



**A NATION IN THE MAKING**  
A DISCUSSION DOCUMENT ON MACRO-  
SOCIAL TRENDS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Policy Co-ordination and  
Advisory Services (PCAS)  
Social Sector  
The Presidency



## PREFACE

While the performance of the economy receives significant attention through a series of broad 'macroeconomic' indicators (e.g. the consumer price index, production price index, gross domestic product growth by quarters, etc.) that are reported regularly, there is not a similar focus on many 'social indicators'.

At the July 2003 Cabinet Lekgotla, government took a decision to undertake a country/macro-social analysis to focus its attention on how these indicators were behaving over time. This would help inform our assessment of the efficacy or appropriateness of government's social programmes. The discussion document on macro-social trends in South Africa (Macro-Social Report [MSR]) is based on extensive research and discussions at the Forum of South African Directors-General clusters and Cabinet.

The matters raised in the document are critical in understanding the movement of our society from its apartheid past towards non-racialism, equity and unity in diversity. Though many of the critical social trends may require a longer timeline than a decade to evince definite patterns, the analysis depicts important critical drifts, some because of public policy and others occurring somewhat independently of material conditions and policy prescripts.

The release of the MSR for public discussion provides an opportunity for interaction across society on the many critical issues it raises. This will afford South Africans the opportunity to reflect on such critical matters as identity, networks of social solidarity and social mobility – the better to determine the role that each one of us can play in building a society that cares.

Arising from work done in preparing the MSR, the Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services (PCAS) is pursuing various areas of policy analysis, such as the National



Income Dynamics Study, which will provide new data, to be tracked over time, on issues of income dynamics and social mobility.

We do hope that the discussion generated by this document will help propel our democracy to new heights.

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## I BACKGROUND

This discussion document is a product of extensive research. It takes forward reflections in the Ten-Year Review (TYR) and the Scenario Planning Process (SPP) as well as discussions at several Cabinet meetings.

The document (hereinafter termed the Macro-Social Report) addresses, among others, the following questions:

- how have the material conditions of South Africans changed in the past decade?: a summary of the trends identified in the TYR and an update on major trends
- in what way has the structure of South African society changed since 1994?: social mobility in the context of class, race, gender and age
- what have been the trends in the organisation of social life?: trends in households and families, community organisation and economic relations
- through what identities do South Africans define themselves?: how do the diverse and overarching identities and value systems affect their self-worth and aspirations?

These issues are critical in understanding the movement of South African society from its apartheid past towards non-racialism, equity and unity in diversity. Though many of the critical macro-social trends would require a timeline longer than a decade to assert themselves with a degree of certainty, this treatise starts to point to major critical drifts, some at the behest of public policy and others defining themselves independent of material conditions and policy prescripts.



The fact that some macro-social developments play themselves out irrespective of public policy does emphasise the need to understand the capacities and limitations of the State. In part, this underlines the importance of partnerships across all sectors of society. But it can also reflect omissions on the part of public policy, or unintended consequences of a particular programme or a combination of programmes.

The identification of key driving forces in the SPP, over some of which the State has little influence, was meant partially to fill this gap. At the same time, public discussion of these issues and their implications for public policy should help society in pursuing the objectives enshrined in our Constitution.

The methodology used in this analysis is premised primarily on facts and figures. In this regard, the document avoids the temptation to allow *a priori* prejudices and beliefs to sully an objective appraisal of social dynamics, with the hope – and, the conviction – that the facts will speak for themselves. The main sources of data in this document are the TYR, Statistics SA, and research studies and surveys conducted by organisations such as the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa), South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), FutureFact Surveys, Medical Research Council (MRC), South Africa Institute of Security Studies (ISS), South African Advertising Research Foundation (SAARF), Markinor, etc. The bibliography comprises complete details of these and other relevant selected studies.

Although methodologies may differ from country to country, macro-social analyses (integrative country-social analyses) are conducted in many countries to examine such issues as social identity, social intercourse, trends within and among social groups and interaction between formal institutions, social institutions and informal practices.

Government hopes that, arising out of this experience, South Africa will be able to conduct such reviews on a regular basis to inform public policy and help in forging effective social partnerships to build a better society.





## **II SOCIAL CONDITIONS – MAJOR TRENDS IN THE PAST DECADE**

### **1 Economic development impacting directly on social conditions**

South African economic relations are characterised by a market-based system of ownership of capital and distribution of wealth and income. The permutations in the economic system have historically been defined by race.

In the period since the attainment of democracy, the State has been successful in achieving macroeconomic stability and using the fiscus and other instruments at its disposal for the redistribution of wealth. The economy has grown at a rate higher than that of population growth, though far below the country's requirements and potential.

While measures such as industrial restructuring, labour legislation, Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and small, medium and micro enterprises' (SMMEs) support, human resource development and changes in the taxation structure have somewhat impacted on economic relations, exclusion of the majority from the economic mainstream manifests itself in the existence of 'two economies' in one country. Such exclusion finds expression starkly in the high rate of unemployment.

### **2 Impact of major social programmes**

Income poverty alleviation by the State has happened mainly through the system of social grants, with expenditure and the number of beneficiaries having increased more than threefold since 1994. Changes in the taxation structure have also improved disposable income.

Human capital poverty alleviation has taken the form of programmes in the areas of education, health, water, sanitation and electrification. These have quantitatively and qualitatively improved the lives of millions.



Asset capital poverty alleviation, through the housing and land programmes, has seen massive resources transferred to individuals and communities.

However, the legacy of apartheid remains huge, with millions still unable to access such basic necessities as clean portable water, electricity and shelter.

### **3 Building a law-governed society**

Transformation of the agencies responsible for security and justice has improved their legitimacy. This reform has included the introduction of a new culture based on respect for human rights and co-operation with the public.

Progress has been registered in dealing with high priority crimes, including the virtual elimination of political violence and terrorism. Murder, vehicle hijacking and bank-related crimes have declined by more than a third; and campaigns on violence against women and children have improved public awareness and co-operation with security agencies.

Measures to regulate private security and intelligence industries, control gun-ownership, focus on crime syndicates and attend to corruption in both the private and public sectors have ensured steady progress towards a law-governed society.

However, the progress made should be measured against the fact that, in 1994, the country started from a very high base in terms of crime incidence. Further, the challenge is exacerbated by the fact that a large part of the crimes are violent.

### **4 Governance and legitimacy of the system**

The abiding strength of the political system lies in its legitimacy, giving voice to the people and rooted in the principle of accountability. Ongoing efforts to restructure the State to better serve the people has found expression in new laws, improved conditions of public servants and infrastructure to reach the people.



Performance-related assessments and efficient public finance management have improved the integrity of the State.

Overall, the dynamic of popular legitimacy, macroeconomic stability, improving social conditions and a security system changing for the better defines the trajectory of social relations in the first decade of freedom. The greatest progress was manifested in those areas in which the State has direct control, raising a critical question about the leadership role of the State in mobilising society to take active part in the processes of change.

Further, the observed major social trends have thrown up new challenges: changes in demographic patterns reflected in the massive growth in the number of households; a dramatic increase in the economically active population; restructuring of the economy with new sectors gaining prominence and redefining labour needs; and migration which has changed the economic, political and social profile of many communities.

### **III SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND SOCIAL MOBILITY**

In order to understand changes in the social structure of society, particularly trends with regard to mobility, a number of factors need to be taken into account. These include measurements of poverty in its various dimensions, trends in employment, the interface between household demographics and income, as well as the composition of various income groups within society as a whole.

Further research on these issues is required, but some trends can be gleaned from the Census and other data.

#### **5 Assessing poverty and inequality trends**

Two main sources of income mobility are demographic and economic events. The former refers to changes in household size and composition while the latter examines changes in employment, wage income and unearned incomes.



According to 1995 and 2000 income and expenditure surveys' figures, between 1995 and 2000, the rural share of income poverty declined by approximately 5%, while it increased by about 5% in the urban areas. In 1995, 28% of households lived below the estimated poverty datum line of R322 per month – calculated on the basis of expenditure – while the figure for 2000 was just under 33%.

Due to sluggish economic growth and weak labour market outcomes, the proportion of people with low (poverty) income increased marginally during the period 1993 to 2000. A recent study by Van der Berg *et al* (2005) shows that there has been a marked decline in poverty since 2000, from approximately 18,5 million poor people to approximately 15,4 million poor people in 2004. This may largely be due to the unprecedented expansion of social grants expenditure in the last four years – an increase of R22 billion in real terms.

The second important trend to note is that across all sectors of society, between 1994 and 2000, average household size declined substantially. This is further attested to by the fact that the dependency ratio (population not working to those who are working) decreased from 3,5 in 1996 to 3,4 in 2002 (HSRC, State of the Nation Address, 2004). However, poor households still have a much bigger household size:

**Table 1: Changes in average household size by poverty group**

Year	Very poor	Poor	Non-poor	All
1995	6,57	5,86	3,45	4,53
2000	6,07	5,22	2,85	3,92

Source Stats SA: 2004 Very poor poverty line = R174 per capita expenditure monthly

Another dimension of poverty is access to opportunity and services (social assets). In terms of electricity, piped water, sanitation and telecommunications, such access improved substantially between 1995 and 2000 though poor households still fare much worse than non-poor ones. To these can be added other social services such as education and health.

**Table 2: Changes in access to basic services by poverty group**

Basic Service	% of poor households		% of non-poor households	
	1995	2000	1995	2000
Public electricity	34,9	58,4	79,8	85,6
Piped water	59,3	77,2	88,7	94,0
Sanitation facility	74,6	71,7	93,7	91,3
Telecommunications	5,9	16,1	41,8	52,2

Source: Stats SA(2004)

Poverty line = R322 per capita expenditure monthly


Public electricity: connected to public network

Piped water: piped water inside the house or in the yard at a public tap

Sanitation facility: modern sanitation facility, excluding bucket toilet

Telecommunications: cellphone or landline

Recent research conducted by Borat *et al* (2006) shows that the share of the poorest 10% of households with access to piped water increased by 187% between 1993 and 2004, with similar gains reported for sanitation services. The authors contend that the share of households with access to electricity for lighting and cooking has shown particularly spectacular gains – access to electricity for lighting for the poorest households – those in decile one – grew by a phenomenal 578%. The study further shows, respectively, that access to formal housing grew by 42% and 34% for deciles one and two between 1993 and 2004, and 21% and 16% for deciles three and four.



Source: Van der Berg, et al (2005)

As shown in figure one, the direct assault on human capital poverty is most pronounced through the provision of basic services such as education, health and so on. Van der Berg, *et al* (2005) shows, using concentration curves, that school education, access to water, cash transfers and access to healthcare benefit the poor most.

For asset poverty, housing and land reform programmes have played an important role. Indirectly, mobility resulting from the advent of democracy, Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) and assistance to SMMEs as well as changes in the tax structure have improved the asset profile of black South Africans.

In terms of inequality, using expenditure share measures, data shows that in 2000 the poorest 20% accounted for 2,8% of total expenditure. In contrast, the wealthiest 20% of households accounted for 64,5% of all expenditure in 2000. The Gini coefficient, another widely used measure of inequality, was 0,59 in 2000 when social transfers were excluded. If these were included, it was 0,35.

## 6 Dynamics of income mobility

What are the major dynamics of income mobility? Reference used is the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) *et al* (2000) which collected follow-up data in 1998 of 1 003 African households surveyed in the 1993 Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development. The major conclusions arising from this research are that:

- 63% of the households experienced increased income (median monthly income increasing from R990 to R1 270) while only 39% reported increased expenditure.
- Both the income and expenditure Gini coefficients point to rising inequality among Africans, with the educated and upwardly-mobile better able to take advantage of opportunities that have come with freedom.
- The rigidity (persistence) index is low at about 0,89, compared with advanced countries (0,95), which reflects a high degree of social mobility (note that Spain, which is experiencing rapid structural change is comparable with South Africa at 0,90).
- There is less mobility in the top and bottom quintiles than in the middle of the distribution, with the bottom quintile reflecting a poverty trap – indeed two economies in one country. Preliminary calculations from the latest KIDS dataset imply the same trends.


**Table 3: Quintile mobility matrix using data purged by outliers of wage regressions**

1993 quintile	Quintile in 1998					(now) total
	1	2	3	4	5	
1	37,44	28,44	18,01	11,85	4,27	100,0
2	31,90	27,62	25,71	13,33	1,43	100,0
3	19,05	26,19	27,62	22,38	4,76	100,0
4	10,00	16,19	24,76	37,62	11,43	100,0
5	1,90	1,43	3,81	14,76	78,10	100,0

Source: Woolard and Klasen (2005)

This is also reflected in the trend with regard to consumer confidence over the past 10 years, with recent figures showing a general improvement all-round. While the poorest were the most confident at the advent of democracy, the reality of the two economies influenced the evolution of this indicator, with the confidence of low-income earners having fallen below that of the rest.

**Figure two: Consumer confidence by income group**



Source: FNB/BER Consumer Confidence Index (2004)

Detail regarding the impact of an individual factor (e.g. household size, education, age and/or gender of household head) is important in its own right in the mobility trends. For instance, households with individuals of over 60 years of age are less likely to have experienced a fall in income due to social pensions. However, compared to this univariate approach, the multivariate analysis demonstrates the central importance of unemployment as an inhibitor to mobility, where unemployment largely corresponds with poor average education.

Given the predictors of 'movers' and 'stayers', the poverty trap is also shown in the Reduced Transition Matrix.



**Table 4: Reduced Transition Matrix**

Work status 1993	Work status 1998			Total
	Formal	Informal	Not employed	
Formal	62%	17%	21%	100%
Informal	20%	40%	40%	100%
Not employed	21%	21%	58%	100%
TOTAL	36%	23%	41%	100%

Source: Cichello, et al 2003

## 7 Mobility and the middle strata

A critical layer of any society, in terms of its intellectual contribution, its influence on culture in the broad sense, and its role in determining national identity and value systems is the middle strata. In examining demographic and economic trends within these strata, an attempt is made to assess the impact of democracy on their size and dynamics within them in terms of income.

Definitions of these strata as a group are highly contested, on account of changes in the production process such that most of them today do not occupy a middle position between the 'two great contending classes, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie', but are in a subordinate relationship to capital-owning employers. On the other hand, divorce between ownership and control in many private and even public establishments, renders managers rather than shareholders the typical decision-makers. This is besides the trend of direct and indirect ownership of at least institutional capital by the middle strata and even the working class.

For purposes of this discussion, 'new middle strata' are identified, comprising professional, technical, managerial, executive and administrative as well as clerical, service and market sales workers (roughly above R3 500 per month at 1995 prices). The trend is also tracked through an examination of segments of the labour market.

Table 5: Proportions of employees by occupational category, race and gender (Census: 1996 &amp; 2001)

Category	Year		African		Coloured		Indian or Asian		White		Total		
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	
Legislators, senior officials and managers	1996	2.0	1.2	1.7	3.2	2.1	2.7	9.2	4.5	7.5	14.1	7.1	11.1
	2001	2.7	1.7	2.3	4.1	2.8	3.5	14.5	7.2	11.7	19.4	10.3	15.4
Professionals	1996	4.9	11.8	7.5	4.5	9.4	6.6	9.7	14.8	11.5	15.3	19.3	17.1
	2001	3.7	4.3	4.0	3.9	4.0	3.9	11.7	12.8	12.1	18.5	16.8	17.8
Technicians and associate professionals	1996	2.6	3.9	3.1	4.3	5.7	4.9	9.8	10.4	10.0	12.8	16.4	14.4
	2001	5.6	11.4	8.0	6.5	10.7	8.4	11.1	14.2	12.3	13.0	18.0	15.2
Clerks	1996	3.3	6.1	4.4	5.4	14.2	9.3	9.2	24.9	14.8	4.6	30.9	15.9
	2001	6.2	10.3	7.8	7.9	19.3	13.1	14.4	32.0	21.1	6.3	31.8	17.5
Service, shop and market sales workers	1996	10.2	7.2	9.0	7.6	9.0	8.2	10.3	8.9	9.8	9.7	8.6	9.2
	2001	11.7	8.3	10.3	8.3	8.9	8.6	13.4	10.2	12.2	11.3	9.2	10.4
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers	1996	5.9	2.7	4.7	4.6	1.3	3.1	0.6	0.3	0.5	4.2	0.8	2.7
	2001	3.8	2.1	3.1	3.4	1.4	2.5	0.5	0.1	0.4	3.6	0.9	2.4
Craft and related trades workers	1996	22.1	5.4	15.7	21.4	5.0	14.2	15.5	4.9	11.7	16.9	2.0	10.5
	2001	18.9	4.9	13.2	19.2	5.6	13.0	13.3	5.2	10.3	13.8	1.5	8.4
Plant & machine operators and assemblers	1996	15.4	2.1	10.3	9.8	7.5	8.8	9.6	10.0	9.8	4.3	0.8	2.8
	2001	16.7	2.7	11.0	10.3	5.4	8.1	9.4	6.5	8.3	3.4	0.5	2.1
Elementary occupations	1996	22.4	52.1	33.8	29.3	37.6	33.0	5.3	5.0	5.2	3.3	2.5	2.9
	2001	24.7	47.7	34.0	29.3	35.0	31.0	5.6	4.9	5.3	3.1	2.4	2.8
Undetermined/Other	1996	11.2	7.3	9.7	9.9	8.2	9.2	20.9	16.3	19.2	14.8	11.5	13.4
	2001	5.9	6.7	6.2	6.9	6.8	6.9	5.9	6.8	6.3	7.6	8.6	8.0

While the data may require more rigorous interrogation, the following major trends seem to emerge:

- the proportion of skilled categories among the employed increased from about 40% in 1996 to 46% in 2001
- there is a reduction in craft and related trades – reflecting in part the restructuring of the economy, but also a weakness in the training of artisans – and this trend is more pronounced among Africans
- there has been a slight increase in the proportion of Africans in the category of ‘legislators, senior officials and managers’, from 1,7% in 1996 to 2,3% in 2001; and given the massive increase in the ‘legislators’ category, the trend in the other categories should be dismal
- by far the most significant proportion of African employees remains in elementary occupations, with a disproportionately large percentage made up of women.

Research by the SAARF (2004) showed a rapid rise in the percentage of blacks in the slightly higher echelons of the middle strata (average household income of R4 075 per month and above) between 2000/01 and 2003/04.

[NB: In table six, ‘black’ means African, excluding coloureds and Indians. Other research also uses the term narrowly, or refers to ‘black Africans’. However, generically, in this document, ‘black’ is used broadly. As such, each illustration will need to be examined in this context.]



**Table six: Living Standard Measure (LSM) categories by race**

UPWARDLY MOBILE Racial composition and changes in LSM categories							
LSM	Average monthly household income	No of black individuals Jun '00 – Jul '01	% who are black	No of black individuals Jun '03 – Jul '04	% who are black	Gain/loss	% gain/loss
LSM 1-5	LSM 1: R879 LSM 5: R2 427	-	-	-	-	-	-
LSM 6	R4 075	2 435 000	67,3%	2 933 000	69,1%	498 000	20%
LSM 7	R6 455	661 000	38,5%	846 000	45,1%	185 000	27%
LSM 8	R8 471	372 000	22,4%	370 000	25,1%	- 2 000	-0,5%
LSM 9	R11 566	144 000	9,2%	244 000	13,6%	100 000	69%
LSM 10	R18 649	39 000	2,7%	102 000	6,3%	63 000	161%

Source: SAARF (2004)

However, the SAIRR Survey 2002/03, published in 2004, suggests that income accruing to the upper middle strata is increasing, while the share of that of the lower middle strata is decreasing. Hence, average annual income of heads of households from managerial, professional, technical and administrative grades increased from R116 000 per year to R150 000 (29,3%) between 1995 and 2000 (at year 2000 market prices), while decreasing from R79 000 to R59 000 for those from clerical and sales grades.

The recent study of 750 black professionals aged 21 – 39 years in the LSM7 by the School of Management Studies of the University of Cape Town suggests that black South Africans are the future engine/stimulus of the growth of the economy.

## 8 Trends in small, medium and micro enterprises


The contribution of the SMME economy towards poverty alleviation is the subject of growing controversy. Although a number of critical studies question the potential of the SMME economy to attain the goals of extensive employment creation, most

observers concur that it can be a positive factor in contributing towards poverty alleviation through job creation (Kesper, 2002, Gumede, 2004). This role is not necessarily a reflection of the success or impact of government programmes; indeed, once again it can be viewed as a default option for household survival (cf. Driver *et al*, 2001).

Although South Africa ranks substantially below other countries on the degree of entrepreneurial activity, a substantial amount of activity within both survivalist or opportunistic and true entrepreneurial activity is noted.

**Figures three, four and five compare South Africa's Total Entrepreneurship Activity (TEA) rates by year from 2002 – 2005.**


**Figure 3: South Africa's TEA rates (2002 – 2005)**



Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) (2005)

In figure three, South Africa's TEA rates between the years 2002 and 2005 remained relatively the same. The TEA index measures the percentage of individuals between the ages of 18 and 64 who are involved in starting a new business. Individuals may start the business on their own account. They may also start the business in collaboration with or on behalf of an existing business. They do not need to own the business, either partly or wholly, and to manage it, either on their own or with others.

**Figure four: South Africa's opportunity and necessity rates (2002 – 2005)**




Source: GEM (2005)

In figure four, the TEA rates are disaggregated into 'opportunity' and 'necessity' enterprises. These figures give some indication of why the TEA rates in 2002 and 2003 differed. Figure four indicates that annual variation in the TEA rate seems to be attributable to variance in the rate of necessity-motivated entrepreneurship. While part of the graph suggests sampling error, what is encouraging is that the 'opportunity' entrepreneurship rate, which makes a far more significant economic contribution than 'necessity' entrepreneurship, is stable.


Figure five compares start-up, new firm and established firm activity. The start-up rate in 2003 was significantly lower than was the case in 2002. This difference in start-up rate provides an explanation for the difference in TEA rate between 2002 and 2003.

**Figure five: Start-up, new and established firm activity (2002 – 2005)**



Source: GEM (2005)

According to the GEM report of 2001 (see figure six), entrepreneurial activity levels, including 'necessity entrepreneurship', are higher among women than men, with nearly twice as many female as male entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurial activity is highest in the 35 – 54 age group, for both men and women.

**Figure six: Race and location differences in levels of entrepreneurial activity**

Source: GEM (2001)

These age and gender patterns of entrepreneurial activity are similar for those in all the GEM countries combined. Figure six shows:

- racial differences in levels of entrepreneurial activity: with more than double among the whites (10,1%) and Indians (10,3%) than among Africans (4,6%)
- locational differences are more striking: nearly 10% of metro adults are engaged in a start-up or new firms, while in rural areas it's fewer than 2%.

The low TEA index for black adults is explained in part by the fact that the black population is concentrated disproportionately in rural areas, where rates of entrepreneurial activity may be lower due to low economic activity.

## 9 The relevance of education to entrepreneurship

Higher levels of education are associated with significantly higher levels of entrepreneurship. Those with matric and tertiary education are significantly more likely to own and manage a start-up. As indicated in table seven, having tertiary



education significantly increases the probability that a person will be an owner-manager of a new firm – a firm that has survived beyond the start-up phase.

These findings suggest two things: firstly, that a matric qualification increases one's capacity to pursue entrepreneurial activities; and secondly, that tertiary qualification education increases the durability of entrepreneurial activity.

**Table seven: Necessity- and opportunity-motivated entrepreneurial activity among young adults by educational attainment for all developing countries in the GEM (2003 sample)**

	Not completed secondary schooling	Completed secondary schooling	Tertiary education
Probability of opportunity entrepreneurship (%)	5,8	7,5	12,6
Probability of necessity entrepreneurship (%)	6,1	3,8	3,5
Sum of opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship (%)	11,9	11,3	16,1
Ratio of opportunity to necessity entrepreneurship	0,95	1,97	3,60

Source: GEM (2005)

#### IV DIVERSITY – DEMOGRAPHICS OF RACE AND NATIONALITY

The history of South Africa since the advent of colonialism has been shaped by race as a critical determinant of social relations within and among classes.

Progress in building a non-racial society finds expression in the new constitutional order which guarantees equal rights and promotes equal access to opportunity. As indicated in Section II, much progress has been made in building a legitimate state based on the will of the people. The Reconstruction and Development Programme

(RDP), including affirmative action and the outlawing of discrimination in all areas of social endeavour, constitutes the holistic assault on the manifestations of racism and prejudice.


National diversity also manifests itself in terms of language and nationality. Though these attributes have historically been somewhat benign, they have to varying degrees defined nuance in societal relations over the years.

### 10 Demographics of race and power relations

Post-enumeration data indicate that on Census night 2001, there were 44,8 million people living in South Africa, compared with 40,6 million in 1996. About half-a-million of these were not South African citizens. Statistics South Africa's mid-year population estimates for 2005 estimated the population at approximately 46,9 million.

In terms of percentages by population group, between 1996 and 2001, Africans increased from 76,7% to over 78%, coloureds remained at 8,9%, Indian/Asians decreased from 2,6% to 2,5% and whites from 10,9% to 9,6%.


Figure seven: Population by race



Source: Census in Brief (2001)

By province, the breakdown is as follows:


**Figure eight: Population by province**



Source: Census 2001

As will be elaborated on later, the age distribution of the different population groups shows on the one extreme Africans comprising a younger population, with 34% aged 0 – 14 years and on the other whites with an ageing population (19% aged 0 – 14 years).

**Figure nine: Education by race**




Source: Census in Brief (2001)

As indicated earlier, while there has been a significant and rapid advance of Africans into and within the middle strata, the reality is that the proportion belonging to these strata among Africans is 7,8% while it is 15,6% for coloureds, 20,7% for Indians and 33% for whites.

In terms of unemployment, the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2001 shows the distribution of those aged 15 – 65 by labour market status as follows: using the strict definition, 35,9% of Africans, 21,8% of coloureds, 18,4% of Indians and 6% of whites were unemployed.

**Figure 10: Unemployment rate (strict definition) among those aged 15 – 65 by gender and population group – LFS and Census data compared**



With regard to labour market outcomes, the LFS 2005 showed that the unemployment rate according to the official definition among Africans remained higher than among Indian/Asian, coloured and white people by a large margin. For example, in September 2005, the unemployment rate among black Africans was 31,5% against 22,4% among coloured people and 5,1% among white people. Over the period, the unemployment rate for black Africans decreased by 4,4%, increased marginally for coloured people, decreased by 2,6% for Indian/Asian and decreased marginally for whites.

The racial imbalance is further reflected in the irony that 50% of Africans live in households of four or more people compared with only 30% of whites. Yet, in terms of the number of rooms available to households, 73% of Africans have four or less rooms (including kitchens and where applicable, toilets) while 86% of white people have four or more rooms in a household.

In terms of access to electricity, 40% of Africans use it as the energy source for cooking, while for whites the percentage is 96,6%.

Many other indicators can be used to illustrate this disparity. At the level of ownership and/or control of wealth, the proportion of senior management who are black in all senior management positions increased by 8,4% (percentage points) between 2000 and 2004; while for whites a decrease of 8,6% was recorded over the same period. (See tables eight – 10).

**Table eight: Top management – total % change for females from 2000 – 2004**

Group	2000 (%)	2002 (%)	2004 (%)	Total % point change
Female	12,4	13,7	15,1	2,7
African female	1,2	2,0	2,8	1,6
Coloured female	0,7	0,7	0,8	0,1
Indian female	0,5	0,6	0,8	0,3
White female	10,2	10,4	10,7	0,5

Source: Commission on Employment Equity (CEE) (2004)

**Table nine: Top management – total percentage for males from 2000 – 2004**

Group	2000 (%)	2002 (%)	2004 (%)	Total % point change
Male	87,6	86,2	84,9	2,7
African male	5,0	8,0	9,0	4,0
Coloured male	2,0	2,7	2,9	0,9
Indian male	3,3	4,4	4,8	1,5
White male	77,3	71,1	68,2	-9,1

Source: CEE (2004)

**Table 10: Top management – total % change for race from 2000 – 2004**


Group	2000 (%)	2002 (%)	2004 (%)	Total % point change
Blacks	12,7	18,4	21,1	8,4
Whites	87,5	81,5	78,9	-8,6
Africans	6,2	10,0	11,8	5,6
Coloureds	2,7	3,4	3,7	1,0
Indians	3,8	5,0	5,6	1,8

Source: CEE (2004)

One of the major consequences of this race-based system of economic power, in the context of political democracy, is the dichotomy in leadership between political institutions (predominantly black) and economic institutions (predominantly white).

### 11 Public opinion on race relations

In a 1999 HSRC survey, published in 2003, the largest percentage of respondents (42,1%) asserted that there had been an improvement in race relations. A total of 32,8% felt race relations had remained the same, while 14,9% felt they had deteriorated. The HSRC's recently published South African Social Attitudes Survey, conducted between August and October 2003, showed that there were further improvements in perceptions of race relations. A total of 57% felt that race relations had improved, 29% felt that they had remained the same and 14% felt that they had become worse.



Source: HSRC, South African Social Attitudes Survey (2006)

In the 1999 survey, Africans and Indians indicated the highest level of the positive view with only 11,7% of the former saying relations had deteriorated and 8,3% of Indians. A large proportion of whites (33,4%) and coloureds (19,9%) felt relations had deteriorated. In the 2003 survey, coloureds (61%), followed by Africans (59%), Indians (58%) and whites (42%) reported improved race relations.

**Table 11: Perceptions on race relations by race group, 2003**


Race					
	African	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White	Total
Improved	59	61	58	42	57
Remained the same	32	28	16	17	29
Deteriorated	9	11	25	41	14

Source: HSRC, South African Social Attitudes Survey (2006)

What this suggests is that perceptions of 'improvement/deterioration' do not relate only to liberation from oppression but also discontent among those who have either lost power or feel threatened by the abolition of the 'colour bar'.

What is also striking is that, by province and social status, three questions emerge:

**Figure 12: Opinions on race relations by province**



Source: HSRC (2001)

Firstly, does the low base from which people come, the extent of transformation of the police and activities of commandos and farmers influence popular experience? Mpumalanga shows the second-worst perception of improved race relations, and this is further confirmed in response to the question whether individuals had experienced actual incidents of discrimination within the past six months. Limpopo is third in line. North West, on the other hand, shows greatest improvement in perceptions.

Secondly, does population density, high levels of inequality and more spaces of inter-racial interaction result in a greater sense of minimal improvement in race relations? Gauteng, with the lowest perception of improvement and Western Cape with the highest perception of worsened relations seem to represent this trend. Further, after Gauteng and the Western Cape, Mpumalanga has the highest economic base and would manifest high levels of inequality.

Thirdly, is racism being left to fester in the private sphere? While educational institutions and government departments have had improved relations, workplaces, shopping centres and 'elsewhere' reveal the highest ratios of experiences of racial discrimination.

For those who assert an improvement in race relations, the factors that they attribute to such improvement are, in order of preference: the church, sporting events, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), the Constitution, affirmative action and employment equity legislation. These choices may have been influenced by high-profile events during specific periods, but they do point to important policy implications about partnerships, sport as a unifier and the church as the place for truth, penance and forgiveness in creating a sense of closure.


## 12 Demographics of language

Population distribution by language most often spoken at home ('home language') reflects the extent of diversity. IsiZulu is spoken by 23,8% of the population; isiXhosa



and Afrikaans by between 10% and 20%; Sesotho sa Leboa, English, Setswana and Sesotho 5% – 10%; while Xitsonga, siSwati, Tshivenda and isiNdebele account for 1% – 5%. A total of 0,5% of the population speak none of these as home languages.

**Figure 13: Languages spoken at home**



Source: Stats SA, Census (2001)

The proportions didn't change much between 1996 and 2001. However, as with the population growth figures by race, the percentage of Afrikaans 'home language' speakers decreased from 14,4% to 13,3% and English speakers from 8,7% to 8,2%. The proportion of speakers of indigenous African languages increased in this period, more or less to the same measure as the broad demographic trends, except for isiXhosa which decreased slightly from 17,9% in 1996 to 17,6% in 2001.

Contained in these data are complex factors difficult to unravel such as geographic migration and acculturation; language migration which may reflect changing preferences as, for instance, between Afrikaans and English; interlanguage marriages and so on. Six of the languages reflected a provincial demographic majority: Afrikaans in two provinces (Northern Cape – 68% and Western Cape – 55,3%); isiXhosa (Eastern Cape – 83,4%); isiZulu (KwaZulu-Natal – 80,9%); Setswana (North West – 65,4%); Sesotho (Free State – 64,4%) and Sesotho sa Leboa (Limpopo – 52,1%).

This means that the rest of the language groups are a minority even in provinces where the majority of the language group is located. In terms of geographic spread of language communities, that is, the extent of 'cosmopolitanism' among the language speakers, the trends are as follows:

**Table 12: Language concentration by 'main language provinces'**

Home language	Three provinces of highest concentration*	Province of lowest concentration**		
<b>Afrikaans</b>	Western Cape, Gauteng, Eastern Cape	73%	Limpopo	2%
<b>English</b>	KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng, Western Cape	88,9%	Northern Cape	0,6%
<b>isiNdebele</b>	Mpumalanga, Gauteng, Limpopo	88,1%	Northern Cape	0,1%
<b>isiXhosa</b>	Eastern Cape, Western Cape, Gauteng	90%	Limpopo	0,2%
<b>isiZulu</b>	KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng, Mpumalanga	96,9%	Northern Cape	0,0%
<b>Sesotho sa Leboa</b>	Limpopo, Gauteng, Mpumalanga	95,8%	Northern Cape, Western Cape	0,0% ea
<b>Sesotho***</b>	Free State, Gauteng, North West	87,5%	Northern Cape	0,3%
<b>Setswana</b>	North West, Gauteng, Free State	90,4%	KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape	0,1% ea
<b>siSwati</b>	Mpumalanga, Gauteng, Limpopo	95,7%	Northern Cape	0,0%
<b>Tshivenda</b>	Limpopo, Gauteng, North West	99%	Northern Cape	0,0%
<b>Xitsonga</b>	Limpopo, Gauteng, North West	93,4%	Eastern Cape, Northern Cape	0,0% ea
<b>Other***</b>	Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, North West	68,5%	Free State	2,3%

Source: Census (2001)

\*The provinces are listed in order of the largest percentage towards the third-lowest

\*\* Where equal lowest percentages exist, both are listed

\*\*\*Sesotho speakers do not have a concentration of 50% or above in any of the provinces, with the largest concentration being 49% in Free State. The same applies to 'Other', with 41,5% in Gauteng.

What this demonstrates, with regard to official language speakers, is that:

- Gauteng features mostly as a second home of choice for all South Africans, except for isiXhosa speakers (Western Cape)
- Afrikaans speakers are the most evenly spread across the country, fol-


lowed by Sesotho and isiNdebele speakers while Tshivenda followed by isiZulu, Sepedi and siSwati speakers are the most concentrated

- Afrikaans, English, Sesotho and isiXhosa speakers have 0,2% or more of their nationalities in all the provinces: this has implications not only for acculturation, but also with regard to such issues as allocation of resources for education, radio signals of specific language stations and so on.

In terms of language concentrations within racial groups, the Indian community is the most homogeneous, with 93,8% having English as their home language, followed by coloureds with 79,5% having Afrikaans as their home language and whites with 59,1% Afrikaans-speakers.

According to the 2001 Census, 463 002 residents in South Africa were citizens of other countries. Of these, 69% were from the other Southern African Development Community countries, 19% from Europe, 5,4% from the rest of Africa and 3,5% from Asia. Gauteng, Free State, North West and Western Cape had the highest concentrations against the size of their respective populations:

**Figure 14: Percentage of non-South African citizens in each province**



Source: Stats SA, Census (2001)

### 13 Language usage, social status and identity

Given the diversity of language communities, as well as relative dispersal of language groups across the country, the issues of languages of communication and avenues for such expression, language preferences and multilingualism are critical for social discourse and national identity. Not much direct research has been done on these issues, and for purposes of this discussion, use will be made of proxies as well as opinion research.

There is contradictory data on these issues, reflecting both the multiple identities of South Africans and the commonality of socio-historical experiences of the various racial groups, irrespective of language.

The incidence of association between language most spoken at home and such factors as education and age are instructive only in so far as they confirm the basic social demographics in terms of race. For instance, it is essentially a reflection of the legacy of apartheid that, among people aged 20 years or more with Xitsonga as home language, 30% had received no formal education, compared with 2,7% of English speakers and 6% of Afrikaans speakers. Further, it is mainly a reflection of the demographic age structure that, for instance, 65% in the age category 55 – 59 years spoke an indigenous language compared with 75,6% of those in the age group 30 – 34 years: proportionally there were fewer older Africans.

In terms of place preferences, the data showed a direct relationship between contemporary geo-linguistic patterns and preference for a province. Half of Afrikaans speakers preferred the Western Cape followed by the Northern Cape; while English respondents preferred KwaZulu-Natal (35%) and Western Cape (29%). This played itself out in respect of African languages with Gauteng the most preferred followed by the province where the language community was concentrated. As such, economic factors and sense of community seemed to be the driving forces in this regard.



**Table 13**

Source: AMPS 2004AP - Ma

Broadcast media and language	Index: Language as proportion of audience divided by language as proportion of population										Representative is				
	Audience	Zulu	Xhosa	Afrikaans	English	North Sotho	Tswana	South Sotho	Tsonga	Swazi	Venda	Mdebele	to		
Total population by language (%)	30,31	22,6	16,2	15	10,9	9,2	8,5	8,1	3,6	2,2	1,9	1,2			
Total 16+ audience Index	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00			
SABC 1 - P7D	21,47	0,96	0,97	0,95	1,02	0,93	1,13	1,15	1,03	1,09	1,00	1,00			
e-TV - P7D	17,73	0,85	0,85	1,22	1,37	0,83	1,08	1,09	0,89	1,05	0,68	0,75			
SABC 2 - P7D	16,71	0,62	0,67	1,52	1,29	1,05	1,15	1,15	1,08	0,73	1,21	0,92			
SABC 3 - P7D	12,09	0,63	0,72	1,51	1,97	0,78	0,98	0,91	0,69	0,59	0,79	0,75			
Likhosi FM - P7D	6,56	3,50	0,81	0,01	0,10	0,09	0,09	0,25	0,17	0,82	0,05	0,42			
Metro FM - P7D	5,44	1,61	0,98	0,41	0,57	1,33	0,93	1,16	0,50	0,50	0,37	1,42			
Limpho Wenene FM - P7D	4,78	0,37	5,02	0,21	0,06	0,02	0,12	0,57	0,06	0,09	0,05	0,17			
Total Community - P7D	4,50	0,53	1,19	1,57	0,95	0,82	1,21	0,90	0,83	0,95	1,68	0,92			
Lesedi FM - P7D	3,77	0,49	0,48	0,05	0,07	0,63	1,95	6,84	0,28	0,4	0,16	0,08			
Minet Main Service - P7D	3,34	0,24	0,25	3,14	3,50	0,11	0,19	0,16	0,06	0,09	0,11	0,08			
Motsweding FM - P7D	3,11	0,19	0,20	0,10	0,04	1,28	7,16	1,72	0,56	0,09	0,21	0,75			
Thobela FM - P7D	2,93	0,14	0,02	0,02	0,04	7,65	1,20	2,21	2,17	0,27	1,16	2,42			
Jacaranda 94.2 fm - P7D	2,43	0,34	0,08	1,36	0,78	2,21	1,92	0,10	3,03	2,95	2,79	1,25			
East Coast Radio - P7D	1,88	2,09	0,33	0,25	3,74	0,01	0,01	0,27	0,03	0,00	0,00	0,00			
Total DSTV - P7D	1,85	0,21	0,40	2,27	4,33	0,14	0,18	0,16	0,08	0,27	0,26	0,25			
99.2 YFM - P7D	1,61	1,48	0,36	0,31	0,59	1,28	1,56	2,00	1,14	0,41	0,58	1,25			
RadioSonderGrens (RSG) - P7D	1,61	0,01	0,02	5,83	0,87	0,00	0,05	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00			
5fm - P7D	1,49	0,18	0,27	2,29	3,95	0,37	0,34	0,48	0,25	0,59	0,05	0,33			
Lipwalqwa FM - P7D	1,43	1,55	0,04	0,01	0,04	0,79	0,16	0,16	2,92	18,09	0,21	2,50			
Manghana Lomene FM - P7D	1,42	0,10	0,07	0,00	0,01	2,47	0,26	0,14	16,17	1,91	3,79	0,50			
Ikwewezi FM - P7D	1,39	1,46	0,17	0,01	0,05	3,28	0,26	0,22	0,81	2,91	0,05	16,67			
94.7 Highveld Stereo - P7D	1,32	0,39	0,10	2,21	3,57	0,25	0,49	0,65	0,44	0,41	0,32	0,17			
Kfm 94.5 - P7D	1,21	0,01	0,26	4,51	2,46	0,00	0,01	0,00	0,00	0,05	0,05	0,00			
Kaya-FM 95.9 - P7D	1,02	1,60	0,41	0,32	0,82	0,57	1,34	2,53	0,78	0,36	0,47	0,67			
Phalaphala FM - P7D	0,79	0,01	0,05	0,00	0,07	1,92	0,12	0,07	3,22	0,00	35,26	0,00			
CKI FM Stereo - P7D	0,64	0,01	6,00	0,13	0,03	0,00	0,00	0,02	0,00	0,09	0,00	0,00			
Good Hope FM (GHFM) - P7D	0,62	0,01	0,43	4,13	2,76	0,01	0,00	0,01	0,00	0,05	0,00	0,00			
P4 Radio KZN 99.5 FM - P7D	0,62	3,65	0,17	0,01	1,14	0,00	0,00	0,09	0,03	0,14	0,00	0,00			
P4 Radio Cape town 104.9 FM - P7D	0,58	0,08	0,30	4,23	2,70	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00			
RadioKamseleRadio Pulpit - P7D	0,56	0,5	0,09	3,72	1,90	0,33	0,33	0,53	0,72	0,00	0,37	0,00			
Safim - P7D	0,55	0,50	0,65	0,81	4,12	0,54	0,38	0,57	1,08	0,73	0,26	0,00			
Louis FM - P7D	0,48	0,14	0,00	0,15	6,38	0,00	0,00	0,02	0,22	0,00	0,00	0,00			
Alpha FMB.R.F.M. (The Border Drive) - P7D	0,45	0,04	1,78	2,76	2,62	0,00	0,01	0,04	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00			
Ofm 94.97 FM - P7D	0,42	0,14	0,11	4,60	0,64	0,00	1,11	1,14	0,06	0,00	0,00	0,00			
RMFM - P7D	0,36	0,10	0,04	0,53	0,14	3,74	1,91	0,00	6,61	0,00	6,58	0,33			
702 Talk Radio - P7D	0,29	0,54	0,08	0,97	4,95	0,63	0,60	0,25	0,00	0,00	0,68	0,00			
Radio 2000 - P7D	0,28	0,35	0,62	1,96	3,54	0,02	0,60	0,05	1,39	0,23	0,84	0,00			
Classic FM 102.7 - P7D	0,17	0,19	0,17	2,19	4,17	0,20	0,11	0,02	0,36	0,18	0,00	0,33			
967mw Cape Talk - P7D	0,12	0,09	0,09	1,26	7,06	0,00	0,05	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00			

Source: SAARF (2004)

Further work is required on data with regard to multilingualism, identification with a language, opportunity to use it in the social domain, and estimation of its utility in the domain of economic and social opportunities.

As indicated in table 13, using the proxy of radio listenership patterns, as compared to language demographics, may help as a pointer to multilingualism, language identity and preference.

As shown in table 13 some languages are overrepresented compared with their proportion of the overall population. For instance, Zulu-speakers would be overrepresented in Ukhozi FM as would Tsonga speakers in Munghana Lonene. However, compared to their proportion of the population, Tsonga speakers would also be overrepresented in for instance Phalaphala (Venda), Jacaranda (Pretoria, English), Ligwalagwala (Swazi) and Thobela (Pedi). Compared to their proportion of the population, Zulu speakers are overrepresented in P4 (English, Durban), East Coast Radio (English, Durban), Metro (English, national), Ligwalagwala (Swazi), and so on.

In other words, besides a 'neighbouring language' (e.g. Venda/Tsonga) or one in the same group (e.g. Nguni), English seems to be the most preferred alternative language. Further, while there is some crossover from English to Afrikaans, and a significant one from Afrikaans to English, the crossover from these two language groups to African language stations is statistically insignificant. However, it would be necessary in this regard to discount such issues as signal availability, subcultures (African listeners of Classic FM or Khaya FM may prefer the music rather than the English language as such), education and the quality of social and political discourse preferred.

Do these trends reflect continuing weakening of language identity and emergent predominance of other identities? This is dealt with in Section VIII.



## V DIVERSITY – DEMOGRAPHICS OF AGE, GENDER AND DISABILITY


As argued above, race and class dynamics have been central in defining social status and access to opportunities within South African society. However, in addition to, across and within, the hierarchy of class divisions and apartheid racial differentiation, issues of gender in a patriarchal society, the dynamics of age demographics, as well as rights and opportunities for people with disability have loomed large. Further, religion was and remains a critical element in respect of aspects of identity and social stratification.

These issues are addressed in various ways in the Constitution of the country, which proceeds from the premise of gender equality and respect for the rights of religious communities, and asserts the rights of children and people with disability. Most of the data and analysis used in this section derive from the TYR (2003) and the ensuing assessment of progress with regard to gender, disability and children's rights in the Gender, Disability and Children TYR (2005) which The Presidency has undertaken.

### 14 Demographics of age

The age distribution of the South African society resembles that of developing countries, with more than 50% of the population under the age of 24. While there was a slight ageing of the population (reflecting low fertility rates) between 1996 and 2001, the larger pattern remains the same.

Figure 15



In 1996, 11,1% of the total population were aged 0 – 4 years while the corresponding proportion for 2001 was 10%. In the 5 – 9 age category, the proportions were 11,6% and 10,8% respectively.


When broken down by race, the patterns start to resemble those of developing and developed countries, with the two extremes being the African and white populations:

**Table 14: Age distribution by race**

Census 01: Age distribution by race group				
Race group	Age group			Total %
	0 – 14 years	15 – 64 years	65 year upwards	100%
<b>African</b>	83,9%	77,3%	68,9%	100%
<b>Coloured</b>	8,6%	9,2%	7,2%	79%
<b>Indian/Asian</b>	1,8%	2,8%	2,3%	8,9%
<b>White</b>	5,7%	10,6%	21,6%	2,5%

Source: Census (2001)


**Figure 16**



Source: Census (2001)




Figure 17



Source: Census (2001)

Different patterns are displayed in the populations of provinces, with the Eastern Cape and Limpopo on the one extreme, and Western Cape and Northern Cape on the other.


Figure 18



Source: Census (2001)

Gauteng's pattern reflects an obvious anomaly, of an artificially 'bloated mid-riff', with a large proportion in the age groups 20 – 49.

Figure 19



These differences among provinces reflect three distinct patterns: firstly, in the 'poor provinces', a large proportion of young children and teenagers with a small proportion of young adults and a slightly larger proportion of the very old; secondly, more or less ageing populations in the Western and Northern Cape provinces; and thirdly a large proportion of in-migrants in Gauteng. As argued in the TYR (2003), a disaggregation of trends in the metropolitan areas and large towns would show the same patterns as that of Gauteng.

Attached to this, to be elaborated on later, is the fact that in Gauteng and Western Cape, children between the ages of 0 – 14 years are more likely to be actual children of the head of the household (they live with their parents); whereas in the Eastern Cape, Limpopo, KwaZulu-Natal and North West they are more likely to be great-/grandchildren of the household head.

## 15 Age and social status

An assessment of the position of the youth in the country's social structure would reflect the main patterns of race and class as well as the urban and rural divide. How these play themselves out in the detail is, however, influenced by the opportunities that have opened up since the attainment of democracy, the age demographics of the population, migration patterns as reflected, for instance in the age profile of Gauteng, and other such factors.

Indicators on education and employment as they apply to young people do give a sense of the youth's social status. Information on child and maternal healthcare, services such as electricity, water and sanitation, as well as social grants and housing on income and asset poverty is assumed. Without going into the detail of information in the TYR (2003), the following trends manifest themselves (1996 – 2001) with regard to education:

- in the age group 0 – 19 years, a decline of 14,4% in the percentage with no schooling and an increase of 11,9% with some primary education
- the proportion of Africans with no primary education falling from 28% to 13%, and those with some primary education increasing from 42% to 55%
- the percentage of population with Grade 12 or higher increasing from 2,39% to 3,08%.


Other factors, such as the improvement in the matric pass rate and the reduction in the pupil/teacher ratio do point to improvements in quality; though these qualitative measures would need to be discounted against the absolute number of matric passes, subject grades, Mathematics and Science qualifications as well as Early Childhood Development (ECD).

Further, research shows that 51% of black matriculants are still looking for employment compared with 14% of whites, 30% of coloured and 28% of Indians. In 2002, the unemployment rate for those under 30 years of age with diplomas was



35%, up from 10% in 1995. (HSRC, 2004). Unemployment trends by age reflect the following:

**Figure 20: Unemployment by age**



In September 2002, the unemployment rate for under-30s was 49% compared with 21% for those aged over 30. The LFS (2005) confirms that the unemployment rate among persons aged 15 – 24 years is substantially higher than those in the 25 – 34 year age group, although there was a marginal decline in the unemployment rate for these age groups over the period September 2001 to September 2005.

And so, the same trends as with the general population play themselves out among the youth. With improvements in education and opportunities, a large section of young blacks are ascending to the status of middle strata. Among the less educated and unskilled, the prospect is one of a poverty trap: but there are also increasing levels of education among young people looking for work.

## 16 Youth opinions on pride and identity

The 1999 FutureFact Mindset Survey (2000) of South African youth of 16 years and older presents interesting trends in terms of youth self-identity. Although proportionately older age groups seem to identify themselves through the main descriptor of 'South African', larger sections of younger age groups (16 – 34 years) use the identity 'African'.

The percentage of young people (18 – 35 years) who registered for the 2004 elections was 44,5%, which is less than their proportion of the adult population of 56%. It has been argued that the fact that they constituted the highest number of new registrations, shows that they do respond when mobilised.

Related to matters of identity and pride are the various youth subcultures that have mushroomed over the past decade, particularly in music, the arts and the fashion industry. The question in this instance is not whether these subcultures conform to the subjective views of the adult population, but what trail they carve out in relation to the future development path of the country and the continent. The trends can at best be described as contradictory:

- a cosmopolitanism that is reflected in the adoption and adaptation of United States and European music, dress and lifestyles does pose a general question of the impact of cultural globalisation on national identity
- the emergence and popularity of local genres in music, poetry and fashion – some of which expressly project indigenous cultural forms and messages of pride in our history and transformation project – creates the possibility not only of consolidating national identity going forward, but also of impacting on the global youth subcultures from the country's and continent's perspective
- while the level of pride and collective national identity is stronger among white youth than white adults, there is the tendency that in education,


language and accents as well as concepts of civilisation, the black and particularly African middle strata are being acculturated into Euro- or American-centric credos as the primary frames of reference.

### 17 Demographics of gender

The gender make-up of the South African population as reflected in the 2001 Census was 52,2% female, showing a slight increase from 51,9% in 1996.


As shown in figure 21, Limpopo (54,6%), Eastern Cape (53,8%) and KwaZulu-Natal (53,2%) have a higher proportion of female residents; while in Gauteng women comprise less than half (49,7%) of the population. This again confirms the impact of migration, which involves mainly young men. However, while between 1992 and 1996 more men migrated than women, by 2001 the number of men migrating was just marginally more than that of women.

Figure 21



From the figures of the African population (figure 22), indications are that in the lower age groups, the proportion of females is more or less that of males – the difference starts to be marked from age 15 upwards, with the proportion of females double that of males from age 64 onwards. This seems to suggest higher rates of mortality among young men which may derive from risky life styles, as well as longer life spans for females even in instances where age is the natural cause of death.

**Figure 22**



## 18 Gender, social status and opinions

As with other sectors of the population, the core factors in defining the social status of women are race and class. In addition to these, women were relegated to a subordinate position in the hierarchy of rights, and as such, they have to struggle to raise themselves from the lowest rung of the social ladder.

Gender equity is codified in the Constitution, various pieces of legislation as well as in the concrete projects of the RDP and others. For purposes of this discussion, only a few indicators are selected to illustrate the trends.

In terms of income poverty, the Child Support Grant and equity in old age pension have made a massive contribution to poverty alleviation. With regard to assets, close to 50% of beneficiaries of the housing subsidy have been female-headed households. Free healthcare for children under six and pregnant mothers has also been critical. Equity in employment has been improving steadily, particularly in the public sector where gender representation has improved to 24% from a very low base, in addition to improved representation in elective institutions. The pace has, however, been much slower in the private sector.

It is in the area of education that the issue of expanding opportunities needs to be addressed, as this is one critical catalyst to access other social opportunities, especially employment.

Trends in access to education show an appreciable increase in access by females:

**Table 15: Education by gender**

Category	Males %		Females %		Total %	
	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001
<b>No schooling</b>	28,00	12,53	25,35	11,93	26,67	12,23
<b>Some primary</b>	42,89	55,79	40,65	51,65	41,76	53,71
<b>Complete primary</b>	7,35	7,82	7,97	8,11	7,66	7,96
<b>Some secondary</b>	19,68	21,25	23,36	24,77	21,53	23,02
<b>Std 10/ Grade 12</b>	2,01	2,39	2,57	3,25	2,3	2,83
<b>Higher</b>	0,07	0,21	0,1	0,28	0,09	0,25

Source: TYR (2003)

With regard to matric qualifications, African females showed a similar improvement (with about 6% having passed matric) as that of males, though this was lower in the post-matric category. Within the coloured community, the female percentage for matric was higher at 10% compared with males at 8,3%. Overall, in the education arena, there are indications of increased self-assertion and better performance by girl-children.



While these improvements are commendable, the low base from which women come means that unemployment rates, highly dependent on education and skills, declined marginally by 2% between September 2001 and September 2005.

**Table 16: Unemployment rate by population group and gender**

Population group	Rate of unemployment by gender									
	Male					Female				
	Sept '01	Sept '02	Sept '03	Sept '04	Sept '05	Sept '01	Sept '02	Sept '03	Sept '04	Sept '05
<b>African</b>	31,5	31,5	30,0	27,6	26,6	40,6	42,3	38,8	36,0	37,1
<b>Coloured</b>	19,5	19,9	18,8	19,7	20,6	23,1	26,	23,6	24,1	24,6
<b>Indian/Asian</b>	15,7	15,6	15,5	12,4	14	23,5	27,1	18,4	15,4	18,6
<b>White</b>	4,7	5,0	4,0	5,1	3,6	7,4	7,4	6,2	5,8	6,9
<b>Average</b>	25,8	25,9	24,7	23,1	22,6	33,8	35,9	32,0	30,2	31,7

Source: LFS (2005)

There has been an increase in the intake of women in the service sectors and women increased their share of overall employment between 1995 and 1999 in six of the occupational categories. There are also indications that women are starting to earn more in some sectors, particularly the semi-skilled category and, according to Altman (2005) this may reflect a growing demand for women in the service sectors. However, in other areas, women still earn less than males.

**Table 17: Female earnings as % of male earnings (formal sector, 2002)**

Employment category	Percentage
<b>Unskilled</b>	<b>87,0%</b>
<b>Semi-skilled</b>	<b>106,4%</b>
<b>Skilled</b>	<b>82,8%</b>
<b>Highly skilled</b>	<b>73,8%</b>
<b>Managers</b>	<b>80,3%</b>

Source: Altman (2005)

Overall, a contributory factor to women's social status, as will be illustrated later, is the narrow base of useful social networks that women have – while these may be extensive, they comprise women in similar difficulties and therefore add little social capital to their prospects.


The gender composition of the population in the various provinces and overall trends in migration demonstrate that women are affected more by the poverty trap than men and they form a high and disproportionate part of the Second Economy community. Added to these woes are the social vices, including violent crimes, that women are subjected to in the home and other areas of social interaction.

Studies are continuing on the social and cultural implications of gender equity – how in addition to decreased dependence on women's part, society as a whole and men in particular are responding to the new gender dynamics. The implications include such issues as choices in terms of setting up families, female-headed households and the historical 'father-figure' family structure, pathologies such as domestic violence deriving from male insecurity and so on.

### **19 Demographics of disability and trends in social status**

According to Census 2001, people with disabilities constitute 5% of the population and in absolute terms 2,26 million people. These can be broken down as indicated in figure 23.



**Figure 23: Percentage of the population with each type of disability**

Source: Census (2001)

The corresponding figure for 1996 was 6,6% or 2,66 million people; and in both instances, visual disability was the most common (2,7% in 1996 and 1,3% in 2001). That this has come down so massively in this period begs the question whether this is a consequence of changed definitions, and/or massive health interventions such as cataract operations. Indeed, the number of the sight-impaired was just over one million in 1996, decreasing to 577 096 in 2001.

In April 2005, 1 307 459 people received disability grants, representing an increase of more than 108% from April 2001. Compared with the total number of persons with disabilities (2,66 million), and discounting the elderly who would receive old age pension, those who may be in employment, as well as those who may be in receipt of other grants such as veterans grants, the question that arises is whether a further expansion of recipients should be expected.

The issue of definitions is a vexed one, with dramatic increases in those claiming disability grants in the Eastern Cape from 132 732 in 2000 to 237 280 in 2005.

Of persons with disabilities, 87% between the age of 15 and 65 were classified as not economically active while 3% were classified as unemployed.

According to the national Department of Social Development, in 2000/01, 3% of beneficiaries of poverty-relief projects were people with disabilities, and this increased to 19% in 2001/02. Census 2001 indicated that 1,5% of persons with disabilities between the ages of 16 and 35 were studying at technikons or universities compared with 2,6% of 'able-bodied' persons. For people aged 20 years and above, proportionately more people with disabilities had no formal schooling and more people without disabilities (61,4%) than with disabilities (36,2%) had some secondary or more schooling.

Campaigns to ensure functional convenience in the workplace and other public spaces, as well as access to information have raised awareness and resulted in some practical changes. However, weaknesses remain: for example, given that the ability to use services, or attend school or work is largely dependent on the ability of people to get there, the lack of accessible user-friendly transport can be a serious barrier to the full integration into society of people with disabilities. Overall, the new rights regime and government programmes have brought about better conditions for people with disabilities, but much more needs to be done.


## **VI MIGRATION, CAUSES OF MORTALITY AND CRIME**

Data on two social trends in the past decade – migration and causes of mortality – has raised major questions with profound macro-social implications. In and of themselves, these factors are important in influencing dynamics with regard to community life, the family unit as well as race and language demographics. They are in turn impacted on by social status, lifestyles and social mobility.

### **20 Demographics of migration**

Place of residence in this section is defined as the area where a person is resident for at least four days a week.



**Figure 24: Distribution of population by age and province**

What figure 24 shows is that, for instance, the proportion of people across all age categories living in Gauteng is 19,7% (Census, 2001) of the total population. But specific age categories constitute a larger proportion than the provincial average: 20 – 24 years (22,7%), 25 – 29 (26,6%), 30 – 34 (26,3%) and 35 – 39 (25,2%). On the other hand, a smaller proportion of those in such age categories as 5 – 9 years (14,0%), 10 – 14 (13,5%) and 15 – 19 (15,1%) form a significantly smaller proportion of the Gauteng population.


The inverse is the case with provinces such as the Eastern Cape with 14,3% of the total population but with only 10,8% of those in age categories 25 – 29 and 30 – 34, while those aged 5 – 9 years are at a higher-than-average proportion of 17% and those aged 10 – 15 years at 17,5%.

In other words, young adults, with the daring, ambition and some resources are more likely to migrate to provinces with greater economic potential such as Gauteng and the Western Cape.

Migration has also occurred within provinces, reflecting the general trend of movement to urban areas. Approximately 75% of all migration is to urban areas. The incidence of such migration within provinces, from 1997 to 2001, is reflected in the following order: Gauteng (32,8%), Western Cape (14,8%) and KwaZulu-Natal (14,1%).


The proportion of each age category that moved residence between the two post-1994 censuses confirms the age pattern:

**Figure 25: Changing residences – by age group**



Of these 31,4% moved between provinces. The net loss/gain by province confirms the interprovincial patterns and is shown in figure 26:



**Figure 26: Provincial net gains and losses**

Source: Census 2001

The biggest loss was from the Eastern Cape (-253 000) and Limpopo (-163 000) while the biggest gains were in Gauteng and the Western Cape: movement was to areas with higher gross geographic product or higher economic potential. This is further confirmed by the fact that Mpumalanga's rural areas had the highest experience of in-migration.

According to Stats SA (2005) these migration patterns continue. These two provinces have positive net migration, with the largest number of persons expected to migrate to Gauteng (approximately 520 000 for the period 2001 – 2006). The Eastern Cape and Limpopo are expected to have the largest negative migration, with the Eastern Cape expected to experience negative net migration of approximately 320 000 for the period 2001 – 2006.

## 21 Underlying trends in migration

In their analysis of Stats SA's October Household Surveys data, Kok *et al* (2003) proffer a number of reasons for migration as summarised in table 18:



**Table 18: Reasons for migration by percentage of respondents**

Reason	Percentage
Marriage-related	12%
Work-related	50%
Moved to a new house	24%
Could no longer afford to pay rent	1%
Evicted	2%
Left to escape crime	2%
Lack of land	3%
Political reasons	3%
Other reasons	3%

Source: Kok, et al (2003)

There are many undercurrents to the migration process, with a myriad of implications for social cohesion and social capital:

- two migrant profiles describe themselves with migrants 'proper' mainly being the less vulnerable and better-educated residents, while labour migrants are essentially more vulnerable and poorly-educated citizens
- between 1992 and 1996, many more men than women migrated while by 2001 the number of male migrants was just marginally more than that of women
- the young women migrants tend to have secondary education while young males with less than secondary education have a higher probability of migrating – suggesting a poverty trap for poorly-educated women for whom migration is not an escape
- the Gauteng profile where there is a dip in the proportion of those aged 5 – 19, as opposed to Limpopo and the Eastern Cape where there is a higher proportion of those aged 5 – 19, suggests that young mothers migrate with babies (0 – 5 years), but send these back when they reach school-going age.



Three important implications for households and families arise from the following trends in migration:

The first is that households in which a member receives a social pension, experience a drop in working age males and are more likely to have children below the age of five and young women of child-bearing age. This implies the dependency syndrome in extended families but also raises the question of the impact of access to some income on employment search costs.

The second is that migration seems to have a direct influence on household size, with migrant households increasingly tending to be composed more of single-member households, and with the proportion of such among migrants having doubled between 1996 (11%) and 2001 (21%).

Thirdly, migration data indicates that rural areas are being left with high proportions of female-headed households. Apart from the obvious social implications such as family disintegration, these female household heads are particularly prone to poverty, trapped in the deepest mire of the Second Economy.

In terms of identity, migration generally does spawn a change of 'place identity': desegregation of former white suburbs, cultural affiliation, 'imported' dependencies and the emergence of migrant colonies. In instances where the migrants are economic outsiders, these identities can play havoc with the social regulation of formal instruments of the polity.

## **22 Causes of death and social demographics**

As indicated earlier, mortality trends and causes do reflect social dynamics, and these dynamics can themselves be impacted on by trends in mortality, especially where unnatural causes produce distorted life cycles.



In terms of absolute figures from the latest study by Stats SA(2004), mortality trends tend to confirm the relationship between social conditions and race on the one hand and the actual causes of death on the other, though there are some contradictory data in some respects:

- young African males are more likely to die of unnatural causes (mainly violence and car accidents) than any other section of the population – this is borne out by the fact that assault, as a cause of death, does not feature among the top 10 in any other age category but 15 – 29

**Table 19: Leading causes by age**

% distribution of 10 leading causes of death by age: 15 – 19				
Cause of death	Year of death			
	1997	1999	2001	Total
Events of undetermined intent	43,87	26,22	19,46	27,96
Tuberculosis	10,01	13,37	17,60	14,24
Ill-defined and unknown causes of mortality	7,79	8,64	9,12	8,62
Influenza and pneumonia	3,97	6,15	9,28	6,87
Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) diseases	4,76	5,39	3,87	4,61
Certain disorders involving the immune mechanism	2,50	4,70	4,81	4,18
Intestinal infectious diseases	1,93	3,28	4,36	3,37
Other external causes of accidental injury	1,35	3,81	2,15	2,51
Assault	1,54	2,66	2,89	2,47
Other forms of heart diseases	2,54	2,09	2,25	2,27
<b>Total</b>	<b>80,26</b>	<b>76,31</b>	<b>75,79</b>	<b>77,10</b>


Source: Stats SA(2005)

- among the very young (0 – 14 years), respiratory, cardiovascular and digestive system disorders as well as intestinal infections and malnutrition – which are most likely linked to social conditions – are the most prevalent among the top 10 causes of death

- within the white community, among the most pronounced causes of death are diseases and other causes related to lifestyle such as cardiovascular mortalities and so on
- the distribution of deaths by gender suggests a counterintuitive tendency, in that males show a higher level of mortality relative to their proportion of the population as a whole – this is in part influenced by the issue of risky life experiences among young adult males alluded to earlier.

**Figure 27: Causes by gender**

**Distribution of deaths for 1997, 1999, 2001 by gender**



Source: Stats SA(2005)

An analysis of non-natural causes of death in the National Injury Mortality Surveillance System Survey (MRC, 2003), reflecting fatal injuries (homicide, transport accidents, suicides or other unintentional injury fatalities) during the course of 2002 reveals the following critical information on social dynamics:

- such non-natural causes account for 12 – 15% (about 80 000) of all mortalities, and the highest proportions in this regard are in the age group 20 – 44 years

Figure 28: Overall manner of death





Figure 29: Homicide by age



Source: MRC

- 45,4% of these deaths are homicides, and they account for over 50% of all non-natural deaths in the age group 15 – 44 years
- in the age categories 0 – 14 and 55+, the largest cause (at over one-third) is transport-related, and in the group 0 – 14 years over 60% of these are pedestrians

- males account for the highest proportion of non-natural deaths (80,6%) and the leading cause of these among males (49%) is homicide and for females (31,9%) it is transport
- of homicide cases, over half in the age group 15 – 64 years are as a result of firearm incidents followed by 'sharp force injury'.

Overall, the total number of registered deaths increased from 308 790 in 1997 to 422 508 in 2001, an increase of 37% in a period roughly corresponding with the two Census periods in which the population increased by some 11%. Allowance has to be made for improvements in recording over this period: however, there seems to be a suggestion of an increase in the mortality rate.

In the TYR (2003), using figures from MRC research, it was established that average life expectancy of the South African population fell from 57 years in 1995 to 55 years in 2000.

### 23 Unnatural trend – impact of HIV and AIDS?

The percentage of deaths by age for 1997, 1999 and 2001 suggests a reduction in the proportion of deaths among the very young (0 – 14 years) and the older generation (55+).

**Table 20 (a): Distribution of deaths by age**


Percentage deaths by age for 1997, 1999, 2001			
Age	1997	1999	2001
0 – 14	12,2%	11,7%	10,8%
15 – 29	11,8%	13,3%	13,9%
30 – 44	17,5%	20,8%	23,6%
45 – 59	18,8%	17,9%	17,9%
60+	38,5%	35,5%	33,6%
Unspecified	2,1%	0,8%	0,5%

**Table 20 (b): Distribution of deaths by age**

Deaths per year								
Age group	1997	% 1997	1999	% 1999	2001	% 2001	Total	% Total
0 – 4	32 130	10,4%	36 124	10,0%	38 804	9,2%	107 058	9,8%
5 – 9	2 851	0,9%	3 192	0,9%	3 625	0,9%	9 668	0,9%
10 – 14	2 631	0,9%	2 769	0,8%	3 000	0,7%	8 400	0,8%
15 – 19	5 976	1,9%	7 198	2,0%	7 740	1,8%	20 914	1,9%
20 – 24	13 101	4,2%	15 919	4,4%	18 237	4,3%	47 257	4,3%
25 – 29	17 683	5,7%	25 007	6,9%	33 039	7,8%	75 729	6,9%
30 – 34	18 347	5,9%	26 947	7,4%	36 374	8,6%	81 668	7,5%
35 – 39	18 153	5,9%	25 752	7,1%	33 964	8,0%	77 869	7,1%
40 – 44	17 639	5,7%	22 854	6,3%	29 764	7,0%	70 257	6,4%
45 – 49	18 043	5,8%	22 398	6,2%	26 667	6,3%	67 108	6,1%
50 – 54	17 085	5,5%	20 595	5,7%	25 140	6,0%	62 820	5,7%
55 – 59	20 038	6,5%	21 693	6,0%	22 173	5,2%	63 904	5,8%
60 – 64	19 933	6,5%	21 748	6,0%	25 434	6,0%	67 115	6,1%
65+	98 846	32,0%	106 813	29,5%	116 483	27,6%	322 142	29,5%
Unspecified	6 334	2,1%	2 813	0,8%	2 064	0,5%	11 211	1,0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>308 790</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>361 822</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>422 508</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>1 093 120</b>	<b>100%</b>


Source: Stats SA(2005)

As such, compared with 1997, the age distribution for 2001 shows an increasingly pronounced and unnatural hump among both males and females.

**Figures 30(a): Male distribution – comparing 1997 and 2001**


Source: Stats SA(2005)

Figures 30(b): Male distribution – comparing 1997 and 2001



Source: Stats SA(2005)

Figure 31(a) and (b): Female distribution – comparing 1997 and 2001



Source: Stats SA(2005)

In analysing this age pattern, account should be taken of two factors:

- The observations above regarding non-natural causes of death: the fact that a disproportionate number (in terms of 'normal' mortality trends) of those in age group 20 – 44 account for non-natural causes of death. This explains the hump in figure 30 for males and the steep rise for females after 19 years in figure 31.

- As indicated in the TYR (2003), antenatal care utilisation improved from 89% in 1994 to 94% in 1998 with births received without antenatal care falling from 12% to 3%. In part, this explains the reporting of maternal deaths which increased from 676 in 1998 to over 1 150 in 2003 (Department of Health, Enquiries into Maternal Deaths in South Africa, 2004). It is estimated that maternal mortality ratios have averaged 150 per 100 000 of live births.

These two factors, however do not, on their own, fully explain the trend in age patterns of deaths in figures 30 and 31. Combined with this age pattern, is the fact that explicit reference to HIV and AIDS in the recorded data indicates that only in the age groups 15 – 44 does this cause feature among the top 10. Stats SA(2005) has also made a number of inferences from this as well as the incidence of HIV-related opportunistic causes of death to come to the conclusion that 'AIDS-related' causes of death increased from about 15% of all deaths in 1997 to about 25% in 2001.

**Table 21: Extrapolation on impact of HIV and AIDS**

% of deaths per year attributed to HIV & AIDS-related (opportunistic) diseases			
HIV & AIDS opportunity diseases	1997	1999	2001
Diarrhoea and gastroenteritis of presumed infectious origin	1,96	2,82	3,39
Respiratory tuberculosis; not confirmed bacteriologically or historically	6,47	8,26	10,2
Zoster (herpes zoster)	0,01	0,01	0,02
Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) disease resulting in infectious and parasitic diseases	1,39	1,89	1,39
Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) disease resulting in other specified diseases	0,09	0,12	0,1
Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) disease resulting in malignant neoplasms	0,03	0,03	0,03
Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) disease resulting in other conditions	0,21	0,23	0,15
Unspecified human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) disease	0,27	0,34	0,38
Candidiasis	0,02	0,03	0,06
Cryptococcosis	0,07	0,12	0,23
Pneumocystosis	0,04	0,15	0,41
Kaposi's sarcoma	0,04	0,06	0,1



**Table 21: Extrapolation on impact of HIV and AIDS (continue)**

% of deaths per year attributed to HIV & AIDS – related (opportunistic) diseases			
HIV & AIDS opportunity diseases	1997	1999	2001
Other and unspecified types of non-Hodgkin's lymphoma	0,16	0,16	0,13
Bacterial meningitis; not elsewhere classified	0,07	0,08	0,1
Meningitis due to other and unspecified causes	0,37	0,51	0,7
Other disorders of brain	0,08	0,13	0,12
Pneumonia: organism unspecified	3,54	4,82	6,77
Other non-infective gastroenteritis and colitis	0,17	0,29	0,53
Congenital pneumonia	0,93	1,07	1,29
Other congenital infectious and parasitic diseases	0,1	0,11	0,13
Other perinatal digestive system disorders	1,5	1,6	1,18
<b>Total</b>	<b>17,5</b>	<b>22,8</b>	<b>27,4</b>

Source: Stats SA(2005)

In other words, there is clearly not only a pandemic in silent attack, but its fatal impact is starting to express itself palpably in both morbidity and mortality. The most affected in this regard are able-bodied citizens in the prime of their lives. These would most likely be parents of young children and possibly breadwinners of extended families who are also among the most skilled within the population.


## 24 Crime trends and their relevance to social cohesion

Crime incidence does have a bearing on social cohesion – both as cause and effect. In a society in transition, particularly ours, which included the removal of artificial racial barriers, massive migration, changes in the structure of the economy, as well as improving confidence in law-enforcement agencies, there was bound to be upheaval at least in terms of trends in reported crimes.

Crime statistics indicate that the total of all reported crimes steadily increased from 1996/97, stabilised from 2000/01 and decreased by 5% between the 2002/03 and 2003/04 financial years (South African Police Service [SAPS], 2004). The total of property crimes consistently decreased from the 1998/99 to 2003/04 financial years.


On the other hand, the total of contact crimes and theft has been increasing since 1994/95 but decreased marginally in the 2003/04 financial year.

Figure 32: Crime Rate Index



Source: SAPS (2004)

Figure 33: Trends in contact crimes




Source: SAPS (2004)

The above graph (figure 33) depicts trends in respect of crime against the person. Murder has sustained considerable declines and the murder rate has decreased by 36% and between 2002/03 and 2003/04 by 9% (SAPS, 2004). Although murder has been decreasing, the volume of this crime is still high at 18 000 cases reported per year.

Trends for rape have been relatively stable since 1994/95 and decreased moderately from 2001/02 and 2003/04. While attempted murder, assault with grievous bodily harm (GBH) and common assault had steadily increased, latterly they have also decreased. Attempted murder decreased significantly by 18%, whereas common assault and assault with GBH decreased moderately by 3% and 4% respectively. An increase in the number of reported assaults could in part point to growing public confidence in the SAPS.

**Figure 34: Trends in robbery**



Source: SAPS (2004)

Reported robberies have been steadily increasing since 1994/95. Common robberies decreased moderately between 2002/03 and 2003/04 (figure 34). The increase in aggravated robbery rates correlates with the high number of street robberies and muggings recorded by the police in socio-economically depressed areas, as well as the dynamics pertaining to cellphone-related crimes and claims. On the contrary, the number of 'high-profile robberies' such as car and truck hijacking, cash-in-transit heists and bank robberies have decreased considerably, notably between 1996/97 and 2003/04.

Overall, property crimes are consistently decreasing. Only residential burglaries have been increasing steadily since 1997/98 and dropped by 8% between 2002/03 and 2003/04. The increase in residential burglaries may point to the vulnerability of families in socio-economically depressed areas, as well as the general situation of massive poverty and opulence existing side by side within society.

### **Social conditions and the incidents of contact crimes**

The majority of contact crimes occur in socio-economically depressed areas where there are:

- high levels of unemployment
- proliferation of liquor outlets which leads to alcohol and substance abuse
- absence of basic community amenities (water, electricity, recreational facilities, toilets)
- poor infrastructure and environmental design (lack of street lights, street names and sometimes even proper streets, isolated routes between houses and taxi ranks, etc.)
- migration into urban areas (which puts pressure on appropriate urban human settlement planning on the one hand and social, community and traditional systems of censure)
- high levels of recidivism.



Attached to this is the legacy of apartheid, such that areas experiencing the most crimes also remain affected by inadequate security resources.

Most of the contact crimes mainly occur during the festive season and on weekends, very often between people who know one another, and within close proximity of liquor outlets. The peak hours for homicide are 20h00 – 23h00; peak days are Saturday followed by Sunday and Friday; while the peak month is December.

With regard to rape, there is quite strong association with drinking – mostly in the company of acquaintances, gang members, people who have been involved in criminal activity, and at public drinking places such as shebeens, bottle stores and clubs.

A related and relatively new phenomenon is the usage of drugs. Half of the people arrested for murder, 45% for rape and 35% for assault tested positive for drug abuse.

There has also been a dramatic increase in the number of young people who have been incarcerated, either as sentenced inmates or awaiting-trial detainees.

**Table 22: Number of sentenced and awaiting-trial prisoners**

Dates	under-18	19 – 25	26 – 30	31 – 35	Total
31 July 1995	936	37 244	24 423	19 144	81 747
31 July 2004	3 616	71 293	41 789	29 008	145 706

Source: Fagan (2005)

## 25 Public perceptions of the criminal justice system

The National Victims of Crime Survey, conducted by the ISS in 2003, showed an increase in the confidence of the public in the criminal justice system (Burton, *et al*, 2004).

Over half (52%) of the respondents in the study said police in their area were doing a good job, while 45% disagreed. The main reasons behind the positive response included: a committed police force, the arrest of criminals and timely response. On the other hand, corruption was one of the main reasons for the opposite view. Notably, over half of those who had actually visited a police station said their opinions about the police had improved.

Over half (59%) of South Africans who had been to court felt that courts were adequately performing their duties. Just over half (51%) of all respondents said they were generally satisfied with the court performance while 45% were dissatisfied.

Other studies also revealed that the high intensity operations conducted by the SAPS in various crime hot spots left the public feeling safe in those areas. In this regard, 76% of people who had come into contact with the police during these operations expressed satisfaction with their service.

The study indicated high public access to the police. Nearly all respondents (97% of the 3 000 people interviewed) knew where their nearest police station was and two thirds of these were able to reach the police station within 30 minutes or less using their mode of transport.

The study also showed that access to courts was also generally good. Over three quarters (84%) of the respondents knew where their nearest magistrate court was located in their area. Access to courts was much easier for urban dwellers than for people living in rural areas.

## **VII ORGANISATION OF SOCIAL LIFE AND SOCIAL NETWORKS**

Cohesion in a society such as ours is determined by the social structure in terms of such categories as class, race, language and nationality. But social networks extend beyond these socio-economic issues, and are impacted on by factors that can define a trajectory of their own.



What then are the trends in respect of the family and broad social networks?

## 26 Trends in households and families

As stated in the TYR (2003), the number of households increased by approximately 30% between 1996 and 2001, compared with a population growth of 11%. Inversely, household size declined from an average of 4,5 to 3,8 persons per household in the same period. This, among other factors, reflects both migration and a decline in fertility rates.

Four household types have been identified: single-person households; nuclear families consisting of parents and children only; extended family households, which include relatives; and 'others', which include non-family members living in one household. The following trends manifested themselves in the period 1996 – 2001 between urban and rural areas:

**Table 23: Percentage of household types**

Type of household	Urban		Non-urban		Total	
	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001
Single	18,1%	20,1%	13,4%	15,9%	16,2%	18,5%
Nuclear	49,5%	45,1%	41,5%	34,4%	46,3%	41,1%
Extended	17,9%	22,4%	25,5%	34,8%	20,9%	27,0%
Other	11,7%	12,4%	12,6%	15,0%	12,0%	13,4%
Unspecified	2,9%	-	7,0%	-	4,6%	-

*Source: Census (1996 and 2001)*

In essence, there has been an increase in the proportion of both single and extended households in urban and rural areas, while there has been a decline in the nuclear-type households. This confirms the results of migration studies. In extended household families, there is a higher dependency ratio, with more of such households having more young children and elderly women.


On marriage (and divorce) in particular, the following trends can be discerned in the past few years: marriage rates have declined, especially among the African population. As a result of the declining marriage rates, divorce rates are also declining.

It is a matter of conjecture whether all these dynamics affect the social upbringing of children and quality of family life in general. But the large increase in extended households (7%) and the corresponding decrease in the nuclear family (5%), as well as the fact that the number of households living in three or fewer rooms has not changed much in this period (46% in 1996 and 47% in 2001), would tend to give a negative commentary on the quality of family life. This is besides issues of migration and single households as well as the role that young children have to play in families in which the very old are guardians.

Critical in family life are the networks among relatives, in this instance measured by the relative frequency of contact between various immediate family members (parents, siblings, adult children and life partners).

Although the number of immediate family members ranged from 0 to 28, the most common responses were between three and five.

**Figure 35: Contact with immediate family members**



Source: HSRC (2002)




In terms of contact with extended family members such as uncles and aunts, cousins, parents-in-law and other in-laws, nieces and nephews, Indian respondents had the most contact, while white respondents had the least.

On frequency of face-to-face contact, white South Africans spend the least time with a favourite sibling, at half the score of that for Indians and Africans and a third of that for coloureds. This may reflect geographic proximity, extended family households and access to telecommunications.

## 27 Social networks and social capital

Responding to a question regarding the number of friends individuals had in their communities or neighbourhoods, the following trends emerge:

**Figure 36: Number of close friends (% of respondents)**



Source: HSRC (2002)

- urban communities have more close friends than rural communities
- black people tend to have fewer friends in their neighbourhoods
- the better resourced a respondent's community, the more friends they indicated to have (with Indians and whites scoring more than three times the figure for African respondents)

- women have fewer friends within and outside their communities and in the workplace than men while young adults tend to have less friends within their community, perhaps mainly due to mobility.

Overall, in terms of the composite social capital score a person's living standard level (in terms of LSM) does have an impact, but like African respondents, whites tend to have a low composite score. With the latter, the low score on family relationships may pull the score down.

The most critical conclusion from this is that Africans, assumed to experience a better sense of community, in fact not only have a low composite score, but also belong to networks with meagre resources with very little to offer one another. What has also been established is that social networks, even among the poor, do have some influence on an individual's access to resources, opportunities for employment and so on.

## **28 Community and social organisation**


As argued above, social networks are critical in defining the possibilities that individuals may have in accessing opportunities. They are also an important measure of social consciousness and preparedness to take part in both community and general national programmes.

The trend in South Africa since 1994 has been contradictory, with ebbs and flows. Membership in this period has remained highest in political parties. After the 1994 elections, there was a general decline in membership of all organisations except for political parties. Excluding political parties, a sudden increase occurred in 1997, reaching its peak in 1998 and then declining again in 1999 and 2000. In 2001, there was a large increase, with youth organisations experiencing the greatest surge (75%), followed by anti-crime organisations (67%), women's organisations (60%) and trade unions (50%).



The highest percentage of South Africans belongs to religious organisations, followed by political parties, women’s organisations, youth organisations, trade unions, anti-crime organisations and civic organisations.

**Figure 37: Membership of civil-society organisations**



Source: HSRC (2002)

Compared by province, the Eastern Cape had the highest proportion (22%) of people active in political parties, while the Western Cape had the lowest (8,9%). North West and Mpumalanga had the highest percentage (10,7%) in trade unions while Limpopo had the lowest (2,3%).

**Figure 38: Civil-society organisation by province**



Source: HSRC (2002)



Broken down by race, Africans are most active (in this order) in political parties, youth organisations and civic organisations; while in the coloured community youth, religious and anti-crime organisations have the highest proportion; among Indians, women's organisations, trade unions and anti-crime organisations have the highest proportion; and among whites, anti-crime organisations, religious groups and political parties have the highest proportions.

From a different perspective, given the racial demographics, there seems to be a better level of social involvement among Indians, whites and coloureds than within African communities. However, it needs to be noted that structures such as stokvels and burial societies which are quite preponderant within the African community, are not reflected in this research. It also does not include sports organisations.

In terms of age, the most active are in the 35 – 49 years age bracket, followed by 25 – 34 years and 50 years and over.

## **29 Religion and social organisation**

Religious organisation is an important element of social capital in many respects: as a repository of social values, an important element of social networking, a formal system of social organisation and, in some instances, an instrument of socio-economic opportunity and status.

According to Census 2001 (table 24), the vast majority of South Africans (about 80%) identify with the Christian religion; about 5% belong to Islam, Hinduism, Jewish and other religions, and 15,1% do not belong to any religion. Of the Christian churches, the Zion Christian Church (11%) is the largest, followed by the Methodist Church (6,8%) and so on. A significant proportion of Christians (+26%) belong to churches that infuse their practices with African custom; while about 12% belong to charismatic churches. Further, the practise of African traditional beliefs, in their own right asserted as a religion, enjoys support among about 0,3% of the population.



**Table 24: Religious affiliation**

Religious group	Number	Percent
African traditional beliefs	125 898	0,3
Anglican churches	1 722 076	3,8
Apostolic Faith Mission	246 193	0,5
Bandla Lama Nazaretha	248 825	0,5
Baptist churches	691 235	1,5
Congregational churches	508 826	1,1
Dutch Reformed churches	3 005 697	6,7
Ethiopian type churches	1 150 102	2,6
Hinduism	551 668	1,2
Islam	654 064	1,5
Judaism	75 549	0,2
Lutheran churches	1 130 983	2,5
Methodist churches	3 035 719	6,8
No religion	6 767 165	15,1
Orthodox churches	42 253	0,1
Other African independent churches	656 644	1,5
Other Apostolic churches	5 627 320	12,6
Other beliefs	283 815	0,6
Other Christian churches	2 890 151	6,4
Other Reformed churches	226 499	0,5
Other Zionist churches	1 887 147	4,2
Pentecostal/charismatic churches	3 695 211	8,2
Presbyterian churches	832 497	1,9
Roman Catholic Church	3 181 332	7,1
Undetermined	610 974	1,4
Zion Christian Church	4 971 931	11,1

*Note: The Judaism number includes an estimated 11 978 Africans who indicated in the Census that they were Jewish.*

*This figure has been questioned by the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, and Stats SA is aware of the anomaly.*

*Source: Stats SA(2001)*

### 30 Attitudes among Christians in South Africa

In an SAIRR survey (2000), 50% of the population indicated that they attended religious meetings at least once a week. In 2001, the proportion was 46%, with a further 6% attending twice to four times a year, 3% once a year or less and 21% not attending at all.

The official positions of most of the religious groups do reflect the broad aspirations of society as articulated in the Constitution. Most of the religious groups profess concern for the conditions of the poor, and at the same time broadly support a market-based system of private property.

On most of the major social issues, Christians reflect views that are consonant with the average opinions of society, with practising Christians showing a mild leaning towards conservatism on such issues as involvement in political activities, control over flow of information on 'issues of national importance', trade unionism and xenophobia.

**Table 25: Religious affiliation and views on social issues**

	Pract	Laps	Intent	Nom	All
Active members of a political party	11	13	15	14	13
Active members of a trade union	7	9	5	5	6
Active member of a church	66	42	58	32	53
Active member of a civic organisation	3	4	2	2	3
Spent time talking with depressed person in last year	76	67	78	71	74
Adult children have duty to look after elderly parents	86	84	91	80	86
OK to develop friendships with people	44	46	47	44	45
Most South African whites have racist attitudes	61	60	65	62	62
Church has contributed to reducing racism	67	56	61	53	61

**Table 25: Religious affiliation and views on social issues (continue)**

	Pract	Laps	Intent	Nom	All
Race relations improved since 1994	43	43	42	42	43
Are you generally happy	74	72	72	67	72
People like me have no say in government	48	50	46	44	47
Will vote ANC in next elections	45	52	49	45	47
Will vote DA in the next elections	13	8	6	8	9
Will vote IFP in the next elections	5	3	5	2	4
Will not vote in next elections	8	9	10	9	9

Source: SAIRR (2000)

While the African National Congress enjoys the support of the majority of Christians, comparatively it is supported by a smaller proportion of practising Christians compared with lapsed ones; with the inverse for the Democratic Alliance and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). The African Christian Democratic Party, which uses religious conservatism as a party political platform, has not had a significant impact on political contestation, though it has shown a slight increase in support in the three democratic elections since 1994.

### 31 Social organisation and the human rights regime

How does the organisation of society relate to the actual exercise of human rights, and to what extent is there awareness of these rights in the first instance?

Compared to most other societies, South Africa is characterised by vibrant discourse, and a population that is relatively well-informed about the basic issues of public policy and its implementation. Over 37 political parties as well as independent groups contest elections across the three spheres of government; and as was elaborated on above, many citizens do take some part in civil-society structures.

Registration for participation in the 2004 national and provincial elections, compared to the voting age demographics of each group can be broken down as follows (estimates from the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and Stats SA figures):

**Table 26: Voting by gender**

Proportions	Male	Female
% of voting population	48,86%	51,14%
% of registered voters	45,18%	54,82%

Source: Stats SA and IEC (2004)

**Table 27: Voting by age**

Proportions	18 – 35 years	36 – 39 years	40 – 49 years	50+
% of voting population	55,81%	9,50%	15,63%	19,05%
% of registered voters	44,47%	9,21%	19,63%	26,70%

Source: Stats SA and IEC (2004)

In brief, what these figures show is that female registered voters were disproportionately higher than their distribution in the population and that men were underregistered. In addition, the age group 18 – 35 were decidedly underrepresented as a proportion of their distribution in the population, with the 40 – 49 and 50+ age groups decidedly overrepresented.


More significant, though, with regard to women's participation in political life are the conclusions arising from the study on the electoral system itself. Arising from the 1995 local government elections, it was noted that a constituency-based system (the ward vote in the local government elections) disadvantages women, while a proportional representation (PR) system means that political parties that adhere to ensuring that a certain quota of candidates on the list are women, have women elected more easily as local government representatives. The 2000 elections confirmed this trend, although there was a significant increase in the number of women elected both to ward seats and on PR lists (Commission on Gender Equality



[CGE], 2001:11). The CGE's analysis of the election results concluded that these figures 'reflect the potential of the ward system to undermine the gains women make on the PR list'.

Does citizens' involvement with public policy issues reflect a steady pattern?

**Figure 39: National mood and electoral cycle**



Source: Markinor (2004)

What figure 39 demonstrates is that in periods of serious and intense interaction and discourse around public policy issues – as during election campaigns – there is better appreciation among the public of the substance of serious issues of transformation and a stronger sense of the direction the country is taking. What is quite striking about the current trend is that the election campaign, combined with the 10th anniversary celebrations, lifted the mood to the same levels as during the 1994 immediate post-election transition, the period of the 'political miracle'.

Public engagement with policy issues and in exercising their human rights does not necessarily translate into knowledge, and consequently utilisation, of the Constitution and institutions specifically set up to address issues of equity.

In a survey about knowledge of the Bill of Rights, the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), the CGE and the Public Protector's Office, over half of respondents had not heard of these institutions and consequently did not understand their functions, namely to identify and combat discrimination of various kinds.

**Table 28: Percentages who have not heard of/do not know the purpose of these institutions by race and gender**

Institution	Race				Gender	
	Afri	Col	Ind	Whi	Male	Female
Public Protector's Office	73,3	74,2	68,6	53,6	68,8	72,6
Bill of Rights	72,4	77,1	76,1	44,2	65,6	72,9
SAHRC	63,6	68,0	56,5	34,9	54,5	65,3
Constitutional Court	62,8	68,8	57,7	39,4	57,3	63,2
CGE	56,6	72,8	37,9	42,4	59,5	66,6

Source: HSRC (2002)

This illustrates that lack of knowledge is linked to social status – reflecting education, class, variety of sources of information, gender and so on – as well as the extent of political and social engagement which would explain the dissonance in the trend between coloured and African respondents against their relative social status.


In terms of the public's access to 'information-they-can-use' (which is directly relevant to their life conditions), a variety of sources are quoted in surveys: schools and hospitals, interaction with other citizens through individuals' social networks, media, direct interaction with public representatives or government officials, and so on.

Forty-eight percent of those surveyed (by Government Communications) indicated that they 'recalled' hearing of the State of the Nation Address presented in May 2004.

Of these, 66% got the information from TV, 24% by word of mouth from friends/family/colleagues, 20% from national radio and 11% from newspapers. This emphasises the critical importance and impact of TV as a medium, but it may also have to do with the fact that those who have access to TV are more engaged with public policy issues.

Overall, research points to less access to media on the part of poor households, with higher income earners enjoying access to a variety of platforms.

**Figure 40: Access to media**



Source: SAARF (2005)

From their own point of view, citizens prefer direct interaction, which in actual practice has not been the pre-eminent form of government communication.

Public interaction with legislative institutions is mainly through organised formations, besides the political parties themselves. As a result, it is mainly resourced individuals and advocates of specific sectoral causes – not seldom with little mandating from communities they purport to represent – who are able actively to interact with the policy-making process.

While the introduction of multi-purpose community centres, with one-stop government centres and community development workers has started to improve direct contact between citizens and government service-providers, the numbers are still too few to make any significant impact. Similarly, community media – and even community radio which has mushroomed in the past decade, with over 80 radio stations set up since 1994 – are too few and far between to become effective platforms for community social intercourse.

Improving the capacity of civil society to interact with the new terrain of constructive engagement rather than just resistance is one of the central challenges of the current period. This is borne out by the inability of communities and their organisations effectively to utilise ward committees, the trade unions in relation to workplace fora and proactive interventions in the restructuring of sectors of the economy, and small business organisations and individual entrepreneurs in terms of taking advantage of assistance programmes in place.

A question has also been raised as to whether freedoms can be abused in instances where the State is hesitant to assert its authority, where legal loopholes can be exploited to protect anti-social activities, or where local legitimacy is undermined by irresponsible public representatives and state organs.

In the recent period, isolated violent demonstrations, conduct of sections of the medical profession in relation to efforts to bring down the price of medicines and, generally, vigilantism in the face of crime, difficulties in regulating informal trading in town centres as well as tax evasion and avoidance techniques honed into a fine art are instances which point to challenges of popular compliance with regulation of social life. Although these can be characterised as exceptions that prove the rule of popular compliance, they can have the effect of chipping at the hardiness of the democratic polity as whole.



## VIII IDENTITY AND SELF-WORTH

The characterisation above illustrates the fact that South Africa is a land of intense social diversity, defined primarily around race, nationality and language, class and religion. How important each of these identities is in the self-definition of South Africans is critical to social cohesion. Do these multiple identities fuse in a melting pot of national identity? Do they co-exist in a variety of multiple combinations, with an overarching common identity emerging in the course of social integration, nation-formation and nation-building?

### 32 Trends in social self-definition

Using FutureFact Mindset Survey data, in 2000, 44% of South Africans considered their primary form of social identification as racial or nationality/language. By September 2001, this had declined with only 22% (12% racial and 10% nationality) using these categories as groups to which they 'belong first and foremost'. Further, there is a suggestion that class identity is rising in prominence. While in 2000, 14% used class or occupational descriptions for primary self-definition, 37% defined themselves in this way in 2004 – while the figure for 1994 was only 3%.

From the FutureFact PeopleScape 2004 Survey of South Africans 16 years and older, the following trends play themselves out:

**Table 29: Primary form of identity**

How would you describe yourself?	Population group				
	Total	Black	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White
<b>Total</b>	29 773 126	22 323 529	2 487 592	777 115	4 184 890
<b>% of total</b>	100%	75%	8%	3%	14%
<b>An African</b>	18%	23%	4%	4%	5%
<b>A South African</b>	53%	44%	78%	70%	82%
<b>Black/white/coloured/Indian</b>	4%	3%	12%	18%	4%
<b>Zulu/Xhosa/Swazi/English/Dutch</b>	14%	18%	1%	0%	2%

Source: FutureFact PeopleScape 2004 Survey

- 71% of these South Africans define themselves either as African or South African, and this is strongest among whites, followed in this order by coloureds, Indians and Africans.
- Language/nationality is strongest as a primary form of identity among Africans (18%) compared with less than 2% among the other racial groups. The language/nationality preponderance seems to be declining from 23% for Africans in 1999 and about 4% for other races.
- Language identity seems to be strongest among those in the lower income bracket, with low educational qualifications.

There is also a slight variation of this in terms of age, with suggestions of a stronger African/South African identity among younger citizens, especially in the age group 25 – 34 years:

**Table 30: Primary self-identity by age**

How would you describe yourself?	Age group				
	Total	16 – 24 years	25 – 34 years	35 – 49 years	50+ years
<b>Total</b>	29 773 126	9 130 289	6 332 386	7 176 261	7 134 190
<b>% of total</b>	100%	31%	21%	24%	24%
<b>An African</b>	18%	20%	18%	21%	14%
<b>A South African</b>	53%	52%	58%	50%	51%
<b>Black/white/coloured/Indian</b>	4%	5%	3%	3%	6%
<b>Zulu/Xhosa/Swazi/English/Dutch</b>	14%	9%	13%	16%	17%

Source: FutureFact PeopleScape 2004 Survey

- comparatively, more young people across all race groups use the identity of African/South African as a self-descriptor
- language/nationality is most pronounced among Africans over 50 years of age.

Is there a relationship between attainment of democracy and improvement in material conditions on the one hand and the growth of national identity on the other? Does it also correspond with improvements in race relations? How do the respondents understand the concepts 'African' and 'South African' and can these be used as a way of salving a conscience and claiming that the past is buried and forgotten and so freezing social relations in their current form? All this is a matter of conjecture; but what is clear is that despite the different meanings that could be attached to these concepts, the trends reflect widespread identification with the territory of South Africa as well as the presence of some society-wide loyalties.

### **33 Identity and social values**

In the discussion on social networks, the chain of social circles stretches from families and households, to relatives and close acquaintances, geographic communities, language/nationality and class, to race and society at large. In addition to this, affiliation to sectoral and political organisations also plays a large part in defining a sense of belonging.

It can be argued that these multiple sites of social intercourse exert significant influence on individuals' social values both as incentives to their social capital and as instruments of regulating behaviour. However, central in determining social behaviour is the system of ownership and distribution of resources, coloured – in the South African setting – by race.

In this context, our social system is a market-based economy which retains most of the features of racial exclusion within which it was constructed. As such, survival-of-the-fittest does inform a great part of society's morality; and individuals and groups ally with one another or act variously in order to thrive in the market jungle: as owners or producers of wealth, as holders of political office or the governed, or as the economically marginalised.



At the same time, efforts to reconfigure social relations – both in terms of the history of struggle and current efforts at reconstruction – pose an alternative value system of human solidarity. Such a value system has as its starting point reform of the economic system compared with the rapacious licence of the apartheid economic order.

Policies to achieve equity and ensure redistribution of wealth and income are aimed at achieving this objective, as is the recognition of the rights of workers. The new Constitution and jurisprudence aim at constructing a legitimate polity and law-governed society.

This requires conscious individuals determined to propagate humane values – in government not enticed by the arrogance and illicit rewards that power can bring; in business not mesmerised by the glitter that purely selfish pursuits can harvest into the personal purse; and in civil society not fazed by mindsets that pour scorn on the humble lifestyle of an honest day's work.

The tension between the reality of a market-based highly competitive social system and the endeavours to build humane and just social relations represents in the same measure tension within value systems and social morality.

As the State seeks to redistribute wealth and income through the fiscus and other instruments, the market, impacted on by global realities, emphasises huge rewards and ostentatious lifestyles among the upper middle strata and owners of capital.

At the same time, lifestyles tend to be determined not only by social status, but also by the desire to flaunt such status – even in instances where remuneration does not allow it. To generalise: so, neighbours compete in conspicuous consumption; poor university students seek other sources of income to keep up with their richer peers; households go into debt to finance unaffordable lifestyles; and the country cannot introduce a low-cost entry vehicle because everyone prefers some 'extra' for comfort





and bragging! Rich and poor are impelled by the demands of an individualistic system to operate on, and sometimes beyond, the margins of legality – be it with regard to finding ways to minimise tax payments, avoiding to pay rates and licences, and succumbing where regulation is weak to the temptation as worker and employer alike to ‘make it’ by fair means or foul.

### **34 Attitudes towards corruption in government**

The HSRC recently began to track public perceptions of corruption. In the 1999 survey, three direct questions were asked about the extent of corruption and government responses to it.

Just over half (53%) of the respondents indicated that they thought corruption within state institutions was increasing, while just less than one quarter (22%) thought it was decreasing. A rather large segment (25%) said they did not know. The recent HSRC’s South African Social Attitudes Survey shows that there appears to be some improvement in the public’s trust in government. At an aggregate level, 55% of respondents in the 2003 survey trusted public institutions compared with 50% of respondents in the 1999 survey.

Within all race groups, an outright majority or close to a majority argued that corruption was increasing. The figures ranged from 45% among Africans, 63% among coloureds, 81% among Asians and 84% among whites.

Among Africans, 27% felt corruption was decreasing with a similar ‘do not know’ figure. Male respondents were slightly more likely to feel that corruption was increasing than female respondents (58% to 50% respectively). Since this was the first time that this question was asked in this way, no clear trends over time can yet be drawn.



**Table 31: Do you think corruption among government officials is increasing or decreasing? (% , rounded off)**

	African	Coloured	Asian	White	All respondents
<b>Increasing</b>	45	63	81	84	53
<b>Decreasing</b>	27	15	9	4	22
<b>Do not know</b>	27	22	10	13	25
<b>Total</b>	99	100	100	100	100

Source: HSRC (1999)

Also of interest is the connection between the perceptions of respondents and their political party affiliations. Supporters of the United Democratic Movement, closely followed by the then Democratic Party had the most negative perceptions. IFP supporters had the most positive attitude.

**Table 32: Major parties' supporters: Is corruption increasing or decreasing? (%)**

	ANC	DP	IFP	NNP	PAC	UDM
<b>Increasing</b>	48	85	30	76	41	89
<b>Decreasing</b>	27	7	41	10	54	6
<b>Do not know</b>	26	8	28	15	6	5
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	10

Source: HSRC (1999)

The data appears to suggest that the balance of opinion among South Africans is that the Government is doing enough to control corruption. Just over one third (34%) believes that the Government is giving 'sufficient' priority while another 17% believes that the Government is giving it 'too high' a priority. Just under one third (30%) believes it gets 'too low' a priority. The remaining 18% reports a 'do not know' response.

These responses, it should be emphasised, reflect opinions on pointed questions pertaining to the public sector: someone else's problem outside of the domain of day-

to-day life in the private sector as it affects the behaviour of employers and employees; outside of community practices on such issues as buying stolen goods. Corporate incidents also point to pervasiveness of this problem within the private sector. These include such specific instances as raids on pension surpluses, blatant theft of shares and the conduct of small businesses which complicate projects such as housing and the provision of transport to learners.

What it does show, though, as an aspirational value system is that the bigger family that is the nation knows that collective survival depends on successful regulation of social behaviour, including elements of the private space in so far as they bear direct relevance to the social sphere. The State, supported by the system of political organisation, is the pre-eminent authority charged with leading this process, and civil society should add to both the formal and informal mechanisms of social regulation and morality.

It can be argued that there is in our country a dominant collective social aspiration to fashion a society that cares, an aspiration informed by the ideals of equity, compassion for the most vulnerable, gender-sensitivity, and honesty in individual and collective behaviour. These are the ideals that inform the core values of the Constitution. The truth, however, is that aspiration and reality do not necessarily, and not always, coincide. Real life, even if it may jar with ideals, influences social behaviour in the here and now.

### **35 Social values and frames of reference**

Issues pertaining to identity and social morality are influenced also by the dominant views in society, which often are in sync with social relations, but which can in some instances be at variance with these relations. As argued above, the values of our society reflect a continuing struggle between survival/prospering in the market jungle and the humaneness of the human spirit.



Beyond the social networks referred to above, the media and creative industries, including performing arts, music, literature, the fashion industry, marketing and advertising as well as educational curricula play a critical role in moulding social behaviour. Constitutional democracy has provided ample space for the flourishing of these expressions and the emergence of new genres.

However, the tension described above between the base instincts spawned by the social system and the aspiration for a caring society manifests itself, perhaps even more intensely, in the creative industries and other means of discourse. Within these areas of social endeavour, the outlook of non-racialism, non-sexism, unity in diversity, democracy, equity, inclusivity and transparency is continually struggling for pre-eminence against value systems attached to the old order: racism, sexism, diversity as a source of social conflict, political and social exclusion and opaqueness.

At the same time, while the art forms that promote new value systems reflect good intentions and are of good content, they may not necessarily be the most creative and attractive. Further, the creative space afforded by the new order is continually under strain, with bounds of sensibility in terms of obscenity, gratuitous violence, insensitivity to human dignity and other offensive portrayals often tested. Commercialism, including cost-cutting measures such as the importation of cheap forms as well as discarding of the concept of public service and public goods in relation to the means of discourse, can impact negatively on the definition of value systems.

Related to all this is the tendency to devalue – both in terms of social status and social rewards – some of the professions that deal with the moulding of social values, particularly pedagogy and the teaching profession from primary to tertiary level, writing, research in social sciences and other such pursuits. Intellectual consumption is then often satiated by imported products (much of them of low quality), with the popularity especially of reading, cinema and live theatre undermined.



An aspect of the challenge is a false 'cosmopolitanism' under the guise of globalisation, which can conceal, though scantily, a paradigm to view Europe, Australia/New Zealand and Northern America as the paragons of civilisation. In the end, this reflects a modernisation of a colonial mindset, a view that South Africa should be an extension of Europe and its historical offshoots 'in the free world'.

Combined with a history in which acceptance or rejection by 'the world' played a crucial role, this can encourage a 'catwalk syndrome' within society: on the one hand, with those who seek to retain apartheid privilege using racial kith-and-kin sentiment across the globe to demand conformity with norms of already 'normal' more equitable societies; and on the other, with those in political office constantly and subconsciously seeking to demonstrate how 'good and civilised' they are.

Much work needs to be done for the nation to use its own prism to define itself, without craving for affirmation from others as the starting point of self-worth. As with instances where individuals are trapped by loyalty to a cause or reliance on employment for self-sustenance to the extent of tolerating abuse, much of South African society, in its mindset, is still struggling to strike the right balance between self-assertion on the one hand and reasonable, principled conformity based on enlightened self-interest on the other.

In the past few years, the discourse and practical programmes on the regeneration of Africa has posited a new frame of reference whose significance is only now starting to be felt. But as with the long march of the African Renaissance itself, this will be a hard slog – protracted in its time frames and slow in shifting paradigms.

## **IX CONCLUSION – DISTILLING THE MAJOR TRENDS**

### **36 Overall characterisation of society**

The data overall points to a society in dynamic change, both materially and spiritually. It is subject to debate whether some of the volatility, for instance in social



mobility, is a reflection merely of immediate corrections to the history of discrimination – the smashing of the glass ceiling in relation to those who already had some opportunity such as education – or a sustained trend of increased access. It should be expected though that, with the expansion of the economic base and BBBEE, such a trend should continue, even if the pace may slacken.

While there is an improving sense of an overarching identity, the persistence of racial profiles with regard to most of the macro-social indicators does illustrate the road yet to be traversed. In terms of ownership and control of wealth and income, access to social services such as health, water, housing, electricity and education; the character of civil-society structures to which individuals belong; and public opinion on various aspects of government activity, this profile is all still too obvious.

How to mediate the tension between a market-based economic system premised on cut-throat competition, and the desire to build a caring society is one of the critical issues that identify themselves. This is not merely a matter of social values, but also one that impacts on public policy: as a tension firstly between encouraging individual self-advancement and collective development, and secondly between encouraging individual excellence and social equity.

From both public policy pronouncements and social discourse, reconstruction and development as well as nation-building and reconciliation have featured as the core issues defining society's endeavours and aspirations. Are these sufficient to capture the public imagination and define a 'national personality'? Do they constitute a vision? Can societies as diverse as ours – as distinct from ones in which language, religion and/or culture are to all intents and purposes homogeneous – define and collectively pursue a national vision?

Overall, the data points to increasing levels of social cohesion, in terms of unity, coherence, functionality and pride among South Africans. However, this is drawn back by the legacy of inequality, intense migratory trends, crime related to social conditions and vestiges of racism in terms of attitudes and practical actions.



### 37 Main social trends

South Africa has experienced an improvement in the quality of life of the majority of citizens, but the backlogs – defined still in terms of race – remain huge. For those on the lowest rung of the socio-economic ladder, there are manifestations of a poverty trap influenced by such factors as education, gender and geographic location and reflected in income, access to opportunities and assets – an expression of two economies in one country.

The system has in the past decade shown a vibrant tendency to provide welcome possibilities, especially where educational opportunities have been provided. The mass migration into the middle strata and beyond, among those who were squashed under the glass ceiling of apartheid is a reflection both of 'normalisation' and the expansion of opportunity. However, inequality even within these strata seems to be increasing.

Data suggests low economic activity and a spirit of entrepreneurship, particularly among African and coloured communities, especially in rural areas. Artisanry and self-employment seem not to be widespread.

Massive migration to areas with higher economic potential confirms the artificiality of the apartheid economic geography, and puts high on the agenda the issue of spatial planning.

The programmes of the democratic Government have put quite a high premium on equity as it applies to targeted groups, including women, children and people with disability. The impact has been discernible, but from a low base. The variety of other social trends such as migration, the poverty trap, and weak social networks affect these groups even more keenly.

Mortality statistics do help to isolate the issues that require attention to improve the health profile of the nation, primarily social conditions and lifestyles. Of critical



importance is to contain the HIV and AIDS epidemic, while using these efforts to improve awareness of health issues generally and improving health infrastructure.

While there is a myriad of causes of a variety of crimes, a critical underlying factor, especially in respect of contact and property-related crimes, is the issue of social conditions. This includes poverty, the built-environment, choice of forms of recreation and so on. Most of these crimes take place in underdeveloped areas among the poor. Combined with this, especially with regard to serious cases of robbery, drug-peddling and commercial crimes, is the element of greed in a society in which 'to make it' is defined in terms of conspicuous riches, irrespective of whether these are acquired by hook or by crook.

### **38 Social networks and social capital**

There is a trend for the nuclear family to recede as a basic unit of organisation, with an increase in single or extended households. At the one level, this reflects the dynamism of a society experiencing social change; but on the other hand, it presents serious challenges of household subsistence in poor areas and the social upbringing of the young.

Many citizens belong to social networks of various kinds outside of family circles. It is striking though that research on this subject suggests that Africans seem to be the least networked: discounting for the fact that burial societies, stokvels and activities related to sport were not included in the research, the critical issue remains that the poor are the ones with the least effective social capital.

Participation in civil-society activities is relatively high, and in broad terms, South African society seems to manifest a high level of socio-political consciousness. This is reflected both in electoral participation and community assertion of rights. It should be noted that empirical data suggests that larger numbers within the white community are recoiling from political involvement; and the level of participation





within the coloured and Indian communities is quite low. However, civil-society participation within these communities is quite high.

Religion is a critical social force among all communities. It is also seen by many as a critical instrument of social intervention, especially in relation to matters of nation-building and reconciliation. While those most active in various religions evince an element of conservatism on some social issues, in broad terms, they reflect the views of the majority of society, and adherence to a particular faith does not seem to translate into rigid political choices.

### **39 Social identity and self-worth**

South Africans evince a strong sense of national identity, at least in terms of association with the geographic and State entity. However, the diversity of society in terms of race, class and nationality/language does manifest a strong presence in the social consciousness. While race and nationality/language seem to be receding as primary forms of self-definition, class identity seems to be on the ascendancy.

The various nationalities or language groups manifest different levels of 'cosmopolitanism' or geographic spread across the country. Many urban areas reflect high levels of acculturation. Multilingualism seems to be quite widespread, especially within the African community, combined with a trend towards English as the real and aspirational language of commercial and political discourse.

In terms of identity, language/nationality features as a secondary form, but quite pronounced within the African community. This is also most prevalent among the elderly and the least educated. This is statistically significant among those aged 50 years and older.

There is general sense that race relations have improved and such experiences and networks as sporting events, the TRC, the church and legislative interventions are



seen as having made a critical contribution to this. Specific rural areas, and the private sector seem to buck this trend or at least to lag behind. At the same time, complaints of racism among especially whites and coloureds seem to reflect a sense of insecurity arising from the formal elimination of exclusive privileges.

Society's value systems reflect a tension between market-based competitive relations and the aspiration for equitable development in a caring society. This tension finds expression in the creative sphere and mediums of discourse. There is also a continuing struggle to affirm an Afrocentric consciousness against a mindset to glorify everything in developed countries as invincible and infallible. This in part reflects a social pathology to seek affirmation from other nations and thus to view ourselves through the prism of other countries' opinions.

Overall, the chain of inherited social attributes – across distribution of wealth and income; access to social services such as education, housing, water and electricity; lifestyles, including sizes of households and age demographics; health and mortality profiles; forms of social organisation and social capital; and matters of identity and culture – still manifests itself, though decreasingly, in terms of racial fault-lines. With regard to a number of attributes, the younger generation seems to evince practices, attitudes and an identity that is strongly integrative.



**X CONCLUDING REMARKS**

- 41 There is a need, at least more effectively, to articulate an overarching vision for the country attached to which should be the detailed programmes and partnerships already in place.
- 42 The drive to grow the economy and ensure that the benefits of such growth are equitably shared should be expedited.
- 43 Socio-economic interventions should take into account the various trends noted in this document, especially to ensure that the manner of implementation of programmes reinforces the principle that South African society, by providing opportunities, does not reproduce inequality.
- 44 The dynamics of migration and the demographics they spawn should inform a spatial perspective in planning and implementing economic and social interventions.
- 45 Society should encourage forms of social organisation at the basic level that promote social cohesion, especially better household environments and communities for the upbringing of children, such as the strengthening of nuclear family households: while this should be pursued in partnership with civil society, including faith-based organisations, state leverage should be employed where appropriate.
- 46 The outlook of social partnership to achieve national objectives should permeate all of government's work, and should be encouraged across society. This would help address issues of citizen obligations in exercising rights; but also discourage a passive dependence on the State as the provider of all solutions to all social challenges.

- 47 The recommendations in this document should also be weighed against the outcome of discussions on the capacity and organisation of the State.
- 48 The Presidency's Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services is pursuing various areas of research, such as the National Income Dynamics Study, which would be updated on an ongoing basis to track trends in the major macro-socio-economic indicators and further improve public policy interventions and programmes as we better understand households' socio-economic decision-making.
- 49 Overall, this discussion document depicts major trends that require attention and national effort, not only of government but, of all of our society.
- 50 The launch of this discussion document for public discourse provides an opportunity for interaction across society on these issues. On its part, government is distilling the conclusions of the report for their implications on public policy. Taking into account public comments, specific macro-social development interventions will be developed for implementation.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

1. **ACDP**: African Christian Democratic Party
  2. **AMPS**: All Media and Products Survey
  3. **ANC**: African National Congress
  4. **BBBEE**: Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment
  5. **BEE**: Black Economic Empowerment
  6. **CGE**: Commission on Gender Equality
  7. **DA**: Democratic Alliance
  8. **DoH**: Department of Health
  9. **DP**: Democratic Party
  10. **ECD**: Early Childhood Development
  11. **FNB/BER**: First National Bank/ Bureau for Economic Research
  12. **GBH**: grievous bodily harm
  13. **GCIS**: Government Communication and Information System
  14. **GDC**: Gender, disability and children
  15. **GEM**: Global Entrepreneurship Monitoring
  16. **HIV and AIDS**: Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired Immune-Deficiency Syndrome
  17. **HRC**: Human Rights Commission
  18. **HSRC**: Human Sciences Research Council
  19. **IEC**: Independent Electoral Commission
  20. **IFP**: Inkatha Freedom Party
  21. **ISS**: Institute for Security Studies
  22. **KIDS**: KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study
  23. **LFS**: Labour Force Survey
  24. **LSM**: Living Standards Measure
  25. **MPCCs**: Multi-purpose Community Centres
  26. **MRC**: Medical Research Council
  27. **NIDS**: National Income Dynamics Study
  28. **PR**: Proportional Representation
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29. **PSLSD**: Project for Statistics on Living Standards
30. **SAARF**: South African Advertising Research Foundation
31. **SADC**: Southern African Development Community
32. **SAIRR**: South African Institute of Race Relations
33. **SAPS**: South African Police Service
34. **SME**: Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
35. **SMME**: Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises
36. **SONA**: State of Nation Address
37. **Stats SA**: Statistics South Africa
38. **TEA**: Total Entrepreneurship Activity
39. **TRC**: Truth and Reconciliation Commission
40. **TYR**: Ten Year Review
41. **UDM**: United Democratic Movement
42. **US**: United States (of America)

