approved by the government and Renamo in the presence of the United Nations requires the simultaneous withdrawal of forces on the two sides with the demobilization of the irregular troops including the militia”.*¹¹⁵

Rumours circulated freely during the transitional period. In Maputo, two documents, of unknown origins, began to circulate on the eve of the elections, insinuating that the governing party had concluded arrangements to perpetrate massive electoral fraud. Some of these rumours attributed the origin of the document to a Brazilian communication agency, *Vox Populi*, hired to manage Frelimo’s electoral campaign project:

*“High percentages of voided votes from the areas under the influence of Renamo have been guaranteed by Vox Populi in a confidential report [...]. In a triumphant tone, the report gives instructions on mechanisms of distraction to divert the attention of Renamo to secondary questions”.*¹¹⁶

Two days later, the whole document was published by *Savana*. Its impact on the readers was enormous:

¹¹⁵ *Mediafax* n°243 December 1993.

¹¹⁶ *Imparcial* n° 105 October 19, 1994.

*“The political speech of Frelimo must (...) be more critical. It should assume a tone of denunciation. It must lay emphasis on the crimes of Renamo and its leader, but at the same time on the work for peace and national reconstruction”.*¹¹⁷

This document created serious political tension in the country, which necessitated the intervention of the representative of the UN General Secretary in Mozambique, Mr. Aldo Ajello: *“It is sufficient to compare this document with a similar one published in Angola also on the eve of the elections to affirm that it is clearly false”.*¹¹⁸ In Angola, the campaign of the ruling party was also managed by *Vox Populi*. It is extremely probable that this document was manufactured to encourage Renamo to give up the electoral contest at the last minute on the basis of fraud charges. Thus there was some amount of ‘truth’ in the allegations that the documents have been manufactured for political purposes. Another question that arises is why *Savana* published it considering its professional spirit and seriousness.

Another document, purportedly emanating from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, gave instructions that a bomb would be installed in the house of the opposition leader, Afonso Dhlakama. The climate of reconciliation remained very strong among the population, but this was not always the case as there were moments of scepticism, especially when relations between Renamo and the government resulted in tensions. The readers of the *Domingo* weekly magazine had reasons to worry about when this newspaper published a document in its edition on November 13, 1994, less than one month after the elections, claiming that Renamo had concrete plans to return to war and that American Ambassador Denis Jet was one of the instigators:

*“The leadership of the movement [Renamo] met in Maputo, under the chairmanship of Afonso Dhlakama, and it defined new strategies. All the recommendations were recorded in a document that Domingo [the weekly magazine] got and in which the major aspects of this plot were revealed. This strategy was forged by the Ambassador of the United States, Denis Jet, Tiny Rowland [an English businessman and owner of a cotton producing and exporting firm in Mozambique, Lonrho], some British and Portuguese citizens (...). Hundreds of armed men have already been assembled in Matutuine [less than fifty km to the capital]”.*¹¹⁹

The whole political class and even the international community, including the head of the ONUMOZ and Western diplomats, immediately criticized the action of the weekly magazine. *Mediafax* also criticized *Domingo* but it frowned at what it saw as an intimidation of the national press:

¹¹⁷Extract of a confidential report published in *Savana* n°40 October 21, 1994.

¹¹⁸*Noticias* October 25, 1994.

¹¹⁹*Domingo* n° 649 November 13, 1994.

“The article published by Domingo will have been one of the least happy moments for this weekly magazine, as a document that is potentially so destabilizing should not be published without a rigorous confirmation of its contents. But it was not a reason for the headquarters of the international community to unite against the newspaper; in an orgy of judgments that did not exist, for example, at during the case of the document attributed to Vox Populi. What we saw yesterday [the judgment with regard to the Domingo weekly magazine] was an unpleasant spectacle almost comparable to intimidation of the national press”.¹²⁰

Thus, even if *Mediafax* was not directly concerned with the article and even condemned the way *Domingo* published it since the latter was not sure of its contents and did not weigh its impact, the daily faxed newspaper denounced the ‘double standard’ of the representatives of the international community and restated the need for a free press in the country.

¹²⁰ *Mediafax* n° 633 November 15, 1994.

part three

monitoring

Press and democratic transition

I FRELIMO: FACING THE PAST

**II THE PRESS AND THE
ELECTORAL DEBATE**

CONCLUSION

Press and democratic transition

I. FRELIMO: FACING THE PAST

The independent press that has greatly benefited from the new environment of media liberalization has become the principal mouthpiece of anti-establishment forces that disagree with the glorious discourse of the party in power.

■ 1. LATE REVELATIONS ABOUT THE DEATH OF MONDLANE

Thanks to the advent of the multi-party system in Mozambique, the opposition figures that had been in exile since independence could return to the country. In order to participate meaningfully in the democratic process, these former exiles decided to revitalize their political parties, outlawed by the authorities in the case of Domingos Arouca¹²¹, or to form new parties in the case of Padimbe Kamati¹²² and Maximo Dias.¹²³ On the eve of the first round of elections, the majority of the leaders of the emerging parties attempted to discredit the ruling party by linking it to the unresolved deaths of some members of Frelimo during and after the national liberation struggle. On February 11, 1994 in Savana, Domingos Arouca, leader of the Frente Unida de Moçambique (Fumo), one of the parties, wrote an article on the death of the first President of Frelimo, Eduardo Mondlane, on February 3, 1969, in Tanzania. According to Arouca, Mondlane was assassinated by a Marxist faction within Frelimo. This faction was made up of revolutionary intellectuals in charge of the Defence Department in 1966 who were

¹²¹ Domingos Arouca was born in the province of Inhambane, southern region of the country. During the colonial era, he was the only black and assimilated lawyer in Mozambique. He was also one of the last directors of the *O Brado Africano* newspaper, a position that he cumulated with that of President of the Centro Associativo dos Negros de Moçambique. During the 1960s, he was imprisoned by colonial authorities due to his political activities. In 1974, he tried to become member of the transitional government, such a measure being refused by Frelimo. Few months later, he went into exile in Portugal where he created an opposition party, Frente Unida de Moçambique, Fumo. This party had weak clandestine activity in Mozambique.

¹²² President of the Partido Popular de Progresso de Moçambique, PPPM. Makonde ethnic group, Kamati is a former exile to Kenya and the United States of America.

¹²³ Maximo Dias, half-caste, descendent of a great Creole family of the province of Zambezia, was with Joana Simeão (executed by Frelimo after independence) activist in Grupo Unido de Moçambique, GUMO, a political party created in Mozambique few months before the revolution of April 25 in Portugal. This political party close to Jorge Jardim was the judicious counterbalance of the influence of Frelimo near to the Portuguese authorities. Following the formation of the transition government in 1974, Maximo Dias went into exile in Portugal. Presently, his political party, Movimento Nacionalista de Moçambique (Monamo) formes the opposition coalition, Renamo-União Eleitoral.

opposed to his pro-Western position. Even though Arouca's article contained several flaws, particularly its lack of precision on the events, it was widely received by the readership that exhausted all the fifteen thousand copies on sale. That was a great commercial success, such a success being explained by the fact that Frelimo prohibited the Mozambicans from discussing this part of their history. In this episode, *Savana* acted as a vector of freedom of expression. But there was hardly anything original about Arouca's claims, either in terms of sources or arguments. In fact, he had more or less rephrased the arguments of Jorge Jardim.

The publication of an accusation of such a magnitude was unimaginable in the Mozambican press a few years earlier. By allowing the publication of this article, *Savana* proved its independence. Other independent publications, such as *Mediafax*, *Imparcial* and *Metical*, that later emerged as mouthpieces of a public hungry for political changes, went through the same experience.

As Renaud de La Brosse affirmed: "*By their combativeness and independent tone, these 'independent newspapers' have positioned themselves as unavoidable players in the political debate, as major detractors of the one-party State, and often as moralizers of public life*".¹²⁴ Due to the gravity of the accusations in the article, Frelimo was forced to react to the charges, through Sérgio Vieira, one of the people indicted in the article. It was the first time since independence that such a high-ranking member of the party had explained his role in the death of Eduardo Mondlane to the national press. Before, the ruling party had harped on the role of the PIDE, the Portuguese Colonial Intelligence Service, in this crime and very little had been heard about the complicity of Frelimo, then a liberation movement.

From then on, more detail and names besides that of Uria Simango began to emerge. Basilio Banda was suspected of conspiring with the PIDE, Samuel Dhlakama was fingered as the person who transported the letter bomb from Mbeya – Malawi – to Dar-Es Salaam – Tanzania – and Silvério Nungo was said to have received and forwarded the parcel to Mondlane.¹²⁵ The death of Mondlane was used as a pretext for a purge within Frelimo because all the 'accused' were in fact pro-Mondlane and anti-Samora Machel/Marcelino dos Santos. In spite of these reactions, other accusations remained unanswered, for example those bordering on the death of Lazaro Kavandame.

¹²⁴ Renaud de la BROSSE "Afrique subsaharienne en transition: Des journaux nécessairement engagés" in *Les Cahiers du Journalisme*, n°6, October 1999, p: 103.

¹²⁵ See *Savana* of February 18, 1994. Samuel Dhlakama does not have familiar relationship with leader of Renamo Afonso Dhlakama. But both belong to the same clan. During the 1960s, Samuel Dhlakama was the Frelimo's secretary for the province of Sofala. On February 2, 1979 Samuel Dhlakama was imprisoned by the secret services and he was jailed during thirty days in a prison of high security. Moved away from the circle of the power, Samuel Dhlakama died in 1992. All these accused were already suspected by Frelimo as the assassins of Eduardo Mondlane in 1969. For more details see the articles of Aquino de Bragança in *Afrique-Asie*, editions of 1969.

■ 2. “JUSTICE FOR KAVANDAME”

Despite these atrocities committed in the past, neither Frelimo nor Renamo publicly offered any apology for their crimes against the people of Mozambique. The peace agreements had successfully put an end to the war, and so they covered all the crimes committed during the hostilities, without any of the side assuming responsibility for their deeds. For the people, it was the need for peace that was emphasized more than the desire to settle accounts. Frelimo certainly recognized Renamo but it had difficulty in recognizing its political legitimacy. It was a sort of “reconciliation by omission”, i.e. silence on the wounds of the years of the conflict.

Once the rule of the democratic game was established, one began to see new institutions and forms of regulation emerging. The 1994 general elections established a new multi-party Parliament. Frelimo won the majority of the seats, while Renamo and the *União Democrática* a coalition of three parties, formed the opposition.¹²⁶ It was a Parliament where all the present political forces were confronted with a new experience totally different from that during the one-party system. In the first few years of the new National Assembly, each of the former belligerents had difficulty in curtailling its warlike remarks. On many occasions, both parties brought up issues bordering on the past. At the end of December 1995, in a remark intended for the government, Renamo’s legislators “*expressed their disillusionment and accused the executive of incompetence for its inability to respond to questions and for having proposed unconstitutional bills to the Parliament*”.¹²⁷

Quickly, a debate emerged between the legislators of Frelimo and those of Renamo, the former disputing the opposition’s point of view. As the debate between the parties progressed, discussion got heated. For Renamo, the fact that Frelimo won the elections did not mean that it had the right to run the country as it deemed to have: “*We have heard that all the members of the opposition were once members of Frelimo. Yes, but today that is no longer the case. The fact that we have distanced ourselves [from Frelimo] and that today we are in the Parliament confers legitimacy to our departure.*” Indeed for João Gonçalves, one of the deputies, the democracy in Mozambique was possible thanks to Renamo.¹²⁸

The response of the ruling party was immediate. Sérgio Vieira, well-known for his eloquence, retorted: “*I consider it regrettable that, continuously, those whom I consider the least worthy of speaking about ‘democracy’ want to appoint themselves to give lessons on democracy. It is time to ask those who came here to give lessons, namely Orlando Cristina, founder and first general secretary of a political organization present here [Renamo], who he is, from where he comes, what his former activities were, with whom he worked and for what*

¹²⁶ About the elections see the next chapter.

¹²⁷ *Savana* n°98 December 1, 1995, p.2.

¹²⁸ *Ibidem*.

*objectives, and who commander Oscar Cardoso was? You came to tell us that civil servants expelled from SNASP [National Services of Popular Safety, the secret police] for having committed various irregularities are the inspirers of democracy? (...) We all know each other very well in this room [National Assembly], we must stop this play and look at the future...".*¹²⁹ Encouraged by his colleagues in the Parliament, Vieira continued: “*Presidents Eduardo Mondlane, Samora Machel and Joaquim Chissano were all elected in congress by the secret voting procedure...*”

In the middle of this parliamentary debate, a voice, obviously of a Renamo’s legislator, all of a sudden retorted: “*Where is Lazaro Kavandame?*” Vieira, obviously annoyed, responded with a sharp voice: “*Kavandame was executed because he was treacherous. He is your hero, the one who led the Portuguese in helicopters to launch bombs on us [alluding to his activities during the time of the national liberation struggle]*”.¹³⁰ Frelimo deputies applauded and congratulated their colleague, Vieira, for several minutes, without interruption. This sad spectacle at the National Assembly was portrayed by the public media as a simple moment of exacerbation of spirits, mutual accusations and nothing abnormal.

Savana however went further by devoting its headline and even its editorial to this story, calling for justice for Kavandame:

“If mutual accusations are normal between the two parliamentary groups, one cannot remain indifferent to the categorical assertion of Sérgio Vieira according to which Kavandame was executed because he was treacherous. A question bordering on executions [within Frelimo] has never been duly clarified. When, where, how and who executed Kavandame? Was he executed alone or along with other traitors? Who are they? Were they trialled? In which court and what was the sentence? Who was his lawyer? Where was the sentence preserved? Are their families informed on this?...These questions are relevant to the extent that we know that until independence, Kavandame was still alive, which presupposes that he was executed after Mozambique became a State governed by a Constitution of the Republic, with courts and other institutions designed to protect the rights of citizens. If so, it is not normal that official information on the circumstances of the execution will not be available.

The most astonishing to the National Assembly was that the Frelimo parliamentary group was delirious with the revelations of Deputy Sérgio Vieira, so much so that a great number of his colleagues suffocated him with fraternal congratulations. That means that a legislator has just made a serious revelation to the Nation and he is applauded by the majority group, as if he had just discovered the solution of all our problems! Where are we going with this democracy?

It is our conviction that we all have the right to have our idols, and people have the right to know where their sons were buried, whether or not they are perceived as traitors by

¹²⁹ *Savana* n°98 December 1, 1995, p.2.

¹³⁰ *Ibidem*.

some and heroes by others. It is our conviction that a 'Truth Commission' would be fundamental in Mozambique, as Desmond Tutu will say, to 'reopen the wounds of the past in order to threat them permanently'. This occurs because a national reconciliation based on political compromises without justice risks subjecting us to tyrants of the past who praise moments of glory of their tyranny".¹³¹

The political climate was tense after the comments of Savana, so much so that the President of the Republic, Joaquim Chissano, had to come out twice to explain himself the following week. Chissano pointed out that, in this political debate, people should not force the actors "to say things that incite". According to the President, "*the number of traitors to the fatherland executed is much more significant than what we imagined. (...) To reopen this file would require the presence of people who are already dead (...) All these issues have been resolved in the AGP [the General Peace Agreement signed between the government and Renamo in Rome, on October 4, 1992]*".¹³²

Savana did not share the opinion of the President. In its opinion: "*The extra-judicial executions carried out by a constitutionally established government constitute a crime that cannot be invalidated by the signature of an unspecified agreement. They can be forgiven by the people thanks to a sincere apology of those who have repented, which is not, unfortunately, the case in our country (...) On the other hand, arrogant and offensive statements against the soul of the executed multiply. And so the reconciliation and the construction of the country will still not prevail, Mr. President*".¹³³

More than the opposition parties, Savana was firm in the struggle to show that the time of impunity of the one-party system (Frelimo) was completely over and that, from then on, its responsibilities were no longer to protect the media. Members of the ruling party saw Savana's criticism against the authorities as the evidence of its pro-Renamo bias.

■ 3. THE RISE OF A SAMORIANO FEELING

The Nkomati Accord between the authorities in Maputo and those in Pretoria did not prevent certain organizations within the Southern African Secret Service from continuing to provide assistance to Renamo. Even if the South African government was no longer directly involved, it is very improbable that it was unaware of the activities of certain right-wing groups in the South African Defense Forces. Nevertheless, the South African government was constrained by the international community to show its goodwill, to respect the terms of its engagement. Thus, it prohibited Renamo from using its territory as a base.

¹³¹ Extract from editorial "Justiça para Kavandame", *Savana* n° 98 December 1, 1995, p.9.

¹³² President Joaquim Chissano in *Savana* n° 99 December 8, 1995, p.9.

¹³³ Extract from editorial "Acabar com a arrogância e promover a reconciliação", *Savana* n° 99 December 8, 1995, p. 9.

From then onwards, supplies intended for Renamo transited by Malawi. This created an unprecedented crisis between the Malawian authorities and the government in Maputo. On September 15, 1986, during a visit to the province of Tete, President Samora Machel announced the closing of the common border with Malawi, while threatening reprisals if Malawi continued to let supplies intended for the rebels transiting by its territory.¹³⁴ Samora Machel, along with two other heads of States, Presidents Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, even went to Lilongwe to try to convince President Hastings K. Banda of Malawi to stop the passage of supplies to the rebels via its territory.

On October 19, 1986, Samora Machel and thirty-three members of a presidential delegation were killed in an air crash in Mbuzine, in South Africa.¹³⁵ In the following years, the government intensified its campaign of political reorientation, culminating to its 'original' socialist practice of state interventionism, in favour of economic liberalization, particularly privatisation and deregulation of the financial sector.¹³⁶ These changes, combined with the disastrous effects of the war, accentuated social inequalities by leading the majority of the population to an extreme condition of impoverishment. Disengagement of the State and increased corruption elicited very severe criticisms from emerging civic organizations. The apparent inability of the government to solve the situation resulted in the erosion of its popularity. In 1991, the country faced a risk of a social explosion, with strikes in the public service and a coup d'Etat attempt. Rumours, synonymous with socio-political instability, gained ground. President Chissano, incapable of containing the situation, at least for a few months, was described as '*Mariazinha*' (a local word for a weakling).

▲ 3.1 A MINISTER AGAINST FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

According to reports, the years of economic liberalization – the structural adjustment programme launched in 1987 – was disappointing for the majority of the population, especially in the capital. Only members of the political elite and speculators (the black market dealers) benefited from liberalization. Disenchantment was widespread, even among the urban elites in the capital who passively watched the birth of a new middle-class without academic culture and 'unable' to prove the origin of its wealth. Liberalization had allowed the superabundance of products of all kinds, but the majority of the population did not earn enough money to purchase these goods. At the same time, acts of urban violence spread and the feeling of insecurity settled in the large cities, such as Maputo, Beira and Nampula. In the face of the incapacity of the police force to restore safety – that is assuming that it was not part of the

¹³⁴ See *Tempo* edition of September 23, 1986.

¹³⁵ About the last days of President Samora Machel see the article by Carlos Cardoso "A Solidão do Presidente" in *Mediafax* n°1122 October 18, 1996, p. 5-7.

¹³⁶ Frelimo claims a Socialism that is different from that of Soviet and Maoist alignments. An analyst, John Saul, defended this view. For more details see John SAUL, *A Difficult Road: The transition of Socialism in Mozambique*, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1985.

the insecurity and widespread doubts about the willingness of the Interior Minister, Manuel António, to take control of the situation, the press called on the President of the Republic to ask the Minister to resign.¹³⁷

The press even presented evidences suggesting that Interior Minister Manuel António was ‘sponsoring’ some robbery gangs that were stealing cars in Beira.¹³⁸ Infuriated by the publication of this allegation, the Interior Minister threatened to sue *Diário de Moçambique* for slandering: “*The freedom of the press does not grant the right to denounce or defame political leaders*”, he said.¹³⁹ One of the fingered individuals in this illicit activity even threatened to kill the editor of *Diário de Moçambique* and the author of the said article. The whole press kept calling for the resignation of the Interior Minister. But President Chissano refused to give in to their demand. The decision of the President proved to be fatal because four months later, Manuel António summoned the whole media to vow that he would never leave his station and that nobody could force him to do so. His outbursts seemed like a challenge to the press and to the President of the Republic. Even the press that was close to the authorities called for a firm response from the President by António’s resignation. At this stage, the President gave in the request of the press but he left deep question marks about his authority or lack of it: “*In several matters, Chissano did not have the authority that he needed to have as leader of the nation*”, concluded Carlos Cardoso.¹⁴⁰

▲ 3.2 THE FORMER ‘LEFTISTS’ AND THE GOVERNMENT POLITICAL GUIDELINE

The elites of the residential zone in the capital, Sommersfield, had quickly resorted to the services of private security companies and they equipped their residences with alarms and electric barbed wires in order to avoid any intrusion. At that time, two ‘worlds’ cohabited while a feeling of social exclusion grew among the more deprived people. For different reasons, these two ‘worlds’, in their imaginations, continued to make allusions to the ideals of Samora Machel: ideal of ‘social equality’ for the majority of the population, and of ‘social order’ for the elites. Samora Machel was the father of the nation, an orator and a charismatic leader who left his imprints among the elites and the urban population. Devoid of economic resources, Samora drew his legitimacy from his commitment to the construction of the Mozambican

¹³⁷ Editorial “A segurança que não temos” *Savana* n° 62 March 1995, p.9. See also “Urgente desminar o Ministério do Interior” *Savana* n° 63 March 31, 1995, p.1-3.

¹³⁸ See *Diário de Moçambique* edition of March 24, 1995.

¹³⁹ Manuel António talking to the *Radio Moçambique*, Delegation of Beira, in March 27, 1995.

¹⁴⁰ *Mediafax* edition of October 22, 1996. Manuel António was the only Minister of the Ndau ethnic group in the government. This ethnic group is traditionally hostile to Frelimo, thus his resignation would be badly interpreted in Sofala, the Ndau stronghold.

Nation, to development and to the modernization of the State. Samora often practised self-criticism, which brought him great admiration among the ‘leftists’ of that time.¹⁴¹

Some liberal journalists (former ‘leftists’) at the *Radio Moçambique*, who followed the ideas of Samora Machel, published an audio-cassette containing some of the speeches of the former President of the Republic.¹⁴² The success was such that, in few weeks, the cassette was no longer available for the sale. The speeches of Samora Machel replaced the loud music usually played in *Chapa 100*.¹⁴³ All these unfolding events were going against the trend of opinion within the government and Frelimo. This was when Frelimo was seeking to distance itself from the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the old one-party State. Samora Machel was then a kind of representative of this ideological orientation. Joaquim Chissano confirmed this intent to depart from the past: “*This history of Marxism [had] started to pose problems to us*”.¹⁴⁴ Two logics were in confrontation. On one side, some liberal journalists tried to rehabilitate the image of Samora Machel as a national symbol and on the other, Frelimo, constrained by some internal and external factors, was afraid of the political interpretation its adversaries could give to that line of action. For the ‘leftists’, mostly white, Samora Machel was a champion of the antiracist movement, the *homem novo* (the modern man), the only one who could give them a place in the sun.

Throughout the decade 1990-2000, official initiatives aiming at polishing the image of Samora Machel were rare. During this period, only the independent press made significant attempts to introduce the ideas of the late President into the national agenda. However, this turned out to be a confused search for a more egalitarian political project. Still, the only available model in the recent past was that of Samora Machel, i.e. that of the “old and pure Frelimo” against “a new and neo-liberal Frelimo”. Thus, Savana, while criticizing the absence of a government political guideline, observed:

“Every day, it is becoming more obvious to many Mozambicans that Samora Machel is missed in this country. He is missed not only by the masses, who are used to looking him up to solve their problems, but even by the intellectuals. As for the latter, his disappearance seemed to have put an end to an understanding of the historical mission of the country, leaving

¹⁴¹ See Jérôme VIALATTE “Mozambique, l’Etat en quête d’une nouvelle symbolique” in *L’Afrique Politique*, Karthala, a 1997, p. 41.J. Vialatte reports the mitigated assessment of the rural development policy of the public farms and communal villages. We can also note the practice of tortures and arbitrary prisons by the security forces, which Samora Machel denounced during a rally on November 5, 1981 as an example of self-criticism.

¹⁴² Contrary to the other events, Frelimo was not responsible for the publication of Samora Machel’s speech. Liberal journalists as Machado da Graça and Leite de Vasconcelos seem to be the source of this project. This audio cassette is still available in *Radio Moçambique*.

¹⁴³ Name used to call the collective taxis in Maputo. In urban areas, to play music in the collective taxis is usual.

¹⁴⁴ Joaquim Chissano, *Expresso*, Lisbon, May 12, 1990, p34-35/Revista. See also Michel CAHEN “Le socialisme c’est les soviets plus l’ethnicité” in *La nationalisation du monde – Europe, Afrique, L’Identité dans la démocratie*, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1999.

behind a feeling that the absence of Samora has caused a vacuum in the socio-political command in Mozambique".¹⁴⁵

In 1995, *Savana* even published a summarized 'posthumous' interview from a speech on security delivered in 1981, in which Samora Machel was responding to some topical questions. Liberal journalists who shared the ideas of Samora Machel appreciated the proximity of the former President to the population, in particular the idea of putting public resources at the disposal of the people even above his own interest: "*Samora hated misery and the underdevelopment of the country. Today, (...) our leaders are very proud of being the harbingers of underdevelopment*". At least, during the 'Socialist' era, the country "*had a vision, projects and dreams (...), today the country, as a whole, does not have objectives to achieve (...). Our country needs to find, as in the past, some projects, objectives and dreams*"¹⁴⁶ especially because "*Socialism in Mozambique did not fail. It was just defeated*".¹⁴⁷

For these liberal journalists, in spite of the errors he might have made, Samora Machel was a statesman who worked for national unit to the detriment of regional or ethnic divisions. This view by the 'leftists' referred to an urban population of the South, which had replaced the masses (labourers and peasants, especially from the rural zones) allied with the powers that be.

II THE PRESS AND THE ELECTORAL DEBATE

The 'public' and the independent press were often in disagreement on their accounts of the democratic transition. The independent press openly positioned itself as the catalyst of change.

■ 1. THE ROLE OF THE PRESS IN THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN

The media coverage of the 1994 election campaign did highlight the close links between each of the two leading political parties and the press. With the exception of the publications of the *Mediacoop* group, the entire 'public press' did not escape from the temptation of drifting towards one party or another and towards either of the presidential candidates.

¹⁴⁵ *Savana* n° 94 November 3, 1995, p.1. This edition devoted four pages of interview to a researcher at *Centro de Estudos Africanos*, Alexandrino José, on the political vacuum caused by the absence of Samora Machel in the country. This interview was made to legitimate the position of the weekly magazine, very critical with the neo-liberal position of Frelimo. Alexandrino José criticized then the suppression of the Marxist course on national university as a negation of the Mozambican history, in particular the Samora Machel era.

¹⁴⁶ Machado DA GRAÇA, "Padrões, objetivos e sonhos" in *Savana* October 30, 1998, p.6.

¹⁴⁷ Carlos CARDOSO, *Metical* n° 451 April 8, 1999, p.4.

▲ 1.1 A PARTISAN ‘PUBLIC PRESS’?

The ruling party was largely favoured because it controlled the major channels of expression in the public press and two newspapers with wide circulation, traditional *Notícias* and the highly analytical weekly magazine, *Domingo*. Conscious of the “danger of manipulation of the mass communication by the media”, Renamo, for two whole years (1992-1994), kept calling for the dismantling of the Ministry of Information and the removal of all members of Frelimo from the boards of the various public media organizations.¹⁴⁸ These demands by Renamo were only met one month before the elections, “*thanks particularly to international pressures*”.¹⁴⁹

Through the works of Albino Magaia, *Domingo* pursued a strategy that consisted in shifting the real stakes of the electoral campaign by pointing out the supposedly ‘political incompetence’ of Renamo: “*Afonso Dhlakama is conscious that his party, though very good in war and destruction, is much weaker politically. He is also conscious that it is easier to commit acts of sabotage in cities or rural areas than to rebuild a country that is struggling with serious problems, particularly those of subsistence*”.¹⁵⁰ Albino Magaia described Renamo as an isolated party in the southern Africa region: “*Political parties from the southern African region will never forget that, while we were massacred by apartheid commandos, some of us, in the name of anti-communist extremism, alienated themselves with the racist State to dispute a constitutionally established authority. The ANC will certainly not forget the past of Renamo*”.¹⁵¹ Here we can see a clear attempt to help Frelimo to profit from the ANC’s electoral victory in the April 1994 South African elections. The intention was to link the former guerrilla movement to the National Party that was roundly defeated by the ANC. By evoking the past and the regional isolation of Renamo due to the defeat of its former ally, Albino Magaia was implicitly urging the people to confer the same defeat on Renamo.

This article by Albino Magaia was not condemnable from the journalistic point of view. It was a personal opinion. In that case, the author is free to give his opinion on the political parties. Moreover, *Domingo* is not an entirely public outfit as *Radio Moçambique* and *Televisão de Moçambique*. However, the instrumentalization of the ANC’s victory did not stop there. During the official visit of Nelson Mandela to Mozambique, the weekly magazine published a photomontage of the South African leader and his Mozambican counterpart, Joaquim Chissano, on its front page. On the photograph, there were the flag of Frelimo and its electoral slogan “*Frelimo o Futuro Melhor*” (Frelimo, the better future).

¹⁴⁸ It was the case of Manuel Tomé, General Director of *Radio Moçambique* and member of Frelimo Central Committee.

¹⁴⁹ According to “Ministério em vias d’extinção?” *Imparcial* n° 83 October 15, 1994, p.1.

¹⁵⁰ *Domingo* n° 614 March 20, 1994, p. 4.

¹⁵¹ Albino MAGAIA, “Análise política” in *Domingo* n° 626 June 12, 1994, p.4.

Below the imposing photograph, a short sentence was printed in bold characters: “*Mandela, peacemaker in South Africa, (...) is received by Joaquim Chissano, peacemaker in Mozambique. This meeting marks the beginning of a **better future** for the two countries*”.¹⁵² The layout of the front page of Domingo meant something: Chissano was portrayed in a similar light as Mandela. It was also a deliberate attempt to exclude Afonso Dhlakama from the advent of peace in Mozambique. Finally, we must not overlook the strategic inclusion of the campaign slogan of Frelimo: “The better future”.

It also attended to divert attention from the fact that Mandela came to Maputo to convince Joaquim Chissano and Frelimo to embrace the idea of a government of national unity, such an option having been embraced by the South Africans but stoutly rejected by Frelimo. If *Domingo*, a semi-private pro-Frelimo weekly, was discrete in its support for the ruling party and its candidate, *Notícias* was more a branch of Frelimo than a general newspaper. In its July 7, 1994 edition, the daily newspaper wrote: “*The so-called war for democracy was a war of destruction, robbery and murder*”, affirmed Chissano during rallies in Magude and Manhiça. One can easily note the paradox in the attitude of the ruling party that preaches reconciliation but relies simultaneously on a warlike speech to question the credibility of its opponents. But, even more worrisome, these utterances carried on a front page of the country’s major newspaper went without anybody calling him to order. In all their articles about Renamo, the journalists at *Notícias* expressed hostile opinions and comments: “*The Renamo leader held a rally yesterday in Chimoio [in the centre of the country], which seemed to have left a large part of the audience disappointed and frustrated because Afonso Dhlakama’s speech failed to meet their expectations*”.¹⁵³

During the forty-five days of electoral campaign officially allowed, *Notícias* sent correspondents all over the country. One of them was Jaime Cuambe, political editor and Frelimo activist. Cuambe was sent to the central but strategic province of Zambezia the biggest electoral constituency in the country and a principal stronghold of the opposition to cover the Frelimo candidate, Joaquim Chissano.¹⁵⁴ Cuambe’s articles were only a euphoric discourse of Frelimo. One of them announced: “*Chissano arrives in Zambezia and he alters the political tendencies*”.¹⁵⁵ This journalist described the festive environment of the reception of Chissano as “*a delirious of hundreds of thousands of people who shouted: Chissano has already won.*” Cuambe continued: “*Curiously, thirty minutes after the arrival of Chissano in Quelimane [province of Zambezia], the leader of Renamo, Afonso Dhlakama, arrived in the same airport and his presence passed unnoticed.*”

¹⁵² *Domingo* n° 633 July 24, 1994, Emphasis by the author.

¹⁵³ *Notícias*, July 4, 1994, p. 1.

¹⁵⁴ Jaime Cuambe was in 1999 and 2004 Frelimo legislator assistant in the National Assembly. He was simultaneously the political editor in chief in *Notícias*, the main daily newspaper of the country.

¹⁵⁵ *Notícias*, October 1, 1994.

These remarks are highly questionable. First, the title is clearly partial. Second, to say that there were hundreds of thousands of people around candidate Chissano is highly improbable, given the number of inhabitants in an average city such as Quelimane. Last, to suggest that the arrival of Dhlakama went unnoticed in an area that was his stronghold is anything but true. Even all the other present journalists said the opposite. In another article that appeared in the same edition, another reporter, Mussá Mahomed, who travelled with Afonso Dhlakama, wrote: “*Since the beginning of the election campaigns, the town of Quelimane went through the same experience, yesterday, by receiving in less than one hour the two principal candidates for Ponta Vermelha [the presidential house]. Thousands of people came out, separately, to greet the two leaders. Convoys of cars, activists with Frelimo tee-shirts, flags, slogans and pamphlets of the two political formations coloured the avenues and the streets of the provincial capital of Zambezia in a festive and peaceful environment*”.¹⁵⁶

Televisions and radio broadcasts reached a peak of misinformation. During a rally in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, Afonso Dhlakama, apparently referring to some rumours that seemed to have emanated from some elements within Frelimo, said in a rather comic tone: “*They say that Renamo will evacuate the makonde ethnic group to Angola, since it appears that they are originally from Angola. It is a lie. It is Chissano himself who will be evacuated. Since the Changane ethnic group is of South African origin, Chissano will be evacuated to South Africa*”.¹⁵⁷ This small historical ‘excursion’ nourished a campaign of misinformation by Frelimo in the southern region. In its major news bulletin, TVM announced to its audience that “*in the event of victory, Afonso Dhlakama promises to return the Changane ethnic group to South Africa*”. In spite of a prompt protest from Armindo Chavana, the journalist who had sent the dispatch from Cabo Delgado to the editorial-office of TVM – while insisting that the information be corrected “the Frelimo campaign managers ensured that the ‘news’ was aired continuously by *Radio Moçambique*. By these actions, the ruling party presented Afonso Dhlakama as a regionalist or sectionalist who was likely to stoke ethnic hatred, in the event of a victory. This strategy paralysed the Renamo electoral campaign in the province of Gaza populated by the Changane ethnic group and from where the first three presidents of Frelimo came.

On its own, this piece of information that was aired repeatedly in the public media would not have constituted a decisive factor in the voting behaviour of the electorate. Admittedly, some individuals from the South who had heard or seen these items in the public media perceived this “threat of evacuation of the Changane ethnic group” as a signal of an open tribal campaign. But the *grupos dinamizadores and the chefes de quarteirão* – lowest organizational

¹⁵⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵⁷ Michel CAHEN, *Les Bandits, op.cit.*, p.120. Armindo CHAVANA, Maputo, September 2003. It is probably true that the Makonde ethnic group was originating from Angola but in the far past.

structures of Frelimo – by moving from house to house and to roadside markets to spread this information stoked fear within the southern ethnic groups. This group accused of being the ‘holders’ of power thus voted overwhelmingly for Frelimo. It was mainly the members of the lower class who showed little interest in the press, and who were the most terrified by this information, because the small intellectual class was reassured by the numerous statements of Afonso Dhlakama on this subject: “*We did not fight the war against the domination of the South on the Centre and the North*”.¹⁵⁸

In conclusion, the media coverage of the electoral processes by *Notícias* and *Domingo* proved to be clearly in favour of the ruling party. It was also an event that proved that the relations between the party and the State were far from being broken in practice.

▲ 1.2 THE INDEPENDENT PRESS AND THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGNS

As we have seen, historically, Renamo lacked a strong support among liberal journalists, except those at *Imparcial*. Nevertheless, journalists at *Savana* and *Mediafax* showed a remarkable sense of professionalism that exceeded by far the limits of their old ideological positions.

1.2.1 SAVANA AND MEDIAFAX CALL FOR A CHANGE IN ATTITUDE FROM THE MEDIA

During the era of one-party rule, a great majority of individuals who found themselves at the top, i.e. in leadership positions, in the Mozambican press, thanks to their loyalty to the Frelimo party. In the provinces, these journalists constituted the think tank of this political formation. During the campaigns, these journalists put their services to the disposal of the ruling party and their various media organizations alike. *Savana* revealed the facts and the names of these journalists who were engaged in the electoral campaign: António Barros, representative of *Radio Moçambique* in the province of Zambezia and at the same time a legislative candidate on the platform of Frelimo, Sauzande Jeque, representative of *Radio Moçambique* in the province of Nampula and a member of the party’s campaign office in the same province, and also in charge of organizing press conferences for Frelimo candidate Joaquim Chissano, as well as providing logistics for rallies. In the province of Sofala, the Radio Moçambique representative, Valentim Daniel later dismissed and replaced by José

¹⁵⁸ Afonso Dhlakama in *Savana*, January 21, 1994, p. 4.

Duberque, the local correspondent for *Ngoma*, a bulletin owned by Frelimo was allegedly a sympathizer of Renamo. In Pemba, in the province of Cabo Delgado, buildings belonging to the *Conselho Superior de Comunicação Social* “were high-jacked by the Frelimo campaign office to which some of its members belonged”.¹⁵⁹

Some officials of Renamo’s communication department also tried to corrupt journalists with gifts. *Savana* even denounced this on one occasion: “The head office of the SNJ [National Union of Journalists] in Maputo is regularly a theatre of parties sponsored by officials of Renamo’s information department, clearly intended to win the friendship of the journalists so as to get them to publish news items from their party”.¹⁶⁰

Luis Carlos Patraquim, while noting the absence of change in the practices of the public press in spite of the introduction of freedom of the press, asked rhetorically: “If it is the same people that are still in place in newspapers, magazines and ministries, why would these practices change?”¹⁶¹ The media coverage of elections highlighted the resistance of certain journalists to a total brake from the ruling party, and their incapacity to cope in the face of political pressures, as well as the difficulty in establishing an independent press in Mozambique. In general, they acted in their habitual way.

1.2.2 IMPARCIAL AND THE SEARCH FOR EXTERNAL LEGITIMACY

Imparcial, a pro-Renamo daily, lost a great opportunity by taking a partisan stand on the electoral programmes of the political party. It chose to respond to the utterances coming from the ‘public press’. This daily announced the victory of its party and its favourite candidate, even before the poll: “Renamo and Dhlakama have already won the elections opinion of an international observer based on forecasts by diplomatic sources”.¹⁶² It has to be noted that the sentence “the international observer and diplomatic sources” was intended to confer unquestionable legitimacy on the information. This strategy of external legitimisation was an option frequently favoured by *Imparcial*: “Chissano lacking in ideas, Dhlakama evokes Samora”, wrote *Independente*, the Portuguese weekly magazine.¹⁶³ “Dhlakama is a leader par excellence”, said the Brazilian outfit, *Vox Populi*, in a confidential report intended for the Frelimo party.¹⁶⁴

Domingo weekly magazine, in one of its editions, reported a statement credited to Chissano according to which “Chissano promised a special status for Dhlakama”.¹⁶⁵ A more

¹⁵⁹ *Savana* n°37 September 30, 1994, p. 4.

¹⁶⁰ *Savana* n°39 July 14 October, 1994.

¹⁶¹ See Guillaume CABANES, *op.cit.*, p.102.

¹⁶² *Imparcial* n° 97, July 7, 1994.

¹⁶³ *Imparcial* n°106 October 20, 1994.

¹⁶⁴ *Imparcial* n°99 October 11, 1994

¹⁶⁵ *Domingo* n° 644 October 9, 1994, p.1.

careful consideration of this electoral statement reveals the subtle intention of the weekly magazine to make Renamo and its leader accept not only their inevitable defeat, but also some unofficial compensations not provided by the Constitution. The status of an opposition leader was originally an idea of the Domingo editorial office. In its editorial on September 18, 1994, the weekly magazine wrote: “*For historical reasons, we are not used to giving a consideration to the opposition. The post of opposition leader should be, in terms of hierarchy, placed just after that of Prime minister*”.¹⁶⁶ Thus, with these words, *Domingo* gave the clear impression that it would be a ‘honour’ for Afonso Dhlakama to accept this status. The Frelimo candidate had the same idea, three weeks later, making it look like a plot more than a simple coincidence. It was precisely this electoral, and not constitutional, manoeuvre that ought to be denounced. But *Imparcial* played the defensive by announcing that “*Dhlakama [promised] a special status for Chissano and a salary that [would] enable him to have a decent life*”¹⁶⁷

Domingo, *Notícias* and *Imparcial*, three newspapers well-known for their considerable partiality in their discourses, even showed increasingly clearly a shift far from the concerns of the population. None of them questioned the parties, for example, about how they intended to facilitate the return of war refugees. Another question that dissipated much energy in the three ‘partisan newspapers’ was that of the ‘two administrations’, i.e. the zones controlled by the Renamo forces and the government’s army at the time of the signing of a ceasefire in Rome. Between 1992 and 1994, the country was devastated by drought and the population had an urgent need for food aid. But the distribution quickly transformed into political quarrels, Renamo accusing the government of benefiting unduly from the distribution of the humanitarian aid by first satisfying its ‘activists’. Renamo further accused the authorities of sharing out the aid unequally, in favour of the zones under governmental control in order to displace the populations and to empty the Renamo zones.

There was certainly a question of logistics that needed to be solved, but to hold the population hostage as a result of political quarrels was, as *Savana* said, “*inadmissible*”.¹⁶⁸ It is the responsibility “*of the government to resolve the political questions and to show that it is committed to offer the people who live in the two zones health, education and rebuilding*”. This seems to confirm the assertion of Guillaume Cabanes who observed that it was more the humanitarian factor that was paramount to *Savana* than the negotiations¹⁶⁹. This kind of thinking made a difference in the Mozambican press. In contrast, the recalling of the belligerent past of the former belligerents and the refusal to focus on the present were the priority of the ‘partisan press’. *Imparcial*’s advice to voters followed this logic: “*You must vote for any presidential candidate, except for Joaquim Chissano, for any party or coalition, except for Frelimo. We have thus fulfilled our mission of being **Impartial** against tyranny, while making*

¹⁶⁶ Editorial *Domingo* of September 18, 1994, p.8.

¹⁶⁷ *Imparcial* n°98 October 10, 1994.

¹⁶⁸ *Savana* n°4 February 4, 1994.

¹⁶⁹ Guillaume CABANES *op.cit.*, p137-138.

our voice heard in the memory of the thousands persecuted, tortured and destroyed because they refused to mortgage their conscience, their free will and their sacred right to differ".¹⁷⁰ One can certainly notice the absence of a direct instruction to vote in favour of Renamo and its candidate. But as far as the newspaper was concerned, the essential task had been accomplished: "*The armed gangsters have already won the democratic war*", and then, the important thing was to secure this democracy, a mission that any other candidate could carry out, "*except Chissano and his party*".¹⁷¹

■ 2. THE PRESS DIVIDED BETWEEN PROMOTING AND UNDERMINING EMERGING PARTIES

The editorial office of the 'public press' continued to support the ruling party, while adopting a negative attitude towards the emerging opposition parties. This hostility to small political parties did not even raise a thought at *Notícias* and *Domingo* about probable consequences of a bipolarisation of political life. In addition, the small parties were said to be characterized by "*a total absence of political positions which [served] national interests*".¹⁷² According to two 'public newspapers', the concern of these parties was to focus on "*an obsessive criticism of the government in place*". Faced with severe criticisms emanating from the emerging opposition parties, the *Notícias* editors had to support the ruling party: "*Which government, in which part of the world, could ensure an effective, coherent and satisfactory governance of a country that has not known a moment of stability since its independence? How do we expect that a government of a country that has been engaged in successive wars for thirty years, especially under precarious economic conditions, can ensure impeccable governance? We have altered the history of this country with unattainable motives and objectives*".¹⁷³ It is unacceptable to consider the criticisms of the emerging opposition parties unfounded because it would mean to ignore the errors of Frelimo. It overlooks, as affirmed by the editor of *Imparcial* in an incisive tone "*those who today find in the war the cause of all the evils and excuses. They are, themselves, the source of this war*".¹⁷⁴

However, one cannot affirm that the independent press served for the promotion of the emerging small parties. The discourse of the independent press on these parties was often contradictory. For example, for the *Savana* weekly magazine, all criticisms of the 'public press' against the emerging parties are nothing but "*remote controlled messages by the government*

¹⁷⁰ Editorial *Imparcial* n° 108 October 24, 1994, p.1. Emphasis by *Imparcial*.

¹⁷¹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷² Editorial *Notícias* of July 6, 1994.

¹⁷³ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷⁴ Editorial *Imparcial* n° 108 October 24, 1994, p.1.

*that has difficulty to digest new constitutional amendments and that continues to see the opposition as a product of importation, opportunism and other 'isms' (...) This opposition is fragile, it lacks the means because it does not benefit from State budget and enterprises".*¹⁷⁵

Few weeks before, as the deadline for submission of the lists of candidates for the presidential elections with the CNE approached, the same weekly magazine had noted, not without derision, *"the multiplication like mushrooms of lists of individuals who are presenting their candidatures to be the leader of all of us. Among them, there are people who have never worked nor carried out an important social activity in their life, but who want to be leaders. Some were never capable of managing a family but want to manage all of us, millions of families with multiple individual problems".*¹⁷⁶ Savana concluded thus: *"It is no less true that there are within these small opposition parties some interests and obscure personalities who have decided to take their revenge against the ruling party".*¹⁷⁷

In general, the multiplication of political parties attracted the suspicion of the press. For the latter, the majority of these new political formations did not result from a coherent political position. Suffice it *"to note the vacuum that separates them from the reality of the country. This disproportionate proliferation of mediocre parties, which split up continuously into even smaller parties, did not result from the fact that these parties have different projects and visions, but from simple disputes over the need for the acquisition of personal privileges".*¹⁷⁸ Promotion or negation of these small opposition parties did hide another question that proved to be more embarrassing for the press. Renamo often claimed monopoly of the advent of democracy, while the other small parties claimed to be its guarantor, such a position not being shared by the press. The most severe criticism of Renamo came from Mia Couto, a journalist, writer and social critic. In his weekly column, Mia Couto observed:

"I do not know who to believe : everyone is claiming to be a democrat. My cousin, Julinho, would not stop saying that he is a democrat and that I am enjoying the benefits of the aforementioned democracy thanks to his heroic sacrifices. You will find attached the letter where he explains the subject in detail. Help me, I am confused. He went through some military training in a former southern Rhodesian camp where he was personally honoured by Ian Smith who was admired by the world for the 'special' democracy [apartheid] he invented, so much advanced for our time that no country recognized its validity. He also trained in Phalaborwa, South Africa, with members of the extreme right of the South African forces. He was assistant secretary to a certain [Orlando] Cristina, an ex-collaborator of the PIDE, the Portuguese Colonial Intelligence Service that democrats around the world remember with nostalgia.

¹⁷⁵Editorial *Savana* of October 26, 1994.

¹⁷⁶Editorial *Savana* of September 9, 1994, p.9.

¹⁷⁷Editorial *Savana* of October 26, 1994, p.9.

¹⁷⁸Editorial *Noticias* of July 6, 1994.

*Such was the devotion with which he fought against Communism. In Mozambique, Julinho did not attack any military targets of the so-called Marxists but, on the other hand, he burnt schools, hospitals where patients were treated with communist drugs under the cover of their therapeutic functions, preventing the so-called patients from thinking freely”.*¹⁷⁹

Let us note here the attempt of the author of the above citation to highlight the contradictions of Renamo’s position. For the press, nobody could claim a monopoly over the advent of democracy in Mozambique.

Another question of particular concern to the independent press was the future of the army.

▲ 2.1 WHAT DO WE DO WITH THE ARMY?

For the independent press, the success of the transition depended on the role reserved for the soldiers. The peace agreements envisaged the demobilization of a part of the forces on both sides and the formation of a new and unified army of thirty thousand men known as *Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique* (FADM). In spite of the supervision of the United Nations through ONUMOZ the demobilization process was held down by serious problems. Soldiers from both sides rebelled against the authorities, and sometimes even resorted to hostage-takings. Their principal demands included the prompt payment of salaries and subsidies provided by the UN, the improvement of facilities at the demobilization centres, flexibility in the process adopted to help their returns to civil life, etc.

According to the principles of the Rome Agreement, the FADM would be headed by two officials: one from the former guerrilla movement and the other one from the government’s army. While the government nominated Major General Lagos Lidimo to take its slot, the former guerrilla movement nominated General Mateus Ngonhamo. The former had left behind some bad memories among the people of Zambezi central province when he was commander in the region. The latter had equally left bad memories during his time as commander of guerrilla movement in the South. For *Savana*, the arrangement was to do nothing but create fear among the population. Sérgio Vieira, a retired lieutenant and reservist, who shared similar opinion, expressed his concern thus: “*I fear that this army is a sum of the two incompetent armies and chains of command, and it represents a danger to the society and to the State*”.¹⁸⁰

But wouldn’t this measure prolong the political bipolarisation of the State at the military level? *Savana* denounced what it called a “*new army with old names*” and suggested that “*the only means capable of appeasing the collective memory of this country that [would] no longer gloss over humiliations, abuses, deportations, massacres and mutilations of which*

¹⁷⁹ Mía COUTO, “Queixatório” in *Domingo* n° 631 July 10, 1994, p.32.

¹⁸⁰ Sérgio VIEIRA, “No novo exército: receio que se somem duas incompetências” in *Savana* February 18, 1994.

Mozambicans were victim [was] the creation of a new army made up of external soldiers with regard to the former belligerents".¹⁸¹ That was a courageous proposal that could pacify the country with a rupture from the past.

Concerns about the formation of the new army increased when, everywhere in the country, soldiers from both sides, i.e. both the government's army and Renamo, declined invitation to come and integrate in the FADM. However, several top-level posts in the military hierarchy had been quickly occupied by the 'old names' from the former belligerent armies. *Savana* was astonished by what appeared to be commanders without troops: "*There are difficulties in recruiting soldiers, but there are no such difficulties in recruiting officers. Moreover, up to now, the characteristic of this army is to have more officers than men. Why? Because the officers are aware that they are not going into the new army to serve any useful purpose, they are there to enjoy the status. They are going to distribute! To distribute even what does not exist because nobody produces. They are going to eat. In this sense, we have more goats to feed, and less grass to feed upon.*" One day, all this is going to result in very high interest rates for national sovereignty".¹⁸²

▲ 2.2 THE INDEPENDENT PRESS AND THE DRAFTING OF THE ELECTORAL LAW

The principles of the new electoral law were approved in Rome between the government and Renamo. According to the peace agreement, the management of the electoral process shall be the government's responsibility. A National Electoral Commission, CNE, was established to manage the electoral process. It was to be made up of twenty-one personalities including sixteen people nominated by the President of the Republic. The criteria for selecting these individuals were to include recognition, merit, moral and professional ethics and more importantly, independence with respects to the political parties. After having accepted these criteria while in Rome, Renamo rejected them in Maputo, citing the absence of a guarantee of independence from the nominees of the President. Renamo rather proposed an equitable nomination of members of the CNE, i.e. seven members nominated by the government, seven by Renamo and the remaining seven by the other small opposition parties. This proposal created an impasse when it was time to apply the electoral law.

Some newspapers, like *Mediafax*, criticized any tripartite division of the CNE because "the CNE must be a professional institution, completely free from considerations of political nature".¹⁸³ In the same editorial, the daily that circulates by fax criticized Afonso Dhlakama's

¹⁸¹ Fernando LIMA, "Novo exército, velhos nomes" in *Savana* n° 4 February 4, 1994, p.9.

¹⁸² "More goats to feed and less grass to feed upon" is a local expression to name corruption. Editorial "País de chefes" *Savana* September 9, 1994, p. 9.

¹⁸³ Editorial, *Mediafax* n° 152 August 5, 1993.

party contempt for the citizens: “Renamo’s argument is less relevant. It shows it is clearly out of touch with reality. It insults, in a systematic way, a considerable number of decent people, workers who respect the ethical principles of their respective professions.” The incessant change of views by Renamo was another cause for concern for *Mediafax*. Not only did Renamo want to be represented in the CNE, but it also demanded the right to nominate governors in at least five provinces in the country, and to control the National Police Force. Moreover, it wanted an equitable representation of all political parties in the STAE, the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration, a highly sensitive sub- department of the CNE which is in charge of logistics. This ‘all or nothing’ attitude was captured in a headline by *Mediafax*: “*Electoral Process -Renamo wants to supervise all*”.¹⁸⁴ This impasse went on for several months. In the end, the UN had to intervene to save the peace process. The consensus position finally adopted for the composition of the CNE was twenty members instead of twenty-one, in which case ten members were to be nominated by the government, seven by Renamo and three by the other opposition parties. Instead of nominating governors, the former rebels secured the right to appoint thirty-three advisers to governors in the country. While commenting the composition of the CNE, *Mediafax* criticized what it regarded as the “logic of partisan politics”:

*“When the new electoral law will be approved, it will establish a National Electoral Commission (CNE) that looks more like an invitation to paralysis than an instrument for the running of the electoral process. Whereas all decisions are to be reached by consensus, none of the parties can cause a stalemate at any time. In order to avoid a situation where the logic of partisan politics presiding over the formation of this CNE would make a final sentence on the elections impossible, the various parties accepted the constitution of an Electoral Tribunal empowered to cancel the decisions taken by the CNE and to declare the validity or not of the elections”.*¹⁸⁵

One of the most significant issues for the former guerrilla was the proportional poll envisaged in the new constitution. Renamo saw in this provision a measure that was likely to confer a considerable parliamentary representation to the small emerging parties, a situation it was not prepared to accept. After many attempts, it succeeded in incorporating into the electoral law a clause requiring a five per cent threshold necessary to assure a seat in parliament.

▲ 2.3 THE PRESS AND THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY

At the end of the year 1993, foreign leaders were already calling on both Frelimo and Renamo to consider a sharing of power’s arrangement. One of the most strident voices

¹⁸⁴ *Mediafax* n° 217 November 8, 1993.

¹⁸⁵ *Mediafax* n°217 November 8, 1993.

was that of the ambassador of the United States, Denis Jett. During the celebrations of the US Independence Day, Mr. Jett told the ruling party that it had no other choice than to share power with its principal political rival in a national unity government. According to him, agreements in this government could even, if possible, be concluded before the poll itself. He gave the impression that this formula had the blessing of the international community. This comments by the US ambassador followed another he made in response to the allegation, published by *Domingo* weekly magazine that Renamo was planning to return to war. The ambassador said if there was a Nobel Prize for hypocrisy, *Domingo* would easily win it. *Mediafax* condemned Mr. Denis Jett's interferences in the internal affairs of Mozambique:

“If there was a Nobel Prize for arrogance, the US ambassador in Mozambique would win it. His conduct here, once again, was characterized by exaggeration, insult, and by overstepping his diplomatic role”.¹⁸⁶

Indeed, the idea of sharing the power between the former belligerents was promoted by a part of the American political community, particularly republican Senator Jesse Helms who became chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in November 1994. This proposal however divided the Mozambican political class. For the emerging parties, a national unity government was salutary because *“the people do not elect programmes because they do not even know that we are in a multi-party system. Only the party controlling the largest part of the territory will be elected”*.¹⁸⁷ This position was also supported by *Imparcial* that considered that the national unity government was *“an agreement for the survival of democracy in Mozambique”*.¹⁸⁸ A contrary view was however more forcefully expressed by *Domingo* than by the government itself. The weekly magazine saw in this international pressure the risk of elections without any legal basis: *“One cannot say vote for who you want because, irrespective of the outcome of the polls, everybody will be in power”*.¹⁸⁹

■ 3. THE ELECTIONS AS SEEN BY THE INDEPENDENT PRESS

“In eminently precarious political situations, the new African media play either a noble or lamentable role. In the first case, they serve as democratic forces and cement to citizen's consciousness. In the second case, they can be agents of social deconstruction and propagators of a more or less instigated violence”.¹⁹⁰ If the latter case is quite applicable to Radio de Milles Collines for instigating people to commit acts of genocide in Rwanda in 1994,

¹⁸⁶ *Mediafax* n° 633 November 15, 1994.

¹⁸⁷ Inácio Chire, *Domingo* n° 616, April 3, 1994. Inácio Chire was member of the collegial leadership of *Partido de Convenção Nacional*, PCN, an old opposition party created in August 1974 in Beira by the dissidents of Frelimo as Uria Simango, Adelino Guambe and Joana Simeão and prohibited t by Frelimo after independence. PCN re-emerged after the political liberalization in 1990.

¹⁸⁸ *Imparcial* n°103 October 17, 1994.

¹⁸⁹ *Domingo* n° 616 April 3, 1994.

¹⁹⁰ PANOS, *Médias et Conflits en Afrique*, Paris, Karthala, p. 196.

the first one will be easily applicable to Mediacoop, a media organization that showed a high degree of professionalism during the democratic transition process in Mozambique. During this period, *Mediafax* and *Savana* were more concerned about peace. Any information drift was likely to revive antagonisms between the former belligerents. That's why journalists at these two newspapers were called upon to inform with responsibility.

▲ 3.1 THE LESSONS FROM ANGOLA

Mozambique and Angola apparently followed the same historical trajectory. They both had been under Portuguese colonial domination and they attained independence thanks to liberation wars. After independence, they were also both confronted with internal rebellions, although for different reasons. Following a ceasefire agreement between the Angolan government and Unita (*União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola*) the country took the part of elections in 1992. During the process of collation, Unita demanded the suspension of the announcement of poll results and the cancellation of the entire electoral process, citing fraud. The situation soon degenerated into a bloody crisis in Luanda, capital of Angola. Following its refusal to accept the result of the first round of balloting (September 29-30, 1992) that pointed to the ruling party's victory, Unita returned to war.

Since Mozambique had also engaged in a comparable political process of liberalization, *Mediafax* decided to dispatch a special reporter to Luanda to cover the first plural election in Angola. When the crisis broke out, *Mediafax* denounced Unita: "*Unita has left the National Electoral Commission and Jonas Savimbi [leader of the movement] has at all times opted for confrontation, even in the middle of electoral campaigns*". But at the same time, Fernando Lima, the *Mediafax* special reporter, was underlining the disinformation of the people in Angola: "*A lot of information is hidden from the people by officials of the ruling party who control the media*".¹⁹¹

As it witnessed the failure of the Angolan process, *Mediafax* could analyse the Mozambican transition differently. *Mediafax* insisted on that the elections in Mozambique be carried out after all logistical conditions were created. Well beyond, the daily offered itself as an alternative space for expression available to all national parties. This was achieved by making their pages a sort of forum for national reconciliation:

"People are afraid that Afonso Dhlakama keep talking about war, insults and revenge. But he has surprised everybody in a pleasant way as he has assured that Renamo would never again resort to war and he has demanded that national unity be a reality and not a simple theory".¹⁹²

¹⁹¹ *Mediafax* n° 96 October 7, 1992.

¹⁹² *Mediafax* n°243 December 14, 1993.

Afonso Dhlakama was obsessed with the idea of not wanting to be a new Savimbi and he always said that he would denounce the elections – in the event of fraud – before and not after the publication of results, as the leader of the Angolan opposition had done.

▲ 3.2 THE SOUTH AFRICAN HOPE

Since national independence, the stability of Mozambique has closely depended on the kind of relations the country maintained with the South African regime. Many analysts regarded the end of the war in Mozambique as a break with the political liberalization initiated by President Frederik De Klerk of South Africa. President De Klerk started by abolishing the system of racial segregation or apartheid. He legalized the former clandestine or ‘black parties’, like the ANC, Inkhata and even the Communist Party, and he finally freed Nelson Mandela after twenty-eight years in captivity.

The first multiracial elections in South Africa were planned for April 1994 and in October of the same year in Mozambique. The Mozambican press feared that in the event of victory of the National Party – the former white dominated party in apartheid South Africa – some elements from this political formation could seek to maintain their influence on Renamo. This feeling was shared by the Mozambican ruling party: *“The war in Mozambique was initially carried out from Rhodesia and then, especially, from South Africa. The South African forces that led the war by encouraging Mozambican elements to rebel have not completely been disarmed or neutralized. They still exist”*.¹⁹³

These fears increased when Renamo, as Unita had done in Angola, increasingly accused the government of orchestrating an electoral fraud. Like in Angola, the possible victory of a South African National Party left consider that, in the event of defeat, Renamo, rearmed by its former ally, could return to war. This erroneous reading of events – let us recall that since 1984 Renamo had become gradually autonomous – did not facilitate the transformation of the former rebels. The small intellectual class in the capital, including journalists, was reluctant to accept the successful transformation of the guerrilla into a political formation. And this bias manifested itself in the press to the benefit of the authorities.

▲ 3.3 THE PRESS AND THE ATTEMPTS TO POLITICISE RELIGION DURING THE ELECTIONS

“The people will not forgive the party that tries to re-open the past”, said the representative of the UN General Secretary in Mozambique, Mr. Aldo Ajello, when expressing

¹⁹³ Teodato HUNGUANA, *Domingo* n° 604 January 2, 1994, p. 11. Hanguana is a former Minister of Justice and Information. Since September 2003, he has been member of the Constitutional Council.

concern that Frelimo might resort to over-emphasize the crimes of Renamo. This concern was shared by the whole religious communities in Mozambique. As the elections drew nearer, various religious organizations and personalities called on the political actors to show tolerance and forgiveness. As for the ordinary people, the religious leaders counselled that “*the elections should not be used as a popular court*”.¹⁹⁴

The interest expressed by these religious bodies was nothing unusual in the Mozambican society. Indeed, the engagement of religious figures in political affairs is a common phenomenon. However, the ‘public press’ still accused Dom Jaime Gonçalves, the Catholic archbishop of Beira, and one of the peace mediators, of openly calling on the believers to vote for Renamo. Moreover, Gonçalves had publicly expressed support for the creation of a national unity government after the elections, unlike the ruling party and a large part of the press.¹⁹⁵ In Tete, a city in the centre of the country, some priests at the *Sagrada Família* Catholic Church, including the local archbishop, were accused of inciting the believers to vote for Renamo during religious meetings. To buttress their point, the accusers pointed to the presence of a Renamo flag inside the church. More serious, the priests were accused of having refused communion to church members who had refused to come to the airport to welcome Afonso Dhlakama, even though free buses had been provided for this purpose. In Maputo, Catholic religious leaders, such as Mgr Mbuangue were busy glorifying Frelimo and singing its praises. Others alleged that some Moslem leaders based in the northern part of the country were also calling on their followers to vote for Frelimo, although this allegation could not be confirmed.

Disturbed by these developments, the press was however divided with regard to the role of the religious groups in the political affairs of the country. While the dailies owned by the government strongly condemned the attitude of Archbishop Dom Jaime Gonçalves, *Savana* defended him. But for the other accused people, *Savana* had very strong words: “*It is time to say to all these priests a firm VADE RETRO!*”¹⁹⁶

■ 4. “WILL WE BE ABLE TO VOTE?”

In 1994, nineteen years after independence, the citizens were called upon to vote in a presidential and legislative election. The low literacy level among the majority of the voters made people fear of a high percentage of null votes because nobody had experience of a correct voting procedure. These concerns were re-stated by Mediafax when it wrote: “Millions of Mozambicans will go to the polls tomorrow. But how many among them will be able to vote?”¹⁹⁷ In the interior areas of the country, the civic education brigade did find some signs

¹⁹⁴ Dom Jaime Gonçalves in *Savana* April 1, 1994, p.12.

¹⁹⁵ Dom Jaime Gonçalves, “Depois das eleições: se não houver poder jurídico a paz continuará em perigo” in *Notícias* October 21, 1994, p. 1.

¹⁹⁶ “Deus e César” *Savana* May 27, 1994.

¹⁹⁷ *Mediafax* n° 621 October 26, 1994.

of attempts to misinform the illiterate population: “*There were citizens who were told to mark the symbol X in the column for anyone who killed innocent people during the war, meaning to vote against him*”.¹⁹⁸

▲ 4.1 THE PRESS HAILS THE VOTE OF THE PEOPLE AS A CALL FOR PEACE

On October 27, 1994, approximately eight million Mozambicans went to the polls to exercise their civic rights, such an election made possible by the political liberalization across the country. Eleven presidential candidates and fifteen parties participated in these general elections, the first of its kind in Mozambique. A day before the elections, the leader of Renamo went to Harare to meet with leaders of the *Front line* states to complain about suspected fraud in the elections. But the leaders refused to receive him.¹⁹⁹ Upon his return to Mozambique, on the first day of voting, Afonso Dhlakama announced that he was withdrawing from the elections because he considered them fraudulent:

“I am not voting, I am not voting. Chissano and Aldo Ajello [Representative of the UN General Secretary] should not provoke me anymore, if not I will resort to the people and I can paralyse everything [perhaps by returning to war]”.²⁰⁰

By this action, the Renamo leader succeeded, at least in the short-term, in creating doubt about the legitimacy of the elections. This decision to withdraw from the elections announced in Beira, the second largest city in Mozambique, was systematically broadcasted by national television and hammered on by the public radio, whereas, in reality, Dhlakama had not yet given any order to his party to boycott the elections. Dhlakama’s position in the elections was based on a document allegedly emanating from the Brazilian communication agency, *Vox Populi*, and published by *Savana* on October 21, 1994. It should be recalled that this document was an attempt to divert Renamo’s attention, while the agency engaged in fraud in favour of Frelimo. The true intention of this document was to force Renamo and its candidate to withdraw permanently from the elections on suspicion of fraud during the elections – which did not actually occur – at a time when it would already be too late to cancel the elections. So the polls would go on in spite of the ‘boycott’. In this case, the elections’ results would have been regarded as free and fair by the international community. But, according to Michel Cahen, by withdrawing from the elections, Dhlakama believed to exert maximum pressure on those who intended to perpetrate ‘fraud’ in order to avoid fraud. But in reality, he did not fall into the trap set by the document attributed to *Vox Populi*, as he later changed his mind.

¹⁹⁸ *Mediafax* n°621 October 26, 1994.

¹⁹⁹ Front line States is a former political organization that assembled six countries of Southern Africa in order to coordinate efforts against the apartheid regime.

²⁰⁰ *Mediafax* n° 622 October 31, 1994.

Thus, this document might not have been a totally false document, as UN mission in Mozambique suspected, even though Dhlakama himself who was alleging fraud had misinterpreted the intention of the authors, which was the real fraud.²⁰¹

Foreign journalists who covered these elections went on to transmit this unfolding crisis to their respective countries. Foreign diplomats and leaders went to Beira to convince Dhlakama to reconsider his position. One of such people was the South African Vice President, Thabo Mbeki, (the current South African President), and Robert Mugabe who personally got involved by calling the leader of Renamo from Harare. Whereas foreign diplomats and journalists devoted great attention to Dhlakama, in the country, the decision of Dhlakama was denounced:

*“Voters who were predisposed to vote for him remained in the queues and Renamo’s observers remained at the poll stations; many Renamo provincial leaders advised their sympathizers to continue to vote; the CNE, speaking through a member of Renamo, declared publicly the illegality of the exit of the opposition party from the elections; Dom Jaime Gonçalves, the most known pro-Renamo bishop went to vote, so did the representative of this party in Beira, Manuel Pereira. They all expressed their disgust with Dhlakama”.*²⁰²

The following day, after having received guarantees from the international community that fraud would not be permitted, the Renamo leader went to vote and he announced for the first time that he was going to accept the results of the poll. It is imperative to note that the press firmly condemned the role of the opposition leader in this electoral competition at a crucial stage in the construction of democracy in Mozambique:

*“Despite its poverty, Mozambique is not a banana republic where any one can act as he wants. There are laws that must be abided by and legal provisions in place for the resolution of conflicts. Dhlakama has not yet internalised what is called democracy”.*²⁰³

According to Savana, *“Renamo is one of the parties responsible for the possible irregularities noticed in the electoral process. By withdrawing from the voting, ordering the candidates on its platform to do the same, Renamo frontally violated the Electoral Law and showed a total disregard and lack of respect towards the voters”.*²⁰⁴

In a very critical editorial addressed to Afonso Dhlakama, *Mediafax* noted:

“Dhlakama accused himself of a fraud that never existed in order to destabilize the organization of the elections. But his principal instrument of electoral propaganda was the real threat, and this was what constituted the real fraud in these elections. Regularly, Dhlakama

²⁰¹ Michel CAHEN, *Les Bandits*, op.cit.

²⁰² *Mediafax* n° 622 October 31, 1994.

²⁰³ “O líder da Renamo salvou a face mas deixou profundas marcas preocupantes” *Domingo* n° 647 October 30, 1994, p. 2.

²⁰⁴ Editorial Savana November 11, 1994, p.9.

*affirmed that he would never return to war. But simultaneously, he played on the ambiguity of a possible return to war. But simultaneously, he played on the ambiguity of a possible return to war. And he went to the end of this ambiguity. During the polls, he withdrew from the elections and declared, in Beira, that he was awaiting the ‘order’ of the people to return to war... How many thousands of Mozambicans gave him their votes for fear that in the event of insufficient votes he would return to war? Dhlakama is a political actor in Mozambique, that is a fact, whether we like it or not. But his behaviour since the peace agreements—unfounded accusations, insults on the President of the Republic, the President of the CNE and the representative of the United Nations, and then his attempt to launch a big national agitation on the election day reveal a destabilizing character and a political attitude which consist of never assuming responsibility for his acts”.*²⁰⁵

For *Mediafax*, the true winner of these elections was the people because “*when the world was crying about the news of a country in crisis, at the edge of a catastrophe, and the possibility of another African Rwanda, back home, Mozambican voters were giving a single lesson in good citizenship and anti-war culture. Even with the worries provoked by the warlike declarations of Dhlakama, no sympathizer of Renamo or Frelimo was incited to violence and millions of people continued to vote. It was great news of elections in Mozambique. Mozambicans told the world that they knew how to cohabit peacefully in their national territory. Let the world hear the message*”.²⁰⁶

▲ 4.2 THE OPPOSITION AS THE FOUNDATION OF A DEMOCRACY

“*The Frelimo party emerged as the overall winner of the elections, but Renamo came out victorious in five provinces of the country. Thus, both have reasons to celebrate*”.²⁰⁷ The results of the poll had thrown up a new political arrangement in Mozambique characterized by the presence of a parliamentary opposition to the ruling party. Henceforth, the rules of democracy seemed to have been installed with the birth of opposition inside and outside the National Assembly. Renamo became the second political force in the country as confirmed by its control of half of the country. This victory in five provinces recorded in the last elections was interpreted by some sections of Renamo as conferring the right to share governmental responsibilities with Frelimo, by forming a provincial unity government. This idea was originally from Mr. Chester Crocker, the US assistant-secretary of State in charge of African affairs and an architect of a strategy of constructive engagement in Southern Africa. Mr. Crocker had defended this thesis before the US Senate in November 1993, arguing that only the sharing of power would facilitate the end of the wars in Angola and Mozambique.

²⁰⁵ Editorial *Mediafax* n° 622 October 31, 1994.

²⁰⁶ *Ibidem*.

²⁰⁷ *Mediafax* n° 636 November 18, 1994.

Three days after the general elections, before the results of the polls were announced, Mediafax ‘predicted’ the scenario and it even anticipated the various possible consequences. These were reflected in the title of one of its publications: *“Mozambique without opposition? The likely return to one-party system”*.²⁰⁸ Indeed, if Renamo should share power at the provincial levels, where it will probably win, *“there would not be opposition between Frelimo and Renamo at the National Assembly, and if so, who will constitute the opposition?”* *“A section of the press, as was the case during the one-party system that the country witnessed, through a group of journalists, some degree of civil opposition without violence”*, answered Mediafax. Conscious of the weakness of this alternative, Mediafax concluded: *“Mozambique will be a new Zimbabwe, with a one-party system hiding a two-party system. Then the country will have missed this incredible historical opportunity to establish effectively a parliamentary opposition exercised by political parties”*.²⁰⁹

The seeming capacity of this paper to alert the political class about the consequences of a possible “failure of a historical opportunity” of real democracy is incredible. *Mediafax* was not just a simple newspaper with a narrow mission to inform. Its capacity to hold opinion, criticize and analyse the consequences emanating from a political choice gave it a great degree of influence among political actors in the country. From then on, *Mediafax* became a recommendable newspaper, indispensable in the local press. It gave up the role of a simple spectator and it assumed that of an actor in the democratic transition process in Mozambique.

▲ 4.3 IMPARCIAL DENOUNCES RENAMO’S DRIFT

Three months after the first general elections, Renamo held its national conference in the central province of Zambezia. Among the topics to be discussed, there were the conduct of the elections and the party’s strategy in the future. Another issue was the financial health of the opposition party. Indeed, Renamo was in tune with a huge debt, resulting directly from expenses incurred during the elections. Although the former guerrilla movement had become the principal parliamentary opposition force, Renamo had started to receive some subsidies of the State it did not consider sufficient. A senior Renamo legislator argued that *“since Renamo [did] not have any economic base, the state resources in the provinces where [they] won elections [had] to be shared with [them]”*.²¹⁰ Manuel Pereira even went up to the point of threatening the unity of the country: *“If the government refuses to share the incomes with us, we will keep our provinces.”*

²⁰⁸ *Mediafax* n° 623 November 1, 1994.

²⁰⁹ *Ibidem*.

²¹⁰ Manuel PEREIRA, “Renamo ameaça dividir o país” in *Savana* n° 57, February 1995, p. 32.

All sections of the press condemned Renamo's position. But the most virulent criticism came from a bulletin, *Imparcial*, close to the party. Miguéis Lopes Júnior, the director, warned the party led by Afonso Dhlakama: "Renamo cannot make its 'frelimonisation' a sine qua non of its existence, thus risking making the war that it has waged completely absurd and stupid, under very difficult conditions to resist and convince, not to impose a reward, but to expose and offer itself as an alternative option, hope and national project".²¹¹

■ 5. THE INDEPENDENT PRESS AND ELECTORAL VIOLENCE: THE 1999 GENERAL ELECTIONS

The boycott of the 1998 municipal elections demonstrated the capacity of the opposition to mobilize. The rate of abstention was estimated at a national average of eighty per cent. The 1999 legislative and presidential elections could therefore be seen as an opportunity to reconfirm this. Right from the very beginning, the major opposition parties, the coalition led by Afonso Dhlakama, Renamo-União Eleitoral, had been encountering major problems. In one incident, sympathizers of Frelimo, wearing tee-shirts with the symbol and the campaign slogan of the party, attempted to forcefully disrupt a meeting by the opposition Renamo party, somewhere in the southern part of the country, and to barricade roads in order to disrupt the convoys of the opposition leader. These individuals assembled few meters away from the venue of the meeting attended by the opposition leader and many of his sympathizers, obviously intended to incentive violence. In a similar incident, this time in the district of Chokwè, in the province of Gaza and stronghold of Frelimo, one of the armed guards attached to Mr. Dhlakama was hit by a car driven by a Frelimo member who escaped before he could be apprehended. This action provoked bloody conflicts between sympathizers of the two parties who engaged themselves in a bloody exchange of fire for several hours.

Mediafax regretted this 'sad spectacle' in which some of the protagonists were "individuals with public positions of responsibilities, whose names can be revealed publicly if requested, as well as the date and the place of these sad events".²¹² *Savana*, on its part, was astonished by the complicity of the police: "If there were not people who prevented others from addressing the people, if there were not a collaborationist police, if there were not a secret police ready to push others off the track... things would have been balanced on the electoral field. They are not because there are players who were initially not known, such as the elite police force".²¹³

²¹¹Miguéis Lopes JÚNIOR *Imparcial* n° 185 February 17, 1995, p.1.

²¹²"Perigoso" Editorial *Mediafax* n°1883 October 27, 1999. According to the daily newspaper, one of these individuals was Pastor Arão Litsure, elected four years after the President of National Election Commission despite the opposition of the coalition Renamo-União Eleitoral and other civic organizations. Litsure carried out the last general elections in December 2004.

²¹³*Savana* n° 302 October 29, 1999, p.1.

In Angoche, a coastal city in Nampula, a peaceful demonstration staged by the Renamo União-Eleitoral coincidentally the same day as Frelimo candidate Joaquim Chissano was billed to stop over in the town was dispersed by some sporadic shootings by some local policemen hitting several people. Curiously, it was the protesters that were arrested for questioning by the local police station the following day, under the pretext that their actions were a violation of law and order. This action infuriated many people, including Salomão Moyana, the *Savana* editor who wondered why Frelimo was acting this way: “*If it was intended to show that the population does not want any opposition, this is not true. It is the contrary; the people want to listen to the different arguments. On the other hand, it is Frelimo that wishes to prevent it by engaging and financing criminal activities in order to create disorder during opposition meetings. All this constitutes political vandalism, a crass demonstration of political weaknesses of a party that by its age should behave with responsibility*”.²¹⁴

As for the media coverage of the various competitors’ political programmes, the press was generally more responsible than in the 1994 elections. Its coverage reflected a balance, without attempts to include tendentious comments or to misinform the readership. *Domingo* was a notable exception. During one of its rallies in the province of Gaza, Mr. Dhlakama suddenly lost his voice. This forced him to stop his campaign for two weeks, even though officially his absence was attributed to some ‘organisational problems’. This situation was immediately exploited by *Domingo* that published breaking news indicating that it was yet to be confirmed that Mr. Afonso Dhlakama was seriously ill and had been flown abroad for urgent medical attention. The following day, *Mediafax* challenged the claim of the weekly magazine, by confirming that some of its journalists had met Dhlakama on several occasions during the week he was supposed to be hospitalised abroad.²¹⁵

This was a clear attempt by *Domingo* to foment trouble or to create confusion among the opposition coalition and its supporters. As the elections drew nearer, the two principal candidates engaged themselves in a violent exchange of words. Once again, *Savana* intervened by calling on both parties to exercise restraint in order to promote reconciliation and progress of the country: “*Politicians, show what you are going do for this people to quickly improve their living conditions. Discuss strategies and not people. Demonstrate that you know very well the problems of the people whose candidate you are, waiting to serve. Demonstrate that you are intelligent, that you have the capacity to govern us better than we had been governed before now. Demonstrate that you love these people and that you are not candidate just to steal more. Demonstrate how you will end corruption in the State apparatus*”.²¹⁶

²¹⁴ *Savana* n° 302 October 29, 1999, p.9.

²¹⁵ *Mediafax* n° 1891 November 08, 1999.

²¹⁶ Editorial *Savana* of October 15, 1999.

▲ 5.1 THE ELECTIONS THAT SUNK INTO CRISIS

Once again, the general elections ended up dividing the political community. At the centre of the crisis was the process of counting and validation of votes in the polling stations in the provinces of Zambezia and Nampula, the two principal constituencies in the country. Delegates of the two parties could neither reach an agreement on the collating results' processes nor the actual final results from the polling stations. The coalition demanded that the votes be recounted manually by the CNE in Maputo. Initially, the CNE accepted this demand, but few days after the beginning of ballots recounts, the process was stopped and replaced by the adding up of the figures of each province sent by the various provincial delegations of the CNE. These figures were supposed to be the same as those disputed at the provincial level. It was not surprising, therefore, that this move was strongly disputed by the opposition. All the same, the final results released by the CNE gave victory to Frelimo and its candidate Joaquim Chissano. But in spite of its defeat, in absolute terms, the Renamo União Eleitoral still won the polls in six out of the eleven provinces in the country. Afonso Dhlakama did however improve considerably his position, as he was defeated by a tiny 224,678 votes. The total votes cast obtained by the opposition exceeded again those of Frelimo, while the rate of abstention jumped from fifteen to thirty per cent.

▲ 5.2 PRESS INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ELECTIONS RESULTS

A day after the results of the polls were announced, the independent press concluded that the verdict of the voters was nothing but a yellow card to Frelimo, “*a bitter victory*”.²¹⁷ that demanded “Frelimo to look at itself in the mirror”.²¹⁸ because “in spite of a millionaire campaign, a great majority of Mozambicans no longer identify themselves with Frelimo”. Carlos Cardoso even talked about what he called the “enormous improvement of Dhlakama” and “the anti-Frelimo nominal electorate now constituting more than fifty per cent”.²¹⁹

The explanations were obvious: “*Frelimo became a den of corruption and not a platform at the service of the people, a party that chooses options with heavy social consequences*”.²²⁰ And in the future, *Mediafax* recommended: “*Chissano must find a successor with the size of this marathon athlete Dhlakama has proved to be, and it should be a personality not originating from the South, the traditional stronghold of Frelimo*”.²²¹

²¹⁷*Mediafax* n° 1926 December 29, 1999

²¹⁸*Metical* n° 629 December 15, 1999.

²¹⁹*Metical* n° 632 December 23, 1999.

²²⁰*Metical* n° 626 December 15, 1999.

²²¹*Mediafax* n° 1926 December, 1999.

▲ 5.3 POLITICAL INSTABILITY

Renamo did not accept the verdict of the CNE conferring victory to Frelimo and its candidate Joaquim Chissano. It alleged that about 377,773 votes were not computed by the CNE. These votes had disappeared or they had been voided by the CNE. *“This little difference in votes between the two candidates, lower than the number of cancelled or ‘lost’ votes nourished accusations of fraud. Moreover, the government had strongly rejected any re-count of votes”*.²²² The former guerrilla movement took its allegations of election fraud to Mozambique's Supreme Court but it lost the appeal to have the votes re-counted. In response, Afonso Dhlakama's coalition refused to recognize the new government resulting from the elections. And even more, it decided to boycott the National Assembly by refusing to send its legislators to the assembly. In the face of this stalemate, the President of the Republic accepted to meet Afonso Dhlakama but he rejected his demand, i.e. the re-count of votes. Against the provisions of the law, Renamo renewed its 1995's demands, i.e. the representation of the coalition in State apparatuses, the right to nominate governors and administrators in the provinces where it had won the majority of votes. Afonso Dhlakama threatened to paralyse the country if his demands were not met. *Mediafax* wondered *“how astonishing this [appeared], an individual with aims of capturing the presidency [divided] his own electorate, wanting to govern only where he won elections, without taking into account future elections”*.²²³

The new elected President however rejected Renamo's proposals. In the face of a seeming impasse, Afonso Dhlakama convened a press conference to announce the formation of a parallel government. After having listened to the explanations of the Renamo leader, *Mediafax* asked rhetorically *“to what extent Dhlakama's project to form a parallel government in the six provinces where he and his coalition won a landslide victory [was]”*.²²⁴

In May 2000, Renamo demonstrators were brutally repressed by security forces in Angoche, in the province of Nampula, resulting in the death of five opposition activists. In October of the same year, policemen equipped with armoured vehicles encircled Renamo's secretariat in Beira and they searched communication gadgets arguing that their signals exceeded the limits authorized by law. Renamo, in response, called for a massive demonstration against the government throughout the country. Mr. Chissano tried to quickly nip the move in the bud by denouncing the envisaged demonstrations he considered unjustified. Machado da Graça, a *Savana* columnist 'reminded' the President that *“democracy is not about authorizing demonstrations which the government judges to be justified”*.²²⁵ The demonstrations took place on November 9, 2000 and were massively repressed by the security forces, including the PIR, the special police. They were 'tolerated' only in Maputo. According to official

²²² Michel CAHEN, *Les Bandits*, op.cit, p.21.

²²³ Editorial *Mediafax* n°2174 December 21, 2000.

²²⁴ *Mediafax* n° 1957 February 14, 2000.

²²⁵ Machado DA GRAÇA, “Manifestações em democracia”, *Metical* n° 833 October 9, 2000.

assessment, there were forty deaths and more than one hundred people detained in the provinces of Sofala, Nampula and Cabo Delgado. The authorities justified these deaths by arguing that the demonstrations were illegal and that the demonstrators had shot at the police and civilian targets.

The entire media expressed regrets about the deaths but only the independent press issued statements rejecting the authorities' argument of the illegality of the demonstrations. *Mediafax*, while calling attention to article 3(9) of the law on the right to demonstration and the freedom of association of 1991, concluded that "*Renamo met all legal procedures and did not receive any response from the authorities opposing the demonstration on fundamental basis provided by the law. In this sense, the only conclusion is that the demonstrations were legal*".²²⁶ Few weeks after the demonstrations, eighty-three sympathizers of the party, detained without any formal charges and 'abandoned' for several days without water or food, died in prison custody in Montepuez, in the northern province of Cabo Delgado. According to official accounts, the eighty-three detainees probably died due to the imprisonment conditions. They all dumped in a single tiny cell measuring 4x11m – which was obviously inadequate for such a high number of detainees. Thus it was not surprising that the victims were said to have died of lack of ventilation. The opposition denounced this "*massacre done to intimidate its activists*". The independent press called for an independent investigation on this tragedy, the immediate resignation of the Interior Minister and compensations to the families of the victims. The Prime Minister, Pascoal Mocumbi, responded that the State did not have the needed resources to pay compensations to the families of the victims. *Mediafax* condemned this attitude while demanding that "*the State [assumed] its responsibilities for the illegalities its agents committed against the citizens. What happened in Montepuez is a crime committed by government officials and it is up to the government to compensate the involved families. It is imperative that the State assume its responsibilities, unless we are in the phase of putrefied capitalism, as Karl Marx had argued*".²²⁷

No compensation was paid to the families of the victims. The Interior Minister refused to resign and the President reaffirmed his confidence in him. However, four members of the police force, including the commander of the station in Montepuez, were prosecuted and sentenced to various jail terms for this tragedy. The independent press denounced this judgement as a farce, insisting on the fact that the real culprits were the Ministers of Interior and Justice and not the convicted. From the eve of the 1999 elections to the end of the year 2001, the country lived in an environment of political instability. The security forces, including the special police branch, were on alert and positioned in the strategic places, including at radio and national television stations.

²²⁶*Mediafax* n° 2163 December 6, 2000.

²²⁷*Mediafax* n°2161 December 4, 2000.

CONCLUSION

Ten years of independent press in Mozambique: from a commendable past to an uncertain situation

The advent of the independent press in Mozambique and its underlining character was, as we saw in the second part of this article, described by foreign media as a ‘model of freedom’ worthy of emulation in Africa. These commendations were largely attributed to the *Mediacoop* newspaper. Although several new publications appeared in the decade 1990-2000 to consolidate plurality of ideas in the society, most of them performed below expectations. Apart from the publications that belonged to *Mediacoop-jornalistas associados*, only *Metical* adopted a commendable editorial policy.

In the face of increasing cases of corruption, *Metical* created a new column entitled ‘businesses news’. Writing in this section of the paper, Carlos Cardoso frequently asked the question: why are all the major sectors of the economy dominated by former ministers or generals in the government army? *Mediafax* devoted much of its editions to this question and, on many occasions, it published a list of these companies and the names of their respective owners, including individuals such as Armando Guebuza, Teodato Hunguana, Manuel Tomé, Mariano Matsinha, Aguiar Mazula, Alberto Chipande, Jacinto Veloso, Sebastião Mabote, Abdul Magid Osman, Hermenegildo Gamito, Eduardo da Silva Nihia, Prakash Ratilal, etc.²²⁸ The independent press also doubted that “*these companies and their owners had been paying taxes or honouring their financial engagements to their bankers*”.²²⁹

Worried about the boom recorded in property and banking sectors, especially in Maputo, which could hardly be justified by the rate of growth of the economy as a whole, *Metical* launched some investigations to unravel these mysteries. Cardoso found out that some huge loans that had been granted to some members of Frelimo and yet to be refunded were imperilling the solvency of the entire banking sector. Indeed, when the structural adjustment programme was introduced in 1987, the authorities had concluded that a policy of black economic empowerment, especially at the level of the elite, was necessary. And, therefore, the banks were used to achieve this objective by granting huge credits to members of the ruling elite, particularly members of Frelimo. This explains why most of the privatised companies were concerned about members of Frelimo.

Bank scandals, as typified by the fourteen million dollar fraud at the BCM, henceforth began to occupy a pre-eminent place in the front pages of *Metical*. What journalists denounced became increasingly evident. In 2000, two national banks that had been hurriedly privatised without recourse to due process in order to offer an escape route to their major

²²⁸ See *Mediafax* n° 1974 January 28, 2000; n° 1948 January 31, 2000 and n° 1960 February 17, 2000. All these personalities are senior members of Frelimo and most of them occupied ministerial positions between 1975 and 1987.

²²⁹ Editorial *Metical* n° 98 November 12, 1997, p.1.

debtors (members of Frelimo) went bankrupt. Cardoso published the names of the personalities implicated in this dark affair who have contributed to the collapse of the bank by refusing to honour their engagements. In the past, Cardoso had consistently opposed the frequent injection of public funds into these banks as a way of ensuring their continued survival, since he was faced with glaring evidence of frauds. In one of such criticisms, he argued that “*the government [had] not yet demonstrated any interest in recovering looted funds*”.²³⁰

One of the recurrent issues in Cardoso’s articles were the numerous companies allegedly owned by the eldest son of the President of the Republic, Nyimpine Chissano, and the role of the latter in the bank crisis. At the age of twenty-nine, Mr. Nyimpine had already emerged as one of the richest businessmen in the country. On November 22, 2000, Carlos Cardoso was assassinated near the premises of his newspaper. In the same week, two other journalists, Custódio Rafael and Rui de Carvalho at *Radio Moçambique* and *Mediafax* respectively, were brutally attacked in Maputo. Custódio Rafael, who had gone to the spot of the assassination in order to cover and report the incidence, had his tongue partially cut. He was also beaten until he fainted.

Metical survived a few months after the assassination of its founder. But its problems were not over. In February 2001, Mr. Nyimpine Chissano sued the newspaper and one of the collaborators of C. Cardoso, Marcelo Mosse, for slandering. This journalist had alleged in one of his articles in the February 21, 2001 edition of *Metical* that the eldest son of the President of the Republic had been detained for a few hours in South Africa. Although *Metical* did not advance any reason for his detention, other publications, such as *Demos*, alleged that his arrest followed the discovery of drugs in his car. But despite that, only *Metical* was sued. Mr. Nyimpine Chissano demanded eighty thousand US dollars as damages. In order to avoid a situation whereby the penal responsibility would be shifted to the legal inheritors of *Metical*, i.e. the young children of the late Cardoso, the management of the daily decided to liquidate the newspaper at the end of 2001. The case was later decided by a lower court in favour of Mr Chissano and upheld by the Supreme Court in April 2002. The disappearance of *Metical* was a major blow to the freedom of the press in Mozambique.

In July 2001, a delegation of the US-based Committee to Protect Journalists arrived in Mozambique to hold consultations with local journalists on the prevailing situation, bordering on the freedom of the press. Many of the journalists reportedly confirmed that they were now afraid of covering sensitive issues following the assassination of Carlos Cardoso. Fernando Lima reflected this mood when he wrote that “*the mask of hypocrisy which presented Mozambique as a model of freedom of the press in Africa has fallen with the assassination of Carlos Cardoso*”.²³¹ In 2003, some journalists formerly at *Metical* came together to establish a new publication, *Vertical*, under the leadership of Marcelo Mosse.

²³⁰ Carlos CARDOSO “Governo repôs o dinheiro roubado ao BCM” *Metical* n° 619 December 6, 1999, p. 1.

²³¹ Fernando LIMA, *Visão*, November 30, 2000, p.90.

The struggle of the press for the introduction of a living space or freedom of expression is itself a political struggle inseparable from the struggle for democracy. While acting as a tool for social protest, the independent press was at the forefront of the democratisation movement in the country. Democratic renewal was accompanied by a critical reflection on the rule of law permitting, for the first time, the expression of an independent and alternative internal view on the question of democracy. This voice was that of the independent press. It is trying to be a political actor, and from now on, to occupy the public space left vacant by a retreating authoritarian regime. The creation of an independent press constitutes a search for a space not only of freedom, but also of influence in the political arena. Thus by playing the role of mouthpieces for competing voices, these new publications contributed to transform internal hegemonies and relations of power.

The Mozambican press has a long tradition of resistance dating back to the period of the resistance to colonial rule. It is not just a symbol of past memories; it is also the inheritor of these memories. The similarities between the African Albasini press and the independent press that resulted from the liberalization of mass communication sector are numerous. But the essential remains their elitist character. They are both institutions that distanced themselves from a significant fraction of the population on many wide issues of public interest. Only the reversal of this trend can guarantee true popular participation. Admittedly, the independent press was adapting itself to its most critical public. It has confined itself to the places where the majority can read and write and where there are social groups whose activities are likely to support and compliment its efforts. However, the role of mouthpiece for the voiceless remains partial. It can listen but it cannot make itself understood by the voiceless.

The relation between the independent press and the authorities has been quite ambiguous. While criticizing the authorities, it was occupying, at the same time, a privileged position in the networks of power. It is thus a place for the reproduction of elites, as Marie-Soleil Frère affirms: “The new pluralistic landscape does not always confer an equal power of intervention by word or taking of political position on all individuals”.²³²

As in the West, the public space, in Africa in general, and in Mozambique in particular, was initially appropriated by the **press of opinion** and a minority of the elite who favoured the move towards democracy. The independent press has been a prerogative of urban elites whose views dominate newspaper columns and so maintain a ‘monopoly’ over public policy. Democratic consolidation will depend on the capacity to expand the political space for the benefit of the majority because as by Patrick Quantin once said “*democracy refers to a way of exercising power characterized, especially, by an open communication between governors and citizens*”.²³³ This communication is largely carried out by the press. The latter

²³² Marie-Soleil FRÈRE, *op. cit.*, p.500.

²³³ Patrick QUANTIN, “Les élites politiques face aux transitions démocratiques” in *L’Afrique Politique*, 1995.

thus becomes the mediator of the political space. It is its role to arouse the population's interest in politics.

This is also true about the capacity of the press to defend the interest of the majority. However, the tight control exercised by authorities over the media, the persistence of ideological positions, the elitism of the independent press, the low penetration and circulation of the independent press in the country constitute obstacles to the expansion of political participation and prevent the media from being in touch with popular aspirations.

Economic factors also weigh heavily on the strategic and editorial positions of the press. Journalists are often badly paid and are thus obliged to shuttle between personal imperatives and deontological principles. Finding mechanisms facilitating the rapid development and expansion of the independent press in Mozambique is an urgent necessity, above all in the internal and rural areas of the country where it would help the people to understand political issues. In spite of these deficiencies and serious structural problems, the independent press did play, and will continue to play, an important role in the pacification of the country and in the emergence of a robust debate on the democratic transition in Mozambique.