



Research Report 107

Pan-African Citizenship and Identity Formation in Southern Africa: An overview of problems, prospects and possibilities

Francis Kornegay

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Citizenship and identity are important attributes that peoples throughout the world draw on to give their lives meaning. Southern Africans and the broader African communities on the continent are no different. This surveys different historical and political dimensions of regional citizenship and identity in southern Africa. Such issues as are highlighted in this paper assume a prospective expansion of equality of citizenship, in a sub-continent where citizenship was once defined on a stratified basis of race and phenotype. This involves a search for an as-yet-undefined trans-national understanding on equal citizenship rights and duties, benefits and obligations, which reflects a pan-African identity transcending the nation-state. Surveying these issues entails three areas of focus aimed at informing a more exhaustive research agenda beyond the scope of overview of this paper.

Firstly, the issues of free movement of people and migration into South Africa, the sub-region's economic powerhouse, are explored. Secondly, the Free Movement of People Protocol is examined at the level of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Thirdly, the case of Zimbabwe, which has in recent years become a contributor to patterns of forced migration into South Africa and other neighbouring countries, is introduced. An overview of these issues is prefaced by a review of South and southern Africa's historical and contemporary ethnography and demographic dynamics which has contributed to what has been conceptualised as the 'trans-nationalisation' of the sub-continent; trans-nationalism reflecting the phenomenon of those who leave their home country but retain important social ties even as they reside in their new host country within the region.

Southern Africa's contemporary regional identity has been strongly shaped by the liberation struggles against minority racial dominance. This generated a political culture of solidarity largely reflecting a state-centric agenda of mutual support among the region's leaders. Migratory flows from poorer to richer and/or more developed countries - principally South Africa, Botswana and Namibia - that may result from governing crises within the SADC, has complicated issues of immigration and the free movement of people. This created a situation wherein regional citizenship and identity prospects are increasingly caught in issues of democracy promotion and the need for a 'bottom-up' civil society driven participatory trans-nationalism that balances and complements state driven regionalism within the SADC. South Africa's post-apartheid efforts to cope with

growing immigration from the rest of the continent and Zimbabwe's crisis driven forced migration are surveyed against this backdrop.

In terms of nurturing an environment favourable to promoting the free movement of people, a trans-frontier approach to regional integration - trans-frontierism - is discussed. Also discussed is a trans-national option for promoting political integration to advance regional citizenship and identity as a pro-democratic force: the revival of the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA). These options would complement another potential force for trans-nationalism within SADC: the SADC National Committees.

1. INTRODUCTION: THE SCOPE OF THE TERRAIN

Citizenship and identity are important attributes that peoples throughout the world draw on to give their lives meaning. Southern Africans and the broader African communities on the continent are no different. This paper attempts to survey different historical and political dimensions of regional citizenship and identity in southern Africa. Such issues as are highlighted in this paper assume a prospective expansion of equality of citizenship, in a subcontinent where citizenship was once defined on a stratified basis of race and phenotype. This involves a search for an as-yet-undefined trans-national understanding on equal citizenship rights and duties, benefits and obligations, which reflects a pan-African identity transcending the nation-state. Surveying these issues entails three areas of focus aimed at informing a more exhaustive research agenda beyond the scope of overview of this paper.

Firstly, the issues of free movement of people and migration into South Africa, the sub-region's economic powerhouse, are explored. Secondly, the Free Movement of People Protocol is examined at the level of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Thirdly, the case of Zimbabwe, which has in recent years become a contributor to patterns of forced migration into South Africa and other neighbouring countries, is introduced. More detailed studies exploring these issues will be done in separate papers. This paper is devoted to an overview of what may be regarded as some of the salient conceptual and political issues pertaining to regional citizenship and identity in southern Africa as well as some suggested scenarios that may provide some momentum to an expanded regional identity consciousness.

The issues explored in this paper are located within an historical and contemporary context. This will entail looking back at the pre-colonial peopling of the subcontinent. The controversies surrounding the origins of national identity formations that started as a result of a number of triggering factors (endogenous sources that included population pressures and movements, interacting with climatic and environmental change) will also be looked at. Exogenous factors include rival European mercantile, settler and colonialist interventions, the impact of the Indian Ocean slave trade, establishment of colonial outposts along the south-eastern coastal littoral and the entrenching of settler communities and their increasing economic exploitation of southern Africa's mineral resources. How all these influences - exogenous and endogenous - combined to promote, inhibit and/or arrest nation-building and identity formation and laid the foundations for what might be considered the 'trans-nationalisation' of identities will be explored.

These dynamics largely inform the build up to and the entrenchment of the European settler-colonialist period of southern Africa's development. This period that saw the establishment of the sub-region's 'labour reserve economy' was conceptualised in the works of Samir Amin. This phenomenon spurred the rapid evolution of what has become the Southern African Migratory Labour System; a system of interdependency that integrated the economy of South Africa, as the mining-industrial centre of the subcontinent, with the economies of its neighbours at the periphery. The pre-colonial/settler period, leading up to the entrenching of the labour migration/remittance economy and the nature of this system, itself, will inform the section 2 of this paper, establishing the background to the post-colonial/settler era and its contemporary citizenship and identity issues.

The continuing migratory flow and trans-territorial/trans-national establishment of multiple or dual residences among black southern Africans, added another dimension to citizenship and identity formation. This 'trans-nationalisation of black southern Africa' carried over into the post-colonial/settler and post-apartheid era; one that has brought forth its own ambivalences reflected in the loyalties and identities of the subcontinent's peoples. These issues lead into section 3's examination of the liberation roots of southern Africa's regional citizenship and identity crisis associated with this section's overarching theme: 'Southern Africa in Transition: Economic regionalism amid inter and intra-state crises of governance and identity'.

South Africa's hegemony throughout the subcontinent and South Africans' post-apartheid ambivalence regarding their role and identity vis-à-vis the rest of Africa

contribute to this more recent context. Shaping this identity terrain - and the resulting ambivalences - was the new impetus toward regionalism prior to South Africa's democratic transition. This emanated from the various national liberation struggles and destabilising reactions to those struggles by the subcontinent's white elites that inspired the inter-state alliance of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) and its associated 'Front-Line States' (FLS). SADCC/FLS were precursors to SADC and its Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC). The regional identity forged in this crucible shaped what has become the enduring politics of solidarity generated by this liberation struggle phase in southern Africa's history. This will feature prominently in an analysis of current post-liberation regional citizenship and identity prospects.

The exploring of this terrain reflects a yearning amongst people throughout southern Africa and the broader continent to be a part of greater regional communities, as opposed to restrictive and exclusive national or local communities. Nevertheless, the parochial pull of sub-national and indeed smaller micro loyalties at clan and kinship levels cannot be underestimated. Indeed, these loyalties are based on identities of bygone eras and are still relatively fresh in memory. Nevertheless, to the extent that these yearnings amongst many southern Africans for more expansive regional identities increasingly gain ascendancy, this could create the scope for greater responsibilities and regional citizenship obligations.

With regard to these sub-national and, indeed sub-ethnic/clan and kinship identities, that counterpoise the scope for broader regional citizenship and identity, a growing body of research in southern Africa points to the existence of many 'invisible' associations of people who live in 'informal' realities that are neither recognised nor adequately understood by formal, state led processes. These are often marginalised groups that have developed their own rules of behaviour and solidarity networks to provide them with some forms of survival, self-protection and inclusion. In some instances, however, these are ethnic sub-groups or clans either vying for power or bidding to consolidate power in ways that run counter to broad based national, not to mention regional, identity formation. Zimbabwe is, in fact, emerging as an object case in point in this regard, which will be elaborated on at more length elsewhere in this paper. At non-governmental levels, while there is considerable trans-national civil society interaction (and even mobilisation and campaigning occurring in southern Africa) this is not necessarily unfolding in ways that explicitly promote and defend regional integration or regional citizenship and identity.

To be sure, at the formal interstate level, southern African states have, at least superficially, made much progress in the areas of economic integration, peace and security and even in terms of developing a regional identity amongst themselves. Yet they have been negligent as far as the issues of regional citizenship and identity are concerned. Governments throughout the region have, over the past decade, pursued laws, policies and politics that have tended to suppress ethnic, cultural, social and religious diversity and identities in the name of nation building and narrowly defined state sovereignty.

Similarly, citizenship rights are severely constricted everywhere in the region and throughout the continent. Women and minorities of different kinds - migrants, refugees, religious and ethnic minorities - suffer systematic discrimination and are subjected to xenophobia and other forms of exclusion. We could have this problem because governments and their policies are not rooted enough in the issues of grassroots communities. In many instances these policies are often fashioned by consultants (often imported from the West) who have little idea of the issues at this level. These concerns are overviewed in section 4's discussion on 'Immigration, free movement, citizenship and identity'. This section lays the basis for the more country focused case studies that are overviewed in sections 5 and 6 on South Africa and Zimbabwe.

Southern Africa has achieved much as far as regional development, peace and security are concerned. However, the question of people centred regional citizenship and identity is not uppermost on the agenda of the region's political establishment. This paper, therefore, seeks to make the case for such an approach becoming a much higher priority on the region's agenda; for civil society, if not for heads of state. While regional citizenship and identity for the people of the region is a difficult challenge in southern Africa, there are good prospects and platforms upon which to engage this challenge.

Some of the bases for such a regional citizenship and identity are to be found in the fact that the states in southern Africa have already developed a strong regional identity. It is true, however, that this is an elite identity found mainly amongst heads of state and governments. Secondly, most of the countries in the region share a common history; both its negative and positive; this includes the British, Portuguese and German colonial experiences, the Westminster system of government, the unique and prolonged liberation wars against entrenched settler populations, collaboration in the anti-apartheid struggle, as well as the emergence of the SADC. All states in southern Africa are members of the Commonwealth

(except for Zimbabwe, which, because of its internal problems, was suspended from that body and then left it altogether).

As indicated above, southern African states have developed a strong sense of regional solidarity. There is a growing recognition amongst southern Africans that their development problems cannot be addressed solely at national level. Regional integration and approaching issues from a regional perspective, permits a more holistic view of both the constraints to and the possibilities for development. In addition, the globalisation of the economy and increased international information flows have sharply and significantly increased the degree to which development efforts must account for factors operating at the regional, trans-national and supranational levels.

There is a real, if limited, sense of being part of a common political space and of holding common political values in southern Africa. This sense of regional or sub-regional commonality is shared more by governments, and in particular heads of state and government, rather than by the average person. People may, in fact, feel that this 'commonality of space' is severely restrictive in terms of cross-border freedom of movement and the sharing of common identity and citizenship, even though there has emerged at the entry and exit points of air terminals, designations for 'SADC Nationals.'

This sense of constraints among ordinary people exist, in spite of the fact that at the grassroots level, people interact, trade with one another and consequently, have begun breaking down barriers between them (if, indeed, such barriers really existed or were really that deeply rooted). The trans-national realities of the subcontinent's ethnographic map would seem to suggest otherwise. Also, events throughout the region are strongly interlinked. What happens in one country often has repercussions in another. The contradictions between a shared sense of 'commonality of space' and its constraints alluded to here, are elaborated on in section 7's look at 'SADC nationals and the limitations of state led regional integration: Reconceptualising regional citizenship and identity from 'the bottom-up'.'

This section will elaborate on how, at formal interstate and rhetorical levels, the development of common political values, systems and institutions is a key objective of SADC; member states' having committed themselves to being guided by principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. This has inspired a number of regional civil society networks and common interests groups that have

been established with the aim of promoting democracy and good governance in the region even as governments look with suspicion on this agenda.

Examples of such networks include the quasi-governmental SADC Parliamentary Forum, the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) interacting with the SADC Electoral Commissions Forum, the Media Institute of Southern Africa, the Southern Africa Human Rights NGO Network and the SADC Bar Association. The existence of regional common interest groups is evidence of the importance attached to regional cooperation by southern Africans. Support for and interactions with regional entities and initiatives are difficult or impossible to provide through bilateral offices, from bilateral platforms, or with bilateral methods.

In light of the forgoing, there is a need to increase regional capacity to influence the direction of debate and action on regional citizenship and identity. We need a more integrated regional market; to encourage but also enhance trans-boundary natural resources conservation and development and develop a positive sense of regional rights and responsibilities. There is a need for governments to, in consultation with their citizens, develop minimum regional standards pertaining to human and constitutional rights, political freedoms and citizenship and identity.

Ultimately, the onset of a new pan-African era ushered in by the African Union (AU) with its vision of sub-regional economic communities like SADC and the East African Community (EAC) evolving into 'regional integration communities' could give impetus to such developments. This would conceivably unfold within the context of fleshing out new continental institutions; AU organs such as the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) and the newly launched Economic, Cultural and Social Council (ECOSOCC). This, of necessity, would have to extend to sub-regional bodies like the SADC Parliamentary Forum and a new, but as yet undeveloped arm of the SADC, the SADC National Committees (SNCs).

Thus, the concluding section explores the possibilities of 'An eastern and southern African convergence on regional citizenship and identity in the age of the African Union'; posed as an open-ended question for the years and decades ahead. These prospects, it is argued (building on the discussion in the previous section) would have to entail generating, from within civil society, the type of trans-national processes of regional citizenship and identity formation that would manifest politically in balancing the limitations of state centric regional integration. Furthermore, such a process would contain an organic linkage between eastern and southern African integration dynamics. Hence, the proposal offered in

rounding out this paper: revisiting the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA) launched in Tanzania in 1958.

2. BACKGROUND: SOUTHERN AFRICA'S ETHNOGRAPHY

The ethnographic map of southern Africa, for the purposes of this analysis, encompasses what might be considered the sub-continental 'core region' demarcated by the Zambezi River. This leaves out a larger 'periphery' above the Zambezi. The Zambezi is in essence partitioning south-central Africa; what was once the old British colonial federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. Such a distinction may be considered artificial when looking at the migratory link that predates colonialism, between southern Africa, south of the Zambezi, and the Great Lakes area, both of which comprise the expanse of today's SADC.

The contemporary ethnography of 'core' southern Africa below the Zambezi - from Zimbabwe at the northern extremity (or the southern extremity of south-central Africa) to its southerly neighbours (the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) states of South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland) and Mozambique to the east - is rooted in the Bantu migrations from west-central Africa and the Great Lakes. Thus, for example, in a discussion of the 'Sekukune wars' that decisively shaped the history of the Transvaal in South Africa and forged the Bapedi ethno-linguistic identity of what is the now post-apartheid Limpopo province, HW Kinsey observed: "It appears that the Sotho people migrated southward from the Great Lakes in central Africa about five centuries ago in successive waves and the last group, namely, the Hurutse, settled in the western Transvaal towards the beginning of the sixteenth century."¹ More recently, in an analysis of the sub-ethnic clan dynamics animating the Shona ethno-linguistic politics of Zanu-PF, Joseph Chinembiri had this to say when referring to the Karanga, Zezuru, Manyika, Ndau and Korekore Shona sub-groups: "The Shona, who began arriving from west-central Africa more than 1 000 years ago, share a mutually intelligible language. But ethnically they are not homogenous. Between the clans there is a diversity of dialects, religious beliefs and customs."²

¹ Kinsey HW. 'The Sekukune Wars.' *Military History Journal* 1972; 2(5): 1. Accessed at <http://rapidtp.com/milhist/vol025hk.htm1>.

² Chinembiri J. 'Behind the scenes, a battle of the clans: Mugabe consolidates power for Zezuru group in Zimbabwe.' *Business Day* 6 April 2005: 3.

Furthermore, for the purposes of this paper's surveying the conceptual terrain of regional citizenship and identity, some of the most salient political confrontations of this contemporary period, illuminating the trans-national scope of this inquiry, have been played out in the immediate vicinity of the southern African 'periphery' beyond the Zambezi - namely, former Zambian President Frederick Chiluba's campaign to discredit Zambia's founding President Kenneth Kaunda as not being a 'true' Zambian, but a Malawian.

Thus, although the focus of this inquiry in terms of its South African and Zimbabwean case studies are, if you will, 'core' southern African, the trans-national implications of national politics of citizenship and identity in the wider SADC sub-region is directly relevant to this analysis. Indeed, the ethnography of the greater SADC sub-region is intimately reflected in South Africa itself and in aspects of South Africa's black trade union and political history. An example is the role played by the great Malawian, Clements Khadali, when founding the Industrial and Commercial Union (ICU) during the 1920s, a forerunner of the more contemporary black South African trade union mobilisation that contributed to the internal democratic movement that complemented the armed struggle. This example also reflects the role that the colonial-settler system of labour migration in southern Africa played in forging an essentially trans-national ethnography in the core mining economies of South Africa and Zimbabwe.

2.1 The 'Mfecane' phase of regional identity formation

The stress placed here on a more northerly historically rooted context for analysing issues of regional citizenship and identity in southern Africa, serves the purpose of placing in perspective the more limited, conventional and contested 'Mfecane' theory of relatively recent ethno-linguistic nationality formation below the

Zambezi.³ This more 'core' southern Africa historiography accents the upheavals

³ Controversy over the Mfecane thesis of the nineteenth century southern African state formation is associated with the political uses of 'Zulu-centricity' which was seen as serving, for different, though converging reasons, the interest of the apartheid regime as well as those of the Inkatha national cultural liberation movement that came to dominate the KwaZulu homeland. A seminal critique of this thesis by Julian Cobbing in the *Journal of African History* in 1988 attributing the upheavals of this period to external factors; namely the slave trade and slave raiding, and competitive European intrusions, triggered yet more controversy over the prominence or marginality of African agency such as in critiques of the Cobbing hypothesis in *The Mfecane*

that unfolded between the Thukela River and Delagoa Bay. Here, in southeast Africa, external influences included the Portuguese instigated slave trade and slave raiding as well as broader colonial penetration and settlement, along with similar and competitive intrusions by the British and Dutch/proto-Afrikaner trekboers. Such developments were of more than a little importance as they reflected the expansionism of Europe emanating from the late fifteenth century launch of the so-called 'Age of Discovery'.

This manifestly racialised imperial project, coinciding as it did with the beginnings of the Westphalian national state-based international system, culminated in the configuring of international relations as an essentially globalised racial order "based on the dominance of white Westerners over non-Western people of colour..."⁴ European global expansion, as it began to manifest itself in southeast Africa, combined with the more localised influences of drought, environmental degradation and decreasing resources. These developments interacted with a predominantly African dynamic of centralised state formation along the Northern Nguni corridor of population expansion, resource competition and internal conflict.

In chapter one of the online versions of Turning Points Book 3 in the article 'State Formation in Nineteenth Century South Africa' Yonah Seleti discusses the Mfecane wars:

"a migration of southern African people, especially that of Zulu-speaking and Sotho-speaking peoples, during the nineteenth century, originating in the area between Delagoa Bay (present day Maputo) and the Thukela River; ... was associated with the period ...(origin: Zulu 'crushing'; sometimes called Difaqane, from the Sotho word of 'hammering'). The upheaval that was the Mfecane is thought to have been caused by increasing population pressures, drought and decreasing resources. This situation set off a pattern of alliances,

Aftermath, edited by Carolyn Hamilton (1995/1996) and later efforts at reconciling external versus internal / Afro centric perspectives.

See for example:

Parsons N. 'Kicking the hornets' nest: a third view of the Cobbing controversy on the Mfecane / Difaqane.' 16 March 1999. Accessed at <http://www.thuto.org/ubh/ac/mfec.htm>.

⁴ Blauner R. Racial Oppression in America Harper & Row, 1972: 12.

conquest and both military and territorial expansion. It began in the late eighteenth century."⁵

This turbulence spawned new nationalities in the emergence of Zulu, Ndebele and Swati monarchies among the Northern Nguni, a process that extended across into the Shona regions of what is now Zimbabwe and across the Zambezi into the Zambian annexure of the Lozi kingdom of Barotseland. These are the same dynamics that influenced the Southern Sotho consolidation into the Basotho kingdom of Moshoeshoe. The Southern Nguni, comprising the Xhosa, Tembu, Mpondo, Mpondomise, Mfengu and Bomvana were also caught up in the vortex of these external and internal influences as were the Northern Sotho among the Bapedi and Balobedu and the Western Sotho comprising the Batswana.

Though the Zulu wars are better known, the Sekukune wars involving the British against the Bapedi are of equal importance in reshaping the map of southern Africa during the nineteenth century. Taken together, the Nguni and Sotho blocs, in their different regional variants, represented the identity consolidation of southern Africa's Bantu-language communities. The other major bloc (which became marginalised and decimated by these changes) constituted the Khoisan. To this day, the status of the Khoisan remains one of the contentious minority rights issues of marginalised peoples in southern Africa, especially in Botswana.

This cauldron became a pressure cooker of assimilation distilling several cross-cutting cultural features of an African social landscape in flux. As Seleti points out: "The use of the initiation age regiments for defensive purposes and for military purposes such as expanding a chiefdom's range of grazing, cultivating and hunting land had been practiced widely in southern African societies" though it was "in the Northern Nguni states that the initiation age regiments were increasingly brought under the centralised authority of powerful kings and used as standing armies for military campaigns in state building experiments."⁶

The population movements associated with this pressure cooker, according to John Reader, had two factors in common. They "were retreats into defensive mountain strongholds, and they were distinguished by the amalgamation of

⁵ Seleti Y. 'Chapter 1 - State Formation in Nineteenth century South Africa.' Turning Points Book 3: 1. Accessed at <http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/chronology/turningpoints/bk3/chapter1.htm>. Seleti's rendition of the Mfecane/Difaqane attempts to reconcile perspectives.

⁶ Seleti 5.

previously independent groups".⁷ This latter point, in contemporary identity terms, has to be considered crucial in light of the relatively recent vintage of the new nationalities that emerged out this state formation process. This very process, it must be borne in mind, was interrupted by European expansion and intrusion. This intervention prevented what was emerging as essentially African dynastic counterparts to similar formations that had emerged in Europe as precursors of modern post-Westphalian European nationalism. Thus, even today, sub-group loyalties at clan, family and kinship levels have to be considered at least on par with Mfecane rooted ethnic (nationality) identities, let alone post-independence national identities reflecting the yet to be overcome colonially defined fragmenting of African ethnicities.

In fact, quite possibly, to the extent that these sub-ethnic loyalties reflect cross-border, trans-national networks, they could conceivably constitute at least a partial basis for transcending national identity in the forging of a regional consciousness. This is where it may be pertinent to interject an observation that will be looked at in more detail later: the fact that the pre-colonial nature of ethno-linguistic networks were not defined by 'land' and 'territory' as much as by allegiances among specific groups of people. Land occupied by pre-colonial governing structures could expand and contract at will, due to relatively low population densities and people could migrate according to the need and availability of resources. Thus, 'free movement of people' was embedded in the geopolitical and cultural landscapes of pre-colonial Africa. This freedom would begin to face constraints with the European introduction of territorially defined colonial boundaries though pragmatism generally prevailed in the continued allowing of free movement until the rigidities of post-independence imposed 'territorial integrity' on cross-border movements. In the meantime, colonial regimes contributed to the consolidation of the new monarchy based nationalities that emerged in the nineteenth century.⁸

⁷ Reader J. *Africa: A Biography of the Continent* Penguin, 1997: 471. In the successive chapters of 'Black and White Frontiers' and 'Zulu Myth and Reality' Reader also emphasizes the influence of the slave trade and its raiding depredations into the southern African hinterland as a major factor in the Mfecane although he does not downplay the role of Zulu agency in this process.

⁸ This is a summary paraphrasing of 'The Free Movement of People' and the 'History of the problem' accessed at <http://www.cccoe.k12.ca.us/events/synopsis/FMP.doc>.

Once Britain imposed its colonial imperium in southern Africa, its protectorates falling outside the confines of the white ruled 'Union of South Africa' - Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland - crystallised their Mfecane derived kingdoms into dynastic proto-states under colonial rule. While this same imperium crushed the Zulu monarchy within the union, it did not succeed in destroying Zulu nationality. Zulu consciousness regained its nation-building momentum under the apartheid-era homeland policy of the Afrikaner nationalist republic, giving rise to the KwaZulu sectionalism that is still negotiating the terms of its post-apartheid integration into what is now the province of KwaZulu-Natal.

Rounding out this conflicting tapestry was the emergence of the Khoisan derived coloured frontier communities of the Griqua and Kora on the Highveld. These communities were major actors, along with the trekboers, in slave raiding activities aimed at supplying the Cape Colony's labour market. Forced labour, either through slavery or indenture, introduced the Asian strain into South Africa's national identity formation, first through the south Asian and Indonesian slaves brought to the Cape Colony and later, through Indians brought to the sugar plantations of Natal (part of a much larger Diaspora of south Asians to Mauritius, the British-West Indies, Fiji and the French colonies of Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Danish St Croix and Dutch Surinam).⁹

2.2 Race and the labour reserve phase of regional identity formation

In spite of the racial dimension to the liberation struggles against white minority rule in late twentieth century southern Africa, the confrontations between African and European, which led to white domination in the region, would not be defined as straight forward race wars. The period of the Mfecane upheaval and the emergence of centralised kingdoms interacted with European colonial intrusions and were characterised by intra-African and intra-European competition and conflict, as much as by conflict between Africans and Europeans. It was a period of shifting alliances and counter-alignments in European and African balances of power in southern Africa - not unlike a similar process of conflict and accommodation that occurred in North America between different warring Native American nations and rival European powers represented by France, Britain and

⁹ Dhupelia-Mesthrie U. *From Cane Fields to Freedom: A chronicle of Indian South African Life* Kwela Books, 2000: 10.

Spain establishing a foot-hold in the Americas. (This North American colonising process had similar parallels of Native American ‘national’ consolidation as occurred much later in southern Africa. The Beaver Wars and the Imperial Iroquois, depicted by Fred Anderson and Andrew Cayton¹⁰ recounting the Iroquois consolidation in what is now the north-eastern United States is instructive of this larger global context in which similar dynamics unfolded in southern Africa’s imperial transformation.)

In the section on ‘racial identity and alliances’ in Seleti’s addressing of the question: ‘What is the relationship between state formation and South African identity formation?’, Seleti refers to Christopher Saunders making an “interesting point about African perceptions of their own identity” when he observes that: “...*there was no well developed sense of racial identity among Africans*. He further maintains that *though whites may have been divided they had a clearer perception of the struggle as a racial one*, although they were ready to use African allies in order to extend their influence beyond the limits of their formal control”.¹¹ He goes on to note that instances of Africans forging alliances “to fight against the white intruders are limited” though there were important exceptions.¹²

William Watson Race and Jon Guttmann, writing in *Military History* magazine, make reference to Bapedi Chief Sekukune being “a known ally of Cetshwayo” whom the British had factored into their calculations prior to their disastrous encounter with the Zulu Impis at Isandlwana in 1879.¹³ Much later, in the 1890s, the Shona-Ndebele rising against white settlers in southern Rhodesia is another celebrated instance of a ‘pan-African’ military alliance against the ‘white intruders’. Then, Seleti cites the fact that “Moshoeshe is reported to have called on Sekonyela to join forces against the Voortrekkers by saying, ‘We are both black and of one nation’” in pointing out that “this construction of a racial identity among Africans was very unusual” and that “the pattern of black working with white against black has its origins in this period.”¹⁴ Further, in reference to treaties: “Despite the

¹⁰ Anderson F, Cayton A. ‘The Dominion of War: Empire and Liberty in North America 1500-2000.’ Viking, 2004.

¹¹ Seleti 9.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Watson Race W, Guttman J. ‘Zulu Mountain Trap Sprung.’ *Military History* June 1996: 2.

¹⁴ Seleti 9.

remarkable negotiation skills possessed by outstanding leaders such as Moshoeshoe and Mswati, both the Voortrekkers and the British often repudiated the agreements to advance their interests.”¹⁵

Black southern African racial identity appears to have been a post-subjugation phenomenon forged in the mining crucible of exploitation involved in entrenching a racial division of labour as the foundation of industrial race relations. This differentiation based on ‘race’ becomes a defining feature of the ‘labour reserve economy’ and its twin attributes of a regional migratory labour system and remittance economy tying together the southern African core and periphery in economic interdependence. This process further scrambled the southern African ethnographic pot through the levelling experience it generated among all and sundry caught in its web. In describing how the Kimberly mining complex shaped this racial economic regime in the 1870s, Reader observes that “the mines at Kimberly were quite unlike any other mining operation” in that they “had to prise a work force out of a pre-capitalist rural hinterland”¹⁶ referring to Rob Turrell’s depiction of “Kimberly: labour and compounds 1871-1888.”¹⁷ However, such was the extent of Kimberly’s “influence on the economy of southern Africa that, within one year of the opening of the mines, every black society south of the Zambezi, with the exception only of the Venda and the Zulu, was represented in the diamond fields, whether by independent businessmen, artisans or labourers.”¹⁸

Thus, on top of the still relatively new (in historical terms) nationalities that emerged in the nineteenth century out of the consolidation of much small, independent clans, communities and kinship networks, the onset of the southern African labour reserve economy and what would become the proverbial ‘migratory labour system’ spanning the entire subcontinent, resulted in yet another scrambling of identities. This process, spanning the decades of colonialism and the post-colonial rise of independent nation states effectively trans-territorialised and trans-nationalised this black southern African ethno-linguistic and cultural pluralism. Along with this was introduced the beginnings of an additional racial element into the identity mix and, for good measure, with the momentum toward urbanisation,

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Reader 497.

¹⁷ Marks, Rathbone 45-76.

¹⁸ Marks, Rathbone 499.

tensions between 'tradition' and 'modernity' interacting with the organic emergence of urban-rural divides.

Much of contemporary southern African identity has been shaped by the migratory labour system and the urban and rural, modern-traditional sub-cultural domains that have emerged within this system throughout the geopolitical expanse of the subcontinent. Taken together, with the historically recent national identity formations of the nineteenth century, black southern Africa, irrespective of colonially derived political boundaries, effectively constitutes one pluralistic sub-continental cultural nation - in search of a supra-national pan-African state. In short, post-colonial / post-apartheid southern Africa can still be considered to be very much in transition. The migratory labour system that has brought about much of this amalgamation of identities (accompanied by varying degrees of conflict and accommodation) remains, to this day, a major factor in what might be considered the ongoing trans-nationalisation of South and southern Africa.

Colonialism in southern Africa succeeded in creating African wage labour forces by deliberately destroying long established peasant economies through the separation of the peasants from their means of production such as land, according to Chiponde Mushinge.¹⁹ In Botswana, "this was done through three mechanisms: land alienation, coercive labour legislation and the pursuance of the policy of neglect" with the first of the three, land alienation being accompanied by white settlement.²⁰ The Botswana experience represents variations along a theme of land alienation that contributed to varying degrees of psychological alienation as individuals and communities were yanked from their traditional socio-cultural moorings in the depersonalising 'massification' of African labour and its urbanisation within an increasingly racialised formal economy of segregation, subordination and discrimination in a European racial order; 'colonialism of a special type.'

¹⁹ Mushinge C. 'The impact of colonial policies on ecological control and African cattle production in Botswana, 1885-1954.' EASSRR, January 1991: 5.
Accessed at (<http://www.ossrea.net/eassrr/jan91/mushinge.htm>).
Section discussing 'Settler land alienation and cattle accumulation vs Systematic African impoverishment.'

²⁰ Ibid.

2.3 Race and the politicisation of black and white ethnicities

From the migratory-based mining economy emerged an elaborate system of industrial race relations in the South African heartland of the sub-continental economy, which would ultimately sustain a totalitarian racial dictatorship under the ethno-nationalist ascendancy of Afrikanerdom after 1948. This reflected an avowedly white supremacist 'ethnic division of labour' between Boer and Briton; the former assuming control of government; the latter, the economy. Afrikaner political ascendancy, therefore, reflected the mobilisation of ethnic power within a racial dictatorship.²¹ As a form of white 'African nationalism,' its project was to impose an ethnically-based 'divide and rule' ideological institutionalisation of 'separate development' to counter the decolonising forces of pan-African nationalism elsewhere on the continent. In citizenship terms, South African identity was defined in racial terms, with full citizenship accorded to whites, accompanied by 'second class' citizenship stratification for non-African 'blacks' - coloured and Asian - and 'third class' ethnic-homeland citizenship identities for South African blacks.

Resulting from this allocation of racial-ethnic 'citizenship' of differentiated value was a perversion in African national identity formation based on a revisiting of the Mfecane generated national identities of the nineteenth century in the service of white minority domination. This took the form of the apartheid regime's promotion of 'Bantustan nationalisms' aimed at creating fictionally independent homeland dependencies comprising different Nguni and Sotho ethno-linguistic communities.

Yet, the obviously racial agenda underpinning this 'ethnic' project generated its own racial dialectic as African nationalist forces - the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) - that were driven into exile and underground, ultimately regrouped giving rise to a 'black consciousness' movement. This movement, which had its analogy in the African-American 'Black Power' movement, not only sought to transcend the 'separate development' ethnic divisions of apartheid, but the non-white 'racial' ones as well among Africans, Asians and coloureds. In what turned out to be a brittle transitional tendency, it sought to forge a consolidated Afro-Asian-coloured 'black' national identity (which,

²¹ See for example: Adam H, Giliomee H. *Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change?* Yale University Press, 1979.

structurally, in a comparative sense, diverged from the coalitional 'third world' nationalist pluralism in the United States of America (USA) wherein 'black power' forged alliances with comparable movements among Hispanics, Asian-Americans and Native Americans spawning allied 'brown,' 'yellow,' and 'red' power movements).

To further compound the complexity of contemporary ethnic-racial identity issues in a post-apartheid South Africa, is its ongoing integration into the rest of the African continent, including the influx of Africans from throughout the continent into South Africa. However, countering these complexities are certain shared cultural commonalities reflected in such popular forms as urban jazz (a primarily African-coloured ethno-musicological phenomenon) and other more recent popular music forms that are part of the globalisation of a black 'urban-contemporary' genre. Such cultural fusions are accompanied by a phenomenon wherein many African and coloured communities share tightly integrated familial and kinship ties, while other coloured communities merge into Asian descended spectrums of communal identity.

At a political level, the increasing politicisation of industrial race relations as an outgrowth of Afrikanerdom's suppression of the pan-African nationalisms of the ANC and PAC, gave momentum to 'black consciousness' racial mobilisation on the shop floor in the ultimate rise of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU). The mobilisation of the black working class as the backbone of the internal anti-apartheid resistance, in tandem with the armed struggle, ushered in the ascendancy of the ANC's 'non-racial' brand of pan-African nationalism. This brought the South African racial dialectic full circle with the ascendance of the ANC's somewhat black consciousness amended 'non-racial' (and 'non-sexist') ideology. In the process, a common South African citizenship identity was asserted, abolishing the second and third class status stratification of the apartheid era. However, as South Africa pursues regional integration, the unanswered question is whether or not a newly inclusive South African identity of equal citizenship can be expanded into an inclusive southern African trans-nationalism.

2.4 South African post-apartheid contradictions of non-racial 'pan-Africanisation'

South Africa post-apartheid has projected its economic power and diplomatic influence into the rest of Africa via the 'African Renaissance'; an Africanist balance

between 'non-racialism' and pan-African nationalism. It is, however, still very much in the process of trying to find its equilibrium in the cut and thrust of South Africa's identity politics. "South Africa is increasingly host to a truly pan-African and global constituency of legal and undocumented migrants."²² The sheer volume and influx of this diversity has fuelled decidedly non-pan-Africanist counter currents amongst all ethnic and socio-racial groups in South Africa. Trends in labour migration at the turn of the millennium indicated that the migratory flow within southern Africa is still mainly into South Africa and, in some cases, Botswana.²³

As a reflection in the changing post-apartheid migratory picture, a Southern Africa Research and Documentation Centre (SARDC) 'SADC Today' editorial noted in 1999 that: "As the region prepares for the new millennium, the migration pattern which dates back to the nineteenth century continues to grow despite official attempts to regulate it. The current waves of migration do not only include mine and agricultural workers but also *professionals and skilled workers*."²⁴ This observation on the changing nature of migration into what would increasingly be seen as signs of a 'brain drain' flow from the rest of Africa and southern Africa into South Africa was put in perspective by an International Labour Organisation (ILO) report. The report noted a marked rise in the flow of labour migrations to South Africa from the rest of southern Africa throughout the 1990s attributed to "the political liberalisation within South Africa and continued deterioration in the economies of many neighbouring countries."²⁵

This most recent contemporary pattern in southern African migratory flows, inter-linked with political developments within and outside South Africa has added new dimensions to the ethnographic diversity of South and southern Africa while, simultaneously, politicizing the issue of this growing influx. This has been evident in the past several years in the emerging post-apartheid preoccupations with rising xenophobia, interacting with other fundamental concerns, namely high levels of indigenous black unemployment, rural to urban migration placing demographic

²² Crush J, McDonald DA. 'Transnationalism, African Immigration, and New Migrant Spaces in South Africa: An Introduction.' *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 2000; 34(1): 4. Introduces a special issue on transnationalism and interrelated immigration issues in post-apartheid South and southern Africa.

²³ 'Current Issues: Labour migration in southern Africa.' SARDC Webmaster, Editorial. *SADC Today*, 1999: 1.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

pressures on city infrastructures, business districts and inner suburbs, the availability of housing and other social benefits and, last but not least, rising levels of crime and cross-border illegal activities.

The current migratory patterns in the southern African core sub-region targeting South Africa are compounded by influxes from throughout the African continent: Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, the Sudan and Somalia to name a few. Further, this influx is seen as an increasingly genderised phenomenon with women making up a “growing proportion of the African migrant population crossing into South Africa...as women replace men as the foreign employees of choice in some low-wage sectors”²⁶ like agriculture.

This ‘pan-Africanising’ influx has caught a new South African ‘rainbow nation’ in the throws of sorting out its own manifold developmental backlogged legacies of apartheid; unprepared to smoothly manage and accommodate non-South African Africans. Furthermore, compounding this predicament in dealing with what amounts to a pan-African migration, has been the emergence of a complex regional integration agenda - which emerged concomitant with South Africa’s transition - that South African government officials, politicians, policy and opinion makers have had to assimilate while totally revamping the public and private institutions of governance.

The challenges of the SADC Protocol on the Free Movement of Peoples, is linked to a broader continental commitment on the part of the African Union (AU) to a borderless Africa. These challenges, which in lesser or varying degrees are also experienced by other SADC countries like Botswana, compound issues of citizenship and identity at national and regional levels. This is maintained even as older trans-national ethnicities reflecting uncontroversial inter-country movements of people back and forth continue as a normal pattern of southern African life. This complexity of issues also raise identity questions at the level of South Africa’s inter-state relations within the SADC sub-region and beyond in the rest of Africa, at a time when the South African government is asserting an activist leadership role in the rest of the continent. However, this is a ‘double-edged sword.’

²⁶ Crush, McDonald 5.

If the tensions manifesting between South Africans of all socio-racial and ethno-linguistic groups and non-South African Africans contradicts the pan-African aspirations of the country's post-apartheid elites, South Africa's transition to black majority rule also challenges the identities of neighbouring states and their elites. The neighbouring states need to re-adjust to their big neighbour, as an internationally recognised middle power with some global influence. This results in the regional identity tensions that exist at many levels in today's southern Africa.

In light of such realities, inter-state relations between South Africa and the rest of SADC - and beyond in the rest of Africa - cannot be separated from regional citizenship and identity issues as they affect people at grassroots, national and regional levels. For one thing, inter-state relations involve political, policy and governance issues that impact on the lives of the subcontinent's citizens. This, in turn, has a bearing on the scope of the subcontinent's citizens' own individual and collective consciousness in terms of citizenship and identity. Hence, in expanding on southern Africa's ethnographic identity as a sub-continental cultural nation in the throws of pan-Africanisation, there is a need to examine more closely the scope and nature of the shared regional identity that has come to be recognised as residing in SADC, and how this SADC regional identity impacts on South Africa and vice versa.

3. SOUTHERN AFRICA IN TRANSITION: ECONOMIC REGIONALISM AMID INTER- AND INTRA-STATE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE AND IDENTITY

Apart from the fact that airport customs in southern Africa have designations for SADC Nationals and that the SADC has undergone a restructuring (calling on each member state to establish an SADC National Committee (SNC)), regional identity consciousness, in an institutionalised corporate sense, appears to be primarily the exclusive domain of the SADC Heads of State Summit. There is a regional consciousness evident among various sectors of civil society. This consciousness is reflected among organisations that are well networked trans-nationally, in a number of SADC countries, and that pursue programmes on a regional as well as on a national basis. A category of quasi-official SADC and/or affiliated structures exist like: the SADC Parliamentary Forum, the SADC Electoral Commissions Forum, nongovernmental organisations such as EISA and a regional organisational umbrella with national organisational affiliations like the Southern African Trade Union Coordination Council (SATUCC).

To the extent that these organisations pursue activities within SADC member states that may carry political implications, their operations are subject to veto by member governments. They operate at the pleasure of SADC member governments. They have no apparent recourse to popular constituencies within or among SADC member countries that can exert influence on these governments on behalf of such organisations implementing activities that individual governments may deem to not be in their national interests.

Apart from SADC heads of state, this thin veneer of nongovernmental (or quasi-NGO) regionalism appears not to carry with it a magnitude of depth and breadth that would extend to the grassroots of ordinary citizens within SADC member countries. Regional consciousness, at this level, appears to reflect two tendencies. On the one hand, regional identity appears dormant or latent, even where individuals and their family, kinship and community members regularly or periodically travel back and forth between different SADC member states or have kinship, friendship and community ties that span two or more SADC countries. This level of regional identity reflects some notions of trans-nationalism; a high intensity of exchanges on the part of migrants between host and home country wherein social relations are developed and maintained in both countries. Trans-nationalism in southern Africa is facilitated by the trans-national ethno-linguistic overlaps between South Africa and neighbouring countries.²⁷

Within this context, regionalism-trans-nationalism might be said to constitute the latent consciousness of a pluralistic southern African socio-cultural nation where multidimensional identities at clan, ethnic and even national levels are shared in an unspoken understanding of a bonding between and amongst peoples, individuals, members of organisations and affiliates and participants in programmes - all without any conscious political or trans-national civic content. However, this latency is offset by, what may be interpreted as mixed feelings about regional identity merging into outright negativity in countries such as South Africa, Botswana and Namibia, which are targeted by relatively large influxes of immigrants. These attitudes, in turn, raise questions about the viability of equal citizenship rights for foreign African migrants in these countries.

Nevertheless, on occasion there are expressions of regional solidarity (if not broad consensus on particular issues or sets of related issues) which may cut in a

²⁷ Crush, McDonald 8-9.

number of ways in a manner reflecting complex and selective attitudes among sections of the southern African public. Thus, on the one hand, many black South Africans may express xenophobic feelings about Zimbabwean refugees coming into South Africa but on the other, there have been visceral displays of black South African solidarity with Zanu-PF on its confiscation of white owned farmland (though black victims of Zanu-PF actions have tended to be ignored save for the Congress of South African Trade Union's (COSATU's) concerns about its Zimbabwean counterparts - black southern African proletarian solidarity if you will). (More recently, an opinion survey cited on the front page of the *Business Day* reports that "only one in seven black South Africans believes Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe is doing a good job..."²⁸)

Similar sentiments that have surfaced in South Africa on the land issue have been manifest in Namibia as well. In those SADC countries, in fact, race consciousness appears to emerge as a conveyor belt of regional solidarity-identity (which cuts both ways as white South Africans identify with white Zimbabweans who are targeted by land invasions). In a different vein, during the time of Zimbabwe and Namibia's military interventions in the Congo, there were trans-national civil society expressions of both protest and affirmation, which again reflect a certain level of regional consciousness and identity.

The instances referred to here have yet to translate into a more manifestly sustained regional southern African consciousness or agenda. This particular qualitative level of citizenship and identity consciousness constitutes an underdeveloped, more or less subterranean, level of engagement that is particularly germane to the issues addressed in this paper. However, the starting point for unpacking the prospects for developing such a regional consciousness that extends well beyond the national interest/sovereignty boundaries of ruling elites, resides in the domain of those very elites, underlining the state centric parameters of southern African regionalism via the SADC.

3.1 SADC and regional identity at the level of political elites

The southern African regionalism of the SADC heads of state, such as it is, espouses a regionalism of economic cooperation in the service of regional integration. This officially articulated programme interacts with a more narrowly proscribed politico-

²⁸ 'Not our hero, black SA tells Mugabe survey.' *Business Day* 20 May, 2005.

diplomatic agenda of the heads of state, which tends to dominate the business of SADC and has been given institutional expression in the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC). It is this later aspect of SADC regionalism that has tended to generate debate and controversy pertaining to political developments within given member states of SADC. These developments as they relate to discourses amongst heads of state at summit level are perceived as being cloaked in solidarity evoking notions, rightly or wrongly, of SADC as a heads of state club. Here, sovereign equality confers its own equality of regional citizenship, as it were, among southern Africa's leaders despite South Africa's sub-continental hegemony.

This is where it becomes necessary to briefly summarise some of the political history of SADC in order to try and get at the roots of what might be termed southern Africa's regional citizenship and identity crisis in terms of elite-mass relationships within and between countries. The precursors to the SADC were the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) and its more overtly political arm, the Front Line States (FLS) which, in wake of the vacuum left by the early mid-1960s dismantling [in the wake of the founding of the Organisation of African Union (OAU) and its Liberation Committee] of the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA), coordinated Africa's support for the liberation movements in the remaining white redoubts of Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa.

While the SADCC waged an 'economic liberation struggle' against the white regimes to lessen, if not break, their dependency on the white minority ruled bastions, the FLS collaborated with the liberation movements in their armed struggle for 'political liberation'. This combined enterprise forged a political culture of deep-rooted solidarity. As the history of southern Africa's destabilisation bore out, the SADCC/FLS countries were as vulnerable to military reprisals and covert operations as were the liberation movements. The liberation struggle for southern Africa was a shared sacrifice by African state and non-state actors alike. Out of this crucible was forged a southern African culture of solidarity at the highest level of heads of state and guerrilla chieftains turned heads of state. This is a shared experience that, to this day and for a long time to come, will define regional identity if not citizenship at the level of political elites.

The solidarity culture has become entrenched by the emergence of what constitutes liberation movement regimes serving as governments in all of the countries of the SADC region that became independent. The independence gained

was as a result of armed struggles in these countries: Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa and Zimbabwe (in many respects, the largest, richest and most developed economies compared to the Mfecane derived and former British protectorates of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland even though Botswana's economy is considered to be in the 'rich club'). While the struggles waged against white minority rule were often conceived as freedom struggles for democracy, once transfers of power took place, democratisation had to accommodate the nationalist ascendancy of the liberation movement's culture of disciplined solidarity as the new standard of legitimacy in the new governing order. Thus, with the exception of South Africa, where the liberation movement had to negotiate its way to power over an old order that was still very much intact and in an economy that, to this day, constitutes the minority rights of a residual white dominion, nationalist solidarity rather than democratic civic nationalism has served as the reference point for citizenship and national identity in much of the subcontinent.

This political evolution in southern Africa, accenting solidarity as the cornerstone of identity at elite levels of governance, converges with similar trends that unfolded much earlier in the rest of Africa where independence did not automatically translate into democracy. This has had profound implications for any serious consideration of the potential for regional citizenship and identity formation. Apart from the fact that post-independence, African elites opted for a continuation of the colonial dispensation in founding the OAU on the principles of the sanctity of borders and territorial integrity, the absence of and/or decline in democratic governance meant two things:

- 1) the maintenance and, indeed promotion, of colonially partitioned identities at a national level that in all probability had had no time to assimilate sub-national and micro-loyalties (which in Europe had taken centuries)
- 2) the related absence of popular sovereignty as a democratic expression of a civic nationalism overriding sectionalist loyalties and as a check on the power of incumbent rulers.

There have been exceptions to this rule such as in the case of mainland Tanzania, where the nation building Ujamaa patriotism championed by Mwalimu Julius Nyerere facilitated something akin to an African brand of civic national identity formation in a multiracial, multicultural society. Moreover, to the extent that post-apartheid South Africa has come to represent the ascendancy of a popular sovereignty based civic nationalist dynamic over that country's many sectionalist loyalties, both socio-racial and those ethno-linguistically rooted in the Mfecane, its emergence as a hegemonic force in the affairs of southern Africa and the continent

as a whole has generated no small amount of ambivalence. These mixed feelings reflected tensions between Africans elsewhere in southern Africa and beyond and between them and South Africans. It strikes at the very heart of South Africa's national identity consolidation. Black southern Africa beyond the Limpopo seems almost no more comfortable with a black ruled South Africa that it has to engage as a legitimate member - and a leading one at that - of the continental African family than they were with the white ruled enemy they knew only too well.

3.2 The South Africa-Africa identity conundrum

South African blacks and whites alike now often share a common dubious identity as the 'Americans of Africa' which, in turn, plays on the over-sensitivities of South African leaders anxious not to have South Africa perceived as sub-continental or continental dominator. This sensitivity, at least in part, motivates South Africa's post-apartheid pan-African drive for an African Renaissance in what has unfolded as the OAU's transformation into the AU accompanied by South African President Thabo Mbeki's promotion of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) as the continent's economic recovery blueprint. Thus, Pretoria has been driven to integrate South Africa into the rest of Africa with a vengeance. The country plays a major role in conflict resolution and peacekeeping and in projecting itself as Africa's voice with donor countries. South Africa is also important in international fora as well as hosting the AU's Pan-African Parliament (PAP) and even had a successful bid for hosting the 2010 Soccer World Cup.

But is post-apartheid South Africa, as a black majority ruled Afro-Eurasian formation at the tip of the continent, 'African' enough? This amounts almost to something of a metaphorical question reflecting the ambivalence that many a South African coloured feels; being torn between not being 'white' enough for whites or 'black' enough for blacks.²⁹ Many a non-South African African, with ulterior motives tinged with mixtures of envy, jealousy, resentment and apprehension, are prone to reinforce such doubts. This tendency is evoked in:

²⁹ An example of how South Africans are intellectually engaging the identity questions is an interesting collection of writings and reflections in: Distillers N, Steyn M (eds). Under Construction: 'Race' and Identity in South Africa today Heinemann, 2004: 213.

- geopolitics with the competition between South Africa and Nigeria for a seat on the UN Security Council
- in tensions between South Africa and its neighbours in the affairs of SADC
- in the geo-economics of South African corporate expansionism on the continent and the often abrasive encounters this brings with it
- in the mixed feelings that individuals experience as they navigate their way through sundry personal, impersonal and inter-personal encounters in South Africa in whatever capacity they happen to be in during their visit or stay in South Africa.

Questions surrounding South Africa's identity as an African country and the identity of South Africans as Africans comes into play both at the level of inter-state relations within SADC and in interactions between South Africans (black as well as white, Asian or coloured) and black non-South Africans in South Africa, whether they are expatriate professionals, immigrants or refugees. These questions impinge heavily on the wider prospects for forging a pan-African momentum on regional citizenship and identity formation that is trans-national in scope in southern Africa. In this regard, Zimbabwe and its national identity and citizenship conundrum could be considered the perfect counterpoint to South Africa's dilemmas. As one of the two largest economies in the region, Zimbabwe had much in common with South Africa as a semi-developed white settler outpost. At the time of its liberation in 1980, it was seen internationally as forerunner of a hoped for negotiated transition in South Africa and Namibia.

As Zimbabwe's first decade of independence unfolded, many whites who had fled south to a still apartheid South Africa began returning to benefit from what appeared to be a society that was overcoming its racial divisions. The Zanu-PF government, meanwhile, had assumed the leadership mantle of the SADCC/FLS enterprise. However, South Africa's transition to majority rule appeared to throw Zimbabwe's status off balance. The rise to international prominence of South Africa's liberation icons when coming into political control of the continent's largest economy began to show up the cracks in Zanu-PF's less than liberal governing edifice especially when South Africa's leaders committed to a liberal democratic constitutional dispensation.

3.3 Zimbabwe: the anti-South Africa?

Zimbabwe's crisis, over the last several years, in national identity terms, has revealed what appears to be a decidedly fragile and narrow nationalism. This nationalism reflects an ethnic sub-clan bid for power in a one-sided ethnic-regional political settlement and brings about Zanu-PF's ultimate hegemony over the state and its army and security apparatus. This evolution has progressed against the backdrop of South Africa's eclipsing of Zimbabwe's leadership within the SADC, in the continent and on the international stage. Relations between the two countries have experienced considerable tension as a result. Tensions surfaced on issues ranging from renewal of preferential trading relations that benefited Zimbabwe to the bid by Zimbabwe for a military settlement of the crisis in the Great Lakes. In contrast to this is the South African led peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The fact that Pretoria mounted a shambolic military intervention to stave off a royal coup in Lesotho under the imprimatur of SADC added no small amount of irony and heightened neighbouring suspicions about South Africa's intentions in the region.

Divergences over the DRC reflected the different and often conflicting paths taken by South Africa and Zimbabwe when it comes to the affairs of the continent. Pretoria's pro-democratic governance oriented African renaissance challenged the 'big leader' syndrome of one-party authoritarianism that was increasingly evident in Harare. Zanu-PF's pan-African 'imperial overstretch' in the DRC, coupled with its politically inspired confiscationist land reform project and bid for economic autonomy has simultaneously turned Zimbabwe into an international pariah and an economic colony of South Africa; even as Zanu-PF leaders have been dismissive and even contemptuous of Pretoria's leadership.

The political and economic deterioration stemming from the Zanu-PF governing crisis has generated an exodus of Zimbabwean refugees and undocumented migrants from Zimbabwe into neighbouring countries; principally Botswana and South Africa. This has produced severe though managed tensions between Botswana and Zimbabwe in as much as Botswana's overall HIV/AIDS-impacted population is less than that of Harare while the influx into South Africa has exacerbated domestic expressions of xenophobia. In short, regional tensions generated by Zimbabwe's crisis adds yet another layer of complication to the regional citizenship and identity conundrum; further compounded by the SADC's seeming impotence in steering Zimbabwe toward an internationally acceptable solution of its problems.

The role of South Africa and the SADC in the Zimbabwe crisis amid the continuing exodus of Zimbabweans - black and white - has generated any number of critiques that challenge the effectiveness of SADC and its corporate regional identity based on a political culture of solidarity (solidarity having mutated from its liberation support function to insulating heads of member states from internal challenges to their leadership). Zimbabwe's crisis, then, appears to reveal limits to a state centric regional citizenship and identity agenda that is not organically linked to the more broad-based national constituencies of popular participation. This assumes that the SADC has a conscious intent in this regard with a plethora of regional integration issues ranging from trade integration toward merging the SADC free trade area into an expanded SACU (which would become a SADC Customs Union) to eventually implementing a free movement of people's regime.

At the same time, however, Zimbabwe's crisis may also reveal another dimension to the limits of national citizenship and identity formation when national identity becomes subsumed not simply under sub-nationalism but also under a sub-ethnic agenda. Viewed in conjunction with other crises of state elsewhere in Africa (notably Somalia's state disintegration into clan rivalries) it could well be that nationalism within colonially defined boundaries is inadequate to contain the incipient rise of the 'clan state' that threatens the nation state and attendant citizenship and identity loyalties, in the absence of more broadly encompassing trans-national political arrangements.

4. IMMIGRATION, FREE MOVEMENT, CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: AN OVERVIEW

The issue of the free movement of people across borders coupled with immigration makes considerations of regional citizenship and identity concrete unlike any other issue. In a 'Statement of the Problem' on free movement of people, it is observed that in the contemporary period of inter-African relations, free movement has emerged as a function of efforts to promote regional economic integration.³⁰ However, "because of the close relationship between free movement and citizenship, they cannot be viewed as solely economic measures" and indeed, "the threat to government authority posed by free movement should not be taken

³⁰ Distillers, Steyn 5.

lightly.”³¹ Further underlining this point: “An increase in free movement inevitably will bring about a sense of alliance that goes beyond individual Member States, an alliance that has the potential to threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity that the AU is committed to defend.”³² This commitment is counterpoised to the Constitutive Act of Union’s equal commitment to “accelerating ‘the political and socioeconomic integration of the continent.’”³³

4.1 The limits to free movement in southern Africa

The constitutive contradiction will be revisited later in the context of arguing on behalf of a politics of regional citizenship and identity wherein regional integration is inextricably linked to the internal democratisation of the nation-state. This should place the threat perception of free movement in a different - pan-African - light reflecting on the relative viability of African governance at the nation-state level as opposed to the supranational level. Nevertheless, such a political evolution inevitably confronts some sobering realities that challenges the pace and potential to forge a broader regional consciousness in southern Africa. Popular sentiment on free movement/immigration, while reflecting a mixture of attitudes, appears to tilt heavily toward the negative, especially regarding the two SADC protocols about the free movement of people that have been attempted. One of the initial goals of a reconstituting of the SADCC into SADC was to arrive at a common policy to regulate the movement of SADC nationals between member countries.

To this end, according to the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) that monitors such issues:

“a draft protocol on the free movement of persons in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was submitted for consideration by the governments of member countries in early 1996. The short-term objectives of the protocol were to facilitate for citizens of the member states (a) entry without a visa into the territory of another member states for a period of three months at a time; (b) residence in the territory of another member

³¹ ‘The Free Movement of People.’ 1. Accessed at <http://www.cccoe.k12.ca.us/events/synopsis/FMP.doc>.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

*state; and (c) establishment of oneself and working in the territory of another member state. The long-term objective was to develop policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to the movement of people of the region generally into and within the territories of the member states.”*³⁴

Zimbabwe, which has - at least in the past - been a target country for immigration from the rest of Africa, supported the Draft Protocol. This support, however, has been subsequently contradicted by the fact that its own national citizenship law has become much less liberal and internally divisive as a reflection of the anti-British racial politics surrounding the land issue. Nevertheless, “opposition from South Africa, Botswana and, to a lesser extent, Namibia” largely accounts for its never having been ratified.³⁵ “Even a watered down version of the original protocol failed to move opponents of free movement. Free movement therefore continues in practice but a regionally coordinated approach to migration management seems as elusive as ever.”³⁶ Recently, however, it is reported that agreement on a new protocol is expected during 2006.³⁷

In effect, within the southern African region there exist a split on the issue of free movement of people and immigration: those countries where governments and citizens feel under pressure from influxes of people entering as a result of political and economic upheavals in their home countries are resistant to facilitating such movements. Governments in countries that are not facing such inflows of immigrants, whether legal, illegal or refugees seem more tolerant. A major issue that is at the root of this division over free movement is the economic imbalances within the SADC that are reflected in South Africa’s economic gigantism: if “free movement were truly established without any sort of economic parity emerging between SADC members there would be a mass movement away from the poorer countries and into the more developed nations of South Africa, Botswana and Namibia.”³⁸

³⁴ Tevera D, Zinyama L. Zimbabweans Who Move: Perspectives on international migration in Zimbabwe SAMP, Migration Policy Series, 2002; 5: 24.

³⁵ Tevera, Zinyama 24.

³⁶ Tevera, Zinyama 24.

³⁷ ‘SA no land of milk and honey for new wave of African immigrants.’ Business Day 7 June 2005.

³⁸ Ibid.

Here, the issue of immigration and freedom of movement across borders, and the threat of mass movement to wealthier, more developed states are exacerbated by the political and economic circumstances among neighbouring states and those farther afield in Africa undergoing major upheavals. The spill-over effects of such upheavals that threaten to exert unsustainable pressure on the resources and infrastructures of neighbouring countries that may have to host refugees, carries with it security implications in terms of social, economic and ultimately political stability. Thus, South Africa's commitment to the rest of Africa, based on Pretoria's espousal of an African renaissance, could appear hypocritical when placed against its resistance to (or hesitation about) the free movement issue.

By the same token, neighbouring governments should be expected, within the spirit of regional cooperation and integration within the SADC, to exhibit a sense of responsibility with regard to internal governance issues and how those issues may affect neighbours. This trade-off may suggest the need for a policy link between advancing free movement of people and the developmental and governance imperatives of regional integration in strengthening the economies of South Africa's neighbours. Seen in this context, the setbacks to the free movement protocol need not be irreversible when considering how to create a dynamic regional environment.

This is where, the issue of national sovereignty as opposed to popular sovereignty based on Africa's accommodation of colonial borders, has repeatedly been coming back to haunt the continent in the form of regionally destabilising intra-state crises. Governance crises and crises of the state throughout Africa (southern Africa included) are prejudicing the continent's ability to overcome its colonial partitions by employing one of the obvious means for transcending this predicament without having to redraw boundaries which, many fear, could trap Africa in an endless and possibly even more destabilising quagmire. Yet, in the absence of more formalised inter-state regimes for regulating population flows, population pressures in many parts of Africa (demographically the fastest growing continent in the world) will tax the ability of governments to cope within their own sovereignty with such pressures. (Moreover, rising demographics will combine with the threat of communicable diseases like HIV/AIDS and climate change to further compound challenges facing the African nation-state.)

4.2 South Africa, Zimbabwe and the dilemmas of free movement

In South Africa's case, the 'free movement of peoples' issue emerged at a most inopportune time. The country is still undergoing a challenging transition from the regime of apartheid and its legacies, accompanied by high unemployment and one of the most unequal socioeconomic national profiles in the world. This polarisation finds its reflection in a black 'revolution of rising expectation' that has already generated considerable disaffection and the perception that whites came out as the main beneficiaries of the new 'rainbow' dispensation.

These insecurities among the black majority, in particular, are predictably not conducive to tolerating foreigners. According to the SAMP surveys these insecurities appear to be widespread, cutting across race, ethnicity and socioeconomic status in South Africa. This will be discussed at more length later. It is sufficient to stress that these circumstances could heighten contradictions between the South African government's pan-African integrationist aspirations and the urgency of meeting domestic demands for a post-apartheid 'peace dividend.' A pan-Africanist South African identity, in the spirit of the AU's vision of a continental citizenship, would presumably stress equal citizenship among non-South African and South African Africans alike. Domestic pressures for a post-apartheid 'peace dividend' might, on the other hand, dictate a more nationalistic 'South Africa first' sentiment.

In the case of Zimbabwe, the free movement of people mutates into more of a 'forced migration' issue, where free choice ceases to exist amid a fast-track land reform that has emptied the rural areas of white farming communities. This has created something of a white 'Rhodesian' Diaspora, whose members have sought and, in many cases, found greener pastures in other SADC states like Zambia and Mozambique and even as far north as Nigeria. Black Zimbabweans of all economic stations, meanwhile, have felt compelled by the economic and security deterioration to flee to Botswana, South Africa and other neighbouring countries. The resulting 'brain drain' from Zimbabwe has resulted in a 'brain gain' for countries like South Africa. Forced migration under such circumstances raises a whole host of political issues that confront regional citizenship and identity. Concerns like these strike at the very heart of African governance in the prevailing colonially defined nation-state context, at a time when the AU and regional economic communities (RECs) like the SADC are politically committed to regional economic and political integration.

If, for example, free movement is a threat to the sovereignty of the colonially derived nation-state, might not sovereignty that is not vested in the popular will of the people constitute an even bigger threat to the peace, security and prosperity of those people and might this not extend to the surrounding countries? To the extent that national leaders feel insulated from accountability to a regional club of fellow heads of state with vested interest in narrowly defined state sovereignty (as opposed to popular sovereignty) and thereby acquiesce (for whatever reason) in such intra-state misgovernance, should it not be reasonable and predictable that non-state countervailing forces of accountability should emerge challenging such regimes? Further, if such forces genuinely reflect a democratic alliance transcending national boundaries, while espousing the pan-African integrationist agenda of the AU, NEPAD and the RECs, would this not constitute a legitimate route to accelerating the political and economic integration of the continent? Furthermore, would this not in the process, advance regional citizenship and identity formation based on popular participation in governance and development?

Zimbabwe's brand of neo-patrimonial governance, in contradistinction to South African constitutionalism, brings all of these fundamental questions - and more - to the fore when efforts to elucidate the parameters of regional citizenship and identity in Africa generally, and southern Africa in particular, are made. This occurs during a phase in the continent's political evolution when the integrationist project is overwhelmingly state centric. This project may not be capable of inspiring wider pan-African loyalties amongst citizens due to the paucity of popular sovereignty regimes. (Many citizens may only exhibit the most tenuous of identification with the nation-state - as opposed to smaller units of identity.) Moreover, the imbalance of power between the state and civil society in southern Africa in forging a sense of regional citizenship and identity is shown up as being especially acute in the impotence surrounding efforts to resolve Zimbabwe's governing crisis.

This crisis forms the backdrop to the forced migration issue. This issue, in turn, may further compound the challenge of generating momentum on people's freedom of movement in the SADC region. What do the South African and Zimbabwean cases, revolving as they do around immigration and freedom of movement issues, begin to convey in terms of the problems, prospects and potentialities regarding regional citizenship and identity in southern Africa?

5. SOUTH AFRICA: IMMIGRATION, FREE MOVEMENT AND THE QUESTION OF REGIONAL CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY

The South African case study may, first and foremost, represent one wherein the degree of receptivity of its citizens to free movement of peoples from other African countries becomes a function of South Africa's hegemonic relationship with its neighbours. Flowing from this would be the following consideration: the extent to which hegemony begins to be mitigated by cooperative developmental initiatives that move the region toward some semblance of inter-state parity and where closing the gap in South Africa, between 'first' and 'second' economies enhances the human security of South Africans at a time when they are sorting out their post-apartheid identities vis-à-vis the rest of Africa. The situation is dynamic and mixed, both at the levels of personal identity and policy.

Here, it is instructive to refer to the findings of a SAMP survey by Jonathan Crush and Wade Pendleton. The survey found that "citizens across the region consistently tend to exaggerate the numbers of non-citizens in their countries, to view the migration of people within the region as a 'problem' rather than an opportunity, and to scapegoat non-citizens" with the harshest sentiments "expressed by the citizens of South Africa, Namibia and, to a lesser extent, Botswana" while "citizens of Swaziland, Mozambique and Zimbabwe are considerably more relaxed about the presence of non-citizens in their countries."³⁹

However, the harshness of the SAMP findings is offset by some interesting findings of a CPS survey conducted by the South African Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) concerning identity.⁴⁰ In a cluster of responses to questions pertaining to 'South Africa's emerging national identity' it was found that while blacks, coloureds, Asians and whites appeared equally committed to a common South African national identity, not only blacks, but the majority of coloureds and Asians tended to subscribe to identifying themselves as 'African'. Whites tended to respond negatively in this regard.

In terms of attitudes toward non-citizens, all groups were more or less evenly divided on the question, 'when deciding whether foreigners may immigrate to

³⁹ Crush J, Pendleton W. 'Regionalising Xenophobia? Citizen Attitudes to Immigration and Refugee Policy in Southern Africa.' SAMP, Migration Policy Series, 2004; 30: 1.

⁴⁰ In the soon to be published 'Race and Ethnic Relations Barometer: A narrative analysis of findings from the Centre for Policy Studies Social Identity Survey.'

South Africa, should government take into account whether they come from Africa or Europe?' Blacks, coloureds and Asians responded 'yes' more often than 'no' while clear majorities from all groups thought that government should consider the potential economic contribution that immigrants could make. Although expressing ambivalence, the majority of respondents also favoured government allowing immigrants to qualify as refugees though whites were evenly divided on such a proposition. Interestingly, coloureds appeared much more in favour of allowing immigrants to qualify as refugees than both Africans and Asians. Finally, in rating issues that were of greatest concern to South Africans, crime, violence, poverty and unemployment received much higher attention than issues clustering around xenophobia, homophobia and sexism.⁴¹

South African attitudes toward non-citizens may, therefore, be more complicated than SAMP and other surveys suggest. However, to underline the magnitude of the problem, the SAMP findings show that negative attitudes of citizens among the 'anti-foreign troika' - South Africa, Namibia and Botswana - appear "so pervasive and widespread that it is actually impossible to identify any kind of 'xenophobic profile'."⁴² In other words, the poor and the rich, the employed and the unemployed, male and female, black and white and conservative and radical, all express remarkably similar attitudes. Nevertheless, at a policy level, such attitudes may not necessarily constitute a permanent veto against free movement of people. A case in point is relations between South Africa and Mozambique and South Africa and Zimbabwe.

In April 2005, South Africa and Mozambique signed a visa waiver agreement, which will allow citizens of both countries to stay in South Africa or Mozambique for a period of 30 days without a visa. South African Home Affairs Minister, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula said the agreement fell within government's strategy of closer cooperation with SADC, "many of whose states' citizens are dependent on South Africa for their livelihoods."⁴³ The article reporting this development went on to note that the bilateral agreement was aimed at encouraging legal instead of illegal entry into South Africa as well as keeping proper records and track of people coming into the country under the oversight of a newly established National

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ 'Maputo, SA sign deal to waive visas for visits.' Business Day 13 April 2005: 3.

Immigration Branch. Both countries would share intelligence on unwanted migrants and reserve the right to allow visitors in or to turn them away. The Mozambique-South Africa agreement may reflect the increasing economic integration between the two countries though similar visa waver agreements also exist between South Africa and its partners in SACU, Mauritius and Zambia. Perhaps as a means of encouraging Zimbabwe's normalisation and eventual economic recovery within the region, a similar visa waver agreement is currently under negotiation.⁴⁴

What these visa waver agreements suggest is a trend that could incrementally evolve toward a more elaborated free movement regime, interacting with the economic development and integration of the southern African region which, within the context of the AU vision for the continent, is a process whereby RECs transform into regional integration communities (RICs). Such a process would seem likely to unfold irrespective of the attitudes of citizens because it is crucial to South Africa's vital national interests to promote such integrationist trends. Moreover, as another SAMP survey shows, public attitudes regarding foreigners, as on any number of other issues, are subject to media distortion.⁴⁵

It was found from an analysis in 2000, that "coverage of international migration by the South African press has been largely anti-immigration and not analytical."⁴⁶ While it was acknowledged that newspaper coverage on such issues did appear to be improving over time, nevertheless, "the overwhelming majority of the newspaper articles, editorials and letters to the editor surveyed for this research are negative about immigrants and immigration" with a large portion of such articles reproducing "racial and national stereotypes about migrants from other African countries, depicting - for example - Mozambicans as car thieves and Nigerians as drug smugglers."⁴⁷ The report went on to note that "this 'criminalisation' of migrants from other parts of Africa is made worse by the more subtle use of terms like 'illegal' and 'alien'..."⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Danso R, McDonald DA. Writing Xenophobia: Immigration and the Press in Post-Apartheid South Africa SAMP, Migration Policy Series, 2000; 17: 1.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

6. ZIMBABWE: FORCED MIGRATION, THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE AND THE QUESTION OF REGIONAL CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY

Media negativity on migrants coming into South Africa, among other things, obscures the 'brain gain' that post-apartheid South Africa is benefiting from. This has to be considered an important indicator of the country's post-apartheid integration with the rest of the continent. The forced migration exodus from Zimbabwe cuts across racial lines. It is a function of the country's economic and political turmoil and the resulting deteriorating quality of life. These circumstances of decline have taken a heavy toll on the most skilled sectors of Zimbabwe's population. Depending on circumstances, Zimbabweans have responded in several different ways. Some move back and forth across the South Africa-Zimbabwean border in an effort to meet basic needs but without the desire or means to move to South Africa, Botswana or elsewhere either temporarily or permanently. Others have or are in the process of making permanent or temporary moves from Zimbabwe to South Africa and other countries.

The SAMP study published in 2003, found that: "Zimbabwe's skilled population is not only highly discontented with domestic economic, social and political conditions...they are extremely pessimistic about the possibility of positive change within the next 5 years. The net result is a population with an extremely high emigration potential."⁴⁹ The fact that the Harare regime has had to resort to coercive measures such as national service - which, under other circumstances, could constitute a positive national building initiative for forging citizenship, identity and patriotic commitment among young people - and bonding, attests to the magnitude of popular disaffection.

Unlike unskilled migrants, skilled personnel tend to be highly mobile and may express their disappointment or disagreement with government by 'voting with their feet' and move to other countries. In the case of skilled and professional Zimbabweans in South Africa, the magnitude of hostility toward the incumbent government was clear in the response received by one of its economic ministers on a visit to South Africa to persuade Zimbabweans residing in South Africa to send

⁴⁹ Tevera DS, Crush J. The New Brain Drain from Zimbabwe. SAMP, Migration Policy Series, 2003; 29: 31.

money home. At a 2004 gathering at Gallagher Estate in Midrand, he was forced to flee by angry countrymen who made it known in no uncertain terms that rather than sending money home, they preferred to return home were it not for the conditions that had forced them to leave the country in the first place.

According to the SAMP survey, beyond the obvious explanation of economic decline and political turmoil, many Zimbabweans who want to emigrate are motivated by deteriorating quality of life conditions. Some of the contributing factors to this decline predate the land invasions that heightened the international visibility of the country's crisis. An example is the onset of structural adjustment in 1991, which saw a removal of price controls and subsidies generating a price escalation of most basic goods. This brought on rampant inflation and shortages of consumer goods in a country saturated in the same global consumer revolution that has long distinguished neighbouring South Africa from most other parts of the continent. Challenges such as the deterioration in the upkeep of public amenities, growing anxieties about the future facing children, housing availability, medical services and education registered major concerns.

As destination countries, Zimbabweans prefer the USA, the United Kingdom (UK), Botswana and South Africa; in that order, although "Zimbabweans feel that it is more likely that they will actually end up in South Africa."⁵⁰ The Zimbabwean influx into South Africa, meanwhile, reflects the larger post-1990 trend in "South Africa's immigration experience; the movement of skilled Africans (as immigrants and asylum seekers) to the country following the demise of apartheid"⁵¹ (where some 87 % of non-SADC Africans entered after 1991). As a mirror image of the deteriorating quality of life conditions in Zimbabwe, a different SAMP survey showed that "skilled non-citizens are very satisfied with their personal economic conditions in South Africa, access to health care and quality schooling, and the cost of living."⁵² With respect to Zimbabweans, this has meant that as the government and ruling Zanu-PF have pursued a brutal agrarian revolution in the countryside, skilled urban black Zimbabweans have been beating a path to South Africa. This has occurred as upheavals in rural areas have been accompanied by a political

⁵⁰ Tevera, Crush 19.

⁵¹ Mattes R et al. *The Brain Gain: Skilled Migrants and Immigration Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa SAMP, Migration Policy Series, 2000; 20: 2.*

⁵² Mattes 3.

crackdown on an urban population whose loyalties have been captured largely by the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) emanating from trade union and civil society disaffection.

Despite the fact that South Africa may be benefiting from an influx of skilled Zimbabweans, it and Botswana are also feeling the pressure of impoverished Zimbabweans crossing the border. Furthermore, the threat of a mass exodus brought on by a heightening of Zimbabwe's economic and political crisis, such as might occur if conditions spiral out of control in escalating violence, civil unrest or even civil war, has forced South Africa and the SADC into protracted crisis management mode. Given the strengthen of the government and ruling party's iron grip on Zimbabwe and their imperviousness to external pressure or conversely, the caution displayed by South Africa in exerting leverage over Harare, the results of crisis management have been decidedly unsatisfactory from international (mainly Western) and southern African civil society perspectives. This raises two major issues with regard to how Zimbabwe's governance crisis influences regional citizenship and identity.

Firstly, it highlights the limits of a southern African regional consciousness and identity emerging that revolves exclusively around the liberation struggle derived political culture of solidarity; a phenomenon that largely resides at the level of SADC heads of state and liberation movements that have become governing parties. Indeed, the Zimbabwe crisis has the potential to either push back the prospects of a positive regional consciousness and identity emerging or promoting alternative politics of solidarity that could positively impact on regional identity through a democracy movement transcending national boundaries.

Secondly, with respect to the free movement of people, the forced migration and ever present threat of mass influxes of refugees places added pressure on countries to come to grips with such fundamental issues as the 'sanctity of borders' and 'territorial integrity' in southern Africa and the inter-African system as a whole. Moreover, in identity terms, given the fact that the 'sanctity of borders' and 'territorial integrity' appear historically linked to the colonial imposition of a land paradigm as opposed to its being centred on the allegiances of people, the perceived pan-African notion of land as the sole basis of African identity may need revision in constructing a viable framework for regional citizenship and identity formation in southern Africa. This, in turn, adds another dimension to the fashioning of a trans-national democratic politics of regional citizenship and identity.

7. 'SADC NATIONALS' AND THE LIMITATIONS OF STATE LED REGIONAL INTEGRATION: RECONCEPTUALISING REGIONAL CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY FROM THE BOTTOM-UP

While an attrition of Zimbabweans leaving Zimbabwe continues as a result of the country's governing crisis, a major regional identity building initiative by the SADC, in its promulgation of electoral standards for member states, failed to have any decisive impact on Zimbabwe's parliamentary elections. If the Zanu-PF regime was immune to the regional influence of SADC at the heads of state level, it proved to be even less impressed by the first signs of a regional civil society mobilisation for free and fair elections surfacing from South Africa and led by the ANC's alliance partner, Cosatu. Cosatu has been barred twice by the government of Zimbabwe from entering the country to consult on parliamentary election preparations with its counterpart, the Zimbabwe Trade Union Congress (ZCTU) and other civil society actors. The planned regional mobilisation on the Zimbabwe elections involving the Southern African Trade Union Coordinating Council (SATUCC) and a threatened border blockade did also not amount to much. However, in the open disagreements that emerged in public between Cosatu leader, Zwelinzima Vavi, and South African Minister of Labour Membathisi Mdladlana over the union federation's attempts to visit Zimbabwe, some fundamental tensions between the SADC governments and civil society political activism in the region emerged.

7.1 Southern Africa's contentious bifurcated regional identity between state and civil society

The fact that the MDC challenge to Zanu-PF in Zimbabwe radiated from the ZCTU led civil society opposition to President Robert Mugabe's government has appeared to resonate in South Africa with alleged fears among some in government that Cosatu might do something similar; that is discard its alliance with the ruling ANC and form an opposition worker's party. Thus, it was reported that Vavi had "lashed out" at Labour Minister Mdladlana, "accusing him of perpetuating false claims that the labour federation was positioning itself to become a political party."⁵³ In

⁵³ 'Vavi slams 'paranoid, suspicious' politicians: Cosatu blames labour minister for disastrous fact-finding trip to Zimbabwe.' Sunday Times 6 February 2005.

expanding this observation beyond South Africa, Vavi is reported to have further elaborated that “some government leaders in the Southern African region...had been spreading rumours that Cosatu and other unions in the region were getting sponsorship from western governments such as the USA and the UK to unseat the liberation movements.”⁵⁴ The surfacing of such tensions amongst elements within the South African ruling alliance over Zimbabwe, alongside Zanu-PF’s assault on Zimbabwean civil society - in addition to the MDC - raises questions about whether or not there exist a common set of shared beliefs and values between rulers and citizens on what constitutes citizenship and identity in southern Africa.

Here, the principle of countervailing power may be fitting to determine the current and future prospects of regional citizenship and identity. The fact that the region’s more autocratic leaders may feel insulated from popular pressures for accountability within the territorial domains of national sovereignty, while looking suspiciously at any challenges to their power coming from civil society, once again, underlines the problems facing African citizenship and identity at national and trans-national or regional levels. To the extent that southern Africa’s leaders perceive a utility to the SADC in defensive terms of self-preservation rather than popular participation, state led regional integration exposes severe limits in a governance sense.

Meanwhile, civil society seems largely powerless - or insufficiently organised - to challenge the status quo in the absence of sufficiently strong trans-national ties of counter solidarity to inject more accountability within the SADC and member governments. Accountability based on popular participation could strengthen the basis for forging ever-expanding parameters of identity and citizenship within countries and regionally with such issues as free movement of people and immigration linked to accelerated momentum toward economic development. The outlines of a more-participatory SADC as a basis for developing an expanded regional consciousness in citizenship and identity formation does, nevertheless, exist.

Within SADC’s very state centric framework there exists the new institutional complement dubbed SADC National Committees (SNCs). SNCs were conceived as mechanisms for building expanded national constituencies of stakeholders in each

⁵⁴ Ibid.

SADC member state. As currently conceived, SNCs would link national constituencies more closely to the workings of the SADC Secretariat in what is intended to provide the means for monitoring the work of SADC when implementing its programmes. As of yet, the SNCs have not achieved sufficient visibility to enable a determination on how effective they will be in attracting meaningful levels of civil society, including private sector and other nongovernmental institutional input into the workings of the SADC. Even though they are designed to bring civil society and government into partnership in advancing the SADC's programme at national level, the scope for effective civil society leadership is not yet clear. With the Standing Committee of Officials forming part of the composition of the SNCs, governments would be expected to take the lead in setting national agendas and priorities on SADC.

7.2 In search of the bottom-up missing link in the citizenship and identity equation

The functioning of SNCs could provide a point of departure for transforming the SADC into a more transparent and accountable institution, especially if their development can be made to dovetail with a more proactive role by political parties and members of parliament in the SADC countries. This, in turn, could help reinforce other components of the SADC or SADC-related or affiliated structures in achieving greater effectiveness. An example is the SADC Parliamentary Forum, which should, eventually, evolve into a SADC legislative assembly much like the East African Legislative Assembly that already exist in the EAC. Here, in fact, it should be pointed out that the marginalisation of the SADC Parliamentary Forum in monitoring Zimbabwe's 2005 parliamentary elections in light of their having given a critical verdict on the Zimbabwe elections of 2000 tends to reinforce criticisms levelled against the SADC depicting it as a protectionist club for incumbent leaders. Hence, the dialectical importance of the development of national and regional legislative structures in any citizenship and identity project in southern Africa.

Such regional legislative complements to the checks and balances of the power of heads of state are crucial within the context of the emerging AU system to ensure the transition of the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) into a viable and credible organ (which among other things will have to grapple with issues such as the free movement of people). However, in the meantime, the development of multiparty and parliamentary participation in the SADC, interacting with a more visible

functioning of SNCs could provide the framework for generating a broader based bottom-up dynamic in the regional integration process. This will mean greater trans-national networking between the Members of Parliament (MPs) of the SADC parliaments, either within the framework of the SADC Parliamentary Forum or as promoted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in the 2000 African Governance Forum (AGF) on the role of parliaments in African governance, held in Kampala, Uganda. More recently, greater trans-national networking was also encouraged in the CPS-Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (IMD) programme for eastern and southern African political parties. However, to make such networking more meaningful in terms of generating clout, a greater collaboration between parliaments and their MPs with a range of civil society organisations (CSOs) on a range of issues such as free movement of people and related immigration concerns, is required.

Even as political parties compete with one another in the electoral cut and thrust of domestic politics, a multiparty-parliamentary-civil society partnership could flesh out the SADC as an institution by injecting dynamism into such structures like SNCs (which are intended to build national SADC constituencies and, by implication, a regional identity consciousness), in the process giving a voice to more grassroots levels of society in SADC countries, while providing balance to the SADC; balancing the top-down dominance of heads of state and officials with a bottom-up dynamic of popular participation. This, in effect, is the type of process envisioned by perhaps the most important governance declaration to ever come out of the OAU, the 'African Charter For Popular Participation in Development and Transformation' launched by the OAU and the ECA in Arusha, Tanzania in 1990. The fact that this Charter was not incorporated into the conceptualisation of the economic and political governance terms of reference for NEPAD may be instructive to some of the buy-in problems that have confronted NEPAD among African CSOs.

Building regional citizenship and identity implies a dialectical process that is essentially political in nature; one that points in the direction of regional political integration as a necessary complement to regional economic integration within the context of the AU's vision of promoting regional integration communities. Such a project will have to require devising of strategies or options for transcending national boundaries and amending notions of national sovereignty in the direction of shared sovereignty as corollaries to facilitating the cross border free movement of people. This also implies, perhaps more in the medium to long term than the

short term, a harmonising of national political systems in the direction of greater popular participation in governance at national levels whereby 'national democratic revolutions' transform into 'trans-national democratic revolutions' at the regional level. What follows are two illustrative scenarios: one implicitly political; the other more overtly so in giving momentum to regional political integration from the bottom-up. Both point toward an interregional convergence between eastern and southern Africa.

8. CONCLUSION: AN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN CONVERGENCE ON REGIONAL CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY IN THE AGE OF THE AFRICAN UNION?

The economic union path to integration is the road currently being travelled in southern Africa, though by most estimates, little progress has been made in intra-African trade in the region. The existence of the customs union linking South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland into a tighter core union within the SADC free trade area does provide the cornerstone for an expanding SADC customs union, which has become the regional goal. However, this objective could exert peer review leverage if it entailed an accession process, which in essence might prove beneficial to regional citizenship and identity formation.

However, it is not clear that the SADC will pursue this variable speed route. Were it not for Zimbabwe's protracted political turmoil and economic deterioration, the pivotal economic and, possibly political, integration axis in SADC would be Pretoria-Harare. Instead, this axis appears to have shifted south easterly along a Pretoria-Maputo trajectory, potentially merging into the newly launched East African customs union with Tanzania; Tanzania potentially serving as a SADC-EAC pivot. The problem, however, is that momentum toward economic integration is already slow, heavily South Africa dependent and a point of contention between South Africa and other SADC states. Moreover, in the absence of a more popular political dimension to economic integration, the forging of a regional consciousness is likely to take place at a glacial pace if at all.

8.1 Trans-frontierism as a means of restoring free movement of people

At this stage (which could change by the end of 2005), there does not appear to be any consciously articulated policy momentum toward nurturing an environment favourable to free movement of people apart, possibly, from the bilateral visa agreements that Pretoria has arrived at with neighbouring states. One trend, however, that has the potential to enhance inter-state trans-border integration with the effect of facilitating free movement of people is the uniquely South African policy innovation initiated by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). This policy promotes *Spatial Development Initiatives* (SDIs) between South Africa and its neighbours with the involvement of the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA). SDIs are aimed at creating formal development corridors, which can focus on industry, agriculture and tourism, or some combination thereof.

While there are internal South African SDIs, this strategy encourages cross border development initiatives between SADC countries like the Maputo Corridor joining Mpumalanga province with neighbouring Mozambique. SDIs also support Trans-frontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs) or peace park initiatives like the Kgalagadi Trans-frontier Park linking Kalahari Gemsbok Park and the Gemsbok Mabuasehube National Park (also known as the GKG Trans-frontier Park). Virtually all SDIs have national park/game reserve components, while the SDI methodology includes a strategic environmental assessment within which alternative development scenarios can be explored and specific issues of economic and environmental sustainability evaluated.

One of the conservation motivations behind the SDI/TFCA concept is to promote ecologically sustainable development in ecosystems that span several countries. This will, for example, provide wildlife corridors for migrating fauna, while facilitating cross border eco-tourism. This same concept could conceivably apply to the inter-state managing of free movement of people. This might be especially applicable to nomadic herding communities throughout the continent as well as provide a regionally cooperative framework for post-conflict recovery in such areas as the Great Lakes. An elaboration of the SDI/TFCA strategy could, for example, result in the establishment of trans-frontier regional authorities as trans-national governing units of shared sovereignty under the auspices of regional economic

communities within the AU integration framework.⁵⁵ Trans-frontier strategies could conceivably serve as peace building and confidence building measures between countries and communities. They would constitute the conscious promotion of trans-nationalism as a coherent integration policy and strategy to the extent that they are able to re-establish the pre-colonial pattern of population movements as a pragmatic means of evolving a free movement regime. Such an approach may warrant further study as a policy option with the consciously intended spin-off of promoting regional citizenship and identity.

If trans-frontier strategies were allowed to establish an evolutionary basis of federating neighbouring states in a prospective AU regional integration community, this might help to overcome what has emerged as a major obstacle to the democratic political management of diversity in Africa: the application of federalism as a power sharing device in multi-racial/ethnic/cultural polities. Whether or not this will lead to Africa's political elites rethinking and redressing federalist approaches would remain to be seen. These approaches were abandoned in the past under the banner of African nationalist unity in a unitary state, in reaction to perceived neo-colonialist divide and rule agendas (which also applied in South Africa to such an extreme extent in terms of 'separate development' that federalism as a concept was discredited).

Given the ethno-regional dynamics of Zimbabwe, a federal status for the Matabeleland provinces (harking back to the old Ndebele national home movement) would seem to make sense as a means of arriving at something other than the zero-sum system currently on offer. The same goes for Barotseland in Zambia and possibly the Caprivi region adjoining Namibia, Botswana and Zambia and the insurgent province of Cabinda in Angola. Certainly, South Africa's political settlement accommodating nine semi-federal provinces reflecting the country's regionally based diversities has contributed to its post-conflict stability and an environment in which the ANC has been able to gain ascendancy in the Western Cape and in KwaZulu-Natal through peaceful, democratic multiparty competition.

Citizenship and identity, whether national or trans-national, cannot be based on the basis of zero-sum power struggles, especially in racially, regionally and ethno-linguistically heterogeneous polities; even not, for that matter in ethnically

⁵⁵ Kornegay F. Towards a Trans-Frontier Spatial Development Initiative for the Great Lakes Region: Post-conflict recovery for ecologically sustainable economic development, regional integration and security cooperation Unpublished concept paper, 2002: 18.

homogenous but multi-clan situations such as among Somalis in northeast Africa and possibly the Shona in Zimbabwe (harking back to the Chitepo assassination and the internal Zanu strife that almost destroyed the movement). In fact, the intra-Zulu civil war between the United Democratic Front (UDF)/ANC and Inkatha/Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) throughout much of the 1980s and 1990s that almost derailed South Africa's 'miracle,' underlines the fact that ethno-linguistic homogeneity in Africa is no guarantee of stability.

However, if trans-frontierism, leading to or accompanying inter-state and intra-state federal arrangements, becomes a possibility within the SADC core and periphery, the development of a trans-national political culture as a cementing glue to facilitate such integration might also add value. It is difficult to envision how the new AU system that is trying to be born will take shape without the unfolding of a trans-national democratic revolution to give content to the AU's new regional (or sub-regional) and continental organs and institutions. This should, in the process, transform African consciousness in regional citizenship and identity terms. Moreover, the need for such a non-violent political revolution is necessitated by the intractability of authoritarian politics protected by sanctity of borders and its twin, territorial integrity.

8.2 PAFMECSA Revisited

A prototypical vanguard of a southern African trans-national democratic movement might be a revived Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA). While PAFMECSA was a 1950s expression of anti-colonial pan-Africanism, there was a glimmer of its possible future relevance that emerged at its founding conference in Mwanza, Tanzania on 17 September 1958. In anticipation of the end of the year meeting of the All-African People's Conference in Accra, Ghana, it was decided that, among other things, there was a need to discuss at that conference, "the Democratisation of all Independent African States."⁵⁶

According to Richard Fox who has written the only history of PAFMECSA, this was an intended dig at Ethiopia, "which was regarded as an anachronistic State."⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Fox R. *Pan-Africanism In Practice: An East African Study - PAFMECSA 1958-1964* London: Oxford University Press, 1964: 17.

⁵⁷ Fox 17.

While Ethiopia would eventually become a member state of PAFMECSA and go on to host the headquarters of the OAU, this early expression of the need for African independence to be accompanied by democratic governance proved prescient. Decolonisation, in the main, was not accompanied by democratisation. Rather, in many instances, the reverse held as the continent endured decades of autocratic and repressive rule in many sub-regions: military or 'one man' or 'one party' dictatorships and life presidencies.

As democratic governance began to be recognised as a prerequisite for Africa's development during the 1990s with the enunciation of the African Charter on popular participation (followed up a decade later with the launch of NEPAD in conjunction with the beginning of the OAU's transformation into the AU) the democratisation of all independent African states was added to regional integration as the formula for Africa's hoped for salvation. Moreover, in the case of PAFMECSA, this integrationist project was anticipated by its commitment to the formation of a union of independent African states of PAFMECSA which, at the time, was motivated by Julius Nyerere's commitment to an east African federation which is now anticipated to be launched in 2010.⁵⁸

As a vehicle for fast tracking regional citizenship and identity in east as well as southern Africa, a PAFMECSA updated to address the challenges of the 21st century could provide the political space and scope for democratic forces in civil society to mobilise the clout across national lines to press for the democratisation of government within the context of articulating a trans-national regional integration agenda. Based on EISA studies, Zimbabwe's governance crisis - and the forced migration it has generated - is only the most extreme example of this region's electoral and political dysfunctions. Botswana's one party dominance increasingly lacks credibility, not to mention Swaziland's executive monarchy and the lack of the irreversibility of Lesotho's democratic consolidation. Given this panorama, it will require an effort of pan-African proportions for participatory governance to gain wider traction in southern Africa and, in the process, build national constituencies for political as well as economic integration.

Rather than the anti-colonial umbrella of old, PAFMECSA could take the form of a trans-national political party or movement transcending individual SADC (and east African) states with branches in each country driving the political integration and

⁵⁸ Fox 55.

democratising process from below. This would not necessarily mean that it would adopt an outright oppositional role in all countries. In states where democratic consolidation is advanced, PAFMECSA could promote a regional integration platform in national elections geared to advancing national goals while aligning with a ruling party in provincial and local elections. Alternatively, it could even assume the role of a multiparty pro-regional integration caucus within national parliaments. Yet again, when and if the SADC Parliamentary Forum transforms into a SADC Legislative Assembly, PAFMECSA could contest regional elections for this assembly or for representation in the PAP. As it is, the existence of east Africa's legislative assembly already provides a basis for there to be Kenyan, Ugandan and Tanzanian national branches of PAFMECSA contesting regional elections for that assembly.

In countries with democratic deficits, PAFMECSA would seek to assume a lead role in those countries' democratic opposition with the aim of promoting a transition to democracy that would also advance their regional political integration. The essential point, in any variation of possible scenarios, is that PAFMECSA as a trans-national political entity could potentially introduce the critical element of countervailing power to balance the top-down solidarity of heads of state. Such dialectic could empower African civil society with the clout to transform the political landscape from the purely state centric politics of national sovereignty into a trans-national politics of popular sovereignty. Otherwise, the transformation of the SADC Parliamentary Forum, the EALA and the PAP into authentic democratic institutions of African governance will not happen. This is where a potential convergence of a regional politics of civil society solidarity spearheaded by Cosatu prior to Zimbabwe's election and a possible revival of PAFMECSA could point the way to a longer-term strategy.

What is compelling about PAFMECSA is that it provides a mantle of legitimacy from a bygone era of anti-colonial resistance and liberation struggle as a result of the shared experiences of South Africans, Namibians, Zimbabweans, Angolans and Mozambicans. Part of the credibility problem faced by the opposition in Zimbabwe has been the perception (right or wrong) that it fell outside this national liberation tradition. The Zanu-PF leadership could fashion a retrograde defensive mantle of pan-Africanism in southern Africa to bolster its position while painting the MDC as an imperialist proxy of Britain.

In the meantime, the 2010 target date for the EAC's transformation into a federation could serve as an interim period for east and southern African political activists devoted to promoting a democratic regional citizenship and identity

agenda to establish an Organising Committee for the Revival of PAFMECSA. In a tribute to the anti-colonial and liberation history of eastern and southern Africa, Mwanza, Tanzania could once again serve as the venue for PAFMECSA's launch, perhaps with such patron elders as Kenneth Kaunda and Nelson Mandela in attendance to give their blessing to the rebirth of the 'mother ship' that once nurtured their respective nationalist and liberation movements.

Such a scenario could very well unfold against the backdrop of geo-economic integration dynamics between elements of SADC and SACU in southeast Africa; principally South Africa and Mozambique expanding the prospective east African federation into the beginnings of a greater federal union of eastern and southern Africa that could potentially even take in the Horn of Africa. As futuristic as such a projection might appear, the demographic and environmental pressures (the northeast/east-central African population explosion, taking in an expanse from the Nile to the Great Lakes, wherein Ethiopia alone is projected to be facing a population in the neighbourhood of 173 million people, while much of the continent, especially the SADC region is predicted to face a prolonged era of drought and aridity) interacting with compelling economic trends and imperatives would seem to make such an integrationist project almost mandatory.

Whether the advancing of regional citizenship and identity in southern Africa gains momentum out of the type of intensified regional networking that should take place between parliamentarians and civil society, the elaborating of trans-frontier schemes that promote 'shared sovereignty' federalism between states while facilitating the free movement of people, the emergence of a pan-African political movement in the service of the 'trans-national democratic revolution' or some combination of all of these, the full decolonisation of the continent from its fragmented legacy is not likely to be overcome until this wider African consciousness begins to manifest itself along these or similar lines. As such, regional citizenship and identity in southern Africa evokes that old liberation refrain: *A Luta Continua*.