
Poverty, inequality and service delivery

6 *The happy transition? Attitudes to poverty and inequality after a decade of democracy*

Benjamin Roberts

'Zulu, lomhlaba unzima, lomhlaba'

('This world is a harsh place, this world' – Zulu proverb)

Following the decisive victory of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa's third democratic elections in April 2004, President Mbeki quickly reaffirmed that in spite of notable progress during the country's first decade of democracy, there remained an overwhelming and urgent mandate to deliver. The ANC's election manifesto, 'A People's Contract to Create Work and Fight Poverty', set forth a series of ambitious socio-economic objectives and targets, the most critical being the promises to halve poverty and unemployment by 2014 (African National Congress 2004). While there exists much debate and disagreement about the patterns and dynamics of poverty and inequality, the process of political and economic transformation appears to have been accompanied by rising impoverishment as well as mounting inequality in both incomes and opportunities (Roberts 2004). As the government sets about the task of meeting these challenges and living up to its commitments to improve people's lives, data from the 2003 South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) enable us to reflect on and examine individual welfare a decade after the transition.¹

The measurement of poverty in South Africa, as in most developing countries, has long been dominated by money-metric approaches, according to which income or expenditure is used to determine individual or household well-being. However, building on the international consensus that has evolved over the last decade in relation to the multidimensional nature of poverty, these income-based definitions of poverty are increasingly being complemented by research into subjective measures of poverty.

This chapter therefore begins by examining the extent to which South Africans consider themselves impoverished, and how this corresponds with their satisfaction with various aspects of life, with life in general and with overall happiness. The question of how subjective well-being differs according to socio-economic factors such as age, gender, marital status and labour force status is also explored. Recognising that levels of income inequality remain persistently high, and taking account of the progressive shift away from the relative importance of race towards class as a determinant of inequality, the second section of the chapter considers

attitudes to inequality. It also reflects on perceptions about the responsibility of the state in addressing poverty and inequality. The third and final section of the chapter provides some suggestions about how the research could be useful for policy-makers.

Experience and perceptions of poverty in South Africa: Reviewing the evidence

Research on subjective well-being has tended to focus disproportionately on wealthy nations, a situation largely determined by data availability. The renewed international emphasis on poverty that followed the publication of the 1990 World Development Report has brought rapid advances in data collection in developing and transition countries. South Africa is by no means exceptional in this regard. Over the course of the first decade of democracy, there have been impressive achievements in the availability of quantitative data sets, which Møller (1997) heralded as 'South Africa's emergent social indicators movement'. Coinciding with the transition to democracy and an increasing demand for detailed demographic and socio-economic data in developing countries more generally, the national statistical agency, Statistics South Africa, initiated a programme of cross-sectional, nationally representative household surveys.² In addition, a number of multi-topic surveys have been commissioned by national and international development agencies, most notably the Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development survey conducted in 1993.³ Panel data sets, where the same households or cohort of individuals are repeatedly visited in order to gain a better and more sophisticated understanding of micro-level social dynamics over time, have also been initiated. Examples include the Birth to Twenty Study, the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study, the Cape Area Panel Survey and Demographic Surveillance Sites in Agincourt (Mpumalanga), Dikgale (Limpopo) and Hlabisa (KwaZulu-Natal).

There has been a notable but less dramatic improvement in qualitative data, by means of which a more nuanced portrayal of well-being in South Africa can be developed. The 1993 Southern African Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) survey included a module on perceived quality of life, with items on household-level life satisfaction, perceived needs, perceived physical safety, relative poverty status, and perceived life change if a new government were to come to power. Klasen (1997) used the data to explore the relationship between poverty, deprivation and well-being.⁴ The analysis revealed that a broader measure of deprivation identifies a group of particularly deprived people that are missed using conventional income- or expenditure-based poverty measures. This 'missed' group consisted predominantly of rural-based black people, particularly from KwaZulu-Natal. Powdthavee (2003) uses the data to examine patterns of happiness in the country. The results show that the relationship between subjective well-being and socio-economic variables is similar to that in developed countries. Well-being rises with income (Klasen 1997; Powdthavee 2003) and tends to be higher among white people, households with

small numbers of family members, those living in rural areas, and among households owning some durable assets (especially a motor vehicle, telephone and geyser). As one would intuitively expect, unemployment is shown to be detrimental to reported well-being, both at the individual and the household level. The average educational and occupational status of other individuals living in the same household correlates significantly with reported well-being. Relative income also matters to well-being. A positive perception of past progress is associated with higher levels of reported quality of life. Bookwalter and Dalenberg (2004) find that important differences exist between the poor and the rich in relation to the determinants of subjective well-being. Among poorer households, transportation and housing play the most important role in determining well-being, while sanitation, water, energy, education and health are relatively more important for richer households.

In 1997 the government commissioned the country's first national qualitative poverty study, the South African Participatory Poverty Assessment, to complement the SALDRU survey results and in an attempt to provide a more nuanced understanding of poverty. The study used case studies and various participatory techniques to elicit public experience and perceptions of poverty. This endeavour to understand the lived experience of poverty was viewed as crucial for pro-poor policy-making. This is not only because definitions of poverty have conventionally been constructed by the non-poor, which has direct implications for the likelihood that policies and programmes will effectively target the poor, but is also a result of the apparent lack of consensus on the meaning and measurement of poverty among senior-level government officials (May and Norton 1997; Everatt 2003). The research exercise revealed that the poor characterised their poverty as:

- alienation from kinship and the community, especially among the elderly and for single mothers;
- food insecurity, particularly among children, and the poor quality of food;
- overcrowded living conditions and poorly-maintained homes;
- the use of basic forms of energy and the associated burden on women of collecting firewood;
- a lack of adequately paid, secure jobs or the situation where nobody in the household is employed; and
- fragmentation of the family owing to absent fathers and children living away from their parents (May and Norton 1997; Woolard 2002).

While issues such as hunger, unemployment and job insecurity are fundamentally related to not having enough money, the exercise also pointed strongly to the need to accommodate non-material factors when considering what it means to be poor or, alternatively, what characterises the good life. Well-being in South Africa therefore includes elements that transcend economic prosperity.

Of the few studies that have actually aimed to monitor subjective well-being in the country, the South African Quality of Life Trends Project has the distinction of being

the longest-standing.⁵ Initiated in the early 1980s, the study has regularly collected a range of subjective and objective social indicators, and has charted trends in life satisfaction, happiness and expectations of future life satisfaction (Møller 2001; Møller and Dickow 2002). The indicators of overall life satisfaction, happiness and domain satisfaction (satisfaction with different aspects or domains of life) reported during the turbulent 1980s reflected major societal divides, especially in terms of race. White South Africans were consistently happier with most aspects of life and black South Africans were least satisfied and happy, with coloured and Indian South Africans falling somewhere in-between. Despite the major political changes of the 1990s and the wide-ranging nature of policies and programmes to redress historical social inequalities, the reality of rising unemployment, persistent poverty, crime and HIV/AIDS could conceivably serve to offset any positive gains in subjective well-being. This is in fact borne out by the fact that white people have continued to register the highest levels and black people the lowest levels of life satisfaction and happiness, with only a slight convergence in the post-apartheid period.

In terms of expectations for the future, 1994 appears to be an important benchmark, with an inversion of the racial hierarchy of responses after this date. For black people, a generally pessimistic view of the future (especially in the last days of apartheid) became progressively more optimistic, while the observed optimism amongst the white populace came to be supplanted by a more pessimistic outlook (Møller 2001). In sum, the post-apartheid pattern of subjective well-being seems to be characterised by a situation where white people are largely satisfied with life but possess negative future expectations, in contrast to black people, who are predominantly dissatisfied with life but have positive expectations of the future (Møller and Saris 2001).

The Human Sciences Research Council's Social Movement Surveys, which were conducted annually (in February/March) between 1994 and 2000, asked respondents about their perceptions of the current situation relative to past and future life expectation at the personal, group and national levels. The results are a rich and complex tapestry of attitudes. One interesting and important finding is that satisfaction and dissatisfaction vary according to whether people assess their personal situation, the situation of the group they identify with, or the situation of the people of South Africa. This is most notably evident in the case of white and black South Africans. Black people remained consistently dissatisfied about their present personal circumstances in general, but reported that the situation of their group had improved considerably compared to the previous five years and that the future outlook for the group was bright. White South Africans seemed to hold the opposite opinion. They were satisfied with their current personal situation but felt that the situation of their group had worsened over time and that the group had equally bleak future prospects. One possible interpretation of these results is that black South Africans recognised that there had been some gains for their group during the 1990s, which in turn cultivated hope for the future despite their dissatisfaction with their personal situation. Although white South Africans were

relatively contented with life, the perception that things had worsened for their group as a whole over time could be what fuelled concerns about their own future, hence the negative future prognosis (Klandermans, Roefs and Olivier 2001: 88).

Throughout the 1990s, there were two important divergences from the attitudinal trends outlined. There was a dramatic increase in subjective well-being, most acutely observed for black South Africans, immediately after the first democratic election in 1994. This post-election euphoria was, however, short-lived, possibly because of the divergence between expectations or aspirations and actual improvements in living conditions as the decade progressed. The September 1999 round of the Quality of Life Trends Project also exhibited distinct improvements in global life satisfaction and future life expectations for all population groups (Møller 2001). The 2000 Social Movements Survey showed similar improvements for all population groups (Klandermans et al. 2001). This is again suggestive of a euphoric moment in the aftermath of the second democratic elections of 1999.

Poor, relatively speaking

In order to investigate the relationship between income and well-being, respondents were asked the following direct question: 'Would you say that you and your family are wealthy, very comfortable, reasonably comfortable, just getting along, poor or very poor?' Responses to this self-assessed poverty status were subsequently stratified according to three broad categories, namely the 'poor', those 'just getting by' or the 'vulnerable', and the 'better-off/wealthy'.⁶ Table 6.1 shows that approximately one-quarter of South Africans aged 16 years and older considered themselves poor, two-fifths saw themselves as vulnerable and marginally less than one-third saw themselves as comfortable or wealthy.

Table 6.1 *Self-assessed poverty status, by population group*

	Black African	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Wealthy/comfortable	23	38	60	77	32
Just getting by	47	33	34	22	42
Very poor/poor	30	30	6	2	26
Total*	100	100	100	100	100
Weighted Base N	1 880	213	70	287	2 461**

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.

** A number of respondents did not specify a population group.

Source: SASAS (2003)

As with income- or expenditure-based definitions of poverty, there emerges a remarkable gradient when disaggregation by population group is done, reflecting the close correlation between living standards and race that continues to exist in the country. Nearly a third of black African respondents viewed themselves as poor, 47 per cent said they were just getting by, and only 23 per cent designated themselves as comfortable or wealthy. While a similar share of coloured respondents classified themselves as impoverished, nearly 40 per cent viewed themselves as comfortable or wealthy. In contrast, self-perceived poverty was virtually non-existent among white and Indian/Asian respondents, with 77 per cent and 60 per cent respectively indicating that they were comfortable or wealthy.

Hard times

Table 6.2 shows the responses to two sets of variables aimed at eliciting some sense of material hardship. An estimated 45 per cent of the adult population perceived the income of their households as being inadequate to meet basic needs. This situation of economic vulnerability was more acutely experienced among the self-identified poor (74 per cent) and those 'just getting by'. Casual workers, the unemployed (especially work-seekers), pensioners, and those that were temporarily sick were also at risk of income deprivation. Being black African, never having married, being male, and aged between 25–34 years or older than 50 (the youthful unemployed and pensioners) are other personal attributes that seem to influence the likelihood of having insufficient resources to meet basic consumption needs. Respondents residing in provinces with lower levels of human development, including Limpopo, North West, Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga, and KwaZulu-Natal, tended to report higher levels of income deprivation.⁷

Over time, individuals and households develop different kinds of arrangements to manage various forms of risk to which they are or could be exposed. These can be informal in nature, examples including migration, the buying and selling of assets (such as cattle or property), informal borrowing and lending, multiple jobs, storing goods for future consumption, and building and using social relationships, taking children out of school, reducing the number of meals per day, and trying to save. These arrangements could also involve taking advantage of market-based institutions such as banks and moneylenders or relying on government-provided assistance or insurance (social grants, public works programmes, subsidies) if they are available (World Bank 2001; Norton, Conway and Foster 2002). In order to further examine responses to situations of financial vulnerability, respondents were asked whether they had been unable to pay a clothing or furniture account, or borrowed from family, friends or a moneylender in the last year.

Table 6.2 *Dimensions of financial security, by self-assessed poverty status and population group*

	'My household's income is adequate for our needs' (% disagree or strongly disagree)	In the last year did any of the following happen to you because of a shortage of money?			
		Could not pay clothing/furniture account on time (%)	Asked for financial help from family (%)	Asked for financial help from friends (%)	Borrowed from a <i>mashonisa</i> or money-lender (%)
Total	45	37	45	28	11
Self-assessed poverty status					
Wealthy/comfortable	18	23	27	14	5
Just getting by	49	36	50	31	14
Very poor/poor	74	55	58	39	14
Population group					
Black African	53	43	52	33	12
Coloured	37	28	38	21	10
Indian/Asian	17	16	22	9	7
White	10	9	11	7	5
Age cohort					
16–24 years	42	33	46	22	8
25–34 years	53	42	50	32	8
35–49 years	41	37	43	33	12
50+ years	45	35	40	24	18
Gender					
Male	46	33	42	26	11
Female	45	39	48	29	11
Marital status					
Married	40	34	36	27	13
Widowed/separated/divorced	42	33	47	32	17
Never married	49	39	50	27	8
Employment status					
Unemployed, not seeking work	45	36	61	27	11
Unemployed, seeking work	58	49	53	35	10
Pensioner (aged/retired)	45	27	36	21	15
Temporarily sick	59	43	79	23	0
Permanently disabled	28	32	37	19	7
Housewife, not looking	23	17	34	26	5
Student/learner	37	26	45	19	3
Self-employed (full time)	23	27	26	18	15
Employed part-time	61	47	56	39	18
Employed full-time	35	33	33	26	16
Other (specify)	52	11	30	14	0

Source: SASAS (2003)

Slightly more than a third of respondents indicated that they had encountered a situation where they were unable to maintain the repayment of debt on a clothing or furniture account. This situation was more pronounced for the self-defined poor (55 per cent), the work-seeking unemployed and casual workers, the black population, those aged 25–34, those never married, and women. At the geographical level, debt default is more common in the Eastern Cape, Limpopo, Mpumalanga and Free State, as well as in rural localities.

As an important coping strategy in times of financial need, individuals may rely on borrowing from family or friends as a significant form of social capital. Almost half of respondents borrowed from family, with this behaviour more prevalent amongst the black population, the unemployed and casual workers, students, youth (16–34), those never married or widowed/separated/divorced, as well as amongst the poor and those 'just getting by'. Borrowing from friends was not as widespread (28 per cent) as borrowing from family, but was similarly typical among casual workers and the work-seeking unemployed, black people, the poor and those 'just getting by', women and 25–49 year olds. Relying on market-based institutions was relatively rare, with only 11 per cent of respondents reporting borrowing from a moneylender in the year prior to the survey. This could be partly attributable to the absence of market institutions, or it could be a response to the excessively high interest repayments charged on loans. It may also represent a tendency to rely on family members who have access to a social grant, such as the old-age pension, or who are regularly employed, in times of need (Møller and Ferreira 2003). Borrowing from moneylenders was more widespread among the employed (regular, casual and self-employed), pensioners, the black population, the defeated unemployed,⁸ older cohorts (35 and older), the married, the poor and those 'just getting by'.

Empty stomachs

Research conducted over the last decade has shown that food insecurity has been on the increase. Children have been disproportionately affected by this development. Malnutrition has been worsening, with the prevalence of underweight children increasing from 9.3 per cent to 10.3 per cent during the late 1990s (Statistics South Africa and UNDP 2003). Stunting also rose from 22.9 per cent of children aged 1–6 in 1994 to 23.3 per cent in 1999 (Bradshaw, Masiteng and Nannan 2000). This inability of many South Africans, especially children, to secure their recommended dietary requirements is further corroborated by available data pertaining to subjective measures of food insecurity.⁹ Despite inconsistent phrasing hampering comparability over time, certain patterns can be discerned. Between one-quarter and one-third of households are unable to purchase food to meet the dietary requirements of children at any given time. This phenomenon is more acutely felt amongst rural households and in poorer provinces, especially the Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga (Roberts 2004).

Perceived household food insecurity, expressed as those who disagreed with the statement that 'my household is able to get enough food for its needs', was reported by 29 per cent of SASAS respondents. This figure rises to a staggering 64 per cent for the self-defined poor, but also afflicts the unemployed (especially those seeking work) and casual workers, black people, those never married, and men. In common with official statistics, food insecurity was more commonly reported by respondents in Mpumalanga (45 per cent) and the Eastern Cape. High levels of food insecurity were also observed amongst those located in Limpopo, the Free State, North West and the Northern Cape (30 per cent), and in rural areas (41 per cent).

Attitudes to services

Access to basic services, such as water, electricity and sanitation, is an important indicator of well-being as it has a direct and positive impact on quality of life, resulting in improvements ranging from health to productivity (Klasen 1997). In order to address the disparity in living conditions and access to services between the poor and the non-poor, a sizeable share of government's spending after 1994 has been devoted to improving public services for all, including health care, education, electricity, water, sanitation and housing. The result has been notable progress in the provision of social services over the last decade (PCAS 2003). However, inequalities in access to services persist, especially between provinces, urban–rural locations and population groups (Bhorat, Poswell and Naidoo 2004). A series of questions was included in the survey in order to gauge the public's levels of satisfaction with the manner in which government has been addressing the challenge of service delivery, as well as other national priorities such as crime prevention and employment creation.

Table 6.3 *Satisfaction with public service provision, by poverty status*

Mean score	Wealthy/comfortable	Just getting by	Very poor/poor	All
Water and sanitation	3.6	3.3	2.9	3.3
Electricity	3.8	3.4	3.0	3.4
Refuse removal	3.8	3.5	3.3	3.5
Affordable housing	3.1	2.8	2.5	2.8
Health care	3.1	2.7	2.6	2.8
Treatment for sexually transmitted infections (STIs) including HIV/AIDS	3.1	2.6	2.8	2.8
Crime prevention	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.3
Job creation	1.9	1.8	1.6	1.7
Land reform	3.3	2.8	2.9	3.0

Note: The mean scores presented in this table are based on 'very dissatisfied' = 1, 'dissatisfied' = 2, 'neither nor' = 3, 'satisfied' = 4 and 'very satisfied' = 5. Discrete missing values were assigned to 'do not know' responses. Values in bold indicate those scores falling below the mean.

Source: SASAS (2003)

As Table 6.3 shows, respondents were generally contented with refuse removal, electricity, water and sanitation, and land reform (means ranging between 3.0 and 3.5), but were slightly dissatisfied with housing and health care (including treatment for sexually transmitted infections [STI]). However, in relation to job creation and crime prevention there was broad-based dissatisfaction (means of 1.7 and 2.3 respectively). The self-assessed poor were generally less contented with social services than those just getting by and the better-off. The only services in relation to which the poor expressed neutral attitudes or modest levels of satisfaction were refuse removal and electricity. The better-off were only dissatisfied with job creation and crime prevention efforts.

In terms of satisfaction by population group, there is a clearly discernible trend in relation to refuse removal, electricity, water and sanitation, affordable housing, health care and STI treatment (results not shown). Black African respondents appear the least satisfied and white respondents the most satisfied, with coloured and Indian respondents falling in-between. For these services, the mean satisfaction scores are all above the midpoint of 3.0 (neutral), with the exception of black respondents in respect of affordable housing, health care and STI treatment. In contrast, there was widespread discontent amongst all population groups in relation to the government's efforts in the areas of employment creation and crime prevention. Black African respondents were the most dissatisfied with employment creation (mean = 1.7), with white respondents the least dissatisfied (mean = 2.1). As for crime prevention, Indian/Asian respondents were the least satisfied (mean = 1.7) and black African respondents the least dissatisfied (mean = 2.3).

Life satisfaction and happiness

In Table 6.4 satisfaction with life in general, happiness and four different 'domains' of life are disaggregated by population group and self-assessed poverty status. The results quite starkly portray both the race and class divide that characterises contemporary South Africa.

The mean score for South Africans on life satisfaction was 3.08 (on the positive side, just over the neutral point of 3) and 3.28 on happiness. Of the four population groups, only black people have a negative score on life satisfaction ($M = 2.91$). Conversely, white people are the most satisfied with life as a whole ($M = 3.94$), while coloured and Indian/Asian people fall in-between black and white people and are modestly contented with life. Life satisfaction decreases uniformly from the wealthy/comfortable to those just getting by to the poor, a trend that holds constant when disaggregating self-assessed poverty status by population group. Irrespective of poverty status, black people generally have the lowest average life satisfaction and white people the highest life satisfaction, with coloured and Indian/Asian people falling in-between. The only exception is for the poor group, with Indians/Asians on average the most discontented with life in general and white people reporting a score that is positive.

The progression for happiness from lowest to highest scores follows a broadly consistent pattern. The mean happiness score for all population groups falls on the positive side, ranging from a low of 3.11 for black people to a high of 4.01 for white people. Both the wealthy/comfortable and those 'just getting by' report positive happiness scores, a trend that holds true for all population groups. Nonetheless, the poor cohort are generally unhappy ($M = 2.49$), the only exception being the poor among the white populace.

Table 6.4 Differences in satisfaction domains, by self-defined poverty status and population group (mean score of a five-point scale)

	Life satisfaction	Happiness	Income satisfaction	Dwelling satisfaction	Work availability	Paid holidays
Wealthy/comfortable						
Black African	3.68	3.62	2.94	3.35	2.83	2.78
Coloured	3.83	3.94	3.62	3.89	3.34	3.26
Indian/Asian	3.94	4.13	3.68	3.99	3.44	3.64
White	4.08	4.06	3.96	4.19	3.40	3.59
Total	3.82	3.81	3.35	3.68	3.09	3.12
Just getting by						
Black African	3.01	3.29	2.40	2.80	2.33	2.31
Coloured	3.46	3.79	2.70	3.33	2.61	2.85
Indian/Asian	3.31	3.56	2.79	3.65	2.64	2.88
White	3.51	3.80	2.75	3.69	2.88	3.14
Total	3.07	3.36	2.45	2.91	2.39	2.41
Very poor/poor						
Black African	2.13	2.45	1.75	2.15	1.85	1.84
Coloured	2.32	2.84	1.84	2.31	1.86	2.22
Indian/Asian	1.92	2.59	1.43	2.56	1.74	1.88
White	3.22	3.94	2.25	3.26	2.04	2.56
Total	2.16	2.49	1.76	2.18	1.85	1.88
South Africa						
Black African	2.91	3.11	2.33	2.74	2.30	2.31
Coloured	3.25	3.59	2.80	3.24	2.69	2.90
Indian/Asian	3.62	3.85	3.25	3.80	3.10	3.33
White	3.94	4.01	3.67	4.07	3.27	3.47
Total	3.08	3.28	2.56	2.97	2.47	2.54

Note: The mean scores presented in this table are based on 'very dissatisfied' = 1, 'dissatisfied' = 2, 'neither nor' = 3, 'satisfied' = 4 and 'very satisfied' = 5. Discrete missing values were assigned to 'do not know' responses. Values in bold indicate those scores falling below the group mean.

Source: SASAS (2003)

Overall, the mean satisfaction ratings for income, job availability and paid holidays, and housing domains fall on the negative (dissatisfied) side. The adult black population is dissatisfied in all four specific domains, especially those that pertain to employment and income. Coloured people are similarly discontented, though they provide a more favourable assessment of housing. In contrast, Indian/Asian and white people are on average satisfied in all the domains, with employment opportunities showing the lowest satisfaction levels ($M = 2.21$ and 2.22 respectively). Those describing themselves as wealthy/comfortable present positive attitudes in all four domains (lowest = employment opportunities; highest = housing), whereas those stipulating that they are 'just getting by' or poor have negative attitudes in all four domains. Within the three categories of self-assessed poverty status, black people who are wealthy or just getting by have consistently lower mean scores than the other three population groups, but poor Indians/Asians are the least contented with their income and, by a negligible margin, with the availability of work. Within all four population groups, domain satisfaction decreases uniformly from the wealthy/comfortable to those 'just getting by' to the poor.

Past tense, future (im)perfect

To what extent are these differentials in satisfaction and happiness mirrored in attitudes to change over the past five years and in the prognosis for the next five years? Table 6.5 reveals that the mean score on changes in life since 1999 is 2.03, which indicates that on the whole South Africans have a slightly optimistic view of changes during the period of President Mbeki's first term of office. Nonetheless, this aggregate masks important group-based differentials. In fact, only black people positively assessed changes since 1999, with all other groups appearing to believe that overall, life had got worse for them. The same pattern emerges in relation to black African cohorts who are wealthy or just getting by, when compared with other population groups falling in these two poverty status categories. The poor, on the whole, tend to be marginally more pessimistic about improvements in their lives over the past five years. While the black African poor appear to be relatively neutral, the other population groups indicate a slight worsening over the period. It should, however, be noted that the coloured and Indian/Asian poor have slightly higher mean scores than coloured and Indian/Asian people who are just getting by, though the difference is not that large. Interestingly, poor white people, while negative about improvements to their lives, still have higher ratings than those in the other two poverty categories (with well-off white people being the most disenchanting with life change).

In terms of the outlook for the next five years, South Africans appear somewhat more optimistic, with a mean score of 2.22. This more sanguine prognosis is most evident for black, followed by coloured and Indian/Asian people. For all three groups, there is a greater tendency to view the next five years in a more favourable light compared with their assessment of the past, and for Indian/Asian and coloured people the mean

score has actually shifted from being negative to being positive overall. In contrast, white South Africans hold a generally pessimistic view of life during the next five years ($M = 1.60$), to the extent that the view of the future is as bleak as the evaluation of the past. While the mean scores for the three poverty status categories are modestly positive within a small range (2.21–2.23), better-off white South Africans, vulnerable coloured, Indian/Asian and white people, and poor Indian/Asian and white people foresee negative prospects over the next five-year term.

Table 6.5 *Assessing past and future progress, by population group and self-assessed poverty status (mean score of a three-point scale)*

	Life change since 1999	Life change next 5 years
Wealthy/comfortable		
Black African	2.22	2.48
Coloured	1.98	2.25
Indian/Asian	1.84	2.24
White	1.66	1.66
Total	2.02	2.21
Just getting by		
Black African	2.15	2.31
Coloured	1.76	1.96
Indian/Asian	1.53	1.79
White	1.57	1.41
Total	2.08	2.22
Very poor/poor		
Black African	2.00	2.25
Coloured	1.83	2.14
Indian/Asian	1.58	1.86
White	1.74	1.42
Total	1.98	2.23
South Africa		
Black African	2.12	2.33
Coloured	1.86	2.11
Indian/Asian	1.72	2.07
White	1.64	1.60
Total	2.03	2.22

Note: The mean scores presented in this table are based on 'gotten worse' = 1, 'stayed the same' = 2 and 'improved' = 3. Discrete missing values were assigned to 'do not know' responses. Values in bold indicate those scores falling below the group mean. Source: SASAS (2003)

Combining the results on current individual life satisfaction presented in Table 6.4 with the assessment of past and future group-based progress in Table 6.5, it becomes apparent that black South Africans are generally dissatisfied with their personal situation, but believe that their group has benefited during the past five years. Furthermore, it appears that this assessment has in turn served to nurture hope for the future, and an expectation that some day they will enjoy such improvements themselves. In contrast, while white South Africans seem to feel relatively satisfied with their personal situation, the results also suggest that they perceive that their group may have been excluded from socio-economic gains secured during the past five years, thus raising fears of a decline in social status in the near future.

The reality that poor black and coloured South Africans continue to demonstrate a resilient and resolute optimism about the next five years, despite being unhappy and dissatisfied with income, housing, employment opportunities, paid leave and life in general, is of particular political significance. It underlines the importance of the government using the electoral mandate it was afforded in the April 2004 general elections to drastically scale up delivery and ensure that the poor are adequately provided for. The bubble of optimism amongst poor black and coloured South Africans cannot be taken for granted. If the range of policies and programmes fails to deliver substantively on the electoral promises over the next term of office of the government, then in all likelihood the threshold of patience may be crossed and the optimism replaced by increased disaffection.

Materialism


Research conducted largely in the United States has revealed, interestingly, that materialistic goals and values are inimical to high subjective well-being (Richins and Dawson 1992; Sirgy 1997; Diener and Biswas-Diener 2002). According to this research, people who view money as critical to meeting their goals or aspirations tend to be less satisfied with life than those who place more of an emphasis on other values. In the SASAS study, each of the respondents was asked about the extent to which they agreed or disagreed that 'the best things in life cannot be bought with money'. The responses were captured using a five-point scale, ranging from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree'. Those responding 'disagree' or 'strongly disagree' are considered to be materialists or have high material values, while those stating that they 'agree' or 'strongly agree' are seen as non-materialists with low material values.

For nearly a third of South Africans, material values predominate over post-material concerns. As one would expect, this is particularly true of those groupings that do not have much money, such as the poor and those just getting by, the unemployed, the youth, black people, those never married, casual workers and the self-employed, and women. Similarly, poorer provinces such as KwaZulu-Natal, the Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga and Limpopo, as well as rural localities, are enclaves of

materialist sentiment. Conversely, those less concerned about income matters (post-materialists) appear to be those whose basic needs and security have been satisfied, including white and Indian/Asian South Africans, the wealthy, those residing in the Western and Northern Cape and urbanites.

Figure 6.1 presents the relation between self-assessed poverty status and life satisfaction for participants with less and more materialistic values. As can be seen, materialistic people were much less satisfied with their lives if they considered themselves poor. If materialists were well-off, their life satisfaction tended to be somewhat closer to that of the non-materialists. Although directly measured income is not used, the results do provide some indication that in South Africa the lack of fulfilment of material desires is one of the potential reasons for discontent among materialistic people.

Figure 6.1 Poverty status, materialism and life satisfaction



Note: The mean life satisfaction scores are based on 'very dissatisfied' = 1, 'dissatisfied' = 2, 'neither nor' = 3, 'satisfied' = 4 and 'very satisfied' = 5. Discrete missing values were assigned to 'do not know' responses. Material values were determined from reported levels of agreement with the statement 'the best things in life cannot be bought with money'. High material values were assigned to those that disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement, while low material values were assigned to those that agreed or strongly agreed.

Source: SASAS (2003)


South Africans' priorities for well-being therefore reflect the gap between material and post-material values. While black South Africans appear to be more concerned about basic fulfilment of needs, white South Africans focus more on other societal issues. This provides some resonance with the South African Quality of Life Trends Project and supports Inglehart's (1990) post-materialist theory, which argues that people in developed countries are currently less concerned about income matters than about non-material issues. It also provides some support for Maslow's (1970) classical theory of a hierarchy of values, according to which higher values only become salient after lower-level values such as basic needs have been satisfied (Møller 2001: 44).

Confronting the divide: Attitudes to inequality

The extent to which the political and economic transformation that accompanied South Africa's transition to democracy has benefited those that were previously disadvantaged is subject to much debate. Given that this is one of the world's most inequitable societies, much attention has been devoted to measuring changes in people's incomes and income inequality during the first decade of freedom. Despite a resolute commitment by the government to addressing the pervasive poverty and inequality in the country, and the diverse package of policy responses adopted over the decade, empirical evidence suggests that poverty may have increased. Inequality may also be stagnating due to worsening intra-racial inequality (the gap between rich and poor black South Africans is widening) and only a marginal decline in interracial inequality. This section attempts to provide some insight into people's attitudes towards the changed circumstances brought about by the post-apartheid period.

Perceptions of income inequality

SASAS contains a set of measures that allow us to explore respondents' attitudes to inequality in a reasonably direct manner. In particular, the statement 'In South Africa incomes are too unequal' represents an attempt to establish how South Africans assess the perceived amount of inequality in the country. Figure 6.2 shows that there exists a high level of dissatisfaction with the level of income inequality in the country, with 87 per cent of respondents strongly agreeing or agreeing that incomes are too unequal. Thus, South Africans appear to be generally intolerant of the level of inequality in society, a situation that is more acutely felt by black African compared with white respondents.¹⁰ Furthermore, those that self-identify with being vulnerable or 'just getting by' are significantly more likely to express an aversion to income inequality than those that consider themselves poor or better-off.

Figure 6.2 *Incomes are too unequal in South Africa (percentage that strongly agree and agree)*

Note: Missing values have been excluded from analysis.
Source: SASAS (2003)

There are a number of plausible explanations for these negative views on inequality. Attitudinal differences to inequality are undoubtedly likely to reflect the enduring apartheid legacy of pronounced income and wealth inequality. However, the situation could also be partly attributable to a perceived growth in social inequalities over the decade, a sense of personal material loss for certain respondents, especially as a result of rising unemployment, and a sense of unfairness in the post-apartheid transformation process. The second round of the Afrobarometer Survey¹¹ provides supporting evidence for this, with 64 per cent of South Africans asserting that the gap between the rich and the poor had widened over the last few years, 53 per cent saying that their standard of living had worsened over the last few years, and 85 per cent indicating that the availability of jobs had worsened (see Table 6.A1 in the Appendix to this chapter). Moreover, approximately two-thirds of South Africans believe that the government's economic policies have hurt most people (see Table 6.A2 in the Appendix to this chapter). That those who are 'just getting by' express the highest level of aversion to inequality is unsurprising. The kinds of market reforms and trade liberalisation that South Africa has embarked upon under the Growth, Employment and Redistribution macroeconomic strategy have been shown to create opportunities but also new vulnerabilities, especially for the near-poor or middle strata (Graham 2002).

Perceived class conflict

The egalitarian view also expresses itself in terms of concern over conflict between different societal groupings. SASAS included a set of items that was intended to determine whether, after a decade of democracy, the South African public perceived conflicts between rich and poor, between employed and unemployed, between managers and workers, between young and old and between different race groups (Table 6.6). While perceived tensions along race lines continue to predominate, more than 40 per cent of South Africans mention strong tension between the poor and the rich. Round 2 of Afrobarometer affirms this unease with large wealth differentials, with the majority expressing the sentiment that such inequality needs to be avoided on the grounds that it fosters 'jealousy and conflict'. More moderate conflict is perceived between employed and unemployed, and between managers and workers, while even fewer see much tension between generations.

A majority (ranging between 48 per cent and 61 per cent) sees each of these five conflicts as in the middle categories, either 'some tension' or 'not much tension', rather than at the extremes. Nonetheless, the perceived conflicts are more intense than those in more advanced industrial countries, where moderate levels of conflict have been reported (Kelley, Evans and Castles 2001).¹² Therefore, South Africans do not see social relations within the country as being tranquil and consensual; nor do they see them as extremely conflictual. Instead, evidence points towards a situation where modest to moderately high levels of conflict prevail.

Table 6.6 *Attitudes to class conflict in South Africa*

		Strong tension	Some tension	Not much tension	No tension	Total*	N	DK
Different races	%	46	36	12	6	100	2 381	5
Poor and rich	%	43	37	12	8	100	2 369	5
Employed and unemployed	%	35	43	14	8	100	2 383	5
Management and workers	%	32	45	16	6	100	2 262	9
Young and old	%	22	35	24	19	100	2 371	5

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

Specific sub-groups are more likely to view society as conflict-ridden. Correlation analysis points toward some important individual-level differences in perceptions of conflict (see Table 6.A3 in the Appendix to this chapter). Respondents who are better educated, white, married or have higher personal incomes appear to see less conflict. Female respondents are less likely to perceive tension between management

and workers, a situation that may be related to lower labour market participation. Coloured respondents are less likely to see conflict between the unemployed and the employed and between race groups. In contrast, respondents who subjectively identify with the poorer classes, are rurally-based or are black African are more likely to see conflict. Being older and female is also associated with higher perceived tension between the young and old and between race groups.

Attitudes toward government responsibility

Over the past decade, South Africa's adoption of a progressive, rights-based Constitution together with other important legislation has served to eliminate the discriminatory legal basis for unequal wealth ownership. This has been coupled with public programmes of land reform, housing, education, small-, medium- and micro-enterprise (SMME) development and black economic empowerment (BEE), all of which have directly attempted to redistribute wealth. Yet despite these substantive state-led endeavours, scant attention has been devoted to mapping attitudinal differences towards the government's role in public service provision and in equalising opportunities and outcomes.

With regard to attitudes towards the role of government, especially in terms of the redistribution of income, one would expect that the low levels of tolerance of inequality in society would produce an equally strong desire for governmental redistribution. Indeed, this appears to be the case, with 90 per cent of respondents believing that government should take more responsibility for ensuring that everyone is provided for (Table 6.7). In terms of cross-country comparison, this is exceptionally high relative to the perceived aversion to inequality previously outlined. As Table 6.A4 (in the Appendix to this chapter) demonstrates, while dissatisfaction with the level of income inequality in South Africa approximates that of more developed countries such as Great Britain, and is somewhat lower than countries in central and eastern Europe, this country expresses the highest levels of agreement with regard to government's responsibility for social justice.

Table 6.7 also includes responses to a set of statements directed at eliciting levels of support for forms of public action that could serve to redress income differences, including land reform, BEE, and affirmative action. One would anticipate that individuals who consider themselves better-off or rich would oppose redistributive measures, since they are not benefiting directly. However, fear of becoming poor may prompt them to support such measures as a means of insuring against future potential misfortunes. The poor should favour redistribution since they gain from it, on the whole (Alesina, Di Tella and MacCulloch 2003). The dynamics of the past decade may further complicate this picture, since the new elite, particularly the black middle class, may generally be more altruistic than self-interested and therefore encourage redistribution.

Table 6.7 Attitudes to government responsibility and redistributive measures

Statement presented to respondents	All	Black African	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White	Wealthy	Vulnerable	Poor
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
'Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for.' (strongly agree and agree)	90	92	88	85	84	89	93	93
'Government's duty is to provide employment.' (strongly agree and agree)	90	92	87	78	83	87	94	92
'Government should... redistribute land to black South Africans.' (strongly agree and agree)	67	81	27	28	17	59	75	84
'There should be preferential hiring and promotion of black South Africans in employment.' (strongly agree and agree)	66	80	17	31	15	54	75	81
'Government should... give preferential contracts and tax breaks to black businesses.' (strongly agree and agree)	60	72	20	26	13	50	71	74

Source: SASAS (2003)

An interesting pattern appears to develop, especially when analysing attitudes to such reforms by population group. Despite the uniformly strong sentiment expressed in favour of the role of the state in meeting the inequality challenge, there appears to be less agreement as to the preferred means of achieving these gains. While 90 per cent of respondents believe that government has a responsibility to provide employment, only an estimated two-thirds believe that there should be preferential hiring and promotion of black South Africans. This can be ascribed to the fact that most population groups support government-driven employment creation, ranging from 92 per cent of black African to 78 per cent of Indian/Asian people, but affirmative action only receives mass support from black South Africans. Amongst the other population groups, the level of support for such reform is less than half the national average. There is even less support for BEE, whereby government provides preferential contracts and tax breaks to black businesses. Attitudes to land reform exhibit a similar trend, with sizeable support from black African respondents relative to other population groups.

What are the possible reasons for this paradox between widespread aversion to inequality and polarised support for different forms of redistributive measures along race and class lines? One feasible rationale may be self-interest among South Africa's elites. For these individuals, inequality may be seen to breed crime and pose threats to property rights, hence the strong concern about the extreme income inequality in the country. Social consciousness among elites could also explain this phenomenon, but the research conducted by Kalati and Manor (1999) suggests that this social solidarity is poorly developed in most elites in South Africa, a situation complicated by the geographical, social, educational, economic, and psychological distances that exist between elites and the impoverished masses. The perception of poverty may negatively affect the welfare of the rich and their sense of fairness. Resistance to redistributive policies may come from the fact that most elites have not benefited from such interventions, but may also be a consequence of the fact that the redistribution process has been tainted by poor delivery, corruption, nepotism (and possibly a fear of Zimbabwe-type redistribution of assets). These assertions remain mostly speculative for now, and subsequent rounds of SASAS will need to begin to examine the competing reasons for the complex attitudes to redistribution in South Africa.

Legitimate bases of reward

A number of normative statements were presented to respondents about the factors that should determine earnings from employment, as opposed to the actual situation and the factors that are influencing whether or not people get ahead (Table 6.8). These largely relate to principles of meritocracy, such as level of responsibility, education and skills, work experience, supervision of others, hard work, performance and family responsibility. There is strong support for these more 'objective' criteria in determining earnings. While attitudes remain relatively homogeneous when disaggregating by population group, the level of agreement is marginally higher for Indian/Asian and white respondents. Therefore, the general picture emerging is one of widespread support for transformation, but with employment decisions premised ideally on individual merit rather than membership of a racial or ethnic group. One possible explanation for this is disillusionment with BEE policies, especially in a context of rising unemployment and a perceived worsening of job opportunities. Other contending and contributing factors could also include fear of Zimbabwe-type redistribution of assets (Southall 2003), as well as a growing reaction against corruption as a means of getting ahead. With regard to the latter, there is a relatively low level of agreement that 'to get all the way to the top of business in South Africa today, you have to be corrupt'.

Table 6.8 *Attitudes to determinants of earnings in South Africa by population group*

Statement presented to respondents	All	Black African	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White
	%	%	%	%	%
'The amount of responsibility that goes with the job' (very important and important)	92	91	88	98	96
'Their skills or qualifications' (very important and important)	91	90	89	98	99
'Their work experience' (very important and important)	88	88	82	93	95
'How well he or she does the job' (very important and important)	87	86	86	93	95
'How hard he or she works at the job' (very important and important)	87	86	84	94	91
'Whether the job requires supervising others' (very important and important)	76	76	71	85	76
'Whether the person has children to support' (very important and important)	68	74	58	72	41
'To get all the way to the top of business in South Africa today, you have to be corrupt' (strongly agree and agree)	21	21	14	21	23

Source: SASAS (2003)

Gross national happiness: from attitudes to policy choices

While the analysis of subjective well-being in a given context makes for interesting reading, an obvious question is how to apply such assessments to policy questions. What tentative policy implications can be extrapolated from such research? While international evidence suggests that a significant proportion of individual differences in life satisfaction can be attributed to genetic and constitutional factors, numerous social, economic and institutional factors have also been found to exert a considerable influence on well-being. By extension, certain core government activities are likely to have direct impacts on individual well-being. Therefore, attitudinal research may help governments frame the longer-term social protection policies that aim to address chronic and transient poverty. The greater the financial constraints on redistribution, the more likely it is that attitudes about who requires assistance will play a role. There is some evidence that policy-makers are beginning to take attitudes to well-being seriously. For instance, in 2002 the United Kingdom (UK) Cabinet Office held a seminar on life satisfaction and the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit published a set of policy recommendations concerning steps that might increase the country's happiness (Donovan, Halpern and Sargeant 2002). The government of Bhutan has even gone as far as declaring gross national happiness a more important objective than gross national product (Priesner 1999).

Understanding social attitudes may help policy-makers to assess, frame and navigate their political economy contexts as they attempt to craft social policies that are part of a fiscally sustainable social contract (Graham 2002: 6). The observed attitudinal differences towards the government's role in public service provision and in equalising opportunities and outcomes are important. It has been shown that such differences can develop into patterns of political and economic behaviour. They are particularly relevant to the extent of political support for redistribution or other types of public assistance (Graham 2002). Differences in attitudes towards redistribution affect the design of social welfare structures, which in turn yields insights into what social policies are likely to be successful and politically sustainable in a particular context. Dismissing or neglecting public attitudes is likely to result in unsustainable programmes. Strategies for implementing reform must attempt to navigate the constraints posed by public attitudes, as well as recognise windows of opportunity. For example, the debate about redistribution in South Africa cannot be deferred any longer. The country's income distribution remains among the most unequal in the world and redistribution, on a far greater scale than has been attempted to date in South Africa, is required if the twin challenges of poverty and inequality are to be surmounted. It seems fairly certain, based on the SASAS results, that such redistributive efforts, if attempted, will be resisted. Government therefore needs to find innovative ways of minimising resistance to redistribution while improving the targeting of social spending and the gains from growth towards the lower end of the income distribution.

In order for policy-makers to take cognisance of social attitudes when designing, implementing or refining policies and programmatic interventions, there is a need to further develop the tools with which to assess public attitudes in South Africa. Nationally representative social attitudes surveys (such as SASAS) are fundamentally important, particularly since attitudes about social welfare spending can be a fairly accurate predictor of political support for policies or proposed changes in policies (Graham 2002). Furthermore, national surveys should as a matter of necessity reintroduce subjective questions that attempt to assess how the target population feels about policies executed in their name (Meth 2003). This would facilitate more detailed analysis that links reported subjective states and objective economic conditions in the households in which respondents reside. Ensuring that such research is conducted in a co-ordinated, reliable and regular manner is paramount if policy-makers are to systematically monitor and evaluate attitudinal shifts. On a positive note, the Government Communication and Information System has started a continuous process of monitoring public attitudes on select issues to gauge 'the mood of the nation'. However, these results are not placed in the public domain and there is insufficient clarity on the extent to which attitudes on specific policies are elicited.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to combine data on life satisfaction, happiness, domain satisfaction and relative deprivation with select objective and subjective socio-economic measures. Since SASAS intends to regularly monitor and evaluate progress and decline in attitudes, attention has been devoted to outlining pre-existing research on attitudes to subjective well-being in South Africa in order to contextualise the SASAS results appropriately. The chapter has used these data to estimate apparent quality of life in the South African adult population after a decade of democracy. This was undertaken to give some sense of the magnitude of the challenge confronting the government and other development stakeholders as it turns to the task of formulating policy interventions needed to realise the social and economic targets enshrined in the country's national vision, Vision 2014. While South Africans are on average somewhat satisfied with life and happy, this general attitude masks important sub-group differences.

Recognising that the government has endeavoured to secure, and remains committed to providing, a better life for all, this chapter has also been able to reflect critically on the policy effects of a decade of reconstruction and development. While there exists incontrovertible evidence of improvements in the quality of life of many South Africans over the last decade, and there is a resolute commitment on the part of government to meeting the poverty and inequality challenges inherited from decades of segregation and apartheid, high levels of poverty and inequality appear to have persisted. While the attitudinal scorecard of government performance is positive for certain publicly provided services such as water, sanitation and electricity, in other areas such as employment creation, crime reduction and health care the prognosis is more sobering. Furthermore, large segments of the population continue to consider themselves deprived and are exposed to various forms of risk and vulnerability.

Appendix

Table 6A.1 *Attitudes to South Africa's economic performance*

Comparing our present economic system with the economic system a few years ago, are the following things worse or better now than they used to be or about the same:

	Better/much better (%)	Same (%)	Worse/much worse (%)	Do not know (%)
People's standard of living	32	14	53	0
Availability of job opportunities	8	6	85	1
Gap between the rich and poor	13	19	64	4

Source: Afrobarometer Network (2004)

Table 6A.2 *Attitudes to economic reform and social values in South Africa and other African countries*

Statements presented to respondents	South Africa (%)	All 15 African countries (%)
The government's economic policies have helped most people; only a few have suffered	25	31
The government's economic policies have hurt most people and only benefited a few	64	61
Do not agree with either	6	4
Do not know	5	5
The costs of reforming the economy are too high; the government should therefore abandon its current economic policies	31	31
In order for the economy to get better in the future, it is necessary for us to accept some hardships now	45	57
Do not agree with either	13	5
Do not know	10	7
It is alright to have large differences of wealth because those who work hard deserve to be rewarded	35	38
We should avoid large gaps between the rich and the poor because they create jealousy and conflict	50	56
Do not agree with either	11	4
Do not know	4	2
People should look after themselves and be responsible for their own successes in life	50	48
The government should bear the main responsibility for the well-being of people	42	49
Do not agree with either	6	3
Do not know	2	1

Note: The countries included in the survey are Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.
Source: Afrobarometer Network (2004)

Table 6A.3 *Correlates of attitudes to class conflict* →

Table 6A.3 Correlates of attitudes to class conflict

Correlations	Poor and rich	Employed and unemployed	Management and workers	Young and old	Different races
Tensions: Poor and rich	1.00				
Tensions: Employed and unemployed	0.58**	1.00			
Tensions: Management and workers	0.40**	0.42**	1.00		
Tensions: Young and old	0.28**	0.35**	0.34**	1.00	
Tensions: Different races	0.31**	0.42**	0.25**	0.26**	1.00
Dummy for female respondents	0.00	-0.03	0.09**	-0.05*	0.00
Years of education (respondent)	0.10**	0.04	0.10**	0.09**	0.02
Imputed personal monthly income	0.01	0.07**	-0.03	0.09**	0.02
Age of respondent	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.04*	-0.01
Subjective poverty status:	-0.11**	-0.06**	-0.08**	-0.14**	-0.03
Wealthy dummy	0.10**	0.04	0.05*	0.11	0.01
Just getting by dummy	0.01	0.06**	0.02	0.02	0.04
Poor dummy	-0.12**	-0.11**	-0.08**	-0.14**	-0.05*
Rural	-0.10**	-0.04*	-0.07**	-0.09**	-0.04*
Black African	-0.17**	-0.05*	-0.08**	-0.16**	-0.06**
Coloured	0.03	0.04*	0.00	0.09**	0.11**
Indian/Asian	0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
White	0.19**	0.04	0.10**	0.13**	-0.02
Married	0.03	0.05*	0.01	0.05*	0.02
Never married	-0.05*	-0.04	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01
Widowed, separated or divorced	0.02	-0.02	0.02	-0.05*	-0.02

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Source: SASAS (2003)

Table 6A.4 Respondents expressing egalitarian attitudes, by country

Country	Differences in income in your country are too large (%)	It is the responsibility of government to reduce differences in income (%)
Bulgaria	96.9	85.0
Russia	95.5	86.2
Portugal	96.0	89.9
Hungary	93.1	80.1
Slovenia	91.0	84.8
Slovakia	93.7	74.5
Latvia	96.7	78.7
Poland	89.1	84.9
Austria	86.2	72.5



Country	Differences in income in your country are too large (%)	It is the responsibility of government to reduce differences in income (%)
Spain	89.3	79.3
Czech Republic	87.8	71.9
France	87.4	67.5
South Africa	82.7	90.1*
Great Britain	82.4	68.7
Germany	82.2	61.2
Norway	72.5	61.9
Sweden	71.1	59.5
Japan	69.2	52.6
Canada	70.6	47.5
New Zealand	73.2	49.4
Australia	70.9	49.7
USA	66.2	35.3
Average	92.3	80.7

* Note that the phrasing in the SASAS and International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) modules was somewhat different, which may partially explain the observed differentials in relation to government responsibility.
Source: Redmond et al. (2002) using ISSP 1999 data

Notes

- 1 The analysis relies on a half sample of 2 497 individuals.
- 2 These include the multi-purpose October Household Survey (OHS) series undertaken annually between 1994 and 1999, the 1995 and 2000 Income and Expenditure Surveys (IES) which provided rich information about household consumption and income sources, and the biannual Labour Force Survey (LFS) series introduced in March 2000 primarily to measure labour-market dynamics. More recently, pressure for a regular survey to monitor development trends and performance of government programmes resulted in the development of a General Household Survey (GHS), the first round of which was conducted in 2002.
- 3 The survey was undertaken by the Southern African Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) at the University of Cape Town with technical assistance from the World Bank. Henceforth, this study will be referred to as the SALDRU survey.
- 4 This was achieved by developing a deprivation index using 12 measures, including income, health, education, household wealth (asset ownership), access to services, transportation, and perceptions of well-being. A household's ranking by income poverty was compared to its score on the deprivation index, enabling Klasen to determine the extent to which the different definitions of welfare identified the same households.
- 5 The project was launched by a consortium consisting of the HSRC and university scholars, and is currently run by the Institute for Social and Economic Research at Rhodes University.
- 6 The 'poor' category was derived by grouping together those who declared that they were 'poor' or 'very poor'. The 'just getting by' category corresponds to the original 'just getting

along' response. The term 'the vulnerable' will be used interchangeably for this group of individuals, indicating that they are at risk of becoming poor. Finally, the 'better-off/wealthy' category represents a collapsing together of those who identified themselves as 'wealthy', 'very comfortable' or 'reasonably comfortable'.

- 7 This is based on provincial estimates of the Human Development Index (HDI) included in the 2003 Human Development Report for South Africa (Statistics South Africa and United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] 2003). The HDI is a composite index of life expectancy, educational attainment and gross domestic product that measures economic and social well-being.
- 8 This term refers to those individuals who are unemployed and are no longer searching for employment.
- 9 The October Household Surveys (1994–1999) and the General Household Survey (2002) each contained a question on the ability of households to feed children as an indicator of food insecurity.
- 10 Analyses of variance determined the statistical significance of differences between the groups (race groups, self-assessed poverty status groupings) regarding attitudes to inequality. Differences were regarded as significant at $p < 0.05$. Scheffé tests were performed to determine the specific nature of significant differences where a p value of less than 0.05 was found. In the case of population group differentials, the mean aversion to inequality scores for Indians/Asians and coloured people were not significantly different from those of the other two race groups.
- 11 The Afrobarometer Survey is a periodic series of nationally representative sample surveys on the attitudes of citizens in selected African countries towards democracy, markets, civil society and other aspects of development. Round 1 was completed in September 2001, whereas Round 2 was conducted in the 15 selected African countries between 2002 and 2003. In South Africa, Round 2 was conducted between September and October 2002 and consists of a sample of 2 400 respondents.
- 12 In the 11 countries included in Kelley et al.'s (2001) analysis, more than 80 per cent of respondents saw conflict between rich and poor, management and workers, and the working class and middle class as being in the middle categories rather than at the extremes.

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