

**PROCEEDINGS REPORT
The Second SADC CIVIL SOCIETY FORUM
THEME**

**“DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE & REGIONAL ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION”**

Hosted by

**THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COUNCIL
OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
(SADC-CNGO)**



In partnership with

THE ELECTORAL INSTITUTE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA (EISA)



**14 – 16 AUGUST
MASERU, LESOTHO**

In cooperation with:



Table of Contents

Session 1: Official Opening

Chair: Seabata Motsamai, Executive Director, LCN, Lesotho

1.1	Welcome Remarks: Mabusetša Lenka, <i>President, LCN, Lesotho</i>	7
1.2	Background and Objectives of the Forum, Ms Ilona Tip, Senior Advisor – Conflict Management & Democracy Education, EISA	7
1.3	Opening Remarks: Ted Emmanuel Nandolo, President of SADC-CNGO	9
1.4	Keynote Address: SADC Executive Secretary, Dr Tomaz Salmao	9
1.5	Official Opening: Hon. Minister of Finance, Lesotho, Dr Timothy Thahane	11

Session 2: 1st SADC Civil Society Forum Progress Report 10

Chair: Dr Khabele Matlosa, Senior Research, EISA

2.1	Lessons & Experiences from the 1 st SADC CSO Forum Abie Dithake, General Secretary, SADC-CNGO	14
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Session 3: SADC Structure and Civil Society

Chair: Angela Muvumba, CCR

3.1	Civil Society Engagement, Governance and Poverty in the SADC Region, Chris Landsberg, Executive Director, CPS & Sue Mbaya, Executive Director, SARPN	16
3.2	AU/NEPAD/APRM Structures and Processes and How Civil Society Can Engage, by Litha Musyimi-Ogana	17
3.3	ECOSOCC: Processes and Programmes, Charles Mutasa	22

Session 4: Democratic Governance

Chair: Ms Mats'eliso Ntsoelikane, Co-ordinator, TRC, Lesotho

4.1 Thematic Panel Presentation

- | | | |
|-------|--|----|
| 4.1.1 | Elections and Democracy, <i>Khabele Matlosa, ESA</i> | 24 |
| 4.1.2 | Gender and Democracy, <i>Mrs Keiso Matashane-Marite, WLSA-Lesotho</i> | 25 |
| 4.1.3 | Peace, Security, HIV/AIDS and Democracy, <i>Angela Muvumba, CCR</i> | 27 |
| 4.1.4 | Human Rights and Democracy, <i>Corlett Letlojane, HURISA</i> | 28 |
| 4.1.5 | Access to Justice and Democracy, <i>Professor Haroub Othman, SALAN</i> | 29 |

4.2 Panel on Regional Funding

- | | | |
|-------|---|----|
| 4.2.1 | <i>Making Governance Work for the Poor, Kemi Williams, Senior Social Development Advisor, DFID</i> | 32 |
| 4.2.2 | <i>Strategic Policy Priorities, Neville Gabriel, Executive Director, Southern Africa Trust</i> | 34 |
| 4.2.3 | <i>African Governance & Monitoring, OSISA/AFRIMAP
Tawanda Mutasah Executive Director, OSISA</i> | 35 |

Session 5: Regional Economic Integration

Chair: Ted Nandolo, Executive Director, CONGOMA, Malawi

- | | | |
|-----|--|----|
| 5.1 | Social Impact of Macroeconomic Policies Constraints to Deepening SADC Integration:
The Way Forward – <i>Chinyamata Chipeta, SAIER</i> | 38 |
| 5.2 | Perceptions of Non-State-Actors about Regional Integration,
<i>Klaus Schade, NEPRU</i> | 40 |

Session 6: Engaging SADC

Chair: Ted Nandolo

6.1 Reports from Working Groups & Commissions

6.1.1 Human Rights and Access to Justice Group1 43

6.1.2 Regional Thematic Organization National Lead Agency G2 43

6.1.3 Regional Economic integration G3 44

6.2 Presentation, Discussion and adoption of the Communiqué

Chair: Abie Dillhake, Secretary General SADC-CNGO 46

6.3 Closing Remarks, Abie Dillhake, GS of SADC-CNGO 50

Introduction and Background

This report is a record of proceedings of the 2nd SADC Civil Society Forum, held on August 14 – 16, 2006 in Khotsong Lodge, just outside Maseru, Lesotho, ahead of the SADC Heads of State and Governments Summit.

The Civil Society Forum, hosted by SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organizations (SADC-CNGO) in collaboration with Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA), supported by Southern Africa Trust, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Commonwealth Foundation. The forum further represented progress and development of southern Africa's civil society desire to engage with regional interstate policy and development processes.

The Second Civil Society Forum had the following Objectives:

- Develop an understanding of SADC structures and programmes and how they interface with civil society organizations;
- Provide a civil society perspective on what constitutes democratic governance in SADC and how non-state organizations can influence state-driven projects;
- Provide a civil society perspective of what constitutes regional economic integration and how to engage with integration agenda and bring people in and;
- Develop a concrete plan of action that will become an annual plan of SADC-CNGO for the year 2007

The following four thematic areas were identified to guide the deliberations

- SADC Structures and Programmes and their relations with civil society formations
- Democratic Governance and Civil Society
- Regional Economic Integration and Civil Society and
- Programme of Action for Civil Society engagement

As both the objectives and the thematic areas evidence, the Forum has as its focus and expected outcomes a deliberate bias towards unified and coordinated civil society engagement through collaborative programme of action for the next 12 months.

Thus, following on the inaugural Forum held in Gaborone, Botswana in 2005, this 2nd SADC Civil Society Forum proved to be an advancement and progress as evidenced by the following:

- All major regional thematic organization invited participated and presented strategic inputs based on their sectoral experience and expertise;
- They further agreed to take responsibility of coordinating and implementing thematic outcomes relating to their specific areas of operation;
- A Coordinating task Team was elected to work with SADC-CNGO in realizing implementation of the resolution and follow-up on the communiqué;
- Both the SADC Executive Secretary and the in-coming Chairperson of the Council of Ministers attended and presented papers;
- The communiqué was presented to the chairperson of the Council of Ministers, and a follow-up has been agreed upon;

- A joint dinner was held with Ministers from all SADC member-states as an indication of commitment for future engagement;
- Social movements had their parallel summit, indicating the significance of bringing SADC processes to the attention of broader citizens;

As is evident from the above, the Forum is beginning to play a major role in regional integration and development by bringing citizens closer to regional processes, and thus ensuring that leaders begin to take on board and in confidence the aspirations of their citizens. The major challenge however, is the consolidation of these developments and initiatives by implementing the outcomes and mobilizing ordinary citizens to take effective and direct interest in the regional affairs they affect their future.

Finally, the Forum has achieved its objectives, but also set in place expectations that we cannot afford to disappoint. The papers presented during the Forum are many and lengthy, and can be accessed on request from the SADC-CNGO.

Abie Dithake,

General Secretary, SADC-CNGO

Monday, August 14, 2006

Session 1: Official Opening

Chair: Seabata Motsamai, Executive Director, LCN, Lesotho

1.1 Welcome Remarks: Mabuseisa Lenka, President, Lesotho Council of NGOs

As a hosting country and member organization of SADC-CNGO, Mr. Lenka welcomed delegates both to Lesotho and the 2nd Civil Society Forum as follows:

- Civil Society in the SADC region is beginning to grapple with issues of regional integration and globalization;
- This forum follows immediately after the 1st SADC-CNGO Regional Assembly over the past two days, which also deliberated on organizational questions and regional policy challenges;
- Regionalism is a process where states and non-state actors come together to ensure that integration benefit all member states and regional citizens;
- Some would like to make a distinction between regionalism as an inactive process, merely a state of being there; and regionalization as an active process, one with more political deliberateness than the other;
- Thus, for us here today we may wish to define ourselves, to find our position on the spectrum;
- With these few words I wish to induct us into today's programme which forms the first day of this year's 2nd SADC Civil Society Forum, and wish you all the best in the deliberations that will follow;

1.2 Background and Objectives of the Forum, Ms Ilona Tip, Senior Advisor – Conflict Management & Democracy Education, EISA

In her presentation, Ms Tip indicated that EISA has the honour and privilege of co-hosting the second SADC Civil Society Forum jointly with the SADC Council of NGOs. She highlighted the following:

- That the Forum fittingly identified Democratic Governance and Regional Economic Integration at a time when, in the words of Dr Khabele Matlosa, "two of the most daunting challenges facing the African continent today revolve around the institutionalization of democratic governance and the achievement of sustainable human development";
- Economic development of countries in Africa in general and the SADC region in particular, has for decades been adversely affected by factors such as international business cycles, droughts and floods, foreign debt, political and civil strife and the HIV/AIDS epidemic;
- Whilst there have been significant strides towards democratic governance with the DRC recently holding its first democratic multiparty election since 1965 and Angola scheduled to hold election in 2007, the question we need to ask ourselves is: do we as a region and as part of the African continent, have the will to ensure that both economic development and democratic governance take root and consequently bear fruit for the region's peoples?
- If we paint a broad brush stroke of the SADC region we note that 7% of the world's combined surface area makes up the SADC region and 3.5% of the world population;

- The SADC regions total GNP is 0% of that of the world in 1998 and contributes 0.8% of the world's exports;
- At the same time the SADC region has vast discrepancies in terms of social conditions and wealth where for example you have illiteracy rates of 20% of males between the age of 15 and 24 in Malawi, 10% in South Africa, and 28% in Mozambique. Or for example you have 245 fax machines per population of 10 000 in Mauritius and 1 in Zambia in figures released in 1996, or 21 television sets per 1000 people in Tanzania and 2 in Malawi (1997 figures);
- Throughout the whole continent, SADC is regarded as the worst affected region in regard to the number of HIV and AIDS infected people with the region carrying 37% of the world cases;
- This brief synopsis clearly highlights the enormous challenges facing the region which may inhibit the achievement of democratic governance and regional economic integration;

This Civil Society Forum, the second of its kind since 2005, comes at an opportune time as it seeks to meet the following objectives:

- Develop an understanding of SADC structures and Programmes and how they interface with civil society organizations;
- Provide a civil society perspective on what constitutes democratic governance in SADC and how non-state organizations can influence state-driven projects;
- Provide a civil society perspective of what constitutes regional economic integration and how to engage with integration agenda and bring people in and;
- Develop a concrete plan of action that will become an annual plan of SADC-CNGO for the year 2007

As is evident from the Forum objectives there is a strong emphasis on the role that civil society can and should play in meeting these objectives. This can best be achieved through a strategic partnership between the state and non-governmental sector. However this partnership needs to be a co-operative relationship based on reciprocity between equals where we pool our strengths so that we can achieve a mutually beneficial outcome. Hence, again, the significance of holding this Forum back-to-back with the SADC Summit of the Heads of State and Government scheduled for Thursday 17 August 2006. For democracy to be deepened and development to take place there needs to be continuous and systematic engagement of the state institutions by the civil society pressure, continually highlighting the key issues and monitoring progress.

The concept note for this Forum has identified four thematic areas on which it will focus in the next two days to assist us in reaching the forum objectives, namely:

- SADC Structures and Programmes and their relations with civil society formations
- Democratic Governance and Civil Society
- Regional Economic Integration and Civil Society and
- Programme of Action for Civil Society engagement

Last but not least, let me reiterate that it is a golden opportunity that this Civil Society Forum is taking place at not only the same time, but in the same country, as the SADC Heads of State and Government Summit. This is an opportunity for civil society to make its voice heard and begin to engage state institutions more pro-actively and more systematically. I hope and trust that we will sustain the momentum and reap palatable

fruits from the deliberations of this second forum of the SADC Civil Society organizations as we discuss the interface between democracy and regional economic integration.

1.3 Opening Remarks: Emmanuel Ted Nandolo, President, SADC-CNGO

Mr. Nandolo began his opening remarks joking that “We are not used to being addressed as presidents because that may make us take into unfamiliar habits, but it is nice of course to be so addressed”. His brief remarks were:

- We are gathered here to take stock of developments since our last, indeed our inaugural Forum;
- The theme of this year's forum is Democratic Governance and Economic Integration, and there is no doubt that the two are pillars of improvement of people's lives. It is through them that we can attain greater transparency, accountability and inclusiveness;
- Even foreign direct investment emphasizes these principles. We have come a long way;
- The presence of the Minister for Local Government of Lesotho in the SADC-CNGO 1st Regional Assembly that just ended here yesterday is a sign of that progress;
- Ten years ago this could have not been possible but now that is common in all our countries. Challenges still remain of course, some countries still avoid these principles, and we need to be resilient in lobbying for the removal of such obstacles;
- Our own actions must be guided by the same principles. We should ourselves be committed to the achievement of these ideals in our ranks;
- Our institutions are today called individual NGOs or individual CSOs. Unless we leave this image behind us our journey will not achieved the betterment of the region's people.

1.4 Keynote Address by SADC Executive Secretary, Dr Tomaz Salomao

In his keynote address, Dr. Salomao indicated that SADC is a 14-member organization, and that there is hope Seychelles will rejoin during the current Summit following their departure the previous year. As he is 51 years old, he hinted that he is considering retirement. He was 27 years old when he took his first public position under President Samora Machel during a difficult time for our region. Some of us were eyewitness to that. By October we have reason to celebrate 20 years of the death of President Samora Machel. Some of our region's freedom fighters died in Mozambique, some are still alive. President Mbeki may today be the president of South Africa but for us in Mozambique he is “chief”. The former Deputy President Jacob Zuma and Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma got married in Mozambique.

In 1994 we had a region completely free in political terms, making it possible some years later to end the conflict in Mozambique, after Mandela's release from prison. In 1999 RENAMO and the government signed peace. Three years ago in Cape Town, the DRC parties signed a peace agreement, making the 30th July 2006 democratic election possible. We have to appreciate the long way we have traveled. Sometimes we tend to forget how much we as the citizens have done to attain peace, and without peace we cannot survive. During the war in Mozambique the only way to my home was flying. After peace I took 16 hours to get home over a distance of 600 kilometres, and I counted 1000 landmines. According to AU report our region is the most peaceful among IGAD, Central Africa, North Africa, ECOWAS, and the EAC. The challenge is how to maintain and

preserve the peace, how to build democratic institutions and how to maintain them, how to build national capacity to face our main challenges.

Our challenge is to pursue peace, to build democratic institutions, to maintain them, to build national capacity to tackle more of the modern challenges. The SADC currently has five main priorities:

- Peace, political stability, democracy, and security
- Promotion of free movement of people and goods to boost our market, to trade among ourselves, to bring our rural farmers to the market. If we put barriers, people will jump those barriers and die. It is the responsibility of governments to facilitate movement.
- Women are 60% of the SADC population. Our first target should be women. If we empower women, we could change the society and we can have a more peaceful region. A mother will do everything to ensure that a child does not die
- Infrastructure development. Apart from South Africa, the quality of the infrastructure in the region is poor especially in the rural areas; but 85% of our people live in rural areas. We need to improve the infrastructure of schools, hospitals, communication and with electricity we can send people to school at night and roads give us access to the market.
- Food security: we have land, some of our countries have little water but we have land. We have water and good climate, but we continue to beg for food as a region of 230 million people. We have had drought for ten years, so it is part of us. We have large strong rivers. Food security is a matter of pride, a matter of respect. No one will respect you if you can not feed your house. You cannot control the emotion of someone with an empty stomach. Our mothers' trade tomatoes on the roadside but do not know how to preserve tomato. One week later they throw it away and one week later they go to the market to buy EU tomato.
- HIV/AIDS: The number of deaths in the world caused by HIV/AIDS last year was 2.5 million. Of these deaths, 2 million occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa, and of that number some 1.5 were in the SADC region. Only Zimbabwe managed to bring the situation under control. HIV/AIDS always combines with food security. We should change our attitude from surrender, to collective survival, to share information and sustain treatment by knowing our status.
- Science and technology for research: how do we bring back our researchers, how do we harness local wisdom. It was only two weeks ago when two African doctors tried to cross from Celta to Gibraltar and one died. We need to avoid the CNN syndrome of the disease of Afro pessimism. It is up to civil society to put pressure within institutionalized framework, sometime to force the governments to do the right things. There is nothing wrong with that because often we are in same boat with slight differences, and development is about difference. We are not in the world to suffer. We are a continent of hope; a continent of values. We

can export value to the rest of the world even if we have nothing else. Lumumba, Nkrumah, Mwalimu and others did their part now is our time and now is our part.

Open Forum Discussions

Question: On the priority action areas of SADC as you have outlined them, how do we go

beyond the rhetoric to action, for meaningful change, how will you take us there?

Answer: I have been in office for only ten months. I have to spend time with member states on what went wrong. I am addressing the Summit for the first time over the next few days. I am used to being honest, frank and blunt and I intend to do just that. Give me time yet, and we shall continue with this dialogue. Mr. Mogae, the outgoing chairperson of SADC, has said to me the Protocols are there, the programme is there, now let us go to action.

Question: How do we address the imbalance between South Africa and the region, for example, how can we change the fact that South African corporations are taking over the entire region?

Answer: I agree with you but let's be careful not to send a wrong message. First let's be frank with South Africa. When we talk about poverty we include South Africa. Second, it is true that some RSA corporations do not behave properly in the SADC region. Radical decisions of former comrades at political level are blocked by middle level corporate managers who stick to apartheid culture. South Africa has admitted that it does not have capacity in certain critical areas, including in understanding the region. We need a strong RSA as a region, and we can share the benefits of that stature among ourselves as a region, for example the World Cup 2010.

Question: Why can't we make empowerment of women a priority?

Answer: The role of SADC national committees should be exploited as a space where the stakeholders come together to advance SADC agenda, which include civil society participation. Gender is also a priority and the problem is what do we do at national, regional and continental levels? I have managed to visit all the countries except Mozambique for obvious reasons, and I gave them three distinct messages: ownership, visibility, and inclusion.

Question: I'm a relief worker in Mozambique traveling on Zimbabwe passport and every time I get a single entry visa and often left frustrated. Two people could not make it to this meeting for lack of transit visas through South Africa.

Answer: Some countries which did not sign the protocol on free movement for example have since signed, and this is a bold sign of progress, of commitment. Your role is to keep asking your governments to do the same, something is wrong especially between Zimbabwe and Mozambique if there is still visa between the two countries.

1.5 Official Opening: Hon. Minister of Finance, Lesotho, Dr Timothy Thahane

Dr. Thahane began by acknowledging that he is glad to have got the tail end of exchange with "my friend, brother and colleague", Dr Salomao, because some of the issues he raised are what we have held conversations about over the years. As some of us worked behind doors toward the birth of what became the SADCC, we made a myriad of assumptions about the future of the region: let us assume apartheid is gone, Zimbabwe is free and Mozambique has independence then what kind of life would we lead. The Frontline States were coming in, and developments were in quick flux. With the completion of political independence our leaders decided to come together and form the Community. For the Community to work we need working institutions, free movement of people and goods, a culture of competition; and the Community needs to grow. We

have to ask ourselves what our timeline is and what are the difficulties to overcome, what are the possible partnerships?

- Democratic governance is important to any community, both the bigger and the small need to be listened to. We need to have community values recognizing the dignity of human rights. Human rights must underpin our community. Voice must be given to the people: participation, consultation, equality are essential. As human society, we are composed of men and women and children and we need to value them all. Children in particular, need to be valued, protected, and educated. We need to interact with outside world so education is essential. With our community what are the critical skills and how do we share them? We continue to have segregated curricula, visas, differential charges for tuition. Our civil society has a role to play here. We need to learn one other's languages while not denying diversity of languages. For our community three languages are recognized that is Portuguese, French and English. It is not too much to learn at least these three.
- On the political processes: peace, stability, and security are central pillars of any community. Elections have been held throughout SADC, and civil society organizations have been verifying them. We need civic education. The Summit has created the OPDS, we have Community troops undertaking regular common exercises, and peace missions in places like the DRC. We should all go beyond a fence-sitting type of criticism to research, dialogue and participation.
- On regional economic integration: wealth is created not through production only but also through trade. Countries like Japan and Singapore are rich because of trade, so what is the path to follow from here? We need at least the following:
 - I. A functioning, efficient infrastructure;
 - II. Removal of tariffs and documentary hassles;
 - III. An integrated communication network, electricity, water resources, rail and road linkages;
 - IV. Who are the leaders and the parties to be held accountable in these processes, and where do we place the priorities? Education is important but not sufficient. The SADC National Committees are important building blocks;
 - V. Policy harmonization;
 - VI. HIV/AIDS: this disease makes it impossible to build the Community, but it also spells there will be no Community if we continue to die at these rates;
 - VII. Food security is also important. We have water in Lesotho and supply to South Africa but Botswana does not have so it needs to be given to the whole region. Our countries are productive but we need to find the way to move food around the region. We can feed ourselves but the challenge is to define path towards our common goal and to organize ourselves in partnership, not competition.

Open Forum Discussions

Question: Why is it that from the priorities of the Executive Secretary and from the Minister, SADC does not seem to emphasize the needs of the disabled?

Answer: I do not think the fact that the disabled are not mentioned in the priorities means they do not exist because they are there in SADC treaty. I have said we should prioritize but that does not mean to neglect other things. In the ministry, we discuss issues

and we appreciate the fact that civil society organizations bring other smaller issues for the government to consider. It is best to negotiate issues before the financial year ends, so I will be looking forward to deal with the disabled.

Question: How do we get to a situation where SADC can answer the hard questions like in Zimbabwe, where SADC has always been reluctant to answer the Zimbabwe question?

Answer: Lesotho has been heading the OPDS, and we are the incoming chair of SADC, and we shall remain seized with the matter. SADC has not been silent but there has been intensive discussion with Zimbabwe even at the last Summit. The difficult question is at what point do we negotiate in public? Do we have to follow the OXFAM way or social movements' way? Let us adopt a position where our leaders can talk to us and not feel ashamed. This also touches on the values which the countries have committed themselves to.

Question: Why is it that SADC is busy negotiating with EU with which we have no common agenda, and which is bent on pursuing the macroeconomic policies that are destroying our industries?

Answer: It is not empirically proven that macroeconomic stability policies lead to impoverishment of the mass of people. What this needs is a complementary microeconomic dynamism. This is where civil society and partnership ethos leads. You may otherwise end up in the horns of dilemma of growth without social development.

Question: You say South Africa does not have water and that is why you are selling water to it, but aren't you overlooking the needs of rural people in Lesotho who depend on the natural springs for water?

Answer: The water would still be harnessed by South Africa even if we did not dam the rivers and sell it to South Africa. But now we have the royalties. We have a low lands water supply study which has produced the Metolong Dam project for low lands water supply. We are looking at wetlands and their potential. It is not correct that we are not considering the ordinary people of Lesotho. The Lesotho Highlands Water Project supplies money for water supply to local people.

Vote of Thanks: Mr. Motsamai, Executive Director, LCN

The coming of the Minister to this forum shows that our two parties wish to build the SADC together. We shall be coming up with a communiqué at the end of the forum, which we intend to present to the Council of Ministers, and we hope the honourable Minister and his colleagues will be in a position to receive it.

Session 2: 1st SADC Civil Society Forum Progress Report

Chair: Dr Khabele Matlosa, Director of Research, EISA

2.1 Lessons & Experiences from the 1st SADC CSO Forum

Abie Dithake, General Secretary, SADC-CNGO

We should take stock and say where it is that we are doing well and where it is that we are faltering; and improve on our strengths while limiting the weaknesses. The SADC Secretariat shall not participate in this Forum because the SADC has a standing principle that they do not participate in anything outside SADC when Summit is sitting. Therefore, we will not have SADC Secretariat input in this session that deals with the SADC structures and how they work. There will be no presentation of country reports, but they will be e-mailed, mainly from participants of the SADC-CNGO Regional Assembly which was concluded yesterday in this venue.

Mr. Dithake presented the following observations:

- Since the 1st SADC Civil Society Forum, we presented the communiqué to the Chair of SADC, President Festus Mogae, and later with Executive Secretary, Dr Thomaz Salomao. Though we have not received official response, the room for engagement is emerging. The Executive Secretary and the incoming Chair of the Council have said the way to interact is for us to meet at the Forum or the SADC-CNGO present our recommendations and put forward the issues we want for their consideration well in advance, which looks impossible for this current Summit.
- We could not meet with some thematic network post the forum as we wanted due to resource constraints.
- We however, undertook fact-finding mission to Zimbabwe.
- We also had three meetings acquainting ourselves with the SADC directorates. There is a need to meet concrete, individual directorates according to their specific mandate.
- Presently, SADC-CNGO does not have the required capacity for meeting this challenge but these reside in the various thematic networks. It is for this reason that we propose a coordinating structure of about five people composed of thematic networks, and which will play a role of clearing house following the forum. The purpose is to play a supportive and back-up role?
- We need to find productive, non-workshop modes of interaction and engagement with SADC processes. How do we crack the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security? We may engage the Secretariat, but what about the Summit? To what extent is the Secretariat independent and capable of taking action against the deviant member states? Can the Secretariat deal with the members' violation of the protocols and treaties? Can the SADC-Parliamentary Forum be more than a mere semi-NGO that the Summit takes it to be? Could a SADC parliament not be created to bridge the accountability gap between the Summit and member-states?
- How many of us as civil society organizations have the capacity to monitor the non-compliance of member-states with the Protocols?
- In a different note, a question was raised yesterday in the SADC-CNGO Regional Assembly: how do we define ourselves? Do we simply depend on international organizations to champion our cause or we require their solidarity in matters that we lead as regional organizations representing the interests and aspirations of our

constituencies and communities? If that is the case, how then do we explain the debate in Botswana, the Survival International's involvement with the fate of the Basarwa in contrast with the alleged silence of local NGOs?

- How do we explain the limited internal solidarity with the people of Zimbabwe? Could we be making a greater impact by holding a protest at the Summit as it has been proposed, without supporting mandate and actions from our constituencies and communities on the ground in the individual countries, which could mandate our Heads of State coming to the Summit differently? In the first instance, the Summit deliberations and resolutions should be based on, and informed by national mandates, especially arising from multi-stakeholder forums such as SADC National Committees. That is our challenge.

2.1.1 Open Forum Discussion following Mr. Dithake's presentation

Question: Sequencing, timing and structures: how can we synchronize our meeting with the SADC council meetings? How about effectiveness of attending international organizations?

Answer: There is no guarantee that such synchronization would achieve the results, but what is important is how can we do things differently? Can we do things in a more fundamental purpose than mere proceduralism? Most SADC National Committees (SNCs) are not functional though there could be differences of experience and impacts. There is no enforcement mechanism. It depends on brotherhood bond established at the regional level by the leaders. Both SADC and member-states have commitment to CSOs involvement, but what happens on the ground? We must open up all spaces of possibility and opportunity. The AU has a guarantee for participation of civil society; but could SADC move to the same ethos including speaking rights for the CSOs and the establishment of regional-type ECOSOCC?

Question: The minister and the Executive Secretary say we should engage constructively but where is the platform and the framework? We cannot divorce SADC from member states. They brandish the magic stick of being the elected and use it to monopolize decision-making.

Comment: There is a problem engaging SADC, but the movement is dead at the national level. The SNCs are dead at the national level. A non-state actor's desk should be established at SADC but so far our only door is the Directorate of Social and Human Development Programme, which is not structured for handling precisely the kinds of issues we are raising?

Question: Are we discussing the same thing with the summit or are we moving in a different direction? We would have expected the Executive Secretary to share with us what the Summit is going to discuss especially if we are timing our Forum to coincide with the Summit. Moving from rhetoric to action: can we commit ourselves to at least one issue over the next 12 months for example, the free movement of persons in SADC? We had a good communiqué. We however failed to act on some of our useful decisions.

Answer: We have to count our blessings. Last year the Council of Ministers found itself speaking to our agenda. Most of our resolutions are still useful what they need is to be resourced. There is a disconnection between this Forum and the national level discussion. We still want this Forum to be a primary channel forgetting that SADC is an intergovernmental organization. We still come here and convene only two days before the Summit.

Session 3: SADC Structure and Civil Society

Chair: Angela Muvumba, CCR

3.1 Civil Society Engagement, Governance and Poverty in the SADC Region: Chris Landsberg, Executive Director, CPS & Sue Mbaya, Executive Director, SARP

Presentation was about the method of engagement and approach. He emphasized that for us to engage effectively with SADC, we should know the SADC calendar as to who meet, how, and where? In the engagement method, he highlighted the following considerations:

- First, we need the rules of engagement;
- Second, it must be a mutual process characterised by commitment to reciprocity; and
- Third the political, social and economic spaces must exist. We should not take too seriously our borders.

They further outlined the following areas:

- ❖ Evidence based research: Our approach to research should be evidence-based. When we call for transparency, our opponents hit back by questioning the legitimacy of the NGOs. Be engaged in your institution, failing which we run a risk of surrendering the ground to the adversaries. Our policies should be based on empirical research which will include:
 - I. Availability of evidence;
 - II. Credibility, that is quality of high standard;
 - III. Extent of consultation before generalization that is work-rooted;
 - IV. Relevance;
 - V. Accessibility.
- ❖ Sequencing and timing: The Botswana meeting had impact, and we shouldn't lose steam. We should work on eight months programme that targets the October month since SADC operates on two processes of troikas that determine policy decisions.
 - Heads of State Summit troika, and security and defense troika (OPDS).
 - In October officials, presidents and ministers come to a meeting and set the agenda for the next meeting.
 - Beginning of January is the Council of Ministers' meeting.
 - The Integrated Council of Ministers comes in May where SADC deals with economic and social issues.
 - Politics and governance issues come aboard only in July and there are two key elements - the political structure (defense) and diplomatic policy.
 - We should also target chances like the evening dinner sessions with the ministers, like the one we are having this evening.

Further made the following observations:

- We are faced with problems of resource constraints, inequality, weak political structure and poverty which all result from low income rates.

- Land centralization in our region is a major challenge. Good governance should include placing and resourcing the poor on land for development. SADC land arbitration institution has been established and we should make sure that it addresses the corruption in land allocation.
- Priority services to the poor and increasing spending directly to the poor should be encouraged.
- We should be able to influence state institutions that take care of the resources.
- HIV/AIDS is caused by poverty and is accelerated by poverty and 49% of the population is affected in the SADC region. Impacts of HIV/AIDS are that it impairs the functioning of institutions;
- There is a decline in agriculture and depletion of human capital. A nation can expect a 1% decrease of GNP and a 20% rise in the number of deaths.
- Functions of institutions are declining.
- Poverty and gender: girls and women are more affected by HIV/AIDS. Young women do not access things like education and this decreases the level of participation.
- On poverty, security and infrastructure institutions should work together. Land, financial and marketing institutions are few.
- The Maputo Declaration seems to have had little impact and we should hold our rulers' accountable, demand more compliance.
- Food security has been very much externalized for example Malawi's key conflict was food; 50% of annual costs are externally sourced.
- Democratic space for debate is needed.
- Food security situation is accelerated by lack of land, corruption and mismanagement.
- Poverty has also been attributed to the liberal economic reforms introduced years back.
- Democracy in many states is still young, for example in the DRC, government is facing grave challenges. This creates challenges and opportunities for cultivation of civil society. Swaziland still has a problem of an absolutist and anti-democratic monarchy. Angola has little peace, there is no democracy. Lesotho cannot provide employment and is experiencing a growing HIV/AIDS problem. Zimbabwe has a problem of a rapidly shrinking economy because of government that does not acknowledge and accommodate civil society.
- We have to take the issue of free movement seriously. We should also be aware of the fact that in practice we remain outside the pale of influence on this matter, yet on paper we are there.
- Then we should remind the governments about the commitments that they made. In the region we have poverty Forums for example in Zambia. It is important to know that poverty Forums are places to start. There is a need for social dialogue.

3.2 AU/NEPAD/APRM Structures and Processes and How Civil Society Can Engage: litha Musyimi-Ogana, NEPAD Secretariat

The Framework

The principle of popular participation of African people in the activities of African Union is a prerequisite to success of the AU as enunciated in the African Charter for Popular Participation. To quote from the ECOSOCC Statute this principle is "guided by a common vision of a united and strong Africa and by the need to build strong partnerships between governments, and all segments of Civil Society, in particular women, youth and

the private sector in order to strengthen solidarity and cohesion among our people". This spirit is enshrined in the objectives and Principles of the Constitutive Act which provides for the establishment of the Economic Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) under Article 5 and 22 of the Act.

In addition, **article 41** of NEPAD founding document calls for CSOs commitment as one of the key partners in the NEPAD processes, while **Article 45** of the same document recognises the efforts that CSOs have put in reinforcing the call for greater democratization and good governance. This call is echoed by the appeal by the political leaders in the continent under Article 55 and 56, to all the African people in their diversity to recognise the challenge facing the continent and rise up to it.

On the AU Commission side, serious commitment to CSOs participation in the work of the Union has been demonstrated at the highest level, through the launching of ECOSSOC, in March last year, and early this year through the re-creation of an African Citizens Directorate (CIDO) at the AU Commission level. On the NEPAD side, similar commitment has been seen in the post-Maputo era. The NEPAD Secretariat also put in place institutional mechanisms in the form of the Gender and Civil Society Unit to implement its mandates under the principle of popular participation and also related mandates under AU and NEPAD policy documents. The Unit has a twin mandate to both spearhead the gender mainstreaming of NEPAD Policies, programmes and the entire implementation process and also ensure CSOs are mobilized to effectively participate in the NEPAD implementation process.

Background

The launch of NEPAD in Lusaka in October 2001 was probably one of the most intellectually explosive phenomena in Africa. The NEPAD founding document was received with dramatic excitement. As a result the Secretariat was swarmed with overwhelming responses mostly targeting the NEPAD founding document. They included critiques, analysis, recommendations and sometimes condemnation. The Secretariat took time to respond and it was not until early 2003, that mechanism for a substantive dialogue with the Civil Society Organizations, academia, gender experts, the youth, and trade unions etc, was put in place. One could summarise the phases that this engagement has assumed between July 2001 and July 2004 by asking three simple questions, namely: Where are we coming from? Where are we now? Where are we going to/way forward?

Where are we coming from?

The African CSOs engagement with the NEPAD process has come a long way. Indeed, one could almost say it has undergone a complete metamorphosis. By looking more deeply into dynamics of the consultation process that African CSOs have held among themselves and with NEPAD one appreciates the efforts that both sides have put to bear. Four phases seem to have emerged from this engagement and I would like to briefly highlight the salient features of each phase.

Phase I: A CSO-only type of engagement which occurred immediately after the release of the NEPAD document in Lusaka. It was the immediate reaction to the new document, and was characterized by anger resulting from exclusion of CSOs in the development of the document and skepticism on the political will to implement the commitment as

expressed in big CSO forums such as the CSO forum in Bamako. I have often referred to this phase as a **mis-understanding phase**.

Phase II: Was characterized by ad-hoc engagement between African CSOs and the architects of NEPAD and one is persuaded to refer to the engagements during this phase ad-hoc because of the way it unfolded. African CSOs would often confront the NEPAD initiating Heads of States in global meetings such as the Financing for Development (FfD) and World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) and demand an immediate explanation on the evolution of NEPAD, its vision and issues around stakeholder involvement, and hence the name **Ad-hoc phase**.

Phase III: Was characterized by the NEPAD Secretariat trying to reach out to the CSOs to understand their concerns and led to NEPAD organizing a series of CSO forums such as the Elmina-Ghana CSO/NEPAD, the Accra-NEPAD/private sector forum, the Gabon Gender Summit, the Maputo African Union CSO/NEPAD, the Mali NEPAD Communication and Advocacy workshop and the Dakar NEPAD Media workshop, hence the name **reach out phase**.

Phase IV: Saw the NEPAD Secretariat hold wide ranging consultations on the kind of institutional mechanisms it should put in place to spearhead CSO participation and gender mainstreaming of its policies, programmes and structure, hence the name **consultation phase**. The consultations focused on an appropriate institutional mechanism within NEPAD that could both ensure CSOs issues in general and gender issues in particular could be mainstreamed in the NEPAD processes, policies and programmes. At the end of the consultation process, the Secretariat committed to put in place an institutional mechanism to deal with CSOs and gender mainstreaming, hence the formation of the Gender and CSO Unit.

The Institutional Framework

By the end of the Maputo consultation consensus had already emerged on the need for an institutional mechanism at NEPAD that could deal with CSO matters and also that gender was a cross cutting issue which needed to be addressed at policy and programme level across all its sectors. From these consultations it was becoming evident that the Civil Society Organizations (CSO) and gender issues could easily be considered under the same umbrella. By September 2004, the NEPAD Secretariat had put in place institutional mechanisms to deal with gender and CSO matters as proposed by different stakeholders and gender experts. The creation of this office was a clear commitment by the Secretariat to gender issues and a demonstration of the Secretariat's desire to actively involve CSOs in the implementation process, as NEPAD projects move into the implementation mode.

Where are we now?

Operationalisation of the CSO and Gender unit which has already embarked on the gender mainstreaming and CSO mobilization at Regional level and also through RECS and National Level through National NEPAD Chapters:

- Developed two Roadmaps, one for CSO mobilization to participate in NEPAD initiatives and processes and the other one for engendering NEPAD priority sectors, the structure as well as the processes. The Roadmaps are also being used

to gender sensitize Management and professional staff in the Secretariat as well as the importance of CSOs mobilization and participation in the NEPAD process.

- Already developed a three year Comprehensive Strategic Plan which provides a road map for mobilizing and effectively involving CSOs in the implementation of NEPAD initiatives. As a starting point an 18 month work plan is already in place and half way accomplished.
- The Unit has come also up with a mechanism for mobilizing CSOs to participate in the implementation of NEPAD programmes and actions and is putting in place a NEPAD CSO Think Tank. The Secretariat also made an official announcement for potential candidates to apply and circulated it very widely electronically between December 2004 and February 2005. A sub-committee was formed to short list candidates before the selection process of the members to serve in the CSO Think Tank could be completed. The Think Tank was launched in December, 2005 in Nairobi, Kenya.
- The Unit has spearheaded the preparation of technical position papers on critical areas to Gender and CSOs matters. These include the technical paper on Trade and Gender issues ahead the AU Ministerial Meeting in preparation of the WTO meeting in Hong Kong, a technical paper on Universal Access to care and treatment focusing on "Microbicides", the only promising female controlled method for HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment and lastly the African women's perspective on the UN Reform with regard to the debate on UN Agency for women.
- During the process leading up to the G8 Summit in Gleneagles the Gender and CSO Unit secured authority to circulate the NEPAD's Heads of States position papers to the CSOs for comment, input as well as critique. Similarly in the follow up to the G8, NEPAD once more secured space for African CSOs participation in the African Partnership Forum and enlisted CSOs input in the NEPAD/AU position papers by inviting CSOs to serve in the Ad-hoc Expert Group Meeting that was put together to prepare African position.
- On the African Partnership Forum's (APF) process, NEPAD has been able to initiate a CSO process in partnership with the G8 and non-G8 CSOs to ensure that the role of APF is both implementation driven and well mutually monitored process by CSOs to ensure that pledges made by G8 and non-G8 members are honored on the Northern CSOs side and on the African side by African CSOs. To this end, a CSO forum was organized ahead of the 5th APF forum in London and another one is planned ahead of the 7th APF forum in St Petersburg.
- On the High Level Panel on the UN Reform on Coherence, Secretariat facilitated an electronic consultation on getting an African CSOs perspective on the UN Reform. This became necessary after it was realized that Africa's voice was weak at the CSO consultation carried out by the Panel on 2 July, 2006 in Geneva. The NEPAD CSO Think Tank was instrumental in synchronizing views received from CSOs to develop a position paper, on behalf of CSOs.
- The unit has also developed concept papers around key areas of CSO concern and also recommended in recent reports such as the Commission for Africa (CfA) and various MDGs Reports. The concepts target various CSO stakeholders including the CSO themselves, women, youth and children, which if supported can effectively contribute to CSO empowerment, stability, capacity building and effective participation and ownership of the Africa's renewal process and NEPAD. Indeed we are just at the threshold of mobilizing significant resources for economic empowerment of women and will be working on a mechanism with the RECs Gender Units to ensure that funds reach women at the national and grassroots level.

Where are we going to?

Within the context of ECOSOCC the Gender and CSO Unit has come up with a framework in the form of the NEPAD CSO Think Tank that can help build a bridge between the NEPAD Secretariat, RECs and the AU on one side and the wider CSOs constituency including those in ECOSOCC on the other side.

According to the definition of CSOs, each CSO interest is represented in the Think Tank including youth, trade unions, professional/intellectual, faith based, women and disabled. In order to capture CSOs thematic expertise in each of the NEPAD priority sector, CSO thematic experts are also represented in the Think Tank as well as ex-official members whom the secretariat may wish to include due to their special skills or expertise. For each CSO area of interest there is a designated Think Tank Member and an Alternate Member who can be called upon to act if the designate member is not available. The selection of the designate and alternate members of the Think Tank was subjected to the gender parity principle.

The CSO Think Tank will be an instrumental framework in ensuring effective stakeholder participation in NEPAD processes and its launching could not have been more timely. Through the Gender and CSO Unit, the Think Tank will both advise NEPAD on among other things:-

- How to bring on board and ensure effective participation of CSO sectoral expertise and their networks into the NEPAD thematic priorities
- Inform policy, shape thinking and influence the NEPAD Agenda through soliciting CSO views, input and contribution in the global, regional and national level engagement between NEPAD and its other partners e.g. through the G8 and APF process, the UN and WTO process.
- help build a bridge between the NEPAD Secretariat, RECs and the AU on one side and the wider CSOs constituency including those in ECOSOCC
- Compliment NEPAD advocacy and networking efforts at global, regional, national and community levels
- Facilitate the capacity building initiatives on NEPAD/AU at national and local levels
- Identify best practices from CSOs that can be up-scaled and replicated by NEPAD

The Challenges ahead

The NEPAD/CSO Maputo meeting ushered in a new chapter in the engagement of CSO and NEPAD Secretariat. At the end of these consultations, ten key challenges were identified namely

- The challenge of mobilizing and ensuring the effective participation of CSOs in NEPAD initiatives at REC level and creating a conducive environment for their coordination, capacity building on NEPAD and REC issues.
- The challenge of engendering all concepts, plans, projects and programmes emanating from NEPAD at source so that they do not add on to the existing gender disparities and indeed, address the existing gender disparities and close the existing gender gaps, in the relevant sectors.

- The challenge of mobilizing and ensuring the effective participation of CSOs in NEPAD initiatives at sub-regional level, their coordination, capacity building on NEPAD issues and determining their role in different regional economic regimes.
- Winning CSO support in order to use their networking capabilities to advocate NEPAD at the grassroots level.
- Mainstreaming CSOs in communication and advocacy on NEPAD and the need to build CSO capacity to understand the NEPAD process itself, support and participate in its implementation
- Creating a conducive environment for CSOs to understand the nature, operations and role of different Regional Economic Commissions (RECs) and mechanism of engaging with them at the sub-regional level.
- Strengthening the understanding of integration process at regional and different sub-regional, within the context of ECOSOCC
- Popularizing NEPAD and improving relationships between CSOs, governments and the private sector
- Capacity development within CSOs to effectively participate in the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of NEPAD
- Processing and stepping down knowledge on new ideas rolling out of the NEPAD Secretariat action plans such as African Peer Review Mechanisms to national level.
- Establishing and Maintaining Mechanism for continuous consultations between NEPAD and CSOs at all levels.

3.3 ECOSOCC: Processes and Programmes: Charles Mutasa, ARFODAD

Why is it important to engage the AU? IN 1997 Secretary General of AU proposed to states that there should be cooperation with civil society in the programmes of the AU. That is why in the AU constitution, there are provisions for civil society organization. In the Addis Ababa meeting of the AU there were groups of 20 people and three people were selected from our region. The groups came up with rules; civil society showed there that they were to differentiate between each group. The proposal was that ECOSOCC was to consist of 600 people mostly from the bigger states, but it was decided that each country will have its member. Therefore there were two members from each member state as the representatives. Then continental organizations were to be represented by trade unions and 20 people were from Diaspora, and six members were elected in ex-officio capacity on the basis of how long they had been working with AU.

The ECOSOCC is an advisory arm of the AU, and works with any organization of the AU. There are sectoral unions such as political, social, infrastructure, trade, investment and gender. Members of ECOSOCC participate by field. Whenever the AU is meeting, civil society has pre-meeting which should be in line with the theme of that meeting. Most of us are aware that when the AU has a meeting the issue is put to the ambassadors for them to pass it to their principals. Civil society needs to pay attention on; criteria and selection system. There must be a board which can assess who is civil society. There are countries where there is hostility between civil society and the government. As of now we are concentrating on having national meetings where we are to explain regionally what ECOSOCC is and at the provincial level. The challenges that we faced here are:

- issues of financial resources and it took a year for AU to get some money
- Commitment and consistence of players, some people are not interested at the regional level.

- Being conversant with AU and how it works.
- States that do not appreciate civil society and countries that does not have civil society are difficult to work with

Open Forum Discussions

Question: How do you establish a national chapter and who compose it?

Answer: There should be a way by which civil society can organize itself and whom you choose. You can take people from provincial level and all the way through to the national levels and tell them to choose a person they want. Do as much sensitization as you can. In the region you can have interim chapters. We need two people who can filter information to ECOSOCC and take it back to their countries.

Question: Rationale behind enlisting the Diaspora, when some of those people do not even know Africa?

Answer: The Diaspora has been a tricky question. Some Heads of State say that those might be people who have run away from the rule of law. But South Africa showed that they are still our brothers and they are concerned about the continent, so the issue is to incorporate those outside our continent but continue to show concern for us.

Question: Disability issues in ECOSSOC agenda? We do not see any commitment.

Answer: Concern of ECOSSOC is that when people have made Forums they do not implement the concerns, so it is through ECOSSOC that you get in touch with your ministers.

Session 4: Democratic Governance

Chair: Ms Mats'eliso Ntsoelikane, Director, TRC, Lesotho

4.1 Thematic Panel Presentations:

4.1.1 Elections and Democracy, Khabele Matlosa, EISA

The main objection here is to deal with democracy and elections. Dr. Matlosa shared experience and extrapolated on challenges we are facing. Four segments covered were:

- I. Introduction of subject;
- II. What is the problem facing our region on democracy and election;
- III. Identify the problem in the manner, how to tackle it and by whom;
- IV. By way of conclusion, what lessons have we learnt from the region to consider for democracy and elections?

In listening the SADC Executive Secretary and the Lesotho Minister of Finance, it became clear that leaders of SADC prioritize democracy and stability. SADC has committed that by 2015 we will have a single market. It is only after we have democracy and security and defence that RISDP and SPO can go well. Then to ensure stability we need to have elections, which will facilitate democracy. Democracy needs elections but elections do not need democracy. We often focus on presidential and senatorial elections, but I propose that we need to look beyond these two. We need to look at the local government, and at the pre-election processes within the political parties. Most of our countries are in transition since we come from authoritarian rule. This year general elections were held in DRC (July). Zambia and Madagascar have their general elections scheduled for September and December respectively. A general election that was supposed to have taken place in Angola in 2006 has been postponed to 2007.

We have nevertheless witnessed two contrasting effects of election: elections have helped our countries to have stability but elections have also contributed to a spiral of violence. Mozambique got peace out of elections but in Zimbabwe elections escalated the conflict. So what do we do as civil society to contribute in making sure that elections are helpful in democracy? I was in the DRC recently and what is worth noting is that after a protracted fighting, the country started to hold elections which were successful.

International intervention can also play a critical role. For example in the DRC the election was budgeted at \$422 million, and the government paid only 10 % of this figure. Disarmament cannot be done because of danger of conflict. In the circumstances, it is crucial that when elections are held, government and civil society should join hands to ensure they are held in conformity with international standards. Practically we have identified problems on the ground, and then what do we do. We need to intervene at the national level where we have a problem to ensure that elections go well. We have Electoral Commission offices, but how do CSOs intervene in the commissions and what is the composition of these commissions? At the regional level, how do we deal with SADC?

Electoral Forum: At the continental level, which is at the AU, we should look at the Draft Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, the NEPAD, and the APRM. How can we as CSOs intervene? If elections are to be meaningful to oppose instability there has to

be a peace agreement. It must be accompanied by a commitment of the parties; and the existence of a functional state

4.1.2 Gender and Democracy, Mrs Keiso Matashane-Marite, WLSA-Lesotho National Coordinator

Background and Introduction

The topic was re-cast to read as “democratic governance and gender equality”. Democracy is a preferred form of governance to ensure sustainable development, stable macroeconomic environment, investment, and growth. Promoting the link between development and democracy should focus on good governance. The main principles of democracy are Participation, Representation, and Citizenship. These tie in very well with the central precepts of gender equality. The pertinent question we should ask ourselves at this stage is how far are SADC states grounding global, continental, regional and national commitments to gender equality?

The concept of *Gender Equality* for its part goes a long way back in history, just like the concept of *Democracy*. *Equality* is a central component of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms along with respect for human dignity and freedom from discrimination. Despite the long association of gender equality with human rights, meaningful consciousness to the subject was awakened only in 1975 with the 1st World Conference on Women held in Mexico. In 1979 the UN Convention on the Eradication of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was drafted, and for the first time Women's rights were compiled in a single treaty. The convention has been in force since 1981. It is against this background that we should consider the role of civil society in promoting democratic governance and gender equality.

The Context

With the end of the cold war, globally there is commitment to good governance (even though fighting terrorism, and the Middle East crisis, are bringing other priorities). There is generally, however, undeniable move from autocracy to democracy and good governance and relative political stability in most states. The SADC countries have been putting measures in place to fight HIV and AIDS, promoting economic integration, preserving the environment and fight poverty. The region's leaders have also laid down norms and standards for economic prosperity (e.g. linking development with gender). On the continental level, the African leaders have been working tirelessly to put Africa on the global economic agenda through the Africa Commission, the NEPAD etc. Efforts are afoot by the AU leaders to expand the rights of marginal groups through adopting and acceding to the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women, the African Peer Review Mechanism, campaigns to boost women representation in politics and decision-making to 50 percent. The region is witnessing shifts towards inclusive democracy (although the trend is slow in some countries). The nagging question is whether this is inclusive of all groups that are marginal including women, children, minorities, and people with special needs. These shifts are catalyzed by global frameworks like the Beijing Platform For Action (BPFA) and Beijing + 10 frameworks which reaffirm gender equality as a priority and acknowledge the need to link the attainment of MDGs and empowerment of women.

Democracy and governance: Democracy is a preferred form of governance. Gender equality, good governance, and democracy are important concepts in the development paradigm. Governance is associated with institutions and bureaucracy, structures, systems and processes

Governance: refers to the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels. It comprises of mechanisms, processes, and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate differences

Contextualizing gender equality: SADC communities are predominantly patriarchal. Patriarchy defines power relations between men and women, allocating dominant roles to men and subordinate roles to women. It assigns and allocates *different* and *unequal* roles in society on the basis of the sex of individuals (a gendered division of labour). Women are assigned roles in the private sphere (reproductive roles), while men are assigned roles in the public sphere (running the affairs of the community and of the country). Women in the public sphere tend to play roles similar to the ones they play in the private sphere.

Good governance: The central **pillars** of good governance entail the responsibility of states to manage the role of the judiciary, statutory bodies, the media and civil society to provide checks and balances, the role of the private sector working in conducive environment to create wealth and jobs. Its **hallmarks** are accountability; transparency, openness and respect for the rule of law. The **important dimensions** of good governance include ability to attract investment, improve efficiency and productivity and reduce poverty through macro economic management. It should foster political pluralism, freedom of association and bargaining in professional and vocational formations like trade unions, fair, open and democratic elections periodically organized to enable people to choose their leaders

Gender and governance link: Three most important ingredients of democratic governance are participation, representation and citizenship. Participation implies active involvement of the citizens in the running of national affairs of states. Representation implies that the involvement of citizens in the governance process translates into broad-based inclusiveness in decision-making and policy formulation. Citizenship implies giving people a say in their lives, entitlements to better policies and service delivery and holding those who make such decisions accountable

Looking at our institutions of decision-making, are principles of democracy adhere to majority rule, participation, representation and citizenship? The answer is no, BPPA calls on states to take measures to ensure women's equal access to, and full participation in decision-making by creating a gender balance in government and administration, integrating women into political parties, increasing women's capacity to participate in decision-making and leadership as well as increasing women's participation in the electoral process and political activities

Challenges

The following are only part of the outstanding agenda that cries for urgent attention:

- ▶ Targets to attain representation are under-achieved, minimum targets of 30% as a milestone towards 50% gender parity achieved by Mozambique, RSA and Tanzania

- ▶ Democracy seems to be reduced to electioneering
- ▶ Concept of Democracy and Good Governance is Narrowly Defined and often underplay inclusiveness
- ▶ There is a missing link between democracy and gender equality
- ▶ Democratic principles embraced do not necessarily translate into concrete action towards inclusive democracy and representation of all interest groups
- ▶ Systemic barriers surrounding the socio-legal position of women in general
- ▶ Political Decision-Making still perceived as a male domain
- ▶ Culture of Party Politics discourages women with violence, intra-party conflicts etc...
- ▶ Lack of vibrancy in the women's movement to raise political consciousness and support women's swings

Conclusion

As part of the way forward, the order of business for transformative interventions will need to take aboard the following and part of it stock:

- a) Continued absence of women's voices in governance is largely due to inequitable representation and participation in institutional structures
- b) Boosting women's political participation needs to go beyond numbers to addressing complex relationships and power relations as well as transforming the political agenda
- c) Institutional transformation is needed to create enabling environment for the economic and political empowerment of women
- d) Transforming and increasing accountability of institutions to the interests of marginal groups especially to the poor
- e) Greater levels of transparency and accountability including rapid responsiveness to citizen's demands are necessary
- f) Men and Women need to equally influence decisions that affect their lives, their families and their communities and also to influence structure of international relations
- g) That can only be achieved if principles of democracy are exercised fully and responsibly (*participation and representation*)
- h) Participation and representation are revenues for influencing fair play; equitable resource allocation for development that shapes the lives of men and women boys and girls
- i) Women who are in political power are too few to make an impact
- j) Even where critical mass is achieved, alliances must be made nationally and across frontiers. Women politicians are at their best in teams and when acting in solidarity
- k) Need for facilitation of networking and alliance building
- l) Capacity building especially on ICT and mentoring young women

4.1.3 Peace, Security, HIV/AIDS and Democracy: Angela Muvumba, CCR

First I will pose the question as to what human security is, and proceed to say what we are doing for its promotion at the Centre for Conflict Resolution. There are two conceptions of human security. One concentrates on violent threats such as genocides, political repressions, human rights abuses. The other, broader, conception encompasses non-violent threats like diseases such as HIV/AIDS, environmental degradation, social exclusion, poverty and inequality. This conception talks to the stability of the people as

well as that of the regime. We cannot exclude the security of the state because it is a strong state that protects citizens. It cannot be me or you or a teacher that provides good education that can provide security of the citizens. The state is needed to provide social services in order to address humanitarian disasters, management of government systems and to interact at the international level. And we do need states that protect the people.

Politics and government in Southern Africa with in the context of HIV/AIDS:

In recent years there has been basic research that have focused on social impacts of AIDS not as disease and how treatment is done as such, but at its long term impacts on democratic governance. The population may feel powerless and hopeless. There is concern by women that they are being overburdened as a result of HIV/AIDS since they have to look after the sick and bury the dead. If people are trapped by socio-economic circumstances, they do not have personal motivation, and fatalism could influence political agencies. How do we make sure that they are motivated? People may end up supporting any entity that may eliminate the problem even if that entity is not undemocratically elected. If we look at what happened in South Africa we see a different picture, where the pharmaceutical companies took the government to court on the matter that it imports cheap generic drugs. Immediately the strategic alliance was forged between the Treatment Action Campaign and the South African government. This strategic alliance highlighted the resolve of the poor people.

In 2002 the alliance began to break apart but it shaped the AIDS discourse in South Africa. Provision of treatment has been ignored but it shifted after the alliance help poor people have access to drugs. The policymakers have now recently shifted. We have been engaged with UN in the strategic plan in Lesotho. We deal with governments to engage in strategic planning. In 2004, in Lesotho 30% of the population were HIV positive and the government and other institutions came up with a strategic plan. The government had a Strategic Indicative Plan. The Maseru Declaration was a step forward. Commitments that were made were to establish a regional fund, where unfortunately only two states have made their contributions. South Africa has committed R1million and Swaziland \$30 000.

Our centre had meetings in Namibia where we were trying to enlighten people about HIV/AIDS in the military. However we were faced with a problem of lack of interest and overstretched human resource since we had only one person who was running the programme in that country.

4.1.4 Human Rights and Democracy: Corlett Letlojane, HURISA

Human rights and democracy are interdependent. Human rights are not favors handed down to the citizens by the governments but they are entitlements. Democracy can be fulfilled when one knows their rights as these rights are declared in the Universal declaration.

Human rights and democratic system: The year 2006 marks the 25th anniversary of the adoption of the African Charter and People's Rights and 20 years of entry into force of the Charter. The African Charter has been ratified by most states on the continent. Since it has been existing from 1981, it is time for us to evaluate its impact on the African system of human rights. The civil society Forum should take the opportunity to assess the successes, weaknesses, challenges and prospects as to how it has changed the rights of

women, children, and people with disabilities, the youth, indigenous people, migrants and refugees. We should also look at whether states parties honour and abide by it. We should further ask ourselves whether the African Charter is an accountable and effective system that people can rely on. There is also lack of domestication of the African Charter by the states at the national level. State parties to the African Charter are expected to submit country reports to show legislative or other measures they are taking to implement the regional instrument at national level. But only few states comply and many of the states have long overdue national reports; even those that comply exclude civil society from participating in the drafting process of national reports.

There have been some positive human rights developments: The African Charter on the Human Rights and Welfare of The Child, the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, and the Protocol on the African Court on Human and People's Rights, all attest to human development on the continent. However, only few states have ratified the Protocol of African Court on Human Rights in the region. States are also reluctant to allow civil society to bring cases to the court. Article 23 of the SADC Treaty commits states to work with civil society in regional integration processes, but NGOs have been refused access to attend the Summit which is the highest body of the sub-region that meets once a year. A repeat of this denial of access was experienced during the SADC Summit held in Botswana in August 2005. The Draft Protocol on Free Movement of Persons which was to result in the scrapping of internal controls to enable movement of people including asylum seekers and refugees, still needs to be signed. SADC is commended for adopting a comprehensive programme called the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan for addressing the socio economic infrastructure including attending to gender based issues in the region.

The way forward for CBOs/NGOs: The citizens' organizations should have knowledge of the legislation and statutory framework that is operationalised in the region so that they can hold government accountable to meet its mandate. CBOs/NGOs also need to be equipped with skills, knowledge and information sharing in order to be familiar with the requirements for participation.

4.1.5 Access to Justice and Democracy: Professor Haroub Othman, SALAN

Many of the Southern African countries have it in their national constitutions that all people are equal before the law. The recent high profile cases that came to courts in the region would validate this position. Access to justice is one of the most basic human rights. To meet this challenge there emerged in the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition the concept of 'legal aid' in order to provide free legal services to the poor in the communities. All countries of the region have a provision of legal aid which is either provided by state or by the law societies. Despite the fact that there are many law-training institutions in the region the number of practicing lawyers hardly meets the needs of the people in the region. Zimbabwe has 894 lawyers which puts a ratio of lawyers to clients at 1:26 000; Zambia has 1000 lawyers with 1:13 000; Malawi has 300 with a ratio of 1:40 000; Mozambique has 700 with a ratio of 1:26 000 and Tanzania has less than 1000 with a ratio of 1: 42 000. South Africa, with 28 000 lawyers at the ratio of 1:1600 is the most well-endowed. Therefore alternative ways of providing people with legal assistance had to be considered. The 1980s and the 1990s in Southern Africa saw the appearance of paralegals, which could be likened to "barefoot doctors". These are people who have either received rudimentary law training or trained in basics of law to give legal advice to communities. They serve sections of the society that have little or no access to basic rights and services, especially justice. Paralegals are not officially recognized in the

region except in South Africa. SALAN seeks not to transform paralegals into lawyers but to ensure that the value of their contribution to access to justice is recognized. The people of the region are faced with problems caused by the wounds of colonialism, destructive effects of apartheid, structural adjustments by World Bank and IMF, decades of misrule and dictatorship and neo-liberal economic policies. To overcome all these problems they need a democratic state and a constitutional-legal framework that will give legitimacy to their aspirations. The legal profession, the paralegals and human rights activists have a role to play. As Mwdimu Nyerere used to say, play your part; it can be done.

Open Forum Discussion

Questions & Comments:

- Given that the region seems to be dominated by parties of the former liberation movements which have not only established themselves deeply as unchallengeable but also become authoritarian, what are the prospects for democratic transformation? Can we for example realistically imagine a South Africa without the ANC at the reins, or even Botswana without the BDP at the top of the heap?
- Peace and stability versus the quest of the political elites for undisputed supremacy, intolerance for alternative views. How can we resolve this contradiction?
- Entrenchment of the core values could go a long way to sustaining the process of building peace and stability in the region. We got to have things we love and cherish, things we hold to be inviolable, which hold us together and which our mutual frictions cannot rise above. The nation which we admire outside our continent, and of course individual nations in our own region, have that to hold them together and there is evidence of success.
- What do we as civil society do to face a disaster of human rights violations reports which fail to be brought to the attention of the wider world? South Africa for example has been fighting tooth and nail to support Zimbabwe in blocking the tabling of the latter's human rights record at both the UN and the AU.
- How can we address the negative effects of HIV/AIDS on the turnover of elected politicians and other officers entrusted with carrying forward our development?
- How can civil society put in place the frameworks for causing national leaders to comply with their obligations under regional and international agreements?
- We appreciate the role of BSA in the recent DRC elections, but where the international community finances 90 percent of the elections, and its opinion differs with that of local observers on the fairness of the elections, whose perspective will prevail and what are prospects for consolidating democracy?
- With a view to the patriarchal nature of Southern Africa, is it not wiser to be more cautious and evolutionary, and avoid a disruption, in our advocacy of gender equity?

Responses:

- An unhealthy relationship between the ruling parties and the opposition throughout SADC is a common phenomenon, much as that in undesirable. The ruling parties tend to use state resources while the opposition remains weak, fractious, disorganized, and torn by temptation for violence. There is a need for the opposition to clean up its act if it is to live up to the expectations of those who look up to it to provide alternative governance.
- Yes, in principle the election management body has to be independent to inspire hope in both the voters and the contestants that the outcomes can only be credible. That independence is currently judged on three criteria, namely: i. the appointment of those charged with this responsibility must be done by a parliament and not a single politician in office; ii. the functions, power and authority of the body must be more or less completely unrestrained and not subject to ratification or approval of anyone outside the body; iii. the body must be accountable to no one but the national parliament.
- What is important is how the DRC can avoid an eruption of violence after the announcement of the results of the July 2006 elections, the first elections in 40 odd years! What is important is a general acceptance of the results by the parties. The elections are budgeted at US\$422 million, 90 percent of which is shouldered by the EU while the national government contributes a mere 10 percent. This raises a question: when are we going to put cash where our heart is? Whose interests and influence are served and what are the stakes that determine the relative contributions?
- Yes, principles remain platitudes if they remain just there without being translated into protocols, or even higher legally binding instruments. A recommendation has been made for harmonization of policies and models. While this is desirable, it is in practice not feasible.
- We cannot have a successful election after a civil war, without first going through the processes of DDR – disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. This is a mammoth challenge facing the DRC.
- Regarding the impact of HIV/AIDS, we got to decide whether we should modify our electoral systems to engage this challenge or we go the route of rolling back the pandemic. Research has shown that the impact is much less severe in countries which have adopted hybrid electoral systems. The African solidarity position at the UN on this subject was defeated by desertion on the part of one state from the south and one state from the west of the continent. Only Botswana has so far reached the regional targets of budget allocation to the pandemic.
- The experience of HURSA is that if you keep reminding the government of its obligations, prompt it to file the required reports to international human rights bodies, and telling on the government when it fails to report or when it sends in unilateral reports – all these

help get positive results. As a result the government actively seeks to sit down with the national human rights organizations; it holds report-back sessions after its appearance at international platforms.

- o The 1998 haphazard military interventions in Lesotho and Zaire were a wake-up call for SADC. Now the organization operates through established channels under the OPDS. These emphasize peaceful, political solutions and referral to the UN in case of military action being considered.
- o Girl education is important, but we have to go beyond that and towards transformation of structures with a social partnership. Evolution will not get us there. Speakers have cited the 60 percent representation of women in the local government councils following the recent elections in Lesotho. We forget that this was achieved after deliberate legislative action, which was fiercely contested up to the appeal court. We need a lot of political will and civil society to play its role accordingly. We should move rapidly towards incorporation of international instruments into local law. The SADC Blantyre Declaration ought to be elevated to a protocol.

4.2 Panel on Programme Funding

4.2.1 Making Governance Work for the Poor, Kemi Williams, Senior Social Development Advisor, DFID

I am going to talk about the UK government's New White Paper entitled "Making Governance Work for the Poor", which dictates what the DFID does. This is the British government policy. The DFID is the British ministry that does overseas work. We have an office in Pretoria which covers 6 countries in the Southern part of this region including South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Angola and Namibia. Many of you will know that we have two other white papers which prescribe what DFID does around the world. The first one focuses on poverty reduction and the second one on globalization. The third one entitled "Making Governance Work-ForThe Poor", essentially sets out how the DFID will deliver on the commitments it made in 2005, on the G-8 commitment, and the Commission for Africa commitment.

What the white paper says is that DFID will help build states that work for the poor people that we will help to get security, income, and public services delivered that we will work globally to tackle climate change and create international systems fit for the 21st Century. We know that we are faced with challenges but on top of that it is interesting to note that 90% of people living below \$1 a day will be in South Asian and Sub-Saharan Africa countries in 2015, when we should have achieved the Millennium Development Goals. However other countries like China have decreased that number significantly but this is not the case in the two regions named. About 50% of these people are expected to be living under what DFID calls fragile states, that is states where democracy and development institutions will be weak, in cases like Sudan, Somalia, the DRC etc.

We also recognize that there is a rising international influence of what the DFID calls international big middle income countries like Brazil, India and South Africa which have the footprints in the region where they are. The programme that we have in South Africa is that we will be moving away from a traditional relationship of donor and recipient to

one that is much more focused on partnership about how we can work with South Africa to engage more systematically in the region. Their role for example in the standby force or their role in food security becomes increasingly important and we as donor are interested in working with countries like South Africa towards the impact we can have in the region.

What do we mean by states that work for the poor people? It means we are going to support capability, accountability and responsiveness of states and that means not just state institutions, structures, and processes but the way that we can build the demand side of governance: what civil society does, how poor people can hold their governments account. We are also going to do the following:

- Set up government transparency fund of £100 million to strengthen civil society with media engagement in holding their governments accountable.
- Become more efficient in determining whether the government is getting better or worse this is by looking at their political situation. We are going to get much more overtly political in what we are doing in greater partnership with our foreign office and colleagues. We will be building on the existing governance assessment tools like the APRM and World Bank country policy and institutional assessment.
- Combat corruption and promote international standards of responsible business behavior
- We are also going to engage more in the peace and security debate, as we are already doing with SADC on the SIPO and the AU on the African standby force. We are going to work on security particularly from the human security point of view because the DFID is coming into this from the angle of development and the nexus between security and development is very important.
- Helping the growth of poor people's income by assisting the private sector to get investment especially infrastructure, and we want to work for the trade rules that help the poor countries better. Looking at the relationship between natural resource management and conflict, for example water will increasingly become a contested resource. The fact that Lesotho has a lot of water but South Africa does not have much is going to become increasingly important politically for this region.
- Managing migration from a development perspective, as this will come out clearly in a high level UN dialogue in New York coming up this year September. For the first time the UN will be discussing the nexus between migration and development and we are very keen to engage in that dialogue and help our government to reach a common position between the DFID, our foreign office and our home office because we are coming to migration from different points of view
- We want to promote greater accessibility of service, the basic services but more specifically the social protection or welfare like pensions school feeding, assistance for poorest vulnerable children. We got to find way to move from reactive responses to humanitarian crisis like food and security We want to try to run away from food aid to cash, and we are running a pilot project in Zambia and looking at what Ethiopia is doing which is much quicker and easier to give to people and does not suppress the local market and enables them to make choices about how they develop their own livelihood.
- We are interested in climate because we are going to look at the fact that there are number of development impacts that are going to occur, we will have to look at the fact that the transport system will have to be restructure because certain crops will not be grown in certain areas anymore. Mosquitoes are going

to move to the South and diseases like malaria are going to be prevalent because of global warming.

Open Forum on Ms Williams' Presentation

Question: How do you make sure that you encompass the disabled in regard to their vulnerability?

Answer: We made review as to how much money we spend on the disabled, and we are also running programmes on disabled in countries like Angola and South Africa.

Question: Do you still maintain a multinational focus now that you working from Pretoria only?

Answer: We do not only work in South Africa but we are also found in some countries like Lesotho and we are looking at some issues on Pan-Africa perspectives.

Question: Have you done any evaluation of the African Commission?

Answer: The African Commission no longer exists.

Question: Is there anyway that you can fund media so that it is accessible to the people?

Answer: We recognizes the importance of media but we started first with the usual suspect although we can help with capacity building. However DfID avoids funding one organization.

4.2.2 Strategic Policy Priorities, Neville Gabriel, Executive Director, Southern Africa Trust

I am happy to be in a civil society forum, where I can talk more like an activist. I will speak to the salient weaknesses of strategy that we have as the CSOs in the region then try to say how we can tackle them. I wish to speak for evidence approach to activism. Southern Africa Trust is an independent agency to support poverty-reducing policies. Southern Africa faces a problem of chronic poverty, which often results in problems like market shocks. Yet we as CSOs struggle to describe what poverty looks like. We make a lot of noise about poverty, but we fail to stop and ask ourselves a few critical questions along the way: whose voice are you actually speaking for? And how does the voice of the people you are claiming to speak for interpret what you are saying? Is your approach simply ideologically driven or simply a theoretical understanding of the situation? Or is it informed by the real experience of the lives of people living in poverty? Evidence based approach to policy making and policy intervention, I believe, is not a very difficult thing to do. But it is an urgently required approach, a strategic approach that should be taken more by civil society.

Often when that kind of suggestion is made we are very quick to find all sorts of reasons why it is difficult to do that. But it relates in the first instance to how we develop our policy positions, it's about methods that we use to develop our positions. An evidence-based approach to policy making for CSOs, but also required by governments in this region, results in higher public trust, in more systematic approach to policy making. It ensures that we as CSOs do not just jump from one issue to the next depending on what governments are talking about at the moment, the trend of the day, or the political sensitivity of the day; but that we work in a concerted way towards the particular vision with a very clear evidence base.

The third area of strategic concern in policy work that I think we need in this region is to deepen our understanding of how change happens. As CSOs working on issues of poverty and inequality our intention is to create change, towards a hopefully shared vision. There is a very strong awareness among most of us that we have to do more policy work, more advocacy work. How do we end up doing this? What does it mean in terms of our programming? How do we translate our awareness of the need for more advocacy and policy work, to the "how to" - the action and implementation side. In effect what I am saying is that many of the critiques that we level at governments about implementation, equally are leveled at us about the "how to".

I think we are particularly weak at doing power analysis. When we identify a particular issue in the policy terrain that we want to emphasize we almost skip the process of identifying what are the strategic interventions given the power dynamics in the region and therefore where should we in fact be focusing our energies given the limited resources that we may have to do this work. This approach of doing power analysis will actually help us to ensure that our policy interventions are not just directed at dialogue, discourse, papers, sharing ideas and learning what the latest words are in the development field. We should be more about saying how our policy interventions make a real and lasting impact to the material conditions of the people living in poverty, and on the broad governance landscape because without that we are not going to overcome poverty in the long run.

The next point is that, generally, civil society in the region tends to focus more on the social and the political and to a limited extent the environmental issues of the poverty complex. For example talking about governance here, we emphasize on issues of social services and welfare. But we, with the exception of a few, have a general weakness when it comes to the economic dimensions of the poverty complex. When we match the stance of civil society in the region with the policy processes happening at the government level we basically see that in fact the emphasis at the government level is the economic dimension. When you look at the RISDP of SADC, for example, and ask what could be the key drivers of change to overcome poverty in Southern Africa; the easiest answer is economic dimension. That's RISDP in a nutshell. If CSOs are serious about engaging in policy interventions, we need to beef up our understanding and action on the economic dimensions.

The last strategic concern that I wanted to highlight today is to say that CSOs are diverse, not only on the issues that they focus on, but there are different types of CSOs. There is the SADC-CNGO which is an umbrella organization, for example, and there are others which are thinktank research types of organizations; there are CBOs including trade unions, faith-based organizations. But generally when you look at the CSOs in the region, they all seem to want to operate in the same way rather than operating in the way of that type of organization which would add the most benefit to the collective of the CSOs community in Southern Africa. I think if we are to improve our policy work we need to create the right types of linkages between the strengths of the different types of organization. In the interests of developing evidence based policy work I think those linkages can get us very far.

4.2.3 African Governance & Monitoring, OSISA/AFRIMAP: Tawanda Mutasah Executive Director, OSISA

I have prepared a brief on the African governance, monitoring and advocacy project which I will talk to. There has been a critical question coming up over the last few sessions

of discussion here, which is that we are at the point where on the African continent a number of instruments for democratic governance are developing; but we do not have sufficient capacity nor are we sufficiently consistent in monitoring how that governance is actually taking place particularly as civil society. This is why in the first Civil Society Forum last year in Botswana, our contribution as OSISA was that in partnership with Action Aid and other colleagues including the SADC-CNGO, we sought to provide a manual or a reader that would help people to navigate the principal African and SADC institutions.

This was meant to tackle such question as: What is AU? Who is it that we are talking about? How are they structured? What calendars do they have? We began the second term which is called the AFRIMAP, a response to AU and an attempt to systematically monitor the process of African governance especially in the new AU after July 2002. We agreed that with the help of African Peer Review process we needed something that could be led by civil society so that they can monitor the governance themselves. AFRIMAP was also a response to the AU in the sense that, we sought to look at an audit of government performance in various areas and we decided to do it on a qualitative basis. We resorted to qualitative analysis because it will go in-depth with particular issues that we are dealing with. In NEPAD the questionnaires were developed on the justice sector. We found that on two questions on Peer Review Mechanism we developed not less than 78 questions which were identified at the level of in-depth that we were looking for. In terms of AFRIMAP at the standard of governance monitoring, we started by identifying countries, which were Ghana, Mozambique, Senegal, Malawi and South Africa. OSISA is now responsible for delivery in Malawi presently. We identified three areas which we considered as important on the continent;

- Justice and the rule of law
- The political participation and representation
- Government effectiveness and accountability in the provision of public services.

AFRIMAP methodology

Questionnaires have been developed with experts input from the continent, it was experts from Universities and CSOs. Then we also developed questionnaires at the national level on the basis of founding practitioners who work in that country, and they are the ones to administer the questionnaires. A report was made from each country and it is on the basis of these reports that we can reach the level of advocacy. We have published some books on the justice sector in South Africa and in Malawi.

Main challenges facing AFRIMAP are;

- Access to information
- Weak civil society capacity
- Lack of domestication of treaties and other international instruments. States only sign treaties without implementation. It would be better to copy from Namibia where the signed treaty automatically becomes the law
- Lack of dialogue between governments and CSOs

Those who need more information should look at www.afrimap.org. I hope we will be able to monitor our governments through AFRIMAP.

Questions

Question: Is there any scope for funding?

Answer: Yes, because we exist to support the civil society and number of organizations have already been funded.

Question: Since governments are just signing but not implementing what do we do as civil society to take the treaties to people.

Answer: We need to focus on treaties such as movement of people.

Session 5: Regional Economic Integration

Chair: Ted Nandolo, Executive Director, CONGOMA, Malawi

5.1 Social Impact of Macroeconomic Policies Constraints to Deepening SADC Integration: the Way Forward –by Chinyamata Chipeta, SAIER

The presentation covered the following areas:

- I. The context of Macroeconomic Policies;
- II. Basic Macroeconomic Policy Framework;
- III. Trade Policy Framework;
- IV. Labour Market Policy Framework;
- V. Social Impact of Macroeconomic Policies
- VI. The way forward.

Basic Macroeconomic Policy Framework: This is the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP). The ultimate objective is to deepen the integration agenda with a view to accelerating poverty eradication and attaining other economic and non-economic development goals. The prerequisites for this eventuality are: peace, security, democracy and good political governance; strong and sustained political will and commitment; trade liberalisation and development; liberalisation in the movement of factors of production; good economic and corporate governance; and macroeconomic stability.

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU): For pure macroeconomic policies (fiscal and monetary) the operational framework is the MOU on macroeconomic stability and convergence. Convergence is necessary in order to create regional macroeconomic stability in terms of low inflation, sustainable debt, low budget deficit, low external current account deficits.

Role of Macroeconomic stability: Macroeconomic stability will, among other things, help to stabilise government expenditure, release resources for expenditure on poverty reducing activities, reduce public borrowing and hence interest rates and stimulate private sector borrowing, investment, income and employment growth.

Harmonisation of Stability Oriented Policies: In order to achieve macroeconomic convergence, member states have agreed to harmonise stability oriented policies which aim to restrict inflation to low and stable levels, maintain a prudent fiscal stance based on avoidance of large fiscal deficits, and high or rising ratios of public debt to GDP, avoid large financial imbalances in the economy, and market distortions.

Economic Indicators and Targets: These can be divided into primary, secondary, and other indicators. The *Primary indicators* are: core inflation, budget deficit as percentage of GDP, external debt as percentage of GDP, current account deficit as percentage of GDP. The *Secondary Indicators* are: net central bank credit to the government, foreign reserves, domestic savings rate, domestic investment rate, rate of economic growth. The *Other Indicators* are: payments and clearing systems, currency convertibility, legal and regulatory framework for dual cross listing on the regional stock exchanges, exchange controls, and current and capital account transactions between member states.

The Trade Policy Framework: Member states have liberalised their trade (a) unilaterally through structural adjustment programmes; (b) bilaterally with other SADC member nations; (c) regionally through SADC, COMESA, EAC and IOC; (d) multilaterally through the WTO, EU-ACP Cotonou agreement, EBA and regional integration facilitation forum (RIF).

Tariff Reduction: SADC has adopted a linear tariff reduction approach under which each country will reduce its tariffs on intra-regional trade over an eight year period guided by the principle of asymmetry and an agreed classification of products into three categories;

Category A is for immediate liberalisation of capital goods and raw materials.

Category B is for gradual liberalisation of intermediate goods; and

Category C is for finished goods to be liberalised five years after entry into trade protocol.

Progress in Trade Liberalisation: About half the SADC membership has made steady progress towards completing their tariff phase down programmes. All have made limited progress with respect to i. elimination of non-tariff barriers; ii. liberalisation of trade in services; iii. harmonisation of quality standards; iv. harmonisation of customs procedure.

But most of the member states have adopted SADC-wide applicable rules of origin.

Labour Market Policy Framework: The framework aims at developing harmonious relations in the labour market through: promotion and maintenance of industrial peace; provision of social security; employment and job placement services; maintenance and enforcement of occupational safety and health in the workplace; and development of requisite skilled human resources.

Goal of the Labour Market Policy Framework: The overall goal is to create an environment that is conducive to sustainable social and economic development and improve the standard of living of the people in general and workers in particular.

Components of the Labour Market Policy: Promotion of tripartism and decentralised collective bargaining by strengthening trade unions; Formal training of workers within and outside SADC; Amendment of employment acts to reinforce and regulate minimum standards of employment to ensure equity; Labour relations acts to enhance industrial peace; Flexibility in hiring and firing workers.

Outcomes of the Labour Market Policy: Flexible wage and labour market policies have helped to increase real earnings of workers and contributed to economic growth and poverty alleviation. They have also contributed to a decline in the rate of creation of formal sector employment. This includes an increase in self-employment, including cross-border trading, migration and increased employment of expatriates from other SADC member countries.

Social Impact of Macroeconomic Policies: In most SADC member states, per capita GNI has increased in recent years. Where data are available, they indicate that national poverty rates have declined. Life expectancy has fallen in most of the member states.

Adult literacy rates have increased. The proportion of people without access to safe drinking water and improved sanitation facilities has declined.

Constraints to Deepening SADC Integration: The delays and other inefficiencies associated with the trade protocol are due to deficiencies in the protocol itself, in particular: the discretionary nature of the protocol; provisions that allow member states to restrict intra-regional trade; lack of sanctions against member states that fail to implement its provisions.

Other constraints to Deepening SADC Integration: There are notable human resource capacity constraints, especially in RIF directorate. In addition the areas that clearly cry for attention are: the limited mandate of the Secretariat, long decision-making chain, vertical integration into the north, unequal and uneven development, membership in overlapping regional integration schemes.

The way forward: A realistic approach to accelerating integration will require the following: Fast tracking and expediting the elimination of remaining tariff and non-tariff barriers to intra-regional trade; accelerating the formulation of macroeconomic convergence programmes and their incorporation into national policy frameworks; giving consideration to adopting a rule-based system for the STP and the MOU on Macroeconomic convergence; removing features of the trade protocol that restrict trade between member states; instituting sanctions against member states that do not comply with the provisions of the STP and the MOU; rationalisation of regional integration schemes.

Open Forum Discussions

Question: SADC as a structure is not there, we have not seen it, and it is not related to the escalation of poverty in the region.

Answer: SADC thinks that committee can do anything, yet they do not have capacity. I am also on the view that SADC should abolish national committees because they have not worked.

Question: What is the role of the civil society specifically in economic integration?

Answer: When we form tariffs we need to have commissions and the role of civil society can be on the negotiating of those tariffs.

Question: SADC made decision that by 2010 it will have customs union. Then what will happen with SACU?

Answer: South Africa is in for collecting revenue, there is no way out but we do not need a collective thing each member state should collect its own revenue.

Question: Is there a formula to make integration to work for all?

Answer: The formula that may be accepted to losers is compensation.

5.2 Perceptions of Non-State-Actors about integration, Klaus Schade, NEPRU

Mr. Schade's presentation was a summation of a study commissioned by Friedrich Ebert Foundation in collaboration with SADC Secretariat. It is a collective of a country studies on deepening integration in SADC- macroeconomic policies and their impact and country surveys of perception of business people and Non-State Actors (NSA)-completed and its summaries of both studies are in progress. The participating countries in these studies were; Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Madagascar, Malawi and Mauritius. The type of organizations which were contacted were organized labour, organized employer, industry association, other

professional association, other civil society organization and others. In these studies, 20% were members of SADC national committee while 80% were not; and roughly 45% were affiliated to a regional umbrella organization while 55% were not.

Regarding participation in SADC national committee meetings: only 11.2% said they participated regularly, while 13.7% said they participated only sometime. A mere 3.3% said they did not participate but were invited, 64.7% reported non-participation for lack of invitation, while 7.2% did not know anything about these structures. The SADC region NSA organizations always appear top of the organizations in the COMESA and EAC on questions of discussion of regional integration, in the organization of public workshops/seminars on regional integration, use of press releases to raise issues of regional integration and attendance of workshop or seminars on regional integration. NSA involvement in domestic public design was also found to be high at 69.49%, whereas the involvement in SADC policy design was rather low at a mere 26.6%.

Regional integration impact on NSA involvement in domestic policy making: NSAs which felt this had been strongly strengthened formed 30.4%, those which said it was strengthened slightly were 30.9% and only 10.6% said it had not changed. In relation to need to increase capacity among NSA, 96.8% said they needed to increase their capacity while 3.2% did not want to increase their capacity. A larger number were in strong support of regional integration at 60% in SADC s while 20.9% slightly support it. On the contrary, 40.1% strongly support integration in COMESA while 30% slightly support it. Only 30.1% strongly support integration in EAC while 19% slightly support integration EAC.

Perceived impact of regional integration on business: Some 40.1% thinks the impact of integration is access to cheaper foreign labour. 40.1% sees the problem of retrenchment of employees, and 40.2% perceive the closing down of production in the country, while 50.2% see the impact of employing of more workers and 50.3% see a chance be able to invest abroad. A comfortable 60.4% think they will be able to export more to other SADC countries. Increase domestic production is seen as a result by 60.5%; while access to cheaper inputs is mentioned by 60.8% of the respondents. The gallop of optimism is sustained as 70.9 % see a chance to import more from other SADC countries, and 80.2% see an avenue for joint ventures with enterprises in other SADC countries and 90.7% see the chance of venturing into new business activities.

Perceived effects of regional integration on economy: Here 63% agree that integration will reduce prices of inputs while 25.7% disagree. Influx of migrants was cited by 69.0%, but 23.0% did not agree. Seventy percent 70.1 see the effects as being an increased efficiency of domestic production while 24.0% do not believe so. Some 70.3% agree on the effect of reducing prices of consumer goods, but 18.3% do not see that as being the case. On the other hand 77.0% believe the effects of economic integration will benefit the economy in general while some 10.8% disagree. While a large percentage of 80.5% see the effects as integration providing new investment opportunities, 12.3% do not see that as the case. Equally important 85.5% believe the effects are increasing competition on domestic market but some 9.9% do not think so. Lastly, 90.9% sees the effects as providing new export opportunities while 5.8% disagree with this.

In relation to major barriers to trade: Some 52.3% of these respondents see high transportation costs as the main barrier, while 44.2% see the barrier as the time consuming procedures, and 43.4% mention the corruption of officials. Regarding the cumbersome procedures, 42.8% see export or import licenses and permits as the barrier, but 42.4% also think the barrier is substantial paperwork and the bureaucracy. At the same time 40.0% see the problem as being weak regional transport infrastructure, but

39.9% see the main barrier as the customs tariffs currently employed while 39.9% consider high regional communication costs as the main barrier.

On the way forward: In this category 59.5% thinks it is necessary to remove all trade restrictions within SADC while 61.1% believe in the removal of tariffs and establishment of Common External Tariff with all other countries, and 65.8% call for removal of restrictions on the free movement of capital within SADC. Some 71.4% believe in the removal of restrictions on the free movement of services within SADC, and 72.5% speak for the creation of a regional umbrella organization of Non-State Actors. Designing of competition and trade policies for SADC as a whole was mentioned by 79.5% as the way forward, while a large majority of 91.4% advocated the reduction of tariffs within SADC.

Advocacy of a cautious approach: roughly equal proportions of 40.2% and respectively 40.1% were for a cautious approach to take believe on the creation of political union with parliament and executive on the one hand and a speedy process on the other. In similarly equal measure, 40.2% agree to a creation for a single currency within SADC while 40.3 disagree; and 40.9 % agree on the removal of restrictions on the free movement of labour within SADC, while 40.3% do not agree on the free movement of labour.

In summary there is overwhelming favour of regional integration; removal of all trade barriers, but greater caution concerning free movement of labour and political union. There is overall positive influence on economy in general and businesses perceived, expectation of stronger influence of NSA in policy design and strong need to strengthen capacity in order to participate on regional level.

Session 6: Engaging SADC, Chair: Ted Nandolo

6.1 Reports from Working Groups & Commissions

6.1.1 Human Rights and Access to Justice: Group 1

6.1.1.1 What is the problem?

- a. Very poor pool of lawyers
 - No services in the rural areas
 - Lack of access to justice in the region
 - Independence of the judiciary (lack of), politicized courts particularly the vulnerable, disabled, women and children
 - Institutions for example police, courts, magistrates and administration
 - Access, very poor co-ordination in administration due to poor capacity (training exposure of paralegals)
 - Removal (weak traditional courts in some countries not accorded respect)
- b. Lack of awareness: recognition of the existence of legal services providers in the formal and informal justice delivery system
- c. Lack of comprehensive protection of human rights in the region and poor domestication of international and regional instruments

6.1.1.2 Strategies

- Development of SADC Charter (Draft) on human rights and lobby for its adoption
- Automatic domestication of international instruments.
- Lobby-national governments and stakeholders, justice delivery systems for the legal recognition of paralegals.
- Removal of discriminatory laws and legislation towards women and children (where women are legal minors)
- Lobby for courts to be accessible to people with disability in terms of buildings, transport, interpretations and provision of courts assistance.

Thematic organization to lead

SADC lawyers association and SALAN (legal assistance cluster), SADC-CNGO to work with organizations and others such as SAFOD, SADC-NGO to monitor resource mobilization and evaluation

6.1.2 Regional Thematic Organization National Lead Agency

6.1.2.1 The problem:

The group focused on legitimacy of governments in terms of law enforcement with regard

to elections. Some regional peoples do not have access to elections and thus lack of engagement in terms of citizen participation:

- There is lack of capacity in terms of involving citizens.

Three types of strategies to deal with this problem

- We should work together to push governments to address common issues;
- Lack of coherence between political parties, so we should look at the parties;
- Citizen participation (-civic education, -capacity building, - seven organizations were identified)

In relation to peace, there are priority areas: -political instability, - cross-border migration, and lack of access to service

6.1.2.2 Campaigns

Health crisis: - access to treatment, food security, and lack of practices for increasing agriculture. Lack of access to food security, land rights by women, we fail to use technology that can work for us.

6.1.2.3 Strategies

We need evidence-based research -how effective is the politics that is there working?

- Lobby for free movement of people
- Prevent arms proliferation and landmines
- We should mobilize resources for DRC
- Capacity building
- Advocacy and lobbying – we have to mobilize military and bring back refugees

6.1.3 Regional Economic integration G3

6.1.3.1. Problem

Implementation of instruments of integration is inadequate. As a result, SADC is not making sufficient progress towards eradicating poverty through intra-regional trade, investment flows, and improvement of infrastructure and finally exploitation of resources

6.1.3.2. Campaigns for consideration

- Lack of harmonization of policies within the region
- Lack of genuine political will to implement instruments of integration

6.1.3.3 Strategies

- Rationalization of regional economic communities, i.e RECs
- Institute sanctions to members for non-compliance
- SADC Secretariat must be given more autonomy and decision making powers

Agents for change:

- Regional thematic organization
- National lead Agency
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economic Planning and Finance, and the civil society.

The role of SADC-CNGO:

- To be the link between civil society and member states
- To lobby SADC member states to implement decisions taken
- To commit itself to help in policy monitoring and evaluation

6.2 Presentation, Discussion and adoption of the Communiqué

Chair: Abie Dillhake, Secretary General, SADC-CNGO

The draft communiqué was presented to the plenary by Dr Khabele Matlosa of EISA, and adopted following extensive deliberations:

COMMUNIQUE OF THE SADC CIVIL SOCIETY FORUM ON “DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION. KHOTSONG LODGE, THABA BOSIU, LESOTHO

14-16 August 2006

1.0. PREAMBLE

SADC Civil Society Organisations held a Civil Society Forum at Khotsong Lodge, Thaba Bosiu in Lesotho between 14 & 16 August 2006, ahead of the SADC Heads of State and Government Summit in Maseru, Lesotho. The 2006 SADC Civil Society Forum:

ENCOURAGED that in terms of article 23 of the SADC Treaty, Member States commit themselves to involve fully, the people of the Region and non-governmental organisations in the process of governance, regional integration and to co-operate with, and support the initiatives of the peoples of the Region and non-governmental organisations, contributing to the objectives of the SADC Treaty in the areas of co-operation in order to foster closer relations among the communities, associations and people of the Region;

INSPIRED BY the SADC Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) adopted in 2003 and the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ (SIPO) agreed upon in 2004 both of which form the hallmark of the governance and regional integration framework in the region;

NOTING that both the RISDP and SIPO recognise the centrality of civil society organisations in the achievement of SADC benchmarks on governance and regional integration; and

Adopts the following Communiqué.

2.0. On Civil Society-SADC Relations

The 2006 SADC Civil Society Forum notes that while the SADC Treaty as well as the RISDP and SIPO commit relevant SADC structures to involve civil society in the region in their deliberations and processes, civil society remains excluded and marginalised from

key SADC processes. This trend runs against the spirit and commitment contained in SADC Treaty in Chapter Seven, Article 23 that commits SADC to working in partnership with regional civil society. Additionally, this commitment is reinforced by the Memorandum of Understanding entered into with SADC Council of NGOs. We therefore call upon the SADC Heads of State and Governments to:

- 2.1. Ensure effective and active participation of civil society in its deliberations and processes;
- 2.2. Dissemination distribute information on SADC processes including its programmes such as the RISDP and SIPO to communities;
- 2.3. Promote consultation and active interface with civil society during pre-summit activities, the Summit itself and post-Summit activities;
- 2.4. Guarantee effective and active participation of Civil Society organisations in the SADC National Committees (SNCs);
- 2.5. Ensure participation in the SADC programmes, in particular the RISDP, SIPO and various related projects; and
- 2.6. Support and Strengthen SADC implementing structures to be result-oriented, particularly in meeting the agreed target for RISDP and SIPO

3.0. On Democracy, Peace and Security

The SADC Civil Society Forum recognises that the majority of SADC Member States have undergone transitions from authoritarian rule to multiparty democratic systems since the early 1990s. The Forum notes that challenges for nurturing and consolidating democracy still confront many countries leading to periodic legitimacy crisis of governance which in turn results in political instability. The SADC Civil Society Forum observes that while the SADC region has not experienced major inter-state wars since the collapse of the Cold War and demise of apartheid in South Africa, intra-state conflicts and instability still persist, thereby posing a serious threat to peace and security.

The Forum is concerned that many SADC countries tend to prioritise state security over human security yet human insecurity poses a major challenge for peace in the region today. Human insecurity is exacerbated by economic inequality, endemic health crisis, unabated poverty and hunger etc.

The Forum further notes that the SADC region is still vulnerable to violent intra-state conflicts affecting civilian populations. There is also a continued proliferation of small arms and light weapons circulating throughout the region. These weapons are often used in fuelling violent criminal activities. The regional security architecture in SADC still remains nascent and challenges for conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict transformation are daunting. The Forum notes that escalation of intra-state conflicts generates political instability and compromises security. In many SADC countries violent conflicts tend to intensify around elections with adverse effects for democracy, peace and security.

The Forum, therefore, implores SADC Heads of State and Government to:

- 3.1. Put in place mechanisms for constructive management of conflicts;
- 3.2. Establish the SADC Standby Brigade as a regional element of the AU Standby Force (ASF);

- 3.3. Domesticate international laws, continental and regional democracy and election norms, standards and principles;
- 3.4. Uphold and implement the agreed international, continental and regional democracy and election norms, standards and principles;
- 3.5. Inculcate a culture of peace, democracy and human rights among citizens especially the youth;
- 3.6. Pursue human security in tandem with state security;
- 3.7. Implement SIPO in close partnership with civil society organisations;
- 3.8. Elevate the status of the SADC Principles and Guidelines to a protocol;
- 3.9. Strengthen the SADC Secretariat and give it more power to implement and enforce Summit decisions; and
- 3.10. Elevate the status of the SADC Parliamentary Forum into a regional parliament with requisite powers to hold the SADC Summit accountable.

4.0. On Regional Economic Integration

The SADC Civil Forum notes that SADC Heads of State or Government have committed themselves to deepen regional integration through, among others, harmonisation and convergence of policies across all fronts. The Forum further notes that in order to strive towards deep integration SADC Heads of State and Government have adopted the RISDP which aims at (a) accelerating poverty reduction; (b) promoting economic growth and social development; (c) achieving macroeconomic stability, harmonisation and convergence of policies; and (d) achieving regional economic and security community. The Forum observes that SADC has committed itself to achieving free trade by 2008; customs union by 2010 and common market by 2015 through measurable and time-bound targets;

The Forum implores the SADC Heads of State and Government to:

- 4.1. Accelerate implementation of the RISDP in order to promote socio-economic advancement;
- 4.2. Monitor and evaluate implementation of RISDP annually;
- 4.3. Facilitate the free movement of goods and persons across borders within the SADC region;
- 4.4. Promote and encourage more intra-regional trade;
- 4.5. Strive towards development and retention of requisite human resources for socio-economic development;
- 4.6. Reduce unequal and uneven development among SADC member States;
- 4.7. Inculcate political will for implementation of SADC Protocols signed by member states;
- 4.8. Increase participation of Civil Society Organisations in SADC National Committees; and
- 4.9. Rationalise multiple regional economic communities in the region.

5.0. On Gender Equality

The SADC Civil Society Forum notes with gratification that SADC Member States have signed the 1997 SADC Declaration on Gender and Development in Blantyre, Malawi and the 2003 AU gender parity protocol in Maputo, Mozambique both of which commit them to gender equality;

However, despite signing of these declarations, there is little progress made by a majority of Member States towards achieving just 30% of women's representation in key organs of government, let alone achieving 50% of women's representation;

The SADC Civil Society Forum, therefore, calls upon the SADC Heads of State and Government to:

- 5.1. Elevate the SADC Declaration on Gender and Development into a Protocol for Accelerating Gender Equality in order to give it more legal teeth;
- 5.2. Domesticate the Gender and Development Declaration within national laws;
- 5.3. Accelerate the achievement of the 50% women in decision making by 2015;
- 5.4. Ensure that women occupy decision-making positions; and
- 5.5. Encourage Member States to stamp out gender-based violence.

6.0. On HIV/AIDS

While the SADC Civil Society Forum welcomes adoption of the Maseru Declaration on HIV/AIDS, the Forum is concerned, the HIV/AIDS epidemic is on the increase and taking its toll on populations of the region especially on women and girls;

The Forum calls upon the SADC Heads of State and Government to:

- 6.1. Accelerate the implementation of the Maseru Declaration;
- 6.2. Fulfill their commitment to contributing to the HIV/AIDS Regional Fund in terms of the agreement in Maseru;
- 6.3. Elevate the Maseru Declaration on HIV/AIDS into a Protocol;
- 6.4. Enhance the sub-region's health capacity by implementing the May 2006 African Common Position on HIV/AIDS, Malaria and TB; and
- 6.5. Prioritize universal access to treatment and provision of adequate nutrition

7.0. On Human Rights and Access to Justice

The SADC Civil Society Forum recognizes the centrality of human rights and access to justice to democratic governance. The fundamental embodiment of human rights is the respect for human dignity as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. Human rights and democracy are fulfilled when individuals know their rights, know where to access them; know when they are violated and know how to seek redress for violations. Democracy promotes and protects human rights through constitutional guarantees, rule of law and institutional oversight mechanisms that protect human rights from abuse. The Forum observes that the respect, protection and promotion of human rights and access to justice in SADC countries constitute one of the many challenges facing the region. The Forum, therefore, urges the SADC Heads of State and Government to:

- 7.1. Domesticate international, continental and sub-regional human rights instruments into national laws in order to ensure their legal enforcement;
- 7.2. Promote, respect and protect freedom of expression; freedom of association; access to information and freedom of the press. In this

- regard, we note a worrying trend in Zimbabwe on existing legislation restricting these freedoms;
- 7.3. Provide for and enforce mechanisms aimed at ensuring access to justice, particularly for marginalized and vulnerable social groups such as women, youth, people with disabilities and people living with HIV/AIDS;
 - 7.4. Mainstream human rights, peace and democracy within the educational curriculum from lower level to higher level;
 - 7.5. Promote civic education, in collaboration with civil society organizations to empower citizens around human rights and access to justice;
 - 7.6. Respect the independence of the judiciary and the strengthen the informal courts;
 - 7.7. Strengthen the justice delivery system retain lawyers and accredit paralegal agencies;
 - 7.8. Agree on mechanisms and framework for the implementation of policies and legislation concerning people with disabilities taking into consideration international conventions on people with disabilities; and
 - 7.9. Embark on legal reform aimed at removing laws/legislation that discriminate against marginalized social groups such as women, youth, people with disabilities and people living with HIV/AIDS;

The SADC Civil Society Forum commits itself to collaborate with relevant SADC Structures and actively participate in the realization of the above resolutions.

Done at Khotsong Lodge, Thaba Bosiu, Lesotho, 16th Day of August 2006

6.3 Closing remarks, Abie Dithake – Secretary General, SADC-CNGO:

We have come to the end of this Second Civil Society Forum, and on behalf the SADC-CNGO Executive Committee, and our co-hosts I want to thank everybody who made this endeavor a success. A lot of work lies ahead of us. Later this evening we will present the communiqué to the Chairman of the SADC Council of Ministers, and host a media briefing at the scene of the SADC Summit in Maseru. Following this Forum, we will convene a clearing house meeting with all the regional thematic networks represented here; NEPRU, EISA, HURISA, AFRODAD, SALAN, and CCR to rank our priorities. We will then share with the rest of participants the agreed plan of action. This will then constitute our roadmap for the next 12 months. On this note we take this opportunity thanks everyone wish you all a fruitful and cooperative year ahead and a collective realization of our common goals.

Appendix 1: 2nd SADC Civil Society Forum Concept Note

By: BSA & SADC-CNGO

20 March 2006

1.0. Background

Southern Africa has embarked on a complex process of pursuing democratic governance and regional economic integration in tandem since the signing of the Treaty establishing the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia. It is assumed that the achievement of a successful regional integration regime is dependent upon institutionalization of democratic governance both within individual member states and even at the level of SADC itself as a supranational institution. This assumption is correct. Regional economic integration requires, as *sine qua non*, democratic practices, values and institutions to be in place in each one of the SADC member states. Further more, regional integration cannot succeed without deliberate efforts for the deepening of democratic values and ethos at the level of SADC as regional structure.

2.0. Problem Statement

However, the problem that may inhibit the achievement of democratic governance and regional economic integration in tandem within the framework of the SADC Treaty is simply that both processes are overly state-centric and elite-driven. Democracy at both national and regional levels is perceived as state-propelled project. Regional economic integration, by the same token, is regarded as a state-propelled project. More by design than by default, SADC heads of state and governments have turned the double agenda of democratic governance and regional economic integration into elite projects that exclude ordinary peoples of the region both at national levels and at the level of the SADC secretariat. Further more, it is worth noting that since the signing of the SADC Treaty numerous declarations have been signed by member states yet implementation and adherence to regional commitments is severely lacking. A good example in this regard is the poor record of adherence to the 1997 Declaration on Gender and Development by a majority of SADC member states as we noted during the 2005 civil society forum held in Gaborone, Botswana.

Democratic governance requires popular participation of the citizens. Regional economic integration will not succeed and endure if it fails to positively change the socio-economic situations of ordinary citizens. Articulated somewhat differently, without deliberate efforts to factor citizens individually and in their organized formations as critical actors in the pursuit of democratic governance and regional economic integration, a purely state-centric integration project can only benefit the elite with bleak prospects for the benefits trickling down to the poor and marginalized. This is where civil society organizations come: being a medium between the state and citizens, civil society formations play an important role in bridging the gap between governments and the people. It is therefore imperative that civil society formations intervene and ensure that as SADC pursues democratic governance and regional economic integration, Southern Africa's peoples are considered central to both processes. It is behind this background that the SADC-CNGO in collaboration with BSA will host a civil society forum parallel to the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Governments scheduled for August 2006. Appropriately, the theme of the 2006 civil society forum is "Democratic Governance and Regional Economic Integration in Southern Africa".

3.0. Thematic Areas

The Forum will deliberate on the above-mentioned theme focusing on the following four main areas:

- 3.1.SADC Structures and Programmes and their relations with civil society formations
- 3.2.Democratic Governance and Civil Society
- 3.3.Regional Economic Integration and Civil Society; and
- 3.4.Programme of Action for Civil Society Engagement in democratic governance and regional economic integration.

4.0. Purpose of the Forum

The primary purpose of the Forum is to take stock of the efforts made thus far by SADC in pursuance of democratic governance and regional economic integration since 1992. This assessment will also include a critical thinking around challenges for civil society engagement with SADC around democratic governance and integration.

5.0. Objectives of the Forum

The specific objectives of the Forum are as follows:

- 5.1.Develop an understanding of SADC Structures and Programmes and how they interface with civil society organizations;
- 5.2.Provide a civil society perspective what constitutes democratic governance in SADC and how non-state organizations can influence state-driven projects;
- 5.3.Provide a civil society perspective of what constitutes regional economic integration and how to engage with the integration agenda and bring people back in; and
- 5.4.Develop a concrete plan of action that will become an annual plan of SADC-CNGO for the year 2007.

5.0. Project Implementation

The forum will be implemented jointly by the SADC-CNGO, based in Gaborone, Botswana and EISA, based in Johannesburg, South Africa

6.0. Expected Outputs

Two major outputs expected from the Forum are:

- 6.1. Civil society country reports on governance and integration;
- 6.2. Report of the Forum Proceedings;
- 6.3. Annual Plan for 2007;

Appendix 2: The Second SADC CIVIL SOCIETY FORUM PROGRAMME

Theme: Democratic Governance and Regional Economic Integration

14th – 16th August 2006

Lesotho

Final Programme

Sunday, 13th August

14h00 – 18h00	Arrival & Registration of Participants
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Monday, 14th August

Session 1: Official Opening <i>Chair: Seabata Motsoai, Executive Director, LCN</i>	
08h30 – 08h45	Welcome Remarks: Mabusetsa Lenka, President, LCN, Lesotho
08h45 – 08h55	Background and Objectives of the Forum <i>Ms. Ibna Tip, Senior Advisor-Conflict Management & Democracy Education, BSA</i>
08h55 – 09h10	Opening: <i>Emmanuel Ndlangamandla, SADC-CNGO & CANGO, Swaziland</i>
09h10 – 09h45	Official Opening: <i>Honourable Dr. Timothy Thahane, Minister of Finance, Lesotho</i>
09h45 – 10h15	Keynote Address: Dr. Thomaz Salomao, Executive Secretary, SADC Secretariat
10h15 – 10h30	Introduction to the Programme <i>Abie Dithake, General Secretary, SADC-CNGO</i>
10h30 – 11h00	Tea Break
Session 2: 1st SADC Civil Society Forum Progress Report <i>Chair: Dr. Khabele Matlosa, Senior Researcher, BSA</i> In this Session SADC – CNGO shall present progress and key challenges & opportunities since the 1 st Regional Civil Society Forum. After Presentation the Participants will deliberate on the issues raised and future planning.	
11h00 – 11h30	<i>Lessons & Experiences from the 1st SADC CSO Forum</i> <i>Abie Dithake, General Secretary, SADC-CNGO</i>
11h30 – 12h00	<i>Open Forum Discussions</i>
12h00 – 13h30	Lunch

Session 3: SADC Structure and Civil Society

Chair: Emmanuel Ndlangamandla, Executive Director, CANGO, Swaziland

This Session shall give an overview of the present SADC and AU/NEPAD Structure and where the involvement of Civil Society in policy decision making processes within the SADC region and African continent is supposed to take place; strategies to enhance and occupy this space by Civil Society shall be elaborated

13h30 – 13h50	SADC Structures and How they work <i>SADC Secretariat (?)</i>
13h50 – 14h40	Civil Society Evidence, Poverty & Governance <i>Chris Landsberg, Executive Director, CPS & Sue Mbayu, Executive Director, SARPN</i>
14.40 – 15h00	Open Forum
15h00 – 15h30	<i>Tea Break</i>
15h30 – 16h00	AU/NEPAD/APRM Structures and Processes and how Civil Society can engage, <i>NEPAD Secretariat: Lifa Musyimi-ogana</i>
16h00 -17h00	ECOSOC Processes and Programmes <i>Charles Mutasa, Executive Director, AFRODAD</i>
17h00 – 17h30	Open Forum

Tuesday, 15th August

Session 4: Democratic Governance

Chair: Mary Mwingira, Executive Director, TANGO, Tanzania

The session is about the Key Issues of Governance. (Accountability, Responsibility, Transparency) and how Civil Society can contribute to the monitoring and ensuring of good democratic governance on the regional level.

08h30 – 09h45	Thematic Panel Presentations: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Elections and Democracy, <i>Khabele Matlosa, ESA</i>• Gender and Democracy, <i>Keiso Matashane-Marite, WLSA-Lesotho</i>• Peace, Security, HIV-AIDS and Democracy, <i>Angela Muvumba, CCR</i>• Human Rights and Democracy, <i>Corlett Letlojane, HURISA</i>• Access to Justice and Democracy, <i>Prof. Haroub Othman, SALAN</i>
09h45- 10h15	Open Forum
10h15 – 10h30	<i>Tea Break</i>
10h30 – 11h30	Panel Presentations – Regional Programme Funding <ul style="list-style-type: none">• <i>Strategic Policy Priorities, Neville Gabriel, Executive Director, Southern Africa Trust</i>• <i>Making Governance Work for the Poor, Kemi Williams, Senior Social Development Advisor, DfID</i>• <i>African Governance & Monitoring, OSISA/AFRIMAP</i>
11h30 – 12h00	Open Forum

12h00 – 12h20	Country Reports
12h20 – 12h35	Open Forum
12h35 – 14h00	<i>Lunch</i>
Session 5: Regional Economic Integration	
<i>Chair: Ted Nandob, Executive Director, CONGOMA, Malawi</i>	
This Session shall give an overview about the present status of economic Integration in SADC. Therefore some SADC Protocol's and the ACAD shall be represented towards their policy impacts.	
14h00 – 14h30	SADC Protocols and Status (?)
14h30 – 15h00	Macroeconomic Policies and their Impact, <i>Chinyama at a Chipeta, SAIER</i>
15h00 – 15h30	Perceptions of Non-State-Actors, <i>Klaus Schade, NEPRU</i>
15h30 – 16h00	Open Forum
16h00 – 16h15	<i>Tea Break</i>
16h15 – 17h45	Working Groups & Commissions (<i>parallel sessions</i>)

Wednesday, 16th August

Session 6: Engaging SADC	
<i>Chair: Ms Sue Mbaya, SARPN</i>	
Development of strategies for coordination of civil society engagement with SADC and the Summit, and the Results of the forum shall be synthesized in preparation for the Communiqué	
08h30 – 10h00	Reports from Working Groups & Commissions
10h00 – 10h45	Open Forum
10h45 – 11h15	<i>Tea Break</i>
11h15 – 11h45	Strategic Engagement and Post-Forum Processes: The Way Forward <i>Abie Dii Ihake, SADC-CNGO</i> <i>Khabele Matlosa, BSA</i>
11h45 – 12h30	Open Forum & Resolutions
12h30 – 13h00	Presentation, Discussion and adoption of the Communiqué
13h00 – 13h15	Official Closure
13h15 – 14h30	<i>Lunch</i>

Appendix 3: Commissions Framework questions

COMMISSIONS

1. PEACE, SECURITY & DEMOCRACY
2. HUMAN RIGHTS & ACCESS TO JUSTICE
3. REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
4. CONNECTING NATIONAL TO REGIONAL (SADC National Committees and popular participation)
5. AFRICAN UNION - NEPAD/APRM /ECOSSOC

Key Areas/Questions

1. Problem statement
2. Identify two/three issues and/or campaigns for consideration (next 12 months)
3. Develop strategies
4. Identify regional thematic organization and/or national lead agency
5. Identify SADC-CNGO role

- ❖ ONE STRATEGY/WAY - COORDINATION
- ❖ TWO IDEAS - IMPROVE ON THE FORUM FOR NEXT YEAR

Appendix 4: List of participants

List of staff

No	Name	Country	Organization	Email/Tel	Status
1	Abie Dithake		SADC-CNGO		M
2	Kealeboga Gaboætswe	Botswana	FES		F
3	Linda Ramokate	Botswana	SADC-CNGO		F
4	Teboho Litaba	Lesotho	LCN		M
5	Mots'ea Mohapi	Lesotho	LCN		F
6	Maseketso Ntaba	Lesotho	LCN		F
7	Rethabile Nonkonane	Lesotho	LCN		M
8	Nthakeng Selinyane	Lesotho	NUL		F
9	Itumeleng Makutoane	Lesotho	NUL		F
10	Michelle Presser	South Africa	IGD		

No	Name	Country	Organization	Email/Tel/Address	Status
11	Tlaba Ntse'khe	Lesotho	Lesotho Young Christian	Lesothoycs@yahoo.com	M
12	Raumont Muthepu	Lesotho	LTUD	2231624	M
13	T. Molahli	Lesotho	Lesotho Transport and allied workers		M
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