Summative evaluation of the
Masibambane II Programme

Final Report

Project Evaluation Report

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S&T
Strategy & Tactics

Masibambane

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Summative evaluation of Masibambane II: Overview

1. **Methodology**: A multi-method summative evaluation of Masibambane Phase II (MSB II) has been completed. The evaluation involved a survey of 1025 people living in communities where the sector has delivered services (with direct beneficiaries) since 1994. Two telephonic surveys were also undertaken, one with WSA Managers, another with PMU Managers. Mini-surveys complemented these, such as a mini-survey of national sector departments around sector-wide (SWAP) issues, and a snap survey at the KwaZulu-Natal provincial co-ordinating meeting. In-depth interviews were conducted with over 80 people in the sector, and 5 provinces and 17 projects were visited, for qualitative insights. It should be noted from the outset that these are very rich datasets that deserve greater analysis by the sector over time, since their value extends far beyond the evaluation alone.

2. **The results**: This evaluation focused on outcomes as well as outputs. In other words, we analysed *what* was done in the sector with the support of Masibambane II, as well as *why* it was done and how *sustainable* the results will be over time. And the findings in these two areas are quite markedly different. MSB II scored extremely well in many key output areas, including 'hard' issues such as progress towards targets, and 'softer' issues such as institution and capacity support. But there are critical weaknesses in outcome-related areas, including environmental sustainability, gender mainstreaming and civil society involvement – but above all, operations and maintenance (O&M).

3. The evaluation uses a **standard scoring methodology**. The axes of the evaluation were efficiency, effectiveness, relevance, impact and sustainability. These were drawn together to rate MSB II overall, using the common categories of highly unsatisfactory, less than satisfactory, satisfactory, or highly satisfactory. Achieving a 'highly satisfactory' score is possible, but requires exceptional performance in all 5 key areas across all (or at least the vast majority) of the areas under study. In the case of MSB II, the evaluation team found a mixture of good and bad; and the threats facing the sector in the area of sustainability made it impossible to give an overall score higher than 'satisfactory'. This is nonetheless a very good result, built on very solid performance, and areas where improvement are required are set out clearly in the report and accompanying recommendations.

4. **Above all, the relationship between provision and aftercare needs to be better balanced**: at the moment, WSAs are under intense pressure to meet water and sanitation targets, and they prioritise this (in what they do, what they spend on and what they monitor) above the financial or operational sustainability of the services they provide. This is not sustainable in the long term. As the sector moves into phase III of MSB, the focus should be on water for sustainable growth and sustainable development, with a concomitant shift from delivery to **asset management**.

5. Masibambane II was an extremely important intervention, with some critical successes. MSB supported the sector to **decentralise** earlier and faster than many others, and with greater success. The focus on Water Service Authorities was key in ensuring that assets could be transferred to the local sphere. Of course assets need institutional homes and management teams to manage them, and the **institution and capacity building components of MSB II were probably the most successful in the programme** as a whole. Sector support and sector building were key successes of MSB II.

6. WSAs on the whole felt empowered by taking **ownership of assets** in their locale, as well as receiving staff to help manage them – though it will remain important to monitor the situation and ensure that WSAs have *the right staff* to do the work required of them. Moreover, many of the assets transferred to WSAs are in former 'homelands' and pre-date the 1990-1994 transition. Their technology is old, many are smaller schemes, and many have not been documented. The fundamental outcome of the transfer process is a rapid and extensive expansion in O&M responsibilities for the receiving municipality. A full asset register, operational records and accompanying documentation are needed to fully understand the refurbishment, operations and maintenance work and budget required in the future.

7. The **Water Sector Support Strategy** provides a robust regulatory framework, clearly identifying roles and responsibilities. However, three critical concerns remain about the strategy; it fails to demonstrate how progress towards this aim will be measured, little mention is made of the means

whereby existing support initiatives outside DWAF will be integrated and better coordinated, and exit strategies as a key component of sustainability is not addressed by the strategy.

8. This report recommends that these three concerns could be addressed by developing **indicators** specific to the objectives of the strategy and the systematic monitoring of support initiatives; by putting in place a high level **coordination** mechanism drawing on valuable lessons learnt from structures such as the National Joint Response team; and by formulating an **exit strategy/sustainability strategy** to ensure sector wide support is integrated into the functions of the departments operating within the sector.

9. In addition, this report notes that careful consideration be given to certain types of sector wide support in order to ensure that the support is directly relevant to the needs of the recipients. Moreover, particular attention needs to be paid to the **role of consultants**. The report finds many at local government have an ambivalent relationship towards consultants. On the one hand consultants have ensured that the "job got done", but on the other hand optimal skills transfer did not occur. It is recommended that mechanisms and/or guidelines are developed to ensure more effective management of consultants across the sector.

10. The existing approach to **monitoring and evaluation** is largely effective and in a generally healthy state. Although there are some obvious weaknesses in existing monitoring and evaluation procedures, these have largely been recognised and initiatives are under way to deal with these challenges.

However there are several challenges facing the proposed monitoring, evaluation and reporting (M,E & R) system. These include revising the existing 19 performance indicators to ensure they become **outcome rather than remain output focused** (and that they align with the shift towards a more regulatory role and one in which the sector will refocus on its O&M responsibilities); **improving the validity and reliability of data** captured at the local level (including building local capacity that deals with both the supply and the demand side); **eradicating the duplication of reporting** and the ongoing confusion over the roles and responsibilities of existing data gathering units within Head Office; and **harmonizing existing monitoring systems** within DWAF and the MIG monitoring system under the custodianship of dplg.

11. In addition, the report recommends that in order to address the challenges facing the proposed M,E & R system the sector must **strive to diminish the negative perception of monitoring, evaluation and reporting at local level** (primarily through eradicating the duplication of data collection and assigning appropriate roles and responsibilities), and ensure that lessons learnt are shared appropriately across the sector (both vertically and horizontally).

12. **Sector collaboration** – the hallmark of Masibambane – has been extremely successful. This is true when analysed with regard to government and donors, and within government. MSB II deliberately focused on water services rather than resources; but it is clear that MSB III must now bring in the full sector spectrum in an holistic approach. Moreover, sector

departments – such as health, education, **dplg** and others – told the evaluation team that they would welcome more detailed planning and budgeting, which seems to be a key opportunity the sector should take up. At the same time, the sector should move to secure the full and active participation of key departments such as Environmental Affairs & Tourism, and more active participation from Health and Education.

13. It is worth noting that the point is not to grow the MSB structures to include every possible participant, but to ensure that the sector is represented on other key structures, whether to do with local government strengthening, or provincial growth and development, or capacity and institution building. **The sector needs to reach out to others, not keep expanding itself**, if it is to remain workable.

14. That said, we should not under-estimate the challenges of **realising sector collaboration at the local level**. For example, only 30% of the respondents to the beneficiary survey confirmed that they had received some form of health or hygiene training. Furthermore, during the period of the Masibambane Phase 2 programme, progress with the provision of water and sanitation to *schools* and *clinics* has been disappointing.

15. The benchmarking analysis found the programme to be an entirely appropriate intervention, well developed and with a robust targeting strategy that reaches 'the poorest of the poor'. But this carries **risks and responsibilities** with it. The communities sampled for the beneficiary survey were extremely poor – poorer on average, for example, than those

in ISRDP/URP nodes. The most obvious risk is with regard to financial sustainability: already 11% of respondents have built up arrears regarding payment for water, and 0.5% have been evicted from their dwelling for non-payment.

16. The beneficiary survey also found that **ownership of assets** provided by the sector was lowest in metropolitan communities – typically extremely poor informal settlements – where vandalism is matched by extremely slow response time when schemes break down. In rural areas the situation was better, as in peri-urban communities, where social cohesion and ownership of assets are stronger. Local ownership can be strengthened by reintroducing **project committees**, which were strongly evident in the 1990s, but have fallen away in recent years. Beneficiaries in communities that had such committees rated their performance very positively.

17. Unfortunately, the survey also identified projects listed in the MIG database as 'complete' but where in fact no work seems to have occurred at all. We also found many instances of broken or malfunctioning assets provided by the sector, as the CSIR 'spot check' study did a few months before us. We recommend that the sector follow up on these (specified in the report) as actionable items, to clarify where these result from information gaps, where there is a real need to intervene, and to act accordingly.

18. Municipalities are solely responsible for ensuring the **quality of projects** implemented under MIG but often lack the capacity to do so and end up relying on consultants for quality control, with varied results. One fifth of municipalities reported that the quality of finished products was not acceptable, while a quarter of beneficiaries believed the contractors had done a bad job and these findings were corroborated by project site visits. The report recommends ensuring an effective quality monitoring system that starts with planning, through implementation and into the operations phase, while the sector needs to strengthen project management support to municipalities.

19. Absolutely central to the programme, the sector, and the entire post-apartheid developmental project, is 'O&M' – **operations and maintenance**. Their links to sustainability are self-evident, and as challenging in other sectors as in this one. The evaluation report is littered with concerns about the failure to develop and make preparations for O&M – especially 'M', maintenance. This is strongly evident among WSA Managers, who made it clear that they work under real pressure to meet targets, not to plan and budget for maintenance. When asked how long it takes for leaks to be repaired, 29% of the beneficiary survey respondents answered "never", a result that certainly gives cause for concern.

20. It appears that the funds provided by national government for the purpose of supporting operation and maintenance through the Equitable Share grant are not being ring-fenced, and the **political imperative to deliver and meet targets is obscuring the critical state of many assets in the sector**. The Strategic Framework for Water Services targets the provision of **functioning** water and sanitation facilities. People who were served previously are now re-joining the backlog queue, because existing infrastructure is being neglected.

21. It is recognised that **operation and maintenance** of local level water and sanitation assets is not the job of national departments, or even of Water Services Authorities. However, when municipalities or their appointed water service providers neglect this task, the resulting health problems and political problems impact WSAs and national departments all the way to the top. The only way that national departments can influence the quality of operation and maintenance at local government level is to put in place better **monitoring and regulation** programmes. People don't do what you expect, they do what you inspect.

22. The operation and maintenance challenge is one obstacle to achieving 100% coverage of water supply and sanitation. A further challenge is **population growth and population migration** (both into South Africa, and within South Africa). The South African population has grown by 12 million since 1994, and is growing still. More and more people are moving to our rapidly growing cities in search of job opportunities, while many of these migrants retain a homestead in their ancestral base. In this light it is not surprising that in March 2007, by DWAF's estimates, some 2 074 000 households remained without access to water services (17% of the population), and 3 698 000 households without sanitation services (31% of the population).

23. At current levels of funding and rates of services delivery the **elimination of the water and sanitation backlogs by 2008 and 2010 will not happen**. For example, the meeting of the 2010 sanitation target will require an increase in the rate of sanitation delivery of more than 400%, starting now. 45% of

the WSAs surveyed estimated that it would take them more than 5 years to eliminate their water and sanitation backlogs, and 14% estimated that they would need more than 10 years.

24. Nevertheless, services are being provided to several hundred thousand new households every year. In terms of the international **Millennium Development Goal** (to halve the percentage of the population without water and sanitation by 2015), South Africa is doing well.

25. Targets are only useful if they are achievable. It is recommended that all the **responsible departments agree on achievable targets and timeframes** (noting that 100% coverage may not be a realistic target). These targets and timeframes should be challenging enough to motivate the sector, but not so challenging that existing infrastructure is neglected in the struggle to meet them.

26. Other weak areas are found predominantly in the so-called 'cross-cutting areas' – that should be core programme elements but are side-lined which their title suggests they can be – including **appropriate technology, the environment, gender and civil society participation**. These could have a significantly positive impact on all aspects of the programme and the sector, but are found to be marginal and frequently disregarded.

27. Very little progress has been made in implementing the **appropriate technology** (AT) activities identified in the financing agreement and they must be implemented during

Masibambane III (providing AT guidelines, integrating AT in the planning/project cycle and implementing M&E of AT).

28. Appropriate solutions for **basic sanitation services** are well described in both DWAF and MIG guideline documents but guidance in the key area of O&M (including pit emptying) is needed. Guidelines on appropriate solutions must include both the **rural and urban** environments and must have a broad focus including solutions for water demand management, efficient water use, grey water reuse, home garden food production and water resources management.

29. Intermediate technologies (like hand pumps, protected springs, wells and rainwater tanks) can provide critical access to some water for settlements without services (or when piped water supplies are not working). **Maintaining basic infrastructure** is normally more economical than tankering water and 68% of the municipalities surveyed recognise this and allocate budgets for that purpose.

30. **Civil Society Organisations:** There has been no significant progress on increasing the meaningful participation of CSOs in the delivery of water and sanitation services since the MSBI evaluation and the mid-term review findings. There continues to be different interpretations of who constitutes civil society organizations, their role and how their participation in the delivery of water and sanitation services is monitored. In particular, the MCSSP defines **ward committees as municipal structures** and not CSOs, whilst the DPLG strategic framework recognizes ward committees as the voice of civil society. The sector needs to provide clarity. The

Finance Agreement envisaged that 25% of the EU funds would be channelled through civil society structures (equivalent to R100m) but the total expenditure channelled through civil society structures was reported as R42m.

31. At a national level, CSOs made strategic contributions with respect to policies affecting service delivery, but the participation of CSOs at the provincial level was limited and inconsistent. When it comes to **project implementation at the municipal sphere**, CSOs have a poor track record as service providers when competing with private sector service providers. Limited use was made of community-based organisations and project committees during project implementation and even less for providing services for operation and maintenance. The use of locally based CBOs and SMMEs needs to be increased to support both local economic development and sustainable service delivery.

32. **Gender:** A National Strategy on **gender mainstreaming** is in place, a directorate established and the Director: Gender and Disability appointed. At the provincial sphere progress is varied with some provinces having adopted strategies and some having conducted audits. At the local sphere, more than half of WSAs surveyed stated that they had mechanisms to ensure gender mainstreaming in place but during site visits, most of the municipalities visited had no mechanisms in place and focus on adhering to quotas for procurement and employment of workers on projects. The **concept of gender mainstreaming is often misunderstood** as issues affecting women only and sometimes equated with celebrations of events such as Women's Day.

33. Gender mainstreaming needs to be supported, explained, indicators developed, budgets ear-marked and progress monitored. The sector must develop and implement appropriate **gender education** tools and provide information on best practices to municipalities and provinces where gender-mainstreaming implementation is lagging.

34. **Environment:** The legislative framework for water services delivery, combined with the country's excellent environmental policy, sets the stage for superb water resource management. There is, however, a large gap between intent and practice in the water sector, with delivery and maintenance taking little heed of **environmental issues** such as resource protection, demand planning, appropriate technologies and infrastructure maintenance.

35. The MSB programme needs to recognise the important advisory and regulatory roles played by DWAF and DEAT, where greater collaboration is required, and where support could be provided to WSAs to improve integration of environmental considerations through mentoring. Carrying this support through to WSA level is the challenge, and a capacity building process is proposed. This can only be done by firmly **institutionalising ENVIRONMENT within the programme as a Key Focus Area**. Recommendations are made for addressing these concerns, involving awareness raising at WSA level through various mechanisms, and for improved collaboration between the role-players. In particular DWAF's role as sector regulator needs to be clarified on all levels.

36. Environmental considerations must take heed of macro **long-term resource management** (the big picture of quality and quantity), as well as micro implementation issues such as appropriate technology and conservation (the now concerns, including authorisation for listed activities), in order to ensure that some for all, forever does not become just a wishful mantra.

37. **MIG capital funding** of water supply and sanitation services has consistently been significantly in excess of 50% of total MIG funding. In addition, during the three years duration of MSB II the funding has increased steadily, as did the ability of the WSAs to spend these funds, which has resulted in decreasing rollovers. There is still, however, a serious disparity between funds spent in the first financial quarter and the fourth financial quarter, which needs to be addressed.

38. MIG funding for water and sanitation services has been **significantly pro-poor** although sanitation expenditure has been slightly distorted by the focus and progress in bucket eradication in the "less poor" provinces. This pro-poor focus needs to continue. The **provision costs** for water supply and sanitation infrastructure have increased significantly over the three-year period. The cost of providing water increased by over 50% while sanitation more than doubled in cost.

39. Formula based LG **Equitable Share** (ES) O&M funding of water supply and sanitation services represents 43% of all ES funds and during the three years of MSB II the unconditional ES funding has increased steadily. WSA reporting on how the money is spent is poor and needs substantial improvement. The

results of analysing a sample of interpretable reports indicate that on average excessive funds are spent on executive and council support, finance and administration. The funding of water supply services is fairly robust but only minimal funds are allocated to sanitation.

40. ES funds are made available to implement government's **free basic services** policy and the majority of WSAs have robust Free Basic Water policies in place. In contrast, few WSAs provide any free basic sanitation services and almost none provide services to households with basic sanitation infrastructure like VIPs. In addition DWAF has yet to issue guidelines for the implementation of the free basic sanitation policy and the guidelines are urgently required.

41. Masibambane III has identified the theme '**water for growth and development**' for itself. There is some anxiety among respondents interviewed for this evaluation that the programme will leave behind it 'unfinished business' from the first two phases of the programme. Key amongst these is O&M, as well as centralising cross-cutting issues to allow them to realise their potential for the benefit of the sector. The core item that the evaluation team believes must take centre-stage is gearing up for operation and maintenance.

Summary findings and linked recommendations

This table draws together key findings and their related recommendation (where appropriate) to allow the reader to get a quick graph of the report. The contents have been updated to account for inputs by the sector since the submission of the draft report.

Finding	Recommendation
Evaluating MSB	
Many key respondents were consistently unavailable for interview; a number expressed 'evaluation fatigue', noting that they had recently participated in the MTR and had little new to offer; the task team was unable to meet the team until the evaluation was complete.	The DWAF M&E unit should be supported by senior management in making all sector partners (and individuals) aware of the importance and value of evaluations as a management tool to help their work, not merely an administrative requirement (or irritant). In future evaluations, if certain individuals are regarded as key respondents, they should be cited in the Terms of Reference and avail themselves accordingly.
Benchmarking	
Overall, MSB II emerges as a robust programme, targeting very poor communities, providing services that have psycho-social and particularly socio-economic impacts, and well-regarded by WSA and PMU Managers. Integrated WS provision is clearly a critical issue to take up in MSB III. Sanitation is clearly a major challenge. Operations and management – the cornerstone of sustainability – are widely seen as weak points.	The benchmarking analysis finds many highly satisfactory issues, but the O&M and sustainability-linked concerns are extremely important, and the programme is rated 'satisfactory'.
Asked to rate MSB in key performance areas, PMU and WSA Managers were overwhelmingly positive.	This is a highly satisfactory finding.
PMU Managers felt that MSB's best performance lay in providing an enabling policy and legislative context; ensuring efficient and effective water use; and supporting water service institutions to do their work.	These cover the key aspects of MSB I and II and form a resoundingly positive result for the programme.
PMU Managers were most likely to criticise MSB for O&M, ensuring FBS from all WSAs, and transfers. WSA Managers also criticised O&M, free basic sanitation (an area where other WSA Managers were praiseworthy) and	These are important signals of weak points within MSB that should be followed up and resolved. (They are dealt with elsewhere in this report.) In particular, operations & maintenance are criticised by both PMU and WSA Managers.

the promotion of safe sanitation.	
28% of PMU Managers did not know what Masibambane was; 11% of WSA Managers said the same. The remainder shared a good and varied understanding of MSB.	As MSB III looks to bed down at municipal level, it has some way to go in becoming known to people working in WSAs and ensuring that they have accurate knowledge and thus expectations of MSB.
Two-thirds of PMU Managers felt that MSB projects matched their local priorities, while a fifth (19%) did not. The latter were mainly found in local municipalities.	Alignment with local priorities – matching supply to demand – within the system and with customers – needs to improve.
Many of the technical issues raised by WSA Managers are already being dealt with (e.g. helping WSAs monitor and improve water quality), which is a positive finding.	A consistent theme of the evaluation is the need for a more holistic approach that includes as equals the full spectrum from water resource to services.
Poverty scores from the beneficiary survey suggest that the sector's targeting strategy is robust: the poverty scores in virtually all indicator areas are worse than the national average and worse than their urban/rural counterpart from the 21 poorest urban and rural nodes. Both urban and rural projects appear to have been delivered in very poor communities.	The poverty what marks communities where sector services are delivered directly impacts on financial sustainability and this must be accounted for in design and O&M.
Combined water/sanitation inputs have greater anti-poverty impacts than stand-alone inputs. Stand-alone projects appear to have been less than comprehensive in coverage: rural areas in particular have very high 'water poverty' scores even though sector services have been delivered.	'Coverage' must be properly defined to mean as close to universal as possible.
Unemployment scores for ISRDP nodes are 20.7% higher than those for rural areas served by the WS sector sampled for this survey, while the urban difference is 3.9% – even though those areas tend in virtually all other respects to be poorer than the ISRDP averages.	The data strongly suggest a link between WS delivery and employment creation, which needs to be rigorously monitored under MSB III with its 'water for growth & development' theme.
Respondents who received integrated sector delivery have far lower poverty scores than any other group. Sanitation remains a key concern, with very high poverty scores –	Sanitation has been the Cinderella of the sector for too long and clearly needs to take centre stage in the immediate future.

unless sanitation or combined sanitation/water projects had been implemented.	
Over half (56%) of beneficiaries believe their water services are better, dropping to 37% who say the same of sanitation. Sanitation remains a key challenge: 63% of respondents think sanitation has stayed constant or deteriorated.	The satisfactory levels of service have to be balanced against the impact on a considerable proportion of those served by the sector who have subsequently found themselves in arrears and with service cut-offs and even eviction. The impact of debt on those served by the sector is considerable, and feeds (inter alia) negative sentiments from DWAF clients. These need to be acknowledged, the problems that feed into them understood, and accounted for in planning, implementation, operation and maintenance.
A fifth (22%) of respondents had free basic sanitation; 48% of respondents got free basic water.	
The urban poor in particular are at risk: 22% from metropolitan areas had arrears for water and 13% for electricity; among peri-urban respondents, 28% had water payment arrears and 16% electricity payment arrears.	
5% have had their water cut off because they could not afford to pay for it. 6% of those living in formal dwellings have had their water cut off for non-payment, this doubles to 11% among the urban poor living in shacks and other informal dwellings.	
Asked 'What is the main benefit that this water or sanitation project has provided to your household?', a quarter (23%) replied 'nothing'.	
There is a strong sense from WSA and PMU Managers that the infrastructure delivery work of MSB I and II is far from complete, and must remain central to MSB III. This is not self-evident in the 'water for growth and development' theme proposed for MSB III	The sector needs to undertake rigorous consultations with all partners to ensure that MSB III addresses their concerns, and that they appreciate the nuances of the third phase of the programme
WS Services (including Operation and Maintenance and Appropriate Technology)	
*The concentration on backlog eradication and provision of infrastructure has shifted the focus away from the SFWS targets of providing **functioning** water and sanitation facilities. When asked how long it takes for leaks to be repaired, 29% of the beneficiary survey respondents*	DWAF needs to move fully into its role as the **Sector Regulator** – WSPs and WSAs will not perform to expectations until this is done. Apart from regulation WSAs need ongoing mentorship support.

answered "never".	
Municipal capacity is inadequate to effectively project manage the consultants and contractors engaged on new project delivery even at the current delivery levels.	Municipalities need targeted project management support including mentorship of inexperienced staff.
The quality of end products is recognised as a risk to service delivery. Municipalities are solely responsible for ensuring the quality of projects implemented under MIG but often lack the capacity to do so and end up relying on consultants for quality control, with varied results.	Municipalities must be supported to fulfil their responsibilities in ensuring the quality of end products AND DWAF, as regulator, must provide technical monitoring of project implementation to ensure an effective quality management system that starts with planning, through implementation and into the operations phase
The appropriate technology cross cutting activities of the programme have not been implemented and part of the reason for this is the lack of an individual to drive implementation – but lack of understanding of AT is a more pervasive problem. Performance in this area has been highly unsatisfactory (barring sanitation, where performance has been satisfactory). The dominant perception of AT is that if the technical design is done properly, the technology is appropriate.	Implement the outstanding AT activities planned for Masibambane II during Masibambane III. Identify a national appropriate technology champion from within the sector to drive the implementation of appropriate technology activities.
Appropriate technology for sanitation solutions are well documented and integrated into the systems of planning. What is still often lacking is the planning for operation and maintenance of basic sanitation solutions, specifically pit emptying and the disposal of waste.	Develop guidelines on the operation and maintenance of basic sanitation solutions, specifically pit emptying and the disposal of waste and incorporate into the planning, technical design and M&E of sanitation projects.
For the sector to fulfil its promise that all will have water by 2008 the only feasible way to achieve this is for there to be more of an emphasis on "basic" or "rudimentary" water supplies.	Develop guidelines for appropriate technology solutions that include technologies suitable for basic or emergency water supplies like hand-pumps, protected springs, wells and rainwater tanks including O&M
Technologies like hand-pumps, protected springs, wells and rainwater tanks can provide critical access to some water when piped water supplies are not working.	Develop guidelines for appropriate technology solutions that include technologies suitable for basic or emergency water supplies like hand-pumps, protected springs, wells and rainwater tanks including O&M
Information on appropriate solutions for many aspects of water services and management are not widely known (for eg: water efficient gardening, grey water reuse and home	Guidelines on appropriate solutions must include both the rural and urban environments and must have a broad focus including solutions for water demand management, efficient water use, grey water reuse, home garden food production and water resources

garden food production)	management.
There are excellent examples of applied research into appropriate solutions to municipal priorities conducted by academic institutions	Masibambane III must look to facilitating, strengthening and supporting applied research initiatives that address municipal priorities in partnership with academic and research financing institutions. Dissemination information and sharing of best practices must also be strengthened
Backlog eradication	
Unless the infrastructure which has been built is properly operated and maintained, those who have already been served will soon be rejoining the backlog queue.	While DWAF itself is not responsible for operation and maintenance, it can and must make an impact in this critical area by focussing more energy and resources on its core role as regulator of the water sector.
The total served with water services for the three years together is 6 389 962.	This is a significant and highly satisfactory achievement.
WSA managers were asked how far their municipality was in terms of eliminating their backlog and how long it would take their WSA to eliminate their water supply backlog. Of the 49 WSA managers who responded to this question, 22 indicated that it would take 5 years or longer to eradicate their backlog, and 7 indicated that it would take 10 years or longer.	For a target to be useful it must challenging, realistic and attainable. The evidence indicates that the first goal of the Strategic Framework needs to be revised to reflect the target date for the water backlog elimination which all sector players believe is realistic.
The total served with sanitation services for the three years together is 968 737, or 34% of the total sanitation delivery in the 13 years since 1994, which is estimated at 2 831 237 units. There has been acceleration in this period relative to the decade prior to 2004. However, it is a concern that sanitation delivery appears to have stagnated at 300 000 to 350 000 units per year during the period of the Masibambane Phase 2 programme.	The bottlenecks in the sanitation delivery process need to be identified and eliminated.
According to DWAF's 4th Quarter water sector report, the sanitation backlog as at March 2007 was estimated at 3 439 544 homes.	Unless the rate of delivery is increased, it will take at least another ten years to eradicate this backlog. The evidence indicates that the second goal of the Strategic Framework needs to be revised to reflect the target date for the sanitation backlog elimination which all sector players believe is realistic.
A well-managed WSA will have the backlog information built up from the ground on a village by village basis and regularly updated; and the determination of the backlog	All WSAs should be reporting their delivery and backlog figures on a quarterly basis, and DWAF must audit their figures. The figures should be built up from ground level, and not just a high level estimate.

should be a routine exercise and not a research project. Of the 77 WSA managers surveyed one third were either unwilling or unable to state how long it would take to eradicate their sanitation backlogs. This should be cause for concern.	
Backlogs and rates of delivery for water & sanitation in schools are not evenly distributed around the country. The provinces with the greatest remaining backlogs are Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo. At current rates of delivery in these provinces the elimination of the backlogs will take another three to four years.	Additional resources (people and funding) should be allocated to the eradication of the schools water and sanitation backlog in order to accelerate delivery.
Although the target for clinics target was meant to have been met by 2007, the planned rate of delivery for water, if fulfilled, would only achieve the eradication of the backlog by 2015. For sanitation the planned rate of delivery should see access for all clinics by 2010.	The timeframes for the first five goals of the Strategic Water Framework need to be updated. Such timeframes cannot be prescribed by DWAF to the other sector departments, but must be agreed and committed to by those responsible for their achievement. This means that the implementing departments need to agree and commit to revised target dates, and they should then be held accountable for those commitments.
Bucket eradication will be achieved by 2008 – and possibly in 2007.	A highly satisfactory finding.
Alignment	
72% of PMU managers refer to local IDPs to ensure alignment of demand and supply. Another 17% - especially in local municipalities – hold community meetings for the purpose. This is a considerable improvement on the MTR.	This is a highly satisfactory finding.
Most DM WSAs and metros felt that MSB and their priorities matched. But a fifth of LM WSA Managers felt that MSB had not met local priorities.	This is a less than satisfactory finding, and greater effort is needed to ensure alignment between MSB and the needs of Local Municipalities.
Less than half of respondents say their communities were consulted about sector delivery; and a similarly low proportion believes sector assets serve their communities well.	This is a less than satisfactory finding. DWAF as sector leader and sector regulator needs to ensure that consultation is a prerequisite of all implementation where projects with direct benefits to individuals is concerned. Consultation must be the norm for all delivery and understood as an on-going process, not a one-off event. This must be closely

Less than half of community respondents had been consulted prior to delivery; in many cases, upwards of a fifth of respondents said no-one (including local leaders) had been consulted at all. This will undermine ownership, operation and maintenance.	and understood as an on-going process, not a one-off event. This must be closely monitored by DWAF; implemented or managed by WSAs; and is a role that could be filled by CSOs.
Just a quarter of respondents (25%) were told during construction who would own the project after completion. The danger of not telling people the rules of the game is self-evident: elite capture is one predictable outcome, as is a low level of 'ownership' and concomitant lack of interest in O&M. 14% of respondents told us that the project could have benefited everyone "but some people have taken over the project for themselves".	This is a highly unsatisfactory finding and the sector needs to ensure that local governance and community-based monitoring mitigate against elite capture.
Health & education	
76% of respondents had access to a clinic of some sort in their community; of those, 77% told us that their local clinic has an adequate water supply.	Clinics that lack adequate water will battle to provide adequate health care; and this is clearly an area for urgent intervention, as well as more integrated planning for future delivery.
Of those respondents with a clinic that had adequate water, almost a fifth (17%) had no toilets at all. Half (55%) had flush toilets for patients, and a quarter (24%) had other toilets (1% reported non-working toilets).	The need to draw the Department of Health more deeply into the planning and implementation for MSB III is self-evident.
76% of respondents told us that schools in their area had 'an adequate water supply' while 21% said local schools do not have an adequate water supply.	The agreement between DWAF and the Department of Education is a critical step towards improving this situation, and must be rigorously monitored.
14% of rural respondents said learners could access flush toilets – but another 75% said learners had other forms of sanitation. Just 2% of rural respondents whose schools had water, said learners had no sanitation at all.	There is a need to identify rural schools without any form of sanitation and prioritise supply.
5% of rural respondents whose schools had water access, said the toilets were broken. This rose to 6% among urban respondents and 27% of metropolitan residents. There is	There is a clear need for the Department of Education to better monitor and repair sanitation.

considerable incidence of non-functional sanitation.	
The sector-wide approach	
The sector-wide approach has been entrenched; the idea of returning to the pre-MSB way of working seems inconceivable to many; but there are significant gaps in representation while the sector-wide planning can be deepened.	This is a satisfactory finding.
MSB has focused on water services components and partners.	This must broaden under MSB III – 'water for growth and development' demands an holistic approach to management of the entire cycle, from resource to service provision.
SWAPs should limit the dominance of any one player. MSB structures allow participants to focus on the issues at stake and work together for their realisation – but some complain that MSB meetings are 'talk shops', a sequence of presentations with limited opportunity for engagement and debate.	Criticisms need to be honestly assessed by the sector and responded to by on-going dialogue with participants about what they do and do not want from meetings, flexibility regarding the form and content of MSB and MCC meetings, and conscious nurturing of participation by ensuring that meetings have an environment of openness and are a forum for debate and engagement.
Participation by the departments of Health and Environmental Affairs and Tourism remain (at best) low, as found by the MTR. Given the uneven performance in the key cross-cutting area of environment (see below), these departments should be playing a key role in MSB.	The programme manager must solicit and nurture participation from all key sector departments.
Sector departments want to become more involved in Masibambane. All sector respondents said they wanted more rigorous sector-wide planning; all also noted that there is some discrepancy between MSB and their own departmental strategic plans.	There seems to be a golden opportunity for MSB III to align itself more closely to partners' strategic plans, and draw them into more robust sector-wide planning and implementation.
The participation of civil society organisations (CSOs), remains low, as it was in the MTR.	CSO participation urgently needs to be improved, especially if the next phase of MSB is to take the sector wide approach down to municipal/local level, where CSOs will play a key role in social facilitation.
The new delivery framework	
In the transition to the new delivery framework, some of the experience of DWAF was lost. Many believe that the MIG M&E systems are only now getting to the point where the DWAF M&E systems were in 2004; and there are	This was an unfortunate loss, and government needs to learn how to maintain a degree of continuity and lesson learning while systems and structures are being changed.

crucial gaps in the MIG monitoring systems.	
The key success of the new service delivery framework has been the development of local government capacity to plan and implement service delivery at local level.	The importance of building municipal capacity is one of MSB II's critical successes, the importance of which cannot be over-emphasised.
The sector wide approach of Masibambane has helped the transition through sector wide dialogue on sustainability, supporting municipalities to play their new role and information sharing functions of forums and networks.	
Operations and maintenance seem to be approaching a crisis point. Just 54% of respondents said that the scheme delivered to their community continues to work well. This is echoed by WSA Managers, who rely heavily on consultants for quality assurance, while MIG does no quality or post-implementation monitoring. If operations and maintenance are in such a parlous state, the massive gains of the sector will be thrown into disarray and their sustainability deeply questionable.	The importance of DWAF playing its regulatory – and quality assurance and on-going monitoring – roles, cannot be more clearly nor urgently demonstrated.
Accountability during implementation was found to be satisfactory, but during operation of the scheme, less than satisfactory.	Accountability to communities is a critical component of good developmental practice, with significant spin-offs in terms of ownership, O&M and sustainability – and needs to be improved.
Transfers	
Most municipalities felt that the transfer process had been foisted on them and that it had been politically driven: only 18% disagreed that "My WSA was forced to take transfer". *But the municipalities understand that they have been given a challenge, and many have risen to that challenge, with two-thirds (68%) indicating that the transfers have had a positive effect on them.*	DWAF needs to spend time ensuring that the transfer process is understood holistically, and counter the perception that DWAF is in fact transferring its problems to municipalities.
Staffing and capacity emerged as the major challenge facing the success of the transfer process.. Municipalities felt that a sufficient number of staff were transferred but that the spread of skills was not adequate. Many WSAs	On-going monitoring is required, as is funding certainty and flexibility in the area of support, mentorship, and the like.

*(54%) felt that, in fact **too many** staff were being transferred which would place a management as well as financial burden on them in time to come.*	
25% of respondents felt that transferred employees do not have adequate technical skills and 24% felt that inadequate management skills were being made available.	The lack of specific technical (e.g. millwrights and electricians) and management skills is a major concern that needs to be addressed. DWAF needs to ensure not simply that staff are transferred, but that this includes *the right staff with the right skills.*
The larger transferred schemes are well documented, but the number of schemes officially described excludes a large number of small stand-alone schemes.	All transferred assets require O&M support, and accurate listing are required.
Many schemes identified for transfer were developed under the homeland governments; they are old and often prone to breakdown. The transfer of such schemes will place an additional O&M burden on municipalities. Most surveyed WSAs stated that "schemes were of an adequate technical standard" but agreed that there were needs for refurbishment. Municipalities noted that they are faced with similar challenges due to transfer of schemes as part of other processes, such as section 78.	Given that the need for adequate (i.e. significantly improved) O&M – especially maintenance – is a core theme of this evaluation, this is no small point and must be built into planning and budgeting. The ongoing implications of all transfers should be considered holistically and adequate support programmes put in place.
Interviews indicated that repair of breakdowns at various schemes were not effected within acceptable time periods by the municipalities now providing the service.	O&M remains a critical issue for the sector as a whole and for MSB III.
DWAF and municipal officials were more in touch with the large regional schemes but it was difficult to get any definitive information on the numerous stand-alone schemes that are known to exist.	It is clearly imperative that accurate status data are available on all DWAF assets.
Many of the schemes are not able to provide an RDP level of service, having been constructed over the past 30 years. This creates a situation for WSAs where a scheme may require O&M funding and support but at the same time that area is still counted as part of the backlog.	
Schemes are first transferred and DWAF then provides funding for refurbishment, placing a further burden on municipalities. But it is also necessary that municipalities	Activities, such as the transfers, should become activities functioning within an environment of sustainable operations. The methodology of project implementation will then be set by the operational requirements rather than the other way round.

recognise the need to develop effective strategies to fulfil their ongoing operational responsibilities and stop treating every activity as a project, with a beginning and an end.	
The handing over of the operational responsibility was satisfactorily handled in most areas, with municipalities expressing satisfaction with the functionality of schemes. Operational records were supplied for the majority (64%) of schemes as were drawings and manuals (77%).	This is a satisfactory finding.
There was no specified list of handover checks and inspections to be done before transfer. Health and safety as well as environmental concerns did not receive much attention during the transfer process. None of the interviewees was able to confirm the existence of health and safety plans, as required by legislation.	This is a less than satisfactory finding.
Environment	
Much of the national policy is excellent and in place, and the intentions are positive – but there is a large gap between environmental intent and practice on the ground, throughout the sector.	Policy and overall intent in the area of environment is rated satisfactory. Delivery is however rated less than satisfactory. Recommendations for addressing particular aspects are given below.
The MTR noted progress in terms of efforts to improve integration of environmental considerations at a national level but not at local level. This remains true. Environmental concerns have no real 'teeth' and lack a robust institutional home in MSB. This is attributed to the failure to include environment as a Key Focus Area (it was a draft KFA but never formally included).	This is a less than satisfactory finding: the purpose of evaluations (mid-term and summative) is to identify problem areas so that they can be improved over time. This evaluation has found little evidence of such improvement regarding environmental issues in the local delivery sphere. Environment **must** become a Key Focus Area in MSB 3, in order to institutionalise it as a principle consideration. This *is absolutely critical, as it underpins sustainable resource management.*
Limited understanding of regulatory framework (including EIA regulations and water use licensing/registration) by WSA officials, with frustration at perceived bureaucratic authorisation process holding up commencement of delivery. There is a major reliance on engineering and environmental consultants to advise WSAs as to the need	There is a serious and urgent need for capacity building at WSA level to raise consciousness and awareness of the fundamental contribution to sustainability provided by solid environmental assessment, design and implementation. PMU and WSA managers need to have access to a summary of the NEMA regulations to ascertain whether a basic assessment or full EIA are in fact required. Basic capacity

for EIAs.	building around environmental issues, including NEMA EIA regulations, section 21 of the National Water Act, Groundwater Protocol, etc is advised, to reduce reliance upon consultants.
Groundwater protocol, Water use licensing and EIA compliance appear to be overlooked on a regular basis.	Awareness raising for WSA officials and councillors of EIA process and purpose via short courses, based on existing material, through collaboration between DWAF, DEAT and relevant CSOs. National mandate is required between Departments, for increased support and collaboration, based on practical suggestions and requests from local and regional levels. New one-year EETDP (Environmental Education Training and Development Programme)SETA accredited course can develop capacity of officials through in-service mentoring process. Make use of EIMS tools developed by DWAF and DEAT for use by water service delivery officials.
The thresholds of most rural project parameters are below those listed in the NEMA regulations, and don't require EIAs. Environmental Management Plans (EMPs) to guide and monitor project delivery and impact are only developed if required by an EIA. This makes it easy to overlook environment issues at delivery level.	MIG funded projects should have a basic environmental code to adhere to if they fall below the NEMA assessment threshold. These can be based on simple guidelines, similar to the ISO engineering and design guidelines. This code can be easily developed from existing material within DWAF and DEAT, through collaboration, and its development and effective implementation could be a key deliverable in MSB3.
Some great practise examples were found, but the norm is the lowest common denominator with little innovation or development of appropriate solutions. The value of schools and clinics is greatly underestimated in the role as awareness raisers and role models with respect to health and hygiene promotion.	Make use of best practise at WSA level and in WESSA Eco-Schools programme, and replicate approaches where appropriate. These need to be documented first, and MSB funding could allocate a portion to capturing and modelling best practise 'key features' for sharing across the sector. This includes Appropriate Technology (rainwater harvesting, solar and hand pumps, etc), plus and health and hygiene practice and awareness raising mechanisms.
Maintenance of systems, particularly pit latrines, is almost non-existent, resulting in potential groundwater contamination, and defunct infrastructure joining the back-log queue. Rural communities resort to using informal ablutions, resulting in contamination of surface water.	Maintenance programmes, whereby local operators and homestead owners are supported through health and hygiene training and appropriate maintenance processes, are essential.
Civil society	
The strengths of the different players have not been optimally utilised to strengthen civil society participation in	This is a less than satisfactory finding.

the delivery of water and sanitation services and no significant progress has been made since the Masibambane I evaluation or the Mid-Term review of MSB II. CSO participation has not met the objectives of the Civil Society Strategy.	
The Finance Agreement envisaged that 25% of the EC funds would be channelled through civil society structures, equivalent to R100m. The total expenditure channelled through civil society structures was reported as R42m. As a target it was set far too high.	This is a less than satisfactory finding.
Some funds recorded as going to civil society have been used to sub-contract private sector consultants to do the work needed. This is window dressing and is deeply misleading.	It is recommended that all funds ear-marked for CSOs carry the condition that only CSOs can be used even where sub-contracting occurs.
7 in 10 WSAs at least have a policy in place to encourage CSO participation – but after 6 years of MSB I and II, 3 in 10 still have no such policies.	MSB III must ensure universal policy coverage – and monitor adherence thereto.
CSO participation is more common than non-participation in health and hygiene awareness raising and planning, and equally likely to occur in the area of policy development. But in skills development, construction and O&M, participation remains much less likely than non-participation.	That there is scope of improved participation by CSOs across the board is self-evident. The recently completed survey of sector CSOs should provide a good guide as to the strengths and weaknesses of CSOs and targets should be set for different spheres of operation and types of work rather than a single, global target.
Just 4 in 10 (42%) respondents told us that there had been a project committee in place when the WS services were being implemented. This low engagement of communities during implementation is unfortunate given the positive impact that participation has on ownership and O&M.	Project committees should be a requirement of all implementation of infrastructure that has direct beneficiaries.
18% of respondents told us that their community is kept informed about water issues, and of the 21% who said	CBOs are well-rooted in communities and should be used as channels of communication – from community to the sector and back again.

their water is tested, just a fifth said they were told the results of testing. There seems little reason for this situation to obtain.	
Of the small number who said that meetings were held and that objections could be raised (33% of the total sample), just 41% told us that objections raised were properly dealt with. We have a situation where participation opportunities are being systematically by-passed, with unavoidable costs in terms of O&M, ownership and the like.	More rigorous monitoring is required during the implementation phase as well as thereafter; DWAF should engage MIG about ensuring appropriate indicators are developed and monitored in this regard – ideally using community based monitoring.
The use of local contractors is low. This represents a significant lost opportunity to inject cash into the local communities where projects are being implemented.	Under the theme 'water for growth and development', it is vital that all development programmes engage the 'second economy' wherever possible, and using local contractors where possible is an obvious area for doing so.
Provincial participation of CSOs is declining.	Civil society participation needs to be addressed at provincial level. Provincial steering committees need to be mobilised, including financial support to enable CSOs to increase their participation at provincial level.
CSOs have a poor track record as service providers for the delivery of water and sanitation services and are not widely used in this regard.	Civil society needs to broaden its skills base to include, research, advocacy, monitoring and evaluation, etc.
	CSOs need to focus on skills and resources that exist within their organisations rather than competing with private sector as service providers.
Capacity building has been limited to skills development to enable CSOs to compete with the private sector in service delivery.	Capacity building should be broadened to improve the knowledge base of civil society on issues and challenges facing on the Water Sector so as to enable civil society to act as monitors of public good and safeguard the interests of disadvantaged sections of society.
It is important that the CSO WS sector is properly understood. There are some important NGOs, but also a host of CBOs at grass-roots level that are not well represented if at all, but which are 'walking with the people'.	MSB needs to develop a nuanced understanding of civil society participation and representation that reflects this situation appropriately.
The current reporting systems are inadequate to evaluate the progress, impact or cost effectiveness of CSO participation.	More stringent progress reporting requirements are needed so that progress can be better monitored at all levels.
CSOs are not a homogenous group, and should not be	CSOs need to acknowledge their ideological differences and work towards common

expected to act as a single entity. The diversity of CSOs is a rich resource to be used.	goals where possible; but their diversity should be regarded as an asset not a problem.
Gender	
The strategy has been drafted, but it has not been signed by the Minister and roll-out to provinces has not happened. This situation remains as it was during the MTR.	The strategy needs to be signed off as a matter of urgency and rolled out. Where provinces have their own strategy it needs to be aligned with the National Strategy. High-level political and official support is needed to support mainstreaming.
A Director for gender and disability has been appointed, and with some other officials is keeping gender alive in the Department and in MSB. The Director for gender is seen as a champion and as someone to spearhead gender mainstreaming. But gender must be everyone's concern.	Imperative that all senior managers take gender mainstreaming seriously and do not rely on an individual or small group of committed people. To be mainstreamed, gender inequalities have to be identified and rectified at every level of the programme, not 'ghettoised'.
No gender mainstreaming indicators have been devised.	It is imperative that indicators and targets be drawn up as well as timelines. This should not only be at DWAF head office but across all provinces, and especially at WSA levels.
Gender mainstreaming as a concept is still not understood and is misunderstood to include issues that relate to women.	A comprehensive gender analysis exercise – followed by education and communication around the topic - to be undertaken and spearheaded by the Directorate: Gender and Disability.
Gender mainstreaming is still seen to relate to events such as Women's Day or Sixteen days against women and child abuse and municipalities spend their budgets on these as part of gender mainstreaming.	DWAF to drive a gender mainstreaming programme through the new directorate ensuring that all understand the concept and what it relates to. Support for women's issues must be retained – but must be broadened to understand gender mainstreaming.
The WSA survey suggests that WSAs do take seriously issues of female employment quotas and the like. These are not gender mainstreaming – but are nonetheless very important.	
Provinces have drawn up their own gender strategies and others are using the National Strategy. At provincial level some provinces such as the Eastern Cape and Limpopo seen as good examples. There needs to be a consistent thread that stretches from WSP through WSA to province and national.	Good examples should be replicated in weak provinces. Also of utmost importance that the provinces guide and monitor WSAs.
Case study visits indicate that WSAs no policy guidelines are in place for gender mainstreaming.	Imperative that WSAs be assisted in drawing up guidelines.

Case study visits indicate that WSAs feel that adhering to quotas is equivalent to gender mainstreaming.	DWAF and DPLG to take this into account and develop and implement appropriate gender education tools, ideally working with the Commission on Gender Equality.
Case study visits indicate that no gender mainstreaming or sensitisation is taking place at project level and there are no monitoring mechanisms in place.	For sustainability, training at project level needs to take gender mainstreaming into account.
Masibambane Programme and financial analysis	
MSB II has focused almost exclusively on water services and not water resources. This may have been a deliberate choice – the programme had to start somewhere – but it is time to broaden the sector coverage.	See previous recommendation about water resources.
Financial data show that MSB II was a robust SWAP viewed in IGR terms but not as far as community empowerment went.	Empowerment of and partnership with communities is a core criterion of sustainability and should actively be pursued by MSB III.
Measured by province, MSB can be said to have been pro-poor.	A conscious focus on pro-poor funding should inform MSB III.
LG support has truly become a hallmark of DWAF's operations and M&E is quickly following suite. However assuming its regulatory role appears to lagging behind.	DWAF needs to revisit its WSA checklist support to all WSAs and LG WSPs and to improve its website database to make it more user friendly. Improving the website will help with improving feedback to the WSAs.
SALGA's performance as a MSB II team member has generally been exemplary.	SALGA needs to prioritise councillor training to encourage community management of services.
The ability to spend funds is improving throughout the sector.	More early planning is still required to achieve even spending throughout the year.
Donor funded expenditure on infrastructure decreased from 62% in year 1 to 5% in year 3	This is a highly satisfactory finding.
By the final year of MSB II, the expenditure on single entity soft issues had become robust and equalled 65% of total expenditure.	This robust expenditure on single entity soft issues should continue. The only KFA that may require additional expenditure is KFA06 in as far as it relates to the effective use of water.
In the final year of MSB II, the expenditure on cross-cutting issues had risen to 30% of total expenditure.	This is a satisfactory finding.
Of this expenditure, 87% was spent on what have been classified as miscellaneous cross-cutting themes; namely: MSB facilitation, Project Consolidate, communication and IWRM	This is a large portion of the budget and should be carefully reviewed.

Expenditure on cross-cutting themes was captured on the MSB II database. An additional column captured EU key result areas.	The expenditure on cross-cutting themes appears to have been captured accurately. Reporting on the EU key result areas was not carried out so well. This needs to be improved for MSB III, especially funds expended on *Water for growth and development.*
The MSB II database does not record the person responsible for managing the funds associated with each project.	A column needs to be added to the database to record this information, to assist persons who wish to access project outcomes and future MSB evaluators
MIG, ES and FBS	
The transfer of the local government water services capital grant into MIG has gone smoothly.	Despite its consolidated nature, as a fund for all municipal services excluding electricity, over 50% of the total capital grants have been allocated to water services since these services have been incorporated into the MIG programme.
The funding of water supply services at the provincial level has been significantly pro-poor.	This focus needs to continue and include a focus on the WSAs with the greatest backlogs.
Data indicate a distortion in the funding for sanitation services. The cause of the distortion is the push to eliminate the bucket system as soon as possible. Whilst this is understandable it will cause disruptions to the efforts being made to eradicate sanitation backlogs in rural areas.	A return to a more even pro-poor pattern of funding needs to take place as soon as possible.
The internal and external matrix reporting responsibilities and subsequent oversight control loops within which the WSA MIG Project Management Units (PMUs) operate is generally operating smoothly.	
If funds have not been spent at the end of the financial year, grants for the following year are often reduced without looking at the reasons for the roll over or the possibility that the WSAs can get back on track. This encourages WSAs to spend funds without ensuring adequate quality control.	Thus the application of "penalties" because of rollovers needs to be handled more appropriately. Roll-overs are not automatic signals of administrative snarl-ups, but can be quite the opposite, namely the sign of an administration that is responsive to community needs, pace and the like.
During MSB II the funding of water supply and sanitation services increased steadily as did WSAs' ability to spend these funds.	There is still a serious disparity between funds spent in the first financial quarter and the fourth financial quarter. Projects need to be registered and planned earlier to achieve even expenditure and to eliminate roll-overs. More even expenditure will also help with quality control.
MIG management processes and procedures state that municipalities must invest an appropriate proportion of	This matter needs to be clarified as a matter of urgency. Municipalities need to be made aware that the lifetime operation and maintenance costs are the responsibility of the

MIG funds on rehabilitating existing infrastructure. Despite this there appears to be much confusion at the municipal level with respect to accessing of MIG funding for such projects.	municipality and that MIG cannot allocate refurbishment funds for inadequately maintained infrastructure.
From the national average figures it can be seen that project costs are rising. Surprisingly project costs do not appear to be affected significantly by settlement densities.	DWAF needs to carry out and make available the results of a full investigation with respect to costs of the different components of water services delivery. The results should be used to revise norms.
The formula related LGES grants for the funding of the recurrent costs of water supply services to poor households are only marginally pro poor and the grants for sanitation services are not.	It is essential that the grants are revised as soon as these backlogs are overcome, so that the grants become robustly pro-poor.
The manner in which the new LGES formula distinguishes between households adequately and inadequately served if sensibly implemented is a motivation to WSAs to overcome backlogs.	No additional funds are made available to WSAs as inadequate sanitation is replaced by VIPs. This is a lost motivational opportunity that needs to be overcome. In addition the LGES can be used to motivate appropriate solutions for intermediate levels of services and discourage high pressure water supply and waterborne sanitation services.
Overall poor communication between customers and their WSP, and the poor allocation of ES funds rather than a lack of NT funding, threatens the sustainability of free basic services.	Government's free basic services policy requires additional community participation and empowerment, if it is to be sustainable.
The majority of WSAs have robust FBW policies in place	This is a positive finding.
Few WSAs provide any ongoing sanitation services, such as pit emptying and infrastructure condition monitoring, in areas where VIP latrines have been installed. In addition DWAF has not issued any guidelines to assist them to roll out such a policy.	This situation needs to be rectified as a matter of urgency.
Currently the total LGES grant allocations covering basic services & institutional support are published as a single figure for each municipality. Water Services Managers rely on these unconditional LGES grants to achieve sustainability. But the grants are controlled by the Municipal Manager the Water Services Managers do not know how the LGES total figure was arrived at.	The separate amounts for each service should be clarified.

Knowledge Management	
Evidence gathered by this evaluation suggests that sites such as WSNIS and WIN-SA have enormous value as they provide continuously updated information on the state of the sector in terms of targets and lessons learnt thus providing probably the most informative picture of any sector across South Africa	What is not known, and therefore DWAF needs to pursue further, is how often the information is being accessed, by whom and what are they doing with the information? This will inform the development of a necessary data storage and knowledge dissemination strategy.
Sector wide support	
Notwithstanding DWAF's own assessment of sector support, a robust regulatory framework, clearly identifying roles and responsibilities, has been created by DWAF within which institutional support is provided, namely the Water Sector Support Strategy (WSSS). However, two concerns remain about the strategy i) it s fails to demonstrate how progress towards this aim will be measured in evaluated and ii) little mention is made of the means whereby existing support initiatives outside DWAF will be integrated and better coordinated	Indicators specific to sector wide support are needed. Thought needs to be given to broadening the scope of a structure such as the National Joint Response team, to oversee the role of other players who provide support in the sector rather than rely too heavily on DWAF funded regional coordinators for ensuring departments comply with the WSSS over whom they have no jurisdiction.
DWAF, as noted previously in this report, are extremely effective in identifying the underlying causes of problems and strategising around the development of appropriate initiatives that will be deemed relevant to the targeted participants. Nevertheless not all areas of institutional support have been wholly successful.	DWAF will need to give careful consideration to certain types of institutional support to see whether it is directly relevant to the needs of the recipients and also how best it can be improved to meet the identified needs.
Municipalities have benefited from the support provided and consequently the support has effectively achieved its stated outputs. Concerns were raised about the effectiveness of certain aspects of support, particularly the transfer of skills from consultants to WSAs and WSPs	DWAF need to develop mechanisms and/or guidelines to ensure more effective management of consultants and suggest ways to enable greater skills transfer between consultants and WSAs and WSPs
There is no systematic approach to monitoring and evaluating the support being provided.	DWAF need to ensure that the revised M&E system monitors which support activities have been completed and how these are contributing towards the stated objectives of the programme.

Existing data on the programme is insufficient to provide an adequate cost benefit analysis of the institutional support	DWAF should consider commissioning an exhaustive financial study to provide an accurate quantifiable value of support within the programme. Moreover we strongly recommend that the series of controls as identified in the WSSS (2007) be implemented which we know will ensure that the programme derives more economic value from the support being provided.
Evidence from the case studies and surveys suggests that MSB II has achieved its stated purpose with regards to institutional support. Nevertheless, certain initiatives are seen by the managers within the WSAs and WSPs as having more impact than others.	DWAF need to identify which types of support are not achieving the desired impact and either improve those types of support or replace them with initiatives they know work.
To ensure greater sustainability and ultimately to achieve sustainability with regards to WSAs and WSPs the WSSS has outlined a comprehensive plan to attaining sustainability. However, a key aspect of any sustainable support strategy is an exit strategy.	The WSSS drawn up by DWAF needs to also include an exit strategy or at least signal a process whereby exit strategies are designed at the regional level which map out the manner in which sector wide support will eventually be withdrawn.
Sector wide support provided within MSB II is remarkably effective in comparison with capacity building initiatives in other sector wide programmes in Africa.	Two final suggestions that the those managing institutional support should consider. The first speaks to creating "learning communities", the second addresses the need for a coherent change management strategy.
M & E	
MIG does not monitor the quality of assets, nor their on-going utility; our survey suggests that other fields in the MIG database may also include errors.	As sector leader and regulator, DWAF needs to ensure that monitoring of project status, quality and viability is continually conducted.
There is a major gap in monitoring, namely (a) the quality of assets provided, and (b) the on-going maintenance of those assets.	DWAF needs to support its own M&E unit and ensure quality across all its assets. This is a critical space for DWAF to act and to support action from WSAs.
The existing and proposed Monitoring, Reporting and Evaluation system remains predicated on 19 Key Performance targets that are at different levels, many of which are not at the higher outcome level one would have expected for a sector wide programme.	DWAF should revisit existing targets, especially in the light of a move towards its regulatory role, and ensure that the targets become more outcome focussed.
Although no one can question the strength of the reporting tools and processes already in place in this programme the real issue is the quality of the data being gathered at the	DWAF expand and strengthen existing studies to verify the quality of the data being captured at the local level

local level.	
Regardless of whether one accepts the criticisms made by managers of the existing M&E system, it is fair to state the in terms of relevance the M&E system was generally more concerned with performance management, input and output monitoring and that the higher-order policy relevant issues have largely been neglected.	The revised M,E and R system currently being developed by the programme needs to ensure that improves internal procedures to meet the needs of its users.
Many WSA and PMU managers are battling to understand the M&E guidelines and tools provided.	DWAF must ensure that any capacity building initiatives around M,E & R must not only focus on the supply side but also on the demand side.
Evidence from the interviews and DWAF's own reports reveal a duplication of efforts, considerable overlap between functions, roles and responsibilities within M&E component of the programme	The programme needs to resolve the complex power issues that have developed relating to the relationships between different providers and users by clarifying roles and responsibilities, "streamlining reporting requirements" and reducing the number of monitoring and evaluation initiatives.
The proposed M,E and R system if fully implemented will in all likelihood lead to a sustainable system for the programme	DWAF must be encouraged to support and roll out the proposed M,E and Reporting strategy as developed by the M&E unit.

Introduction and scope[1]

1. The Masibambane Programme (MSB) is a multi-annual, multi-faceted Water Services Sector Support Programme[2] whose overall objective is

    > …*to improve the quality of life of poor communities by improving their access to adequate, safe, appropriate and affordable basic water supply and sanitation services provided by effective, efficient and sustainable institutions that are accountable and responsive to those whom they serve.*[3]

2. MSB was an early water and sanitation sector-wide programme (SWAP) where donors forego parallel project or reporting procedures and provide on-budget support while utilising government's reporting mechanisms and outputs. It is also one of the more fully developed SWAPs worldwide, in any sector.

3. MSB is about provision of sustainable service delivery rather than infrastructure provision, although the latter remains key to government's medium-term strategic goals and on-going efforts to meet the Millennium Development Goals in the sector. For this reason, this evaluation evaluates the infrastructure provided in the water and sanitation sector, while noting that expenditure on infrastructure has declined from 69% in 2004/05 to 27% in

2006/07, reflecting the growing emphasis on sustainable institutions. This in turn reflects the purpose of MSB II which includes sector collaboration, institutional support for "key institutions in each sphere of government" and the transfer of ownership of schemes to Water Service Authorities (WSAs). Decentralisation is at the heart of Masibambane.

4. But so too is redress, by eradicating backlogs and inequalities in provision inherited from our unequal past. To realise these considerable ambitions in practice, the programme involves a range of sector departments across all 3 spheres as well as civil society organisations – though with uneven success, as we note below.

5. The programme is part funded by the European Union, governed by a financing agreement that (in the absence of a programme logframe) provides the basis for this evaluation, as advised by the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF).[4] A mid-term review (MTR) occurred in late 2005, and this summative evaluation ushers in the end of phase II – phase III of MSB has already commenced. The evaluation has been conducted by Strategy & Tactics, with team members drawn from various sector specialist companies (see list of team members at Appendix C).

6. The purpose of the evaluation is as follows:

    > …*to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the programme to determine whether the EU support should be redirected if necessary. The evaluation will cover activities*

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[1] Views presented in this paper are those of the authors and do not represent positions of the South African Department of Water Affairs and Forestry.
[2] Masibambane I lasted from 2000 to 2003; Masibambane II began in 2004 and ends in 2007; MSB III is being finalized at the time of writing.
[3] Financing Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of South Africa, p.15.

[4] Communication from DWAF to evaluation team, 31/1/2007.

from April 2004 to end March 2007; being the effective period of the three-year support programme…. The overall objective of this study is to assess the progress of the programme against the SFWS on the basis of the indicators formulated by the sector and to make recommendations for improvement.[5]

7. The terms of reference, objectives of the study and issues to be addressed were included in an Inception Report approved by the Masibambane Co-ordinating Committee (MCC). A Reference Group was established to provide on-going support to the evaluation team, although unfortunately it failed to meet during the course of the evaluation. It should be noted that the original Terms of Reference were extremely broad and ambitious in scope, and had to be quite considerably trimmed down to be feasible. This is reflected in the Inception Report, attached as Appendix D.

Process

8. This report is the result of a lengthy engagement by the sector, comments from a range of stakeholders, an international consultant, participants workshop sessions analysing different sections of the report, and the like. All have added value, and helped us iron out possible problems or errors of fact.

9. We would like to thank all those people who gave us feedback on the report either individually or through the sector workshop commissions or in other form. Many went out of their way to be helpful, and we remain indebted to them for their energetic commitment to getting the best out of the evaluation. They are far too numerous to mention, and bear no responsibility for errors

that remain. Errors of fact have been corrected wherever possible. Where different interpretations exist, we have tried to indicate these differences; the conclusions of the evaluation team remain our own, based on our analysis of the data.

10. The findings were endorsed by a sector workshop, a sector Task Team, the Masibambane Co-ordinating Committee, and the MSB III working group to whom the results were presented. It is commendable that the sector treat evaluations with such seriousness – far from being an administrative requirement and 'ticking a box' when the evaluation was done, the sector was mobilised into workshops and a task team that gave detailed feedback and then moved on to developing action plans based on the findings of the evaluation. This shows a seriousness of purpose regarding the evaluation that is admirable.

11. We would like to acknowledge the inputs received from Erich Baumann of SKAT Consulting (Consultancy Services for Development, Switzerland). Brought in to examine the report and contribute to the sector workshop, Baumann's comments helped enrich proceedings, and are available on the CD resource pack issued with the evaluation report.

Evaluation … and evaluating

12. To evaluate is to assess, to pass judgement. Evaluations may use many types of methodology – as Babbie reminds us, evaluation research "refers to a research purpose rather than a specific research method."[6] The task of the evaluator is to compile a set of

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[5] Terms of reference for MSB II summative evaluation.

[6] Babbie E. *The practice of social research* (7th edition, Wadsworth Publishing, California, p.338).

methods that can do justice to the terms of reference – the purpose of the evaluation as formulated by the client – and produce data that are reliable. However, precisely because evaluations pass judgement, they are often awkward both to compile and to read. The best an evaluator can do is ensure methodological rigour and trust that while readers may disagree with points of detail, the overall thrust of the argument is clearly supported by the data and the audience will be receptive. As such, we do not expect everyone to agree with or accept every comment, observation or recommendation. The evaluation nonetheless focuses on issues that beneficiaries – in communities, WSAs and so on – deem important, and will hopefully generate useful discussion in these and other areas. This is important because the approach to this 4th MSB evaluation was deliberately skewed to hear the voices and views of individual and institutional beneficiaries of the programme, not merely those managing or operating the programme.

13. This challenge is particularly acute in the case of Masibambane, which is process-based and on-going: rather than having a discrete, measurable set of project-based outputs, the programme has shifted to focus on institutional strengthening and capacity building – notoriously challenging to evaluate – and although this is a summative evaluation of MSB II, MSB III is already being finalised, meaning that the programme is, quite literally, in and about process.

14. That said, in line with In line with our Inception Report, MSB II will be assessed according to the following evaluation criteria:

- **Relevance** of the project relates to the overall objective, the design of the project, and the extent to which its objectives address identified problems and needs. As noted above, this evaluation will use the Finance Agreement, which sets out the Overall Objective, Purpose, Results, budget allocation, Assumptions, Risks, 19 indicators and 9 WSA Key Performance Indicators (KPIs).
- **Effectiveness** assesses how the results/impacts of the project achieve the project purpose, how far the intended beneficiaries benefited from the product or services made available to them via the project activities.
- **Efficiency** focuses on the question "Were things done right?" regarding project implementation. It assesses how well the various activities transformed the inputs and resources into intended results, in terms of quality, quantity and timeframe. It also assesses financial and technical systems, management structure, and the efficiency with which resources were translated into results.
- **Impact** denotes the relationship between the project's overall objective and purpose and how MSB impacted on delivery, including planned and unplanned impacts.
- **Sustainability** indicates how positive impacts of the project have continued or are likely to continue bearing in mind that sustainability is understood as a tripartite balancing act between social, economic and environmental dimensions. It also touches upon the question of ownership.

15. As per standard evaluation approach, each of the criteria presented above will be rated as follows:
   1 – Highly satisfactory
   2 – Satisfactory
   3 – Less than satisfactory
   4 – Highly unsatisfactory.

16. Cross-cutting issues are assessed in their own right and the extent to which they have been mainstreamed into core programme areas. The criteria are assessed using methods outlined in the next section.

Methodology

17. As noted in the Inception Report – and reflecting the objective of the programme, namely to improve the lives of the poor – the evaluation was evidence-based and worked from the bottom up, rather than the other way round, which seems to have been done in previous MSB evaluations. Thus while a considerable number of national and provincial interviews were conducted, the evaluation rests heavily on three surveys:

    a) A 1000 sample survey of respondents living in communities that benefited from sector infrastructure with direct beneficiaries (water and sanitation provision rather than large-scale treatment works, for example)

    b) A survey of Water Service Authority (WSA) Managers from local municipalities, district municipalities and metros; including a small control group of mater service managers from institutions that are not designated WSAs

    c) A survey of Project Management Unit (PMU) managers from WSAs.

18. A detailed methodological note is attached at Appendix E. it is important to note that the survey of beneficiaries of infrastructure provision is sampled at sector-wide level, not through a MSB-specific sample. The latter is impossible: when projects were transferred from DWAF to the Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG), their codes and names were altered, making it impossible to trace them individually or by department. At one level, this

proved challenging, given our specific task of evaluating MSB. At another, of course, it is entirely appropriate both that projects are immersed in a sector-wide system such as MIG; and that the survey measures the impact of the *sector* and not merely one vehicle or one department within the sector.

Nhlungwane in the Msinga Valley, uMzinyathi DM, 2002. This community of 200 families managed their village water supply, which included a diesel generator and a borehole pump, successfully for about seven years on their own before they received any kind of assistance from their WSP and WSA. The monthly contribution was low, only R7, but everybody paid. Each tap served about 5 homes and was opened by a tap minder (an honorary position) for an hour or two morning and evening, and then closed again. Each family was allowed to use only four 25 litres containers per day, unless they paid double, in which case they could take double – they said that was all the water they needed (they wash clothes at the river, and have gardens near the river).

19.   The surveys were critical vehicles for measuring the impact of infrastructure provision from the perspective of beneficiaries; and measuring the impact of decentralisation, transfers, capacity building, institutional strengthening and related matters from the perspective of WSA and PMU managers across the country. After 7 years of MSB, it was considered appropriate to examine its impact and efficacy from the perspective of direct and indirect beneficiaries rather than mainly programme managers; bottom-up rather than top-down, in short-hand.

20.   The surveys also proved important because of the considerable difficulties experienced in accessing respondents working in the sector, particularly in the national sphere. Although some two-score national sphere interviews were conducted, many key respondents were consistently unavailable for interview, out of the country, or snowed under with work (a point also made in the MTR); a number also expressed 'evaluation fatigue', noting that they had recently participated in the MTR and had little new to offer. It is recommended that the DWAF M&E unit is supported in making all sector partners (and individuals) aware of the importance and value of evaluations as a management tool to help their work, not merely an administrative requirement (and/or irritant).

21.   The evaluation team also visited 5 provinces and a series of District and Local Municipalities, WSAs, and individual project sites where services are being or have been provided, set out below.

Province	Sites
KwaZulu-Natal	Carisbrooke, Sisonke (water and sanitation) Hopewell, Sisonke (water) uMzumbe, Ugu (water EC555)
Eastern Cape	Zingcuka, OR Tambo (sanitation, EC503) Sidwadweni, O R Tambo (water, EC555) Zingquthu, O R Tambo (sanitation, EC 503) Tyityani/ward 9 area, O R Tambo (sanitation, EC 577) Motseng water supply, Alfred Nzo
Limpopo	Greater Sekhukhune DC47 (Greater Groblersdal LM 472 Flag Boshielo West peri-urban water supply refurbishment) Vhembe DC34 (Makhado LIM344 Sinthumule-Kutama rural water supply)
North west	Bophirima DC39 (Greater Taung NW394 rural sanitation) Central DC38 (Mafikeng NW383 Modimola rural water supply)
Mpumalanga	(MP 322) Mbombela MP291 Masibambane Facilitation (MP 324) Nkomazi MPNew07 FBS Pilot Project

Table 1: Sites visited by evaluation team

22.   In addition to generating primary data via surveys, field visits and in-depth interviews, the team reviewed a range of policy and programme documents, financial documents and data, work and business plans, M&E reports and sector documents, published and unpublished.

23.   In-depth interviews (as well as telephonic and e-mail interviews and mini-surveys) were held with sector departments at national level including **dplg**, Housing, Health, Education, Treasury and others; and with development partners from the European Union,

Irish Aid and Swiss Development Cooperation. In-depth interviews were also conducted with representatives of civil society; the South African Local Government Association (SALGA); and others. For a full list of respondents, please go to Appendix C.

24.   A final point: the 3 surveys are a rich data source that deserve more in-depth analysis than has been possible within the time constraints that faced the evaluation team, and deserve more rigorous analysis in future.

Benchmarking

25. We start the report by providing some benchmarking, briefly analysing a poverty matrix scored using the beneficiary survey, and doing the same with a quality of life index derived from the beneficiary survey. The purpose is to try and assess overall anti-poverty and quality of life impacts of sector delivery, as experienced and assessed by people living in communities benefiting from sector delivery.

26. Before doing so, however, it is important to hear the voices of communities that have benefited from sector projects in their locale. As part of the evaluation, we conducted 1025 interviews with individual respondents from households in communities where sector projects with direct beneficiaries are listed in the MIG database as 'complete'.

Beneficiary benchmarking

27. The basic rule of any form of applied research is that if you want to know the answer, ask a question. So in addition to the slightly more abstract modelling provided above, we now analyse how respondents – people drawn from communities where sector projects (with direct beneficiaries) have been delivered since 1994 – rate the quality of water and sanitation services since 1994, and what impacts – positive or negative – have accrued to them.

28. It must be noted up-front (see also the methodology appendix) that of the 1025 respondents, 11.3% told us that no water or sanitation project had occurred in their area since 1994, while 4.9% were unsure. For some, this may be the result of short memories or they may have moved to the area after the project occurred; but in a (thankfully small) number of instances, our fieldwork teams confirmed that no project had been implemented. In some cases, the DWAF sign-boards were up (e.g. at Doornkop in Mpumalanga), but no work had commenced – even though the projects are listed as 'complete' in the MIG database.[7] These need to be followed up by the appropriate agencies, and resolved as a matter of urgency.

29. This underscores a point made frequently throughout this report, about the importance of monitoring by DWAF itself. MIG for example does not monitor the quality of assets, nor their on-going utility; our survey suggests that other fields in the MIG database may also include errors. DWAF needs to ensure that as part of its role as sector leader and regulator, monitoring of project status, quality and viability is continually conducted.

30. That said, respondents were more likely to believe that water and sanitation is steadily improving since 1994 – over half (56%) believe their water services are better, dropping to 37% who say the same of sanitation. Sanitation we know is a key challenge, demonstrated by the fact that over half of respondents think sanitation in their

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[7] Projects that appeared either partially or substantially incomplete included Lukanji: Macibini Water Supply (Eastern Cape); Mbizana: Ntlezi Water Supply (Eastern Cape); Umzumbe Rural Sanitation (KZN); Ezibayeni Sanitation (KZN); Ufafa VIP (KZN); Vuna Water Project Ward 14 (KZN); Mpungose Water Supply (KZN); Ingquza: Bala Water Supply (Eastern Cape)

communities has stayed the same (43%) or worsened (20%) since 1994 – that is 63% of respondents who think sanitation has stayed constant or deteriorated.

Figure 1: Attitude to water and sanitation service provision since 1994 (beneficiary survey)

31. It obviously makes a difference if sector projects have been delivered: in areas where sanitation projects have been implemented, 56% of respondents noted an improvement in sanitation since 1994 – but where none had been implemented, 30% said things had worsened and 49% that the situation had stayed the same since 1994. If water projects had been implemented, 56% saw an improvement; where none had been implemented, 26% said things were worse and 43%

that the situation remained unchanged. Significantly, if both water and sanitation projects had been implemented, results spiked: 76% said water had improved and 59% said sanitation had improved, where both water and sanitation projects had been implemented.

32. Respondents in metropolitan areas were most likely to complain that water services have deteriorated since 1994 (18% did so as opposed to 13% of urban and rural respondents). Where sanitation is concerned, respondents from rural areas were most likely (22%) to say things have deteriorated, followed by metropolitan (20%) and then urban (16%) respondents. In both instances, respondents from smaller towns were most likely to say things have improved: 59% of urban (i.e. peri-urban/small-town) respondents said water services have improved since 1994, and 50% said the same of sanitation. Elsewhere we note that delivery patterns tend to favour areas with high population density at low cost – and this is reflected here. Hard-to-reach and costly rural provision is lagging behind urban provision, and reflected in the attitudes of urban and rural respondents.

Pro-poor?

33. There is still a distinctly pro-poor edge to results: 62% of respondents in shacks and other informal dwellings said their water services have improved since 1994, higher than the 55% of respondents from formal dwellings. There were no differences when measured by sex.

34. There is however also a distinctly **non**-pro-poor edge to the findings. We asked respondents if they have payment arrears for water or

electricity and if so with what effect. We had previously asked this question in a survey of the 21 nodes of the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme (ISRDP) and Urban Renewal programme (URP). In that (the first ever nodal baseline) we found the following[8]:

A fifth (18%) of ISRDP respondents have water piped into their dwelling, either with or without a meter, prepaid or other. This rises to half (49%) of urban respondents. A further 44% of URP respondents have water piped to their yard, as do 17% of ISRDP respondents. In all, 93% of urban respondents have piped water to dwelling or yard, true of just 35% of ISRDP respondents. For rural respondents, water is more likely to be communal – 36% of ISRDP respondents get their water from a communal tap, as do 7% of URP respondents. But a further 28% of respondents from ISRDP nodes have to get water from a borehole, river or stream, dam, borehole or other source. This was true of just 1% of urban respondents. We went on to ask respondents if the water they receive is clean, in their view.

Looking at the right-hand bar, we see that people who access water from any source other than piped – in this case, virtually all ISRDP residents – are most likely to have to deal with poor quality water. Just a fifth have a supply that is always clean, and another fifth said it was 'mostly' clean water, but for 60% their water is not clean. A small proportion of rural respondents have access to free communal water, something not enjoyed by most

urban respondents. But rural respondents are hit by a double-whammy: most do not get water piped to their dwelling, and the water they rely on is frequently unclean

Figure 2: Cleanliness of water by source (ISRDP/URP baseline)

35.   This bears out findings in this report, particularly the fact that rural areas constitute the critical final challenge for service delivery generally, and for the WS sector in particular. But we went on to ask ISRDP and URP respondents about the debt trap that they face once connections have been established. Much has been written about commodification – and much of the debate has centred on water as a right – and much invective has been generated.[9] Government's

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[8] See Everatt D., Smith MJ, Solanki G.: *Baseline survey of the 21 nodes of the ISRDP and URP* (Department of Social Development, Pretoria, 2007).

[9] See *inter alia* McDonald D and Pape J (ed.s) (2002) *Cost recovery and the crisis of service delivery in South Africa* (Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria);

commitment to provide free basic services has also become mired in controversy over both the amount provided and the extent to which the poor can access those services (for example, poor tenants may get nothing while landlords take the free services for themselves).

36. In the ISRDP/URP baseline survey we asked respondents whether they had arrears for non-payment for water or electricity; and then asked if they have had their services cut off or had been evicted due to non-payment for services. We asked the same questions in the MSB survey. Let's first recall the results from the 21 poorest nodes in the country:

> *Fewer than 1 in 10 ISRDP households have service payment arrears for water or electricity… Considerably more URP households have arrears, including 17% who have electricity arrears and 27% with outstanding water payments… And, predictably, cut-offs and the like are also far more of an urban than a rural phenomenon – because the services are simply far less available in rural areas.*
>
> *Very small proportions of ISRDP respondents have been cut off for non-payment for water or electricity, and 1% have been evicted for non-payment. These figures should however be seen in the context of low provision of services as well as high poverty. The URP respondents paint a far more bleak picture. One in ten (11%) have had their water supply cut off for non-payment, rising to 1 in 5 (18%) where non-payment for electricity is concerned. A very small 2% have been evicted for non-payment…*

McDonald D and Ruiters G (ed.s) (2005) *The age of commodity: Water privatization in southern Africa* (Earthscan, London).

> *On the one hand, it can be argued that these are fairly small numbers, and that to claim there is a service delivery and payment 'crisis' is overstating the matter. On the other hand, it can reasonably be asserted that in a pro-poor state, to find that in the 8 poorest urban nodes, a fifth of urban households have had electricity cut off, a tenth have had water cut off and 1 in 50 evicted for non-payment, does indeed represent a crisis for the poor – and for the state, particularly an erstwhile developmental state.*

37. So if we move out of the 21 poorest nodes and look more generally at communities where the post-apartheid state has delivered water and sanitation services, is the picture similar or different?

Free water & sanitation … and payment arrears

38. Firstly, a question not asked in the ISRDP/URP baseline, is the issue of free basic services. This is dealt with in detail elsewhere in the report, but it is important to note here that a fifth (22%) of respondents told us they have free basic sanitation – twice as high (predictably) in formal as informal dwellings, but similar in metro (20%) and rural (21%) areas, rising to 27% in urban areas. But this is still a terribly low score, given that we are sampling areas where sector services have been provided, and where 28% of respondents live in communities that had received sanitation, or combined water and sanitation services.

39. Twice as many respondents get free basic water – 48% told us they do so, a very low figure given that these are communities where sector services have been delivered, and 76% of respondents told us their communities had received water or combined water and sanitation services. Free basic water is enjoyed by slightly more rural (49%) than urban (44%) or metropolitan (44%) respondents. In no

instance did half of respondents tell us they get free basic water. This may require more probing with head of household interviews, given that 19% of respondents did not know if their household received free basic water or not, true of 12% where free basic sanitation was concerned. Even if we set them aside, however, we are left with very low numbers and worrying questions about the extent to which people in poor communities are able to access free basic services.

40.   And the flip-side is the debt trap that catches poor people who need water or electricity and run up payment arrears.

Figure 3: Arrears and cut-offs

41.   The situation seems better than in the ISRDP/URP baseline, though still with troubling implications for a pro-poor state. The urban poor in particular are at risk: 22% of respondents from metropolitan areas had arrears for water and 13% for electricity; among urban respondents, 28% had water payment arrears and16% electricity payment arrears. For respondents from rural areas, the corresponding figures were 4% for water and 2% for electricity. These low figures drag down the sample average – but should not obscure the payment crisis that continues to bedevil urban areas.

42.   As we noted in the quotation from the ISRDP/URP baseline above, this in part reflects the fact that services need to be available in the first place, and this is far more common in urban/metro than rural areas. The debt trap is also particularly acute for people living in formal dwellings, 29% of whom had water arrears and 19% electricity payment arrears. The emerging petit bourgeoisie seem to be hardest hit by service payment debt.

Figure 4: Summary: arrears, cut-offs & evictions

43. At one in twenty (5%), water cut-offs may appear low – but from another angle, 5% of those served because they live in poor communities targeted by DWAF for delivery, have had their water cut off because they could not afford to pay for it. This is pulled down by the 3% of rural respondents who have been cut off – but rises to include 9% of those living in metropolitan areas and again to 11% of those in urban areas. Thus while we see elsewhere that urban (by which we mean peri-urban/small town) areas have been most well-served by the sector, with high levels of service come high levels of indebtedness and cut-offs. Equally worrying is the fact that while 6% of those living in formal dwellings have had their water cut off for non-payment, this doubles to 11% among the urban poor living in shacks and other informal dwellings.

44. Thankfully, evictions resulting from non-payment are lower in this survey than the ISRDP/URP baseline – though that by implication suggests that the very poor, locked into nodal poverty pockets, are indeed being hardest hit by the commodification of water. That said, just 0.5% of respondents told us they had been evicted as a result of non-payment for water or electricity – with such small numbers, no meaningful statistical analysis can be performed.[10]

45. Backlog reduction and free services are discussed again later in the report, but it is important that the evaluation is framed by this overarching perspective, where experiences of sector delivery are far from uniformly positive, and where service payment arrears, debt and

cut offs are hitting the urban poor particularly hard. We should not dwell on the negative sat the expense of the positives – always a danger, especially in evaluations – but we must also not be blind to the very real negatives that have arisen from sector delivery.

Figure 5: 'What is the main benefit that this water or sanitation project has provided to your household?'

46. That may be why, when we asked respondents an open-ended question (to which they could give any response they wished) - 'What is the main benefit that this water or sanitation project has provided to your household?' - a quarter (23%) replied 'nothing'. While other

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[10] Just 5 respondents told us they had been evicted due to non-payment – all 5 were women, 4 from rural areas, 1 from a metropolitan area.

respondents had far more positive endorsements, these negative sentiments need to be acknowledged, the problems that feed into them understood, and accounted for in planning, implementation, operation and maintenance.

47. But the majority had positive responses, including better access to facilities, better quality of life, and better health. The major achievements in delivery are acknowledged and appreciated by the majority of respondents.

Benchmarking continued: Views from WSAs

48. We began the surveys of PMU and WSA managers by asking them what words or phrases sprang to mind when we mentioned the word 'Masibambane'. This was an open-ended question, where respondents could give any answer they chose; these were subsequently coded and grouped. This is not meant to be hard science, but is an impressionistic question with impressionistic answers – but these top of the head responses are often a good early indicator of the positive and/or negative associations of a project or programme.

49. And indeed, the largest single set of responses came from over a quarter (28%) of PMU Managers, who did not know what Masibambane was; more worryingly, one in ten (11%) WSA Managers told us they had no idea what Masibambane was. Perhaps Masibambane operates as an invisible hand gently steering the work of the sector, and these are appropriate responses; alternatively, they indicate that as MSB III looks to deepen itself by bedding down at municipal level, it has some way to go in becoming known to people

working in WSAs and ensuring that they have accurate knowledge and thus expectations of MSB.

50. That said, most PMU Managers see Masibambane as encouraging co-operation with communities, a source of funds, water supply services or the provision of basic services – a reasonable mix of associations. WSA Managers were more likely to emphasise co-operation, water or water/sanitation services, or an organised support base for their work – again, a good mix of associations.

Figure 6: 'What word comes to mind when you hear 'Masibambane'?' (WSA and PMU Managers)

51. Turning to a more direct question, we asked WSA Managers to think of the various MSB-supported interventions in their WSA and tell us "did the projects address your priority needs or not?" Again, this is not a straightforward question, given that there may be sector-wide priorities that register differently in different local conditions. That said, two-thirds (68%) of WSA Managers agreed that "Thinking of all the Masibambane projects that were implemented in your WSA", the MSB interventions had addressed local priorities. A fifth (19%), however, said that the MSB projects had *not* addressed priorities, while the remainder (12%) had no opinion on the matter.

	Yes	No	D/k
Total	68	19	12
Metro	67	33	0
DM WSA	100	0	0
DM non-WSA	67	17	17
LM WSA	61	23	16
LM non-WSA	73	17	10

Table 2: Did MSB projects address your local priorities? (WSA Managers)

52. Those who felt that MSB priorities matched their own were most likely to be found in District Municipalities (DMs) and metros, where virtually no respondents (just 2, to be precise) disagreed. But in Local Municipalities (LMs), around a fifth argued that MSB had not met local priorities – 23% of Managers of LMs that are WSAs said so, as did 17% of Managers on non-WSA LMs. The data suggest that alignment with local priorities – matching supply to demand – has some way to go. We return to this below.

53. Asked which MSB interventions were most useful – infrastructure, capacity building, transfers and so on – infrastructure overwhelmingly dominated, followed at some distance by capacity building. Support for infrastructure came from metros, DM and LMs; but capacity building was only cited by WSA Managers from LMs – not a single DM or metro WSA Manager cited capacity building as MSB's most useful project. However, they did cite institutional support – an important distinction.

Figure 7 bar chart:
Category	Value
M&E	1
A T	1
Nothing	2
Gender	2
Environmental	3
Transfers	3
Institutional sppt	12
Capacity bldg	17
Infrastructure	58

Figure 7: Which MSB interventions were most useful? (WSA Managers)

54. Having dealt with this impressionistic area of associations, let us look in more detail at the anti-poverty impact of sector projects.

Poverty index

55. The construction of a poverty matrix allows us to analyse poverty within communities sampled for this project, and to compare them with other locations for which the same data are available. The selection of indicators was influenced by current international trends and local conditions, as well as reflecting key service delivery areas of government – infrastructure, services, health, education and job creation.

Indicator	Definition
Female-headed households	Proportion of households headed by women
Illiteracy	Proportion of population (15+) who have not completed Std 5/Grade 7
Rate of unemployment	Proportion of the economically available population who are unemployed (whether or not they recently sought work)
Household income	Proportion of households with no annual income
Over-crowding	Proportion of households sharing a room with at least one other household
Dwelling type	Proportion of households classified informal or traditional
Sanitation	Proportion of households without flush or chemical toilet
Water	Proportion of households with no tap water in dwelling or on site
Electricity	Proportion of households without electricity for lighting
Refuse removal	Proportion of households refuse not removed by local authority

Table 3: Indicators used to construct the poverty index

56. It also reflects the Copenhagen Programme of Action, which cited food, safe drinking water, sanitation, health, shelter, education and

information as part of measuring absolute poverty.[11] To make sense of the data, remember that a high score is bad news, because it means high levels of poverty.

57. For each indicator, the relevant proportion (as a score out of a 100) was calculated. The poverty index was then calculated by adding all the scores for each indicator and dividing by 10 to obtain an average overall score out of 100. A score of 100 would reflect an extremely high level of poverty while a score of 0 would reflect an extremely low level. Although we lack baseline data on the specific communities, on-going monitoring by DWAF should utilise the same variables – which appear in the census – to measure over time the anti-poverty impacts of sector delivery. This survey provides baseline data for future monitoring by DWAF.

58. Over the page we show a table that computes the poverty scores for this survey using water, sanitation and combined water & sanitation; and compares it with poverty scores for all ISRDP nodes, all URP nodes, all combined ISRDP/URP nodes, and Census 2001 data.

59. It is immediately obvious that people who received integrated sector delivery – both water and sanitation – have far lower poverty scores than any other group in this survey; but they still lag behind the URP sample and the score for the country generally, presumably reflecting the poverty targeting used by DWAF to select communities for implementation.

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[11] United Nations: *World Summit for Social Development: programme of action* (2000) Para 19 Chapter 2.

DWAF beneficiary survey	Female headed	Illiteracy	Unemploy-ment	Income	Crowding	Dwelling type	Sanitation	Water	Lighting	Refuse	Poverty index
Census 1996	37.8	33.6	37.6	14.3	1.6	34.5	49.4	39.3	41.8	45.7	33.6
Census 2001	41.9	31.5	48.2	23.2	2.8	31.2	45.2	37.7	29.8	42.8	33.4
Total sample (this survey)	47.3	42.0	58.1	13.3	9.3	39.0	87.0	56.3	32.0	78.5	46.3
ISRDP nodes (2007)	53.1	37.6	79.1	2.6	2.9	52	79.4	66.2	28.4	76.2	47.8
Rural	48.1	46.1	58.4	8.8	9.9	46.3	98.9	70.4	37.9	92.0	51.7
URP nodes (2007)	46.8	14.2	62.6	3.7	4.1	19	11.6	7.3	4.5	8	18.2
Metro*	44.4	17.8	63.2	11.1	13.3	24.4	68.9	40.0	24.4	53.3	36.1
Urban	45.5	33.9	56.2	27.9	6.4	18.5	52.4	14.2	14.6	40.3	31.0
Water project	52.0	45.2	58.7	11.3	10.1	44.3	94.1	62.1	33.2	85.3	49.6
Sanitation project	52.3	44.2	70.9	12.8	9.3	50.0	81.4	45.3	39.5	67.4	47.3
None/DK	52.4	37.3	55.6	20.5	6.0	36.7	75.3	63.9	33.7	72.3	45.4
Both	55.0	36.0	54.2	13.0	9.5	21.0	79.0	38.0	24.0	69.0	39.9

Table 4: Poverty scores: Census 1996, Census 2001, ISRDP/URP baseline (2007), MSB beneficiary survey (2007)

* Small sample size (45 respondents)

(Rows in blue are data from the MSB evaluation survey)

60. The table of poverty scores also suggests that DWAF has a robust targeting mechanism in place – the poverty scores in virtually all indicator areas are worse than the national average and worse than their urban/rural counterpart from the 21 poorest urban and rural nodes. Both urban and rural projects appear to have been delivered in very poor communities. The flip-side of this was analysed earlier, in terms of the debt trap that may await these very poor people, and must be accounted for when implementing schemes.

61. The table also suggests that combined water/sanitation inputs have greater anti-poverty impacts than stand-alone inputs. This may be the result of such schemes favouring the already less poor (more likely to be in formal dwellings for example), but it is apparent that neither water nor sanitation on its own has the same impact on poverty.

62. It is beyond our scope to substantially explore the link between employment creation and water in this particular survey, although a body of literature exists and presumably informed the theme of MSB III – 'water for growth and development'. But it is worth noting that unemployment scores for ISRDP nodes are 20.4% higher than those for rural areas served by the sector and sampled for this survey, while URP scores are also higher, albeit by a smaller margin of 3.9% – even though, as we have seen, both rural and urban areas in virtually all other respects are poorer than the ISRDP/URP averages.

63. On the negative side, it seems that stand-alone water or sanitation projects have inadequate coverage. Look at the excessively high 'water poverty' scores, especially for rural areas – this in rural areas where completed sector projects exist. It is important that 'coverage' is properly defined to mean as close to universal as possible – delivering a clutch of toilets to a small population in a large settlement, rural or urban, does not mean that that area has been 'done' and delivery can shift to new areas.

64. Sanitation remains a key concern, with very high scores (meaning bad news) – unless sanitation or combined sanitation/water projects had been implemented. Sanitation has been the Cinderella of the sector for too long and clearly needs to take centre stage in the immediate future.

65. Bearing in mind comments made earlier about the debt trap following on connectivity to service provision, it is worth noting that the urban and rural poverty scores for respondents in this survey are higher – worse, in other words – than the average scores for the URP and ISRDP, the poorest urban and rural areas (respectively) in the country. Overcrowding is far more common, as is unemployment and illiteracy – on every indicator bar incidence of some form of household income, this sample scores worse than the Census 2001 average for the country. Sector services are being delivered in very poor areas to very poor people, and both implementation and O&M must be geared to this.

66. A final survey result to underscore this point. No included in the matrix is a poverty proxy question, which is 'In the last year has there ever been a time when you did not have enough money to feed the children in the household?' The assumption is that when households do have (even limited) resources, they tend to use them on children first. In the ISRDP/URP nodal baseline survey, for example, 45% of respondents said there had been a time when they could not feed the children, and the same proportion who said there had not been such a time (the remainder had no children in their household). In the beneficiary survey undertaken for this project, 46% of respondents again told us there had been a time when they lacked money to feed the children in the household. It is in such a context that one has to consider what it is that people may be able to pay for water, or for maintenance; and policies need to account for the same.

67. But the response – even to such shocking poverty – has to be sustainable. The response of Nkomazi municipality, for example, has been to leave pumps and treatment works running 24/7 at full capacity to ensure everyone gets free water; and when that ran short, a new pump was commissioned which pumps untreated water to the area on the assumption that free untreated water is better than none; and because of political pressure to provide free water. The health risks are self-evident; the lack of sustainability of this approach equally so. A nuanced, poverty-responsive approach seems still to be lacking.

Quality of Life index

68. Finally, a brief benchmarking analysis from a quality of life perspective. This methodology was developed for the National Department of Public Works, when evaluating their Community Based Public Works Programme (a fore-runner of the EPWP), and developed subsequently. The reason for using both approaches is that the poverty index measures external developmental issues while quality of life derives from a mix of objective and subjective factors. Using a quality of life approach seeks to measure how people feel about their situation. DWAF is planning to undertake quality of life monitoring, and this data may provide a useful baseline.

Dimension	Subjective indicators	Objective indicators
Global	Life satisfaction Alienation Anomie	
Family	Family happiness Leisure activities Close family relationships	Ability to feed children
Community	Loyalty of community Trust of others	Membership of CBO
Health	Own health Health care received	Access to health care HIV/AIDS awareness – sufferers HIV/AIDS awareness – deaths
Housing	Choice of where to live	Dwelling structure Overcrowding
Infrastructure		Sanitation access Water access Energy source for lighting Refuse removal
Economic	Ability to find jobs Standard of living Gap between rich/poor	Employment status Household income

Table 5: Broad areas and indicators of the Quality of Life index

69. For each indicator, a score of 0 or 1 was allocated to each individual in order to compute an overall score for the broad area. For each broad area, the score was then scaled out of 1. Adding the scores for all the broad areas together resulted in the overall score on Quality of Life, again scaled out of 1. For each area and the overall Quality of Life index, a maximum score of 1 was possible. This would reflect extremely high levels of quality of life in each of those areas. Therefore, the higher the score, the higher the quality of life. In other words, high scores are good news (unlike the poverty index, where high scores were bad news).

70. Running an eye down the right-hand column, which shows overall scores combining the different axes, we immediately see better quality of life (QoL) scores for peri-urban residents compared with those from metropolitan or rural areas, reflecting also the group best served by the sector. Respondents from formal dwellings are more likely to have higher scores than those from informal dwellings. And there is a clear provincial edge, with the Eastern Cape lagging some way behind others and a fairly clear link between provincial poverty and QoL.

71. Seen from another angle, the Eastern Cape outstrips all other provinces in the 'global' category, which measures alienation, anomie and general satisfaction with life. This compounds findings from other surveys, that suggest social capital in the Eastern Cape to be extremely resilient.[12] Run your eye across the row for Eastern Cape respondents and see how low scores are for most other areas, apart from 'global' and 'community' (where Eastern Cape sits somewhere in the middle).

72. Respondents who have had no water/sanitation delivery score lower than those with either water or sanitation, and those with combined water/sanitation score highest of all. The integrated delivery approach seems to have the most positive reactions from respondents, whether measured here or in other questions. The fact that poverty and poor QoL persist after the sector has worked in areas reflects *inter alia* the uneven coverage in those areas.

73. Earlier we saw that unemployment was lower in areas sampled for the survey than the average for the poorest urban or rural nodes in the country. This is again reflected in the QoL index, where the economic score was highest among those with combined water/sanitation or water only delivery.

74. Finally, the fact that there is a 7% gap between the overall QoL of those with no sector delivery and those whose communities did receive water or sanitation or both, strongly suggests that the sector plays a key role in improving quality of life where it delivers services to poor communities.

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[12] See Everatt D., Adam Habib, Brij Maharaj, Annsilla Nyar (2005) 'Patterns of giving in South Africa' in *Violuntas: International journal of voluntary and nonprofit organisations* Vol. 16, No.3.

DWAF beneficiary survey	Global	Family	Community	Health	Housing	Infrastructure	Economic	Overall QoL index
Total sample	0.54	0.72	0.59	0.53	0.70	0.45	0.35	0.55
Free State	0.59	0.78	0.60	0.61	0.73	0.90	0.33	0.65
Mpumalanga	0.58	0.72	0.51	0.56	0.78	0.62	0.34	0.59
KwaZulu-Natal	0.51	0.78	0.65	0.55	0.67	0.33	0.41	0.56
Limpopo	0.49	0.62	0.54	0.53	0.72	0.48	0.28	0.52
Eastern Cape	0.60	0.64	0.55	0.32	0.64	0.31	0.26	0.47
Urban	0.59	0.76	0.56	0.59	0.77	0.73	0.32	0.61
Rural	0.52	0.72	0.60	0.51	0.68	0.36	0.36	0.54
Metro*	0.42	0.63	0.53	0.47	0.66	0.63	0.29	0.52
Formal	0.60	0.76	0.56	0.56	0.81	0.80	0.35	0.63
Informal	0.52	0.71	0.56	0.57	0.68	0.61	0.29	0.56
Both	0.56	0.76	0.60	0.58	0.75	0.56	0.37	0.60
Water project	0.54	0.72	0.59	0.51	0.68	0.42	0.36	0.55
Sanitation project	0.50	0.74	0.59	0.54	0.68	0.46	0.35	0.55
None/DK	0.51	0.69	0.59	0.49	0.70	0.44	0.30	0.53

Table 6: Quality of Life indicator scores (all respondents)
(* = small sample: 45 respondents)

MSB achievements in the eyes of WSAs

75. We are almost at the end of the benchmarking section, and we now turn to the way in which WSA and PMU Managers scored MSB on key performance areas. To measure this, we read out a list of 11 KPIs and said: 'Thinking about what Masibambane has achieved, and what it has not achieved, please rate its performance as excellent, good, OK, poor or terrible in the following key areas.' For ease of reading, we have collapsed the two positive into one positive category, and done the same with the negatives (to give us 'good', 'OK' and 'bad').

76. Overall, PMU Managers are more positive than WSA Managers in their rating of MSB, with barely any of the 72 PMU Managers we surveyed straying into negative territory. And even though WSA Managers are more likely to be critical, this remains limited, and only reaches double figures in one instance (regarding effective O&M of all schemes, significantly). So overall there is a very positive regard for MSB and what it has achieved, a highly satisfactory overall result.

77. Let's first look at the areas where MSB received the best ratings. For PMU Managers, MSB's best performance lay in providing an enabling policy and legislative context (73%); ensuring efficient and effective water use (72%); and supporting water service institutions to do their work (69%). These cover the key aspects of MSB I and II and form a resoundingly positive result for the programme, from a key audience.

78. For WSA Managers, MSB performed best in the areas of ensuring efficient and effective water use (63%), ensuring access for all to functioning basic sanitation (61%), and ensuring effective O&M of all schemes (58%). But these are majority views, not unanimous views: 10% of WSA Managers rated MSB's performance as poor in the latter area, for example; as did 3% of PMU Managers (a small figure, but the most negatively rated item according to PMU Managers).

79. The positive views on providing access to sanitation is somewhat surprising, given what we have already seen about the sanitation backlogs, especially in rural areas. Staying with the somewhat unexpected, the area which was least praised by both sets of respondents – many of whom preferred the 'OK' options - was 'to ensure that all people in South Africa have access to a functioning basic water supply facility', an area where performance is somewhat better than sanitation, for example.

80. Seen from the negative side, PMU Managers were most likely (in very small numbers) to cite effective O&M, ensuring FBS is implemented by all WSAs, and supporting the transfer of schemes from DWAF to the local sphere. WSA Managers also criticised O&M, as we saw; and they were also likely to criticise MSB for free basic sanitation (again an area where other WSA Managers were praiseworthy) and the promotion of safe sanitation.

81. The issue is dealt with in detail elsewhere in the report, but is worth emphasising here, namely operations and maintenance is the most criticised area by both PMU and WSA Managers.

	WSA Managers				PMU Managers		
	Good	**OK**	**Bad**		**Good**	**OK**	**Bad**
To ensure effective and efficient use of water	63	12	5		72	28	-
To ensure that all people in South Africa have access to a functioning basic water supply facility	40	35	6		59	42	-
To ensure that all people in South Africa have access to a functioning basic sanitation facility	61	12	8		60	40	-
To ensure that the free basic water and free basic sanitation policy are implemented by all water services authorities	50	22	7		66	33	1
To promote sanitation practices and safe sanitation	54	18	8		67	33	-
To ensure the Water Services Sector has a sound and enabling legislative and policy framework	54	19	6		73	28	-
To ensure performance and compliance via appropriate regulations and interventions	54	19	6		67	33	-
To ensure the effective operations and management of all schemes	58	13	10		60	38	3
To support the transfer of DWAF water sector schemes	47	19	7		62	38	1
To support Water Services Institutions to fulfil their respective functions and become sustainable	56	19	5		69	31	-
To ensure institutional reform for the water sector	54	16	7		68	32	-

Table 7: 'Thinking about what Masibambane has achieved, and what it has not achieved, please rate its performance' (WSA and PMU Managers)

Towards MSB III: What do WSAs want?

82. We end this section by analysing the way WSAs rate DWAF, as sector leader; and what they want from DWAF in future. We asked 'What is the **one main thing** DWAF must improve to better serve your WSA?'

83. As an open-ended question, to which respondents could give any answer they wish, we ended up with a wide range of fairly specific comments, which we have grouped into broad categories. Typically, about 1 in 10 respondents had nothing to say. Another small group simply said 'carry on with what you're doing'. One at least complained that engineers should not be asked 'social questions', a perspective we should perhaps not comment upon.

84. Turning to more specific issues, these included the fairly predictable requests for resources which ranged from funds to vehicles to bursaries to study engineering to 'management' helping more with resource management. A fair number raised administrative issues, including the need for 'quality statistics', for generally better administration, MSB to provide better support, for more effective meetings, for monthly meetings with staff, and for DWAF 'to meet their deadlines' and to ensure that capacity building plans are implemented on time. Others called for DWAF to help improve communication between WSAs and MIG, an issue deserving more attention.

85. Some also talked of more open lines of communication, or for DWAF to participate in the municipal forum, or generally improve access.

86. Others called for more capacity or for capacity building, including general capacity support, infrastructure-related skills, technical skills and technical training, and (unspecified) equipment; and (optimistically) for DWAF to increase their staff complement.

87. Others raised more technical issues, including:
    - Helping with bulk water supply
    - Helping with ground water supply
    - Helping with backlog eradication
    - Help ensure water quality improves
    - Help speed up project registration
    - Assist with sanitation awareness campaigns
    - 2 respondents asked DWAF to help find new water resources
    - 1 respondent asked for more input on environmental matters.

88. Many of these are being dealt with, which is a positive finding. But some point to the need for a more holistic approach that includes as equals the full spectrum from water resource to services, a key background theme to the evaluation.

89. Interestingly, PMU Managers had almost identical answers. Some variations that did emerge included the need for DWAF to be more familiar with technical issues, more GIS support, to revise unit costs and – importantly – to ensure that monies given to municipalities are spent appropriately.

90. Finally, we asked a slightly different question, namely what did WSA and PMU Managers want from the imminent MSB III – but answers were virtually identical to what respondents wanted from DWAF as a department. There were requests for financial support – from about a third of respondents – while 2 respondents asked for helping in co-ordinating with donors. O&M was again stressed. Other requests re-appeared, such as better communication and so on.

91. However, the dominant category of what WSA Managers want from MSB III is infrastructure. These requests included more community-level projects, addressing backlogs, rural project delivery, bucket system eradication and improving the life of the poor through implementation.

92. The same is true among PMU Managers. They too repeated some of what they want from DWAF – financial support, better communication, better information about MSB I and II, notably – but then also stressed projects, delivery, infrastructure, refurbishment and the like.

93. There is a strong sense from respondents that in their view, the infrastructure delivery work of MSB I and II is far from complete, and must remain central to MSB III. This is not self-evident in the 'water for growth and development' theme proposed for MSB III, and DWAF needs to undertake rigorous consultations with all partners to ensure that MSB III addresses their concerns, and that they appreciate the nuances of the third phase of the programme.

It is important that the 'water for growth and development' theme is developed in close collaboration with WSAs and WSPs. (A CSO representative at the Western Cape quarterly sector meeting asked, appropriately, if the theme should not be re-phrased as 'Water and sanitation for sustainable growth and sustainable development').[13] Civil society and other stakeholders also need to be brought on board now, as the programme is being fleshed out, not after the fact.

Conclusion

94. Overall, MSB II emerges from the internal and external benchmarking analysis as a robust programme, targeting very poor communities, providing services that have psycho-social and particularly socio-economic impacts, and well-regarded by WSA and PMU Managers. Integrated WS provision is clearly a critical issue to take up in MSB III, given its very clearly positive impacts. On the negative side, sanitation is clearly a major challenge, and so is coverage which seems some way from universal in communities we sampled. In particular, operations and management – the cornerstone of sustainability – are widely seen as weak points. There is also a clear need for a holistic approach that draws together resources and services equally.

95. Overall, the benchmarking finds many highly satisfactory issues, but the O&M and sustainability-linked concerns are extremely important, and the programme is rated 'satisfactory'.

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[13] Justin Cartright at WC quarterly meeting, June 2007.

Water and sanitation services

96. This chapter reviews a range of issues, including:

    - Are projects in line with municipal and community priorities?
    - The quality of end-products
    - Operation and maintenance
    - Water and sanitation backlog reduction
    - Choice of technology
    - The effectiveness of MIG
    - Project costs and sector norms
    - Health and hygiene
    - Accountability of service providers

97. Every one of these items is critical from the perspective of sustainable service delivery in the water and sanitation sector, and deserving of detailed individual treatment in its own right, but we shall attempt to balance reporting across the various areas.

98. One point that should be made up front, since it infuses much of the following discussion and resultant recommendations, is the generalised observation that government – in its totality – has focused enormous energy and resources on delivery since 1994, whether water and sanitation, or education, or roads, and so on. But far less attention has been paid to operation and maintenance; and budget allocations tend to follow suit, with large allocations for 'sexy' delivery programmes and far less for the routine on-going maintenance of those items post-delivery. This has been highlighted in evaluations and reports across all sectors that are commonly grouped as 'development' – but the problem remains, and is becoming increasingly acute as infrastructure provided by the democratic state itself begins to require maintenance, let alone older infrastructure provided pre-1994. Ordinary citizens as well as politicians are aware of the fact that people who have already been served are now "re-joining the queue" as their service needs re-emerge following on poor or non-existent maintenance.[14]

99. As DWAF moves – more or less reluctantly, depending on who one talks to – out of implementation and into regulation, its key role as identified in legislation and the sector strategic framework, so monitoring - of the quality of products and the on-going viability and utility of services - will increasingly be its core business. As we note later (see the section dealing specifically with M&E), MIG monitoring focuses on expenditure, coupled with implementation-phase monitoring (e.g. number of days of employment for women, youth, people with disabilities, etc.) – but MIG does not monitor the quality of assets provided, nor do they monitor maintenance of assets. Moreover, as our survey of beneficiaries discovered, sector projects included in the MIG database as 'complete' have in fact not even started construction yet, underscoring the fact that DWAF needs to support its own M&E unit and ensure quality across all its assets. This is a critical space for DWAF to act and to support action from WSAs.

100. Of course sustainability and the community-based maintenance of assets is far easier to achieve when services provided match community priorities, and we now turn our attention to this issue.

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[14] Comment made by a member of the council's water sub-committee of the Sisonke Municipality, KwaZulu-Natal

Are projects in line with municipal and community priorities?

101. We approached this issue from two main angles, namely by asking PMU managers how they ensure that projects are in line with community priorities, and then, in our survey of communities where completed sector projects with direct beneficiaries have been provided, asking community members if they were consulted about projects that were delivered, as well as how well the sector projects meet their community needs.

Figure 8: Ensuring alignment with community needs (PMU managers)

102. The answers of PMU managers are particularly important. In the MSB II mid-term review, it was noted that "a less than optimal alignment exists" between local Integrated Development Plans (IDP), a legally-created mechanism for seeking to ensure demand-driven development, and water service planning and delivery.[15] But when asked how they ensure that sector projects elide with community needs, three-quarters (72%) of PMU managers said they turn to the IDP to ensure that such alignment exists. Another 17% - especially in local municipalities – hold community meetings for the purpose. Ideally, these should not be 'either/or' choices – community meetings are important for reaching people that may not have participated in IDP meetings, but given the legal and developmental significance of IDPs, they must be consulted to ensure alignment between need and provision. One in ten continue to 'consult officials' – again, most common in local municipalities, and a practice that should systematically be rooted out. Overall, however, this is a highly satisfactory finding.

103. Let us now look at the way in which individuals respond to the issue, drawn from communities where sector infrastructure has been provided since 1994. We asked a 3-way question, probing whether provision had been a response to community identified needs, local leader inputs, or without any consultation whatsoever.

104. Whether communities received water, sanitation or both, in no instance do half of respondents recall their community being consulted about provision. This lack of consultation is most marked where sanitation projects are concerned: 36% of respondents told us that no-one was consulted, and provision was decreed by government. Water and

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[15] Department of Water Affairs & Forestry (November 2005): 'Mid-term review of Masibambane II programme', p.4.

sanitation combined projects fared somewhat better, with around a fifth of respondents saying no consultation had occurred prior to delivery.

105. It is a basic tenet of development that participation of communities has a major influence on their sense of ownership and resultant operation and maintenance of assets; it is critical that consultation become the norm for all delivery, especially where the state has put in place such an elaborate set of rules and instruments (from IDPs upwards). This must be closely monitored by DWAF; implemented or managed by WSAs; and is a role that could be filled by CSOs.

Figure 9: Consultation

106. We went on to ask in more detail about who precisely had decided what kind of project was implemented in communities we sampled. This turned out to be local leaders and local government, followed by community leaders and the community itself.

107. Some may retort that what matters is that people receive services, not whether or not they are consulted. This is understandable – but developmentally deeply flawed. We asked respondents how well, if at all, the sector project meets their needs.

Figure 10: How well does the project meet your community needs?

108. The results in Figure 10 are a long way from a ringing endorsement of the value of the project as seen by those who it is meant to benefit, who will use it and who need to maintain it over time. Only in the case of combined water/sanitation projects do over half of respondents feel the project met community needs well (and then the figure reaches 51%), and there is a consistently large grouping who feel the opposite, hovering around a third of respondents.

109. Perhaps this is why just a third (36%) of respondents felt that the project benefited the community as a whole, while 50% told us it benefited only some; but that may reflect the nature of water and sanitation projects provided to RDP standard, which tend to be constructed in phases. Perhaps more worrying from the perspective of on-going ownership and maintenance (O&M) is the fact that just a quarter of respondents (25%) were told during construction who would own the project after completion. Interestingly, more people were told in rural (29%) than metropolitan (7%) or urban (16%) areas, suggesting that better developmental practice – or greater community cohesion – occurs in rural areas.

110. The danger of not telling people the rules of the game is self-evident: elite capture is one predictable outcome, as is a low level of 'ownership' and concomitant lack of interest in O&M. As it is, one in seven (14%) respondents told us that the project could have benefited everyone "but some people have taken over the project for themselves". And in the absence of rigorous community-based monitoring, this situation will persist and expand.

111. Putting the two sides together, we hope that as more WSA officials consult IDPs before deciding on what to implement, alignment of need and provision will edge closer. However, DWAF as sector leader and sector regulator needs to ensure that it occurs. The best means of doing so may vary by province or WSA, depending on local institutional arrangements and M&E capacity; what is clear is that DWAF must ensure that consultation is a prerequisite of all implementation where projects with direct benefits to individuals is concerned. Consultation is not an 'extra' or luxury: it is the cornerstone of the developmental model that has taken shape over the last 13 years and must be embedded in all development work.

The quality of end-products

112. Within the MIG project implementation system, responsibility for quality control of water supply and sanitation projects is delegated to the MIG project management units (PMU) in the municipal sphere. The national MIG office sees quality control as the responsibility of DWAF and municipalities.[16]

113. DWAF's role in ensuring quality is limited to the setting of design standards and guidelines and the scrutiny of project technical reports during the preliminary design phase. All technical reports must have DWAF approval prior to the project being implemented. The DWAF regional offices perform this function with support from head office, except for the Western Cape and Free State provinces where DWAF head office has that responsibility.

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[16] Interviews with MIG officials.

114. The national MIG office does not track the projects after completion of construction, but do evaluations of operational projects from time to time. No evaluation has been done since the MIG started in 2004 but an evaluation is planned for later in 2007.

115. Municipalities end up with the full burden of quality control but often lack the capacity to enforce quality. As a result this responsibility is delegated to consultants with variable results.

116. The mid term review argued that "provision of O&M has a direct bearing on the quality of the end product delivered by municipalities" and went on to point out that the product is not the tap or toilet structure but the entire service, including the removal or conveyance of waste in the case of sanitation.[17] Quality of end products and O&M are closely linked in many ways. Badly designed and badly constructed projects are always more of difficult to operate and maintain, increasing the O&M burden and leading to a higher probability of infrastructure failure. On the other hand, even infrastructure that is well designed and constructed will deteriorate rapidly if it is not correctly operated and adequately maintained. Finally, the quality of water and sanitation **services** delivered (the municipalities "end product") is obviously compromised by inadequate O&M.

117. The question of the quality of end products was approached in the following ways:
   a) From the PMU managers perspective as the project implementation manager

b) From the Water Services Manager as the person who has to keep the infrastructure working
c) From the beneficiaries' or customers' perspectives
d) Observations of quality on project site visits

118. Most PMU managers (79%) and WSA managers (76%) contacted in the telephonic interviews were satisfied with the quality of the projects implemented in the last 3 years. The quality of water projects was seen as slightly better than the quality of sanitation projects. Of concern is that 21% of respondents said the quality of completed projects was not of an acceptable standard.

Figure 11: Municipal confidence in the quality of completed projects being to an acceptable standard

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[17] DWAF (November 2005): 'Mid-term review of Masibambane II programme', p.126.

The good, the bad and the ugly

119. In OR Tambo District Municipality (ORTDM) the PMU manager was concerned about the quality of product and felt that there was no sense of urgency from consultants and contractors, particularly contractors. Furthermore there was a concern that the ORTDM does not have the skills to effectively check designs and this leaves the door open for consultants to "cut corners".

120. Budget overruns seem to be widespread (if not universal), project scope is often poorly defined and many changes have to be accommodated. Quality is checked by the internal staff but in effect they rely mostly on the project consultants to do this. Quality assessment is thus in a limbo, a deeply worrying – and unsustainable – situation.

121. In Chris Hani District Municipality (CHDM) the technical manager reported similar experiences.

- Some poor quality projects had been built and this is largely due to inexperience on the part of the CHDM project managers

- Less than 10% of the projects have quality problems

Figure 12: PMU managers' assessment of the level of completion of projects implemented in the last 3 years.

- There is no in house quality system and consultants are relied on for quality control

- There are some instances of non-operational projects due to poor design by inexperienced consultants

122.	All the municipalities visited identified their capacity to project manage consultants and contractors as a critical factor in ensuring quality. The sector needs to support municipalities to develop the capacity of municipal PMUs and have an effective system of monitoring quality that is continuous from implementation to operation.

Figure 13: Project beneficiaries perception of the work done by contractors on infrastructure projects.

123.	Project beneficiaries also had mixed feelings about the quality of the work performed. Less than a third of respondents believed that the contractors had done a good job. Twenty one percent (21%) of

beneficiaries reported that the project stopped early and only 72% reported that the project had been completed.

124.	We saw earlier than aside from the small number of respondents who received combined water and sanitation services, less than half of respondents were happy with the water or the sanitation services provided to their communities.

125.	Some may respond that beneficiaries are perhaps not the best judge of technical appropriateness, but taken with the views of PMU and WSA Managers and the findings of the qualitative case studies done for this evaluation, these are quite shocking findings. There seems to be a headlong rush to deliver, at the expense (even if unintentionally) of quality and sustainability.

126.	Was the project the best solution? Almost three-quarters of beneficiaries (70%) said yes it was the best technical solution for their community, higher in urban (75%) and rural (71%) areas but markedly less so in metropolitan areas (44%).

127.	But the positive responses drop when asked if the scheme provided by the sector continues to work well. Just 54% of respondents said that the scheme delivered to their community continues to work well, 43% replied with a definite 'no' while the remaining 3% were unsure. Fully 70% of metropolitan respondents said their scheme no longer worked well, true of 45% of rural respondents (just 28% of urban respondents said the same). If operations and – crucially – maintenance are in such a parlous state, the massive gains of the sector will be thrown into disarray and their sustainability deeply questionable. The importance of DWAF playing its regulatory – and quality assurance and on-going monitoring – roles, cannot be more clearly nor urgently demonstrated.

Figure 14: Main source of water supply for surveyed households in communities that had received a water supply project.

128. Beneficiaries were asked what is their main source of water. Taking only those that had benefited from a water supply project, 15% were not using the formal piped water supply as their main source. Again taking only water project beneficiaries, 16% of households are having to walk more than 200m to fetch water. This is occurring in communities that have benefited from sector delivery.

Figure 15: Distance to water source for surveyed households in communities that had received a water supply project.

129. The same question was asked about the type of sanitation the family mainly used. Taking only those who had benefited form a sanitation project, more than 50% of households mainly use unventilated pit toilets or other latrines that are basic minimum service level. Four percent (4%) do not use a latrine.

Figure 16: Main sanitation facility used by households in communities that had received a sanitation project.

130. If this evaluation has one overriding message, it is that operation and maintenance have to take centre stage immediately, or the gains of the sector will become losses. Delivery of infrastructure has been signally impressive – but gains must be consolidated to ensure they remain as gains.

Operation and maintenance

131. While much of the focus since 1994 has been on eradicating the water and sanitation backlogs, Water Services Authorities are keenly aware that the operation and maintenance of the new infrastructure is no mean task. When asked whether those previously served would in the future be rejoining the backlog queue, 77 WSA managers answered as follows:

- 51% said that not only would this be happening, but it was already happening
- 65% said that this would happen in the future

132. In spite of these sobering numbers, 65% of these WSA managers believed they would be able to build up their human and financial resources to keep all their infrastructure in good working order (another 26% were less optimistic).

133. Asked what the main challenge facing their WSA was, 90% of the 77 respondents replied that it was either human resources and skills, finances, or a combination of these two. 62% of the managers felt that not enough was budgeted by their municipalities for operation and maintenance.

134. In a regional survey conducted amongst attendees at the KZN quarterly Masibambane meeting in May 2007, as part of this evaluation, the delegates from seven of the nine WSAs represented identified with the statement "Our organization does not budget enough funds for the operation and maintenance of water infrastructure, and this seriously threatens its sustainability." The two WSAs which indicated otherwise were Ugu (South Coast) and the eThekwini Metro.

135. At the KZN Masibambane meeting the only WSA which could answer in the affirmative to having a policy and a budget for the emptying of pit latrines was the eThekwini Metro. In response to the national survey, however, 51% of PMU Managers (as opposed to the WSA Managers) answered that their municipalities did have a budget for the emptying of

pit latrines when full. But PMU managers are typically not involved in operations and maintenance, so this figure may be misleading.

In Mpumalanga the growth in water demand has been so high that the pump stations and water treatment plants in some districts are not able to keep up. In 2005 the Water Services Manager for the Mbombela Municipality (Nelspruit) wrote in an internal report:
Most people in Nsikazi do not receive water in an equitable manner notwithstanding the fact the sufficient bulk water is supplied by DWAF. In Nsikazi South the supply is 171 litres/person/day and in Nsikazi North the supply is 69 litres/person/day.
In practice some people only receive water once a week and in some areas networks are dry. The program to open and close reservoirs has been altered recently and now people residing far from sources also receive some water.
Teams have repaired all leaks on the municipal networks and will continue these actions.
The main reasons for losses are:
   a) illegal connections (leaking and poor quality)
   b) wastage
   c) no respect for municipal infrastructure (damage Jo-Jo tanks, steal taps, etc)
   d) no payment for services
   e) Eskom interruptions
   f) Car washes, brick works and other businesses

Two years later the same manager reported that his municipality was supplying 75 Megalitres per day into an area with a population of 600 000, an average of 125 litres per person per day. Supply continuity had improved but was still a battle. The Nkomazi Municipality, also in Mpumalanga, has similar problems.

User perceptions of water services

136.   The beneficiary survey reflects not what PMU, WSA or DWAF managers, think, but what was found on the ground. A much debated topic is how much water people need to maintain health. Question 20 of the survey asked how much water each family used every day. Figure 17 shows the levels of consumption of those who draw water from a communal tap vs. those who still rely on a "below RDP" level of service (i.e. stream, spring, hand-pump, tanker etc).

137.   The perhaps unexpected result shown below is that having access to a communal tap does not increase a family's water consumption compared with a family who draw water from a spring, stream or hand-pump (if anything the results indicate the opposite). The sample size for the former was 367, and for the latter was 210. The balance of the interview sample (448) have water on site (yard taps or internal plumbing) and were not asked about what their water consumption.

138.   Of the 367 respondents who are served by communal taps, only 10 (3%) reported that they pay for their water, so the comparison in the next graphic is not affected by the affordability of the water. When asked if the water used from the source included water for washing clothes, the percentage for both RDP and below RDP was similar (82% and 83% respectively).

Figure 17: Comparison of water consumption levels of those with "RDP level" of service (i.e. communal taps) with those with "Below RDP" level of service (stream, hand-pump etc).

139.   The comparison of consumption has been repeated in the next graph for those who reported that their level of water service has improved since 1994 with those who felt it was the same or worse. The sample sizes for the three categories are 258 for better, 220 for same and 95 for worse. [Note that this breakdown excludes the 448 respondents who have water on site]. There are differences between the three categories at the margins, but the overall pattern of consumption is not much changed.

Figure 18: Comparison of water consumption (those with RDP level of service or below only) between those who rate their level of service better, same or worse since 1994.

140.   If upgrading the level of service to the RDP standard of a public standpipe does not significantly affect consumption, why then do respondents rate their level of service as having improved?

141.   Respondents were asked how long it takes them to collect water, and here the difference between those who rated their service as improved and those who did not is marked, as shown below. Those who felt their water service had improved generally spent significantly less time collecting water than those who did not. Note that this comparison only applies to those who do not have an on-site water supply (i.e. 56% of the overall sample); we can safely assume the differences would be even more marked were they included.

Figure 19: Comparison of time taken to collect water (those with RDP level of service or below only) between those who rate their level of service better, same or worse since 1994.

142. Those who have an on-site level of water supply were more likely to rate their level of service as having improved than those with a communal tap or those at below RDP level of service, as can be seen. While 71% of those with on-site water felt that their level of service had improved, only 56% of those with a communal tap felt the same way. Those with a below RDP level of service were evenly balanced between those who felt the service had improved (26%), stayed the same (50%) or worsened (24%).

Figure 20: Perception of improvement in water supply relative to level of service.

143. Project beneficiaries were asked a number of questions about the quality of their water supplies. The results are tabulated below according to whether there had been a water project in the area or not. Of the 1025 people surveyed, 75% indicated that there had been a water project in their area, while 20% indicated that there had not been (and a further 5% did not know). In order to derive the figures in the tables below, the 5% who did not know if there had been a water project in their area have been grouped with the 20% who knew that there had not been one.

144. The questions asked were:
- Is the water clean?
- How does the water taste?

- How does the water smell?
- Does the water stain white clothes?
- Do you get enough water?

Table 8: Would you say that the water you get is clean?

	No water project or did not know	Of respondents who confirmed there had been a water project
Always	45%	62%
Most of the time	18%	24%
Some of the time	19%	11%
Never	18%	3%

Table 9: How does the water taste?

	No water project or did not know	Of respondents who confirmed there had been a water project
Very good	29%	36%
Good	28%	41%
OK	23%	14%
Bad	14%	9%
Very bad	7%	2%

Table 10: How does the water smell?

	No water project or did not know	Of respondents who confirmed there had been a water project
Good	38%	50%
OK	42%	43%
Bad	20%	7%

Table 11: When you wash white clothes in this water, does the water stain?

	No water project or did not know	Of respondents who confirmed there had been a water project
Yes, badly	19%	6%
Yes, a little bit	22%	13%
Not at all	59%	81%

Table 12: Do you get enough water to meet your needs?

	No water project or did not know	Of respondents who confirmed there had been a water project
Yes	52%	70%
No	48%	30%

145.   When the question "Do you get enough water to meet your needs?" is analysed according to level of service the differences between the respondents are quite marked. Those with on-site water are mostly quite satisfied, while those without even the RDP level are quite sure they do not get enough water.

Table 13: Do you get enough water to meet your needs?

	On-site water	Communal tap	Hand pump, stream etc
Yes	84%	63%	28%
No	15%	35%	71.5%
Don't know	1%	2%	0.5%

146. Although 72% of those without access to at least a communal tap believe they do not get enough water, the graph above shows that those with access to an RDP level of service (i.e. a communal tap less than 200 meters away) do not use more water than those without.

147. When asked whether their water scheme worked well, only 54% of those who have had a water scheme implemented in their area said "Yes". The more significant problems mentioned which caused water schemes to be rated as not working well included:
    - Not enough water   14.0%
    - Water cut off   12.1%
    - Incomplete   10.0%
    - Leaking taps and pipes   9.0%
    - Unfulfilled promises   5.4%
    - Long queues   4.6%

148. When asked whether they thought that all in the community had benefited from the project, or only some, respondents (in areas which had had water projects), answered as follows:
    - All have benefited   37%
    - Some have benefited, but not all   49%
    - The project was taken over by a small group 14%

149. A little less than half of all respondents were aware of who owns and runs their water project. The rating of the operation of the water schemes was, however, quite positive, with 77% of respondents being happy with their scheme's management. This is a better rating than might have been expected given earlier comments.

Figure 21: Degree of satisfaction with sanitation relative to level of service

150. When asked whether their **sanitation** had improved since 1994, the respondents with flush toilets were clearly the most satisfied, but those with lower levels of service (VIPs, VIDPs and Urine Diversion toilets were more satisfied than those without. The graphic shows the differences.

151. Of the 1025 respondents, 28% indicated that their area had seen the implementation of a sanitation project. The graphic below shows the types of toilets encountered amongst the survey sample.

Figure 22: Distribution of sanitation types amongst survey sample.

152. The respondents were then asked a number of questions related to their sanitation service and their sanitation practices. In answer to the question, 'Who in your household uses the toilet?', the following answers were given:

Above: hand washing bottle with spring loaded shut off.
Right: detail of water bottle and soap holder

Table 14: Does everyone in the household use your toilet?

	Yes
Flush toilets	100%
VIPs, VIDPs, UDs	89%
Unimproved Pits	82%

153. When asked whether anyone inspects the toilets, 85% of all the respondents said that no-one did. A further 4% said the municipality did, and 4% said a private company did. When this result is filtered for the 286 respondents who confirmed that there had been a sanitation project in their area, the percentage who stated that no-one inspects the toilets dropped to 79%. This and other sanitation maintenance related issues are shown in the table below.

154. While there should be ongoing inspections of sanitation facilities as part of health and hygiene behavioural change programmes, the repair and maintenance of private sanitation facilities is the homeowner's responsibility, unless there has been defective design or construction on the part of the municipality's sanitation team.

155. Of greater concern is the 79% of those who have had sanitation projects who answered that no-one empties pits and septic tanks. This is a function which presumably should fall within the definition of "free basic sanitation".

Table 15: Questions related to toilet maintenance

	% who answered **"No-one"** from full sample	% who answered **"No-one"** from only those where there has been a sanitation project
Who inspects toilets?	85%	79%
Who takes care of toilets?	82%	76%
Who repairs broken toilets?	80%	73%
Who empties pits when full?	82%	79%

156. The interviewers were asked to observe the quality of the latrines and the standard of hygiene practice at each of the respondent's homes. The tables below show how the results differed between those who had a VIP versus those who had an unimproved pit latrine. While the results show that the standard of sanitation is improved for those who have had a sanitation project, the differences are not as marked as one might hope.

157. Table 20, in particular, shows that there is no difference in the likelihood that there will be a convenient hand-washing facility at an improved sanitation facility relative to an unimproved facility (although in case of the former only 81% of the sample had an improved water supply, and for the latter 94% had an improved supply).

Table 16: Does the toilet smell?

	Those with a VIP (RDP basic level of service)	Those with an unimproved pit latrine
No. Not bad	40%	26%
Yes. A little	37%	31%
Yes. A lot	21%	36%
Yes. Terrible	1%	7%

Table 17: Are there flies in the toilet?

	Those with a VIP (RDP basic level of service)	Those with an unimproved pit latrine
No	34%	20%
Yes. A few	54%	51%
Yes. A lot	13%	29%

Table 18: Is the door kept closed?

	Those with a VIP (RDP basic level of service)	Those with an unimproved pit latrine
Yes	81%	72%
No	19%	28%

Table 19: Cleanliness of toilet

	Those with a VIP (RDP basic level of service)	Those with an unimproved pit latrine
Very clean	17%	10%
OK	64%	56%
Not clean	20%	34%

(This question related to the toilet pedestal itself. Another question related to the whole room yielded very similar results.)

Table 20: Is there somewhere at or next to the toilet where hands can be washed?

	Those with a VIP (RDP basic level of service) of which 81% also had an improved water supply	Those with an unimproved pit latrine (of which 94% had an improved water supply)
Yes	17%	18%
No	83%	82%

158. Of those who did have a hand-washing facility near their toilets, only half had soap, whether there had been a sanitation project in the area or not.

Figure 23: Level of hygiene training received by respondents

159. Sanitation delivery is not just about managing toilet construction programmes. The health benefit of improved sanitation will only be realised with improved sanitation behaviour. This requires training, before, during and after implementation. Most of the respondents indicated that they had received no such training, as shown.

Conclusion

160. There is a danger that in the drive to meet the political imperative to provide water and sanitation to all, the quality and quantity of operation

and maintenance provided will suffer. There must be commitment to providing high quality management of water and sanitation services, or those who have been served will before long rejoin the backlog queue.

During the first quarter of 2007, the CSIR, on behalf of DWAF, conducted a major audit of water and sanitation projects as part of DWAF's thrust to get effective monitoring, evaluation and reporting systems in place. The audit, or "spot-check" as it was called, was based on the 2410 projects in the MIG database which were then listed as having moved past planning. Of those 2410, only 41% had actually been completed, and the spot-check sample of 248 projects matched this percentage.

The report showed that compliance with DWAF standards for the completed projects was on average about 80%. Although this was not as high as the 95% target which DWAF has set for the definition of compliancy, it is not bad. The exercise did highlight a few problem areas that clearly require attention, including
- Pumps not operational (21% of electrical pumps, 57% of diesel pumps checked were without fuel)
- Length of time to repair breakdowns (9% took more than a month to repair)
- Taps not working (17% of street taps and 13% of yard taps)
- Standing water and mud around taps (38% of street taps and 14% of yard taps)
- Yard taps without meters (23%) or with broken meters (17%)
- Poorly maintained and managed oxidation ponds (71%)
- Poorly maintained and managed biofilters (40%)
- Problems with toilet doors (10% do not close, and 18% have no latch on the inside)
- Poorly designed or built toilet ventpipes (28%)
- Flush toilets without cisterns (23%) or pedestals (18%)
- No hand-washing facility near toilet (61%)

While the issues highlighted above clearly give cause for concern, the point is not that problems were found. The point is that DWAF is starting to take seriously its mandate to regulate the quality of water services provision, and as it does so that quality will no doubt improve.

161. O&M is not the responsibility of DWAF, but that of those who own the infrastructure, i.e. municipalities, the Department of Education and the Department of Health. Exercises such as the CSIR's spot check audit conducted in early 2007 indicate that O&M is not being carried out as well as it should be, although it is a healthy sign that the audit was conducted at all. It is believed that only once DWAF fully makes the transition from programme implementer (its old role) to that of sector regulator (its core function), will the responsible departments begin to take their ownership responsibilities seriously. Developments such as the establishment of DWAF's Regulatory Performance Management System are very positive signs that DWAF is on the right track.

162. On the basis of the results of this evaluation study, the current standard of operation and maintenance is less than satisfactory.

Water & Sanitation backlog reduction

163. In 2003 South Africa set itself 19 targets for the water sector as part of its Strategic Framework for Water Services. Of these 19 targets, the first five are set out below.

Table 21: The first five sector goals

1	All people in South Africa have access to a functioning basic water supply facility by 2008.
2	All people in South Africa have access to a functioning basic sanitation facility by 2010.
3	All schools have adequate and safe water supply and sanitation services by 2005.
4	All clinics have adequate and safe water supply and sanitation services by 2007.
5	All bucket toilets are eradicated by 2006.

164. The 19 targets including these five are included as part of the performance monitoring framework for the Masibambane programme. It is therefore of relevance to review progress against these goals during the period of the contract.

Target 1: The eradication of the water supply backlog

165. The Consolidated Water Sector Report for the Fourth Quarter of 2006/2007, prepared by DWAF's M&E unit, reports that during the period 2004 to 2007 the following numbers of people have been provided with water at the RDP level of service, or higher:

Table 22: Water delivery as per DWAF 4th Quarter 2007 report

Period	2004/2005	2005/2006	2006/2207
Number of people served	2,271,939	1,778,823	2,339,200

166. In this report the *fourth* quarter figures from the **dplg**'s MIG programme are as yet unavailable, which implies that the number of people served in 2006/2007 will be even higher. The total served for the three years together is 6 389 962, which is a significant and highly satisfactory achievement.

167. However, the figures obtained from the MIG database do need to be used with caution. When asked from where they obtain their backlog information, 63% of Water Services Authority managers indicated that they use either their own records or their backlog study. Only 8% said they used the MIG records, and 16% said they used the DWAF records.

Figure 24: From where do WSA Managers get their backlog information?

168. These WSA managers were also asked how far their municipality was in terms of eliminating their backlog and how long it would take their WSA to eliminate their water supply backlog. The mean estimate of time required was 4.5 years, i.e. until the end of 2011. Of the 49 WSA managers who responded to this question, 22 indicated that it would take 5 years or longer to eradicate their backlog, and 7 indicated that it would take 10 years or longer.

169. On 31 May 2007 The Water Information Network of South Africa (WIN-SA), which is a collaboration between DWAF and the Water Research Commission, published a document titled "Provincial overview of 2006/7: highlights and challenges". In this document the water backlog, as at 31 March 2007, is given as follows:

Eastern Cape	308 000 households
Free State	76 000 households
Gauteng	212 000 households
KwaZulu-Natal	707 000 households
Limpopo	396 000 households
Mpumalanga	250 000 households
North West	103 000 households
Northern Cape	13 000 households
Western Cape	10 000 households
TOTAL	2 074 000 households

170. At current rates of delivery, assuming a static population, it will take at least four years to eradicate these backlogs. However, in reality the population is dynamic, with people moving within South Africa and also into South Africa, and with the natural population growth. With all these factors taken into account, the backlog figures are not static but are a moving target.

171. At the KZN May 2007 quarterly Masibambane meeting five out of nine WSA managers agreed with the statement that it was too late to meet the 2008 target, no matter how much funding is offered. Eight out of nine agreed that the promise of water for all by 2008 was ill-advised and affects the credibility of organisations at the coal face of delivery. One senior official told us that the 'fact' that targets will not be met is "DWAF's worst kept secret".

172. One third of the 77 WSA Managers were either unwilling or unable to state how long it would take to eradicate their water backlogs. Given that this matter has been the subject of considerable investigation and discussion over the last few years, this may be cause for concern.

Figure 24: WSA in eradicating its water backlogs?

173. For a goal or target to be useful it must be challenging, realistic and attainable. The evidence detailed above indicates that the first goal of the Strategic Framework needs to be revised to reflect the target date for the water backlog elimination which all sector players believe is realistic. There seems little question that the backlog will most certainly not be eliminated by 2008.

Figure 25: How long will it take your WSA to eliminate your water supply backlogs?

Target 2: The eradication of the sanitation backlog

174. The Consolidated Water Sector report for the Fourth Quarter of 2006/2007, prepared by DWAF's M&E unit, reports that during the period 2004 to 2007 the following numbers of people have been provided with sanitation at the RDP level of service, or higher:

Table 23: Sanitation delivery as at DWAF 4th Quarter 2007 report

Period	2004/2005	2005/2006	2006/2207
Number of households served	360,200	305,878	302,659

175. The figure for 2006/2007 above is unconfirmed, with an estimate used for the dplg contribution and no data as yet available from the Department of Housing.

176. The total served for the three years together is 968 737, or 34% of the total sanitation delivery in the 13 years since 1994, which is estimated at 2 831 237 units. There has been acceleration in this period relative to the decade prior to 2004, but it is a concern that sanitation delivery appears to have stagnated at 300 000 to 350 000 units per year during the period of the Masibambane Phase 2 programme.

177. According to DWAF's 4th Quarter water sector report, the sanitation backlog in South Africa as at March 2007 was estimated at 3 439 544 homes [the WIN-SA provincial overview report referred to in Section 171 above reports a slightly different figure – 3 698 000). Unless the rate of delivery is increased, it will take another ten years to eradicate this backlog.

178. Looking at the nine provinces (see below, derived from DWAF's Consolidated Water Sector Report, 4th Quarter 2006/2007), the most rapid delivery of sanitation is taking place in the Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga and the Free State, although in speed of backlog reduction the Northern Cape is the leader. The slowest delivery, in absolute as well as percentage terms, is taking place in Gauteng, but close behind are the two provinces with the highest backlogs – Limpopo Province and KwaZulu-Natal.

Table 24: Sanitation Progress by Province

(adapted from DWAF's Consolidated Water Sector Report, 4ᵗʰ Quarter 2006/2007)

Province	Estimated Delivery during 2006/2007	Estimated Sanitation Backlog at March 2007	2006/2007 Delivery as a % of Backlog
Eastern Cape	113,114	529,738	21.4%
Free State	55,209	219,060	25.2%
Gauteng	3,803	398,086	1.0%
KwaZulu-Natal	16,758	701,824	2.4%
Limpopo	12,510	802,325	1.6%
Mpumalanga	54,431	281,541	19.3%
North West	29,817	386,871	7.7%
Northern Cape	10,897	30,668	35.5%
Western Cape	9,099	89,431	10.2%
TOTAL	305,638	3,439,544	8.9%

179. In one of the surveys conducted for this evaluation, WSA managers were asked how far their municipality was in terms of eliminating their sanitation backlog and how long it would take their WSA to eliminate this backlog. The mean estimate of time required was 4.5 years, i.e. until the end of 2011, although this seems optimistic in the light of the data presented above. Of the 52 WSA managers who responded to this question, 23 indicated that it would take 5 years or longer to eradicate their backlog, and 5 indicated that it would take 10 years or longer.

180. The evidence detailed above indicates that the second goal of the Strategic Framework needs to be revised to reflect the target date for the sanitation backlog elimination which all sector players believe is realistic. There seems little question that the backlog will most certainly not be eliminated by 2010.

Figure 26: How far is your WSA in eradicating its sanitation backlogs?

Figure 27: How long will it take your WSA to eliminate your sanitation backlogs?

181. Any WSA that is well managed will have the backlog information built up from the ground on a village by village basis and regularly updated. For such a WSA the determination of the backlog should be a routine exercise and not a research project. Of the 77 WSA managers surveyed one third were either unwilling or unable to state how long it would take to eradicate their sanitation backlogs. This should be cause for concern.

182. The Consolidated Water Sector report for the Fourth Quarter of 2006/2007, prepared by DWAF's M&E unit, reports that during the period 2004-2007 the following progress has been made with the eradication of water and sanitation backlogs at schools:

Table 25: Progress made with the eradication of water and sanitation backlogs at schools

	Number of Schools Served 2004 to 2007	Current rate of service (estimated)	Estimated backlog remaining
Water	2609	874	1980
Sanitation	3085	874	1564

(Source: DWAF Consolidated Water Sector Report for 4th Quarter, 2006/2007)

183. The backlogs and rates of delivery are not evenly distributed around the country. The provinces with the greatest remaining backlogs are Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo. At current rates of delivery in these provinces the elimination of the backlogs will take another three to four years.

184. A concern is that as at May 2007, the DoE had not yet submitted to DWAF its figures on water and sanitation provision at schools for the

period Sept-Dec 2006, or Jan-Mar 2007. On this evidence it appears that meeting this target is not one of the DoE's high priorities.

Target 4: Provision of water supply and sanitation to all clinics by 2007

185. The Consolidated Water Sector report for the Fourth Quarter of 2006/2007 reports that during the period 2004-2007 the following progress has been made with the eradication of water and sanitation backlogs at clinics:

Table 26: Progress made with the eradication of water and sanitation backlogs at clinics

	Estimated backlog as at March 2006	Planned delivery for 2006/2007	Reported delivery for 2006/2007
Water	727	79	8
Sanitation	437	155	11

(Source: DWAF Consolidated Water Sector Report for 4th Quarter, 2006/2007)

186. It is a concern that, although this clinics target was meant to have been met by 2007, the planned rate of delivery for water, if fulfilled, would only achieve the eradication of the backlog by 2015. For sanitation the planned rate of delivery should see access for all clinics by 2010.

187. Of more concern is that the rates of delivery reported are much below even the modest targets adopted, although this may be due to inadequacies in the Department of Health (DoH) reporting system. The DoH has not reported on its progress with clinics since June 2006, and this is noted by DWAF in each quarterly sector report.

188. In 2006 the Departments of Water Affairs and Health worked jointly to obtain special funding to deal with the clinic water supply and sanitation backlog, and this effort was successful. DWAF has been asked by the DoH to assist with the implementation of this programme, as DoH does not believe it possesses the necessary capacity.

Target 5: All bucket toilets eradicated by 2006

189. The Consolidated Water Sector report for the Fourth Quarter of 2006/2007 reports that during the period 2005-2007 the following progress has been made with the eradication of buckets.

Table 27: Progress with bucket eradication

2005/2006	2006/2007	Estimated backlog at March 2007
62 206	71 747	121 592

(Source: DWAF Consolidated Water Sector Report for 4th Quarter, 2006/2007)

190. On the basis of this evidence it would appear that all buckets will be eradicated by the end of 2008. However, the programme is receiving high priority and extra resources have been deployed in the last year. It is therefore possible that this backlog will be eradicated before the end of 2007.

Conclusions and recommendations

191. On the evidence in DWAF's Consolidated Water Sector quarterly reports not one of the first five goals of the Strategic Water Framework, which are all related to access to services, will be achieved within the set timeframes. This in itself is not necessarily a problem, as the goals have helped to focus the sector and without them no doubt far less would have been achieved than has been. What is a concern, however, is that the goals have to date not been revised or updated. For example, in the recently published Masibambane "Draft National Water Sector Implementation Strategy", the goals are repeated without comment. In the political domain, certainly, there still seems to be a belief that all will have access to water by 2008, and all will have access to sanitation by 2010. This affects the credibility of those who are tasked with meeting the goals and who doubt that they are achievable.

192. Of the WSA managers surveyed, only 22% believed that they would be able to meet the 2008 "water for all" deadline, while 54% believed that the 2010 sanitation deadline was still achievable.

193. When asked how they deal with the pressure of meeting these goals when the evidence is so manifestly against them succeeding, there were interesting responses from two of DWAF's regional Masibambane managers. One said that DWAF and **dplg** needed to focus more on ensuring that all had access to at least some form of potable water supply by the end of 2008, whether it was at the RDP level or not.

194. This would probably imply a massive programme of hand-pump installation and repair, as has happened during the drought and cholera interventions in the past. The other replied to the effect that there could only be pressure to meet a deadline if it was achievable. If it was not achievable one could only do one's best and not worry about the deadline.

195. This latter comment emphasises the need for the timeframes for the first five goals of the Strategic Water Framework to be updated. Such timeframes cannot be prescribed by DWAF to the other sector departments, but must be agreed and committed to by those responsible for their achievement. This means that the implementing departments need to agree and commit to revised target dates, and they should then be held accountable for those commitments.

196. The Masibambane programme's progress on backlog eradication during the last three years has been mixed, with not all Departments showing the same commitment to the task. The Departments of Health and Education, in particular, have not treated backlog in access to water and sanitation at schools and clinics as a high priority, despite the goal having been set down for completion by 2005. In terms of provision of access to the general public, DWAF and the **dplg** have served over six million people with both water and sanitation during the 2004 to 2007 period, but the backlogs themselves seem likely to persist for another five years at least. The rating of the sector as a whole in terms of backlog eradication is less than satisfactory, although better for DWAF and **dplg**.

197. Obviously backlog reduction is very relevant, but the efforts have not always been as effective or efficient or impactful as they should be, or the targets would have been closer to being met. Sustainability is only ensured if Treasury continues the current high levels of funding for the sector. Costs are within norms and expectations, and indications are that funds transferred from Treasury for MIG are enough to sustain the current rate of backlog reduction - but not to increase that rate.

198. It would be remiss of DWAF to put too much energy into planning the next phase of water provision ("Water for Growth and Development") until all have access to at least a basic level of water supply and sanitation. The importance of operation and maintenance has repeatedly been stressed in this report and elsewhere. Unless the infrastructure which has been built is properly operated and maintained, those who have already been served will soon be rejoining the backlog queue. While DWAF itself is not responsible for operation and maintenance, it can and must make an impact in this critical area by focussing more energy and resources on its core role as regulator of the water sector.

199. At current levels of funding and rates of services delivery the **elimination of the water and sanitation backlogs by 2008 and 2010 will not happen**. For example, the meeting of the 2010 sanitation target will require an increase in the rate of sanitation delivery of more than 400%, starting now. 45% of the WSAs surveyed estimated that it would take them more than 5 years to eliminate their water and sanitation backlogs, and 14% estimated that they would need more than 10 years.

200. Nevertheless, services are being provided to several hundred thousand new households every year. In terms of the international **Millennium Development Goal** (to halve the percentage of the population without water and sanitation by 2015), South Africa is doing well.

201. Targets are only useful if they are achievable. It is recommended that all the **responsible departments agree on achievable targets and timeframes** (noting that 100% coverage may not be a realistic target). These targets and timeframes should be challenging enough to motivate the sector, but not so challenging that existing infrastructure is neglected in the struggle to meet them.

The effectiveness of MIG in the sector

202. The transfer of the local government water services capital grant from DWAF into the MIG funds paid directly to WSAs rather than being spent by DWAF has gone remarkably smoothly. This is mainly due to the balanced manner in which DPLG has managed the administration of the funds through Provincial Programme Management Units (PPMUs), whilst ensuring that DWAF retains its policy-making, technical support and regulatory functions.[18]

Figure 28: 2005-06 vertical split of MIG grants between services

(Sources: 2006 Local Government Budgets & Expenditure Review: 2001/02 – 2007/08 and DWAF D:WSP&I

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[18] DPLG (2005) The Municipal Infrastructure Grant: National MIG management unit programme management processes and procedures

203. Despite its consolidated nature, as a fund for all municipal services excluding electricity, over 50% of the total capital grants have been allocated to water services since these services have been incorporated into the MIG programme. The graphic reflects the 2005-06 breakdown.

Increased funding and backlog targets

Figure 29: 2004/05 to 2007/08 MIG funding for water services

(Source: Personal communication DWAF D:WSP&I)

204. The total funding for water services has also increased under the MIG programme. Despite this, interviews across the sector have made it clear that the targets of eradicating the water supply backlog by 2008

and the general sanitation backlog by 2010 will not be met[19]. Therefore, funding should continue to increase at the rate it can be spent effectively.

205. Targets do deliver results but there is a downside when they are set without strong engagement with the frontline implemnters and beneficiaries. An editorial discussing targets (in he UK) recently commented: *The* priority *to meet a target took precedence over the need to improve the service to the public. The professionals felt undermined and demoralised, deprived of the initiative and job satisfaction that is at the heart of their sense of vocation*[20]

Is MIG funding pro-poor?

206. Another question pertinent to MIG grants allocated for water services is to what extent the funding is pro-poor. The next two graphs try to answer this at the provincial level for the 2007/08 financial year.

207. As we can see, funding for water supplies is moderately pro-poor, with the Limpopo, Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal all receiving some additional funding whilst the two relatively rich provinces, Gauteng and the Western Cape, receiving less funds that the percentage of poor households living in those provinces.

Figure 30: 2007/08 provincial share of MIG funding for water supply services versus their share of poor households

Sources: Personal communication DWAF D:WSP&I and demographic data for Dec 2005 boundaries supplied by StatsSA to NT for the calculation of LGES grants)

208. We can also detect a distortion in the funding for sanitation services. The Free State, North West and Northern Cape are receiving funds in excess of the amounts related to the percentage of poor households living in those provinces whilst at the other end of the scale the funding for the poorest province Limpopo is low, followed by low funding for Mpumalanga. The funding for GP is also low.

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[19] Budget vote speech by Minister, DWAF, National Assembly, Cape Town 17 May 2007

[20] Pepinster C (2007) *Fitting exit for Mr Blair* The Tablet, 1 King Street Cloisters, London Vol 261, No 8697 30 June

209. The cause of the distortion is the push to eliminate the bucket system as soon as possible. Whilst this is understandable it will cause disruptions to the efforts being made to eradicate sanitation backlogs in rural areas. A return to a more even pro-poor pattern of funding needs therefore to take place as soon as possible.

Figure 31: 2007/08 provincial share of MIG funding for all sanitation services versus their share of poor households

(Sources: Personal communication DWAF D:WSP&I and demographic data for Dec 2005 boundaries supplied by StatsSA to NT for the calculation of LGES grants)

Drawdown controls and rollovers

210. The internal and external matrix reporting responsibilities and subsequent oversight control loops within which the WSA MIG Project Management Units (PMUs) operate is generally operating smoothly. For example if WSAs do not spend their MIG budgets on time the funding drawdown controls come into operation in a manner that is fair to all parties.

211. On the other hand, if at the end of the financial year funds have still not been spent, grants for the following year are often reduced without looking at the reasons for the rollover or the possibility that the WSAs can get back on track. This encourages WSAs to spend funds without ensuring adequate quality control. Thus the application of "penalties" because of rollovers needs to be handled more professionally. Rollovers are not automatic signals of administrative snarl-ups, but can be quite the opposite; namely the sign of an administration that is responsive to community needs, pace and the like.

212. On the other hand PMU managers can look after themselves by registering projects and preparing for their implementation ahead of time, so when there is an unavoidable delay on one project another can be started early and thus eliminate rollovers.

Ability of regions to spend allocated MIG funds

213. It is not only the funding of water and sanitation services that has increased each of the three years between 2004/05 and 2006/07. The ability of regions to spend allocated funds has also increased. The overall

national average expenditure of allocations increased from 75% in 2004/05, through 83% in 2005/06 to 91% in 2006/07[21].

214. The next graph shows the national average quarterly cumulative expenditure of as a percent of the DoRA WSS MIG allocations for 2006/07. In addition it shows the performance of the two worst and the two best performing provinces.

Figure 32: 2006/07 ability of regions to spend MIG funds

(Source: Allocations; personal communication DWAF, D:WSP&I; and actual expenditure; MSB II consolidated quarterly reports)

215. This figure shows that whilst the ability of regions to spend funds has increased steadily there is still a serious disparity between funds spent in the first and fourth financial quarters. Thus the early registering and planning of projects should not only be done to eliminate rollovers, but also to achieve even expenditure which will help with quality control.

- **Comments on specific MIG process clauses**

216. The National MIG management processes and procedures[22] contain clauses related to:
    - Project based capacity building, including improving the ability of communities to become involved in the future operation of the resultant infrastructure.
    - Different design alternatives are to be identified for evaluation before the final design is selected

217. These two clauses have been singled out because they are generally *completely* overlooked despite their ability to improve long-term community involvement.

218. The MIG management processes and procedures document states that municipalities must invest an appropriate proportion of MIG funds *on rehabilitating existing infrastructure*. Despite this there appears to be much confusion at the municipal level with respect to accessing of MIG funding for such projects.

219. Since it is vitally important that sufficient funds are allocated for rehabilitation/refurbishment, to ensure that existing infrastructure

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[21] Source: Allocations; personal communication DWAF, D:WSP&I; and actual expenditure; MSB II consolidated quarterly reports

[22] DPLG (2005) The Municipal Infrastructure Grant: National MIG management unit programme management processes and procedures

continues to function satisfactorily, this matter needs to be clarified as a matter of urgency. At the same time, municipalities need to be made aware that the lifetime operation and maintenance costs are the responsibility of the municipality and that MIG cannot allocate refurbishment funds for inadequately maintained infrastructure.

- **The quality of finished projects**

220. Although the WSA PMUs are generally operating smoothly there have been indications for some time that the quality of many finished projects does not meet the legislated basic water supply and sanitation standards, and that this poor quality is adversely affecting the sustainability and the quality of the services delivered.

221. The M&E unit of DWAF's Directorate: Water Services Support recently commissioned explorative spot-check assessments of MIG water and sanitation projects. Although the assessment report has not been finalised it confirms the earlier indications. The underlying causes of the unacceptable quality are not investigated, but the indications are that all parties in the procurement chain from DWAF approval of designs right down to the training and supervision of community labour by main contractors are contributors. It is therefore essential that this baseline assessment be appraised in detail and used by DWAF and representatives of all parties in the procurement to develop a quality assurance, control and regulation strategy that will be supported and implemented throughout the water services sector.

Project costs

Figure 33: 2004/05 to 2006/07 cost of water supply infrastructure per household based on total households served and MIG funding

(Source: Personal communication DWAF D:WSP&I)

222. The following gives an indication of water supply project costs per household served for the years 2004/05 to 2007/08. From the national average figures it can clearly be seen that overall costs are rising.

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[23] DWAF Directorate Water Services Support, M&E Unit, *Water Services Sector & Masibambane II Consolidated WS Report: July to September 2006*

Cost per household (Rand thousands)

Year
- 04/05
- 05/06
- 06/07

National average

KwaZulu-Natal lowest

Northern Cape highest

(Note: Bucket eradication has increased cost

Figure 34: 2004/05 to 2007/08 cost of sanitation infrastructure per household based on total households served and MIG funding

223. The sanitation project costs recorded below. Because waterborne sanitation is being used to replace the bucket system the costs are generally higher than those for water supply services. It is important to note that these higher costs do not include any costs of upgrading water supply distribution services, bulk water supply systems or waste water treatment plants.

224. The sector needs to carry out and make available the results of a full investigation of the costs of the different components of water services delivery and their sensitivity to different scenarios. The costs need to specifically cover the management of all soft issues. DPLG needs to use these results to review its funding norms. Thereafter it is recommended that DWAF become the final arbitrator with respect to the acceptability of funding requests for specific projects.

Financial sustainability of water services

225. In South Africa water services have to be sustainably managed within a free basic services policy. This section of the programme analysis will report on implementation progress and on the local government equitable share (LGES) allocations from National Treasury designed to achieve financially sustainable services within the free basic services policy.

- **Are LG Equitable Share allocations pro-poor?**

Figure 35: The pro poor status of water services ES grants

(Sources: DoRA 2007 and demographic data for Dec 2005 boundaries supplied by StatsSA to NT for the calculation of LGES grants)

226. As indicated, the formulae related to LGES allocations for the funding of the recurrent costs of water services to poor households are neither pro- nor anti-poor. This outcome is the result of backlogs, because with the recently introduced revised allocation formula the ratio of funds provided for poor households that are adequately and inadequately served is three to one.

Figure 36: Ability of provinces to cross-subsidise basic WS

227. It is important that the allocations are revised once the backlogs are overcome, so that the grants become robustly pro-poor to the extent that the richer municipalities can be expected to cross-subsidise basic services to poor households from internally generated revenue raised from medium to high income households.

228. Apart from the general non pro-poor horizontal division of LGES allocations between municipalities, they are based on defining a poor household as one with a 2001 income of less than R 800/mth. Treasury needs to constantly review the target recipients of Free Basic Services (FBS) in keeping with the Financial Fiscal Commission's recommendations[24], it needs to recognise that households with slightly

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[24] FFC Submission for the Division of Revenue 2007/08 part 2

higher incomes, whilst not requiring FBS, do still require subsidised services on a decreasing sliding scale.

229. If sensibly implemented, the fact that the new LGES formula distinguishes between households that are adequately and inadequately served is a motivation to WSAs to overcome backlogs. However as implemented, no additional funds are made available to WSAs as inadequate sanitation is replaced by VIPs [25]. This is a lost motivational opportunity that needs to be overcome. In addition the LGES ought to be used to motivate appropriate solutions for intermediate levels of service and discourage the most costly and often inappropriate high levels of service such as high pressure water supply and waterborne sanitation services.

230. WSAs that make special arrangements to tanker water to inadequately served households need to be rewarded in the short to medium term for doing this. The motivation would cost and the precedent of providing additional LGES funds to WSAs that have to service bucket latrines.

- **How LG spends ES funds**

231. Local government reporting to Treasury on how it spends ES funds is poor and needs improvement. A failure to submit adequate returns should result in external interventions to ensure the municipality is performing all the functions allocated to it.

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[25] National Treasury Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review 2001/02 – 2007/08, Annexure A: Consolidated set of local government tables

232. A random set of 37 returns for 2006/07 was analysed to check what they have used grant funding for. Seven had to be discarded as unintelligible. Of the remaining 30, 22 were WSAs. The funds examined were ES formula allocated grants plus the conditional capacity building grants. The DoRA allocations were successfully correlated with the amounts stated in the LG returns but the actually spending has not been verified.

Figure 37: Analysis of LG 2006/07 ES expenditure

(Source: Personal communication with NT's custodian of LG databases)

233. The results of the analysis indicate that on average excessive funds are spent on institutional executive and council support and on finance and administration. No matter how the results are interpreted only minimal funds are allocated to sanitation. The funding of water supply services is much more robust but only reaches satisfactory if some of the finance and administration expenditure is reallocated to the different services.

- **Free Basic Water (FBW)**

234. Most WSAs now have robust PBW policies in place. Some are even tankering essential quantities of water for drinking and cooking to households without an improved water supply system within 200m of their homes, despite the fact that providing such a service does not currently allow them any addition LGES funding. The implementation has been facilitated through guidelines and workshops produced and organised by DWAF whilst some WSAs have, in accordance with the policy, developed their own implementation details.

235. The policy is based on people living in poor households receiving 25 litres of water per day, but most WSAs are implementing the policy by allowing all households free access to 6 kl per month. Generally this provides sufficient water for households without waterborne sanitation, for in-house domestic use, but households with waterborne sanitation need a minimum of 50 litres per person per day. Implementing 50 litres per day policy is probably not sustainable without targeting and the allocation of the water on a per person rather than a per household basis. The sector needs to do more research in this regard.

236. In addition if the Masibambane III slogan *water for growth and development* is to have any meaning for poor South Africans, the sector needs to develop a detailed policy based on it own guideline for municipalities for small scale multiple use water systems[26]. Some further ideas about small scale multiple use water systems.[27]

- **Free Basic Sanitation (FBSan)**

237. FBSan is only being implemented by a few WSAs. In fact few WSAs provide any ongoing sanitation services, such as pit emptying and infrastructure condition monitoring, in areas where VIP latrines have been installed. In addition DWAF has not issued any guidelines to assist them to roll out such a policy. This situation needs to be rectified as a matter of urgency.

- **Water services operating subsidies**

238. When water supply schemes are transferred to WSAs, the WSAs continue to receive the conditional Operating Subsidy Grant. This grant is normally fully under the control of the WSA water services manager and is therefore fully transparent to him/her. The only trouble is that it will only be paid in full for three year after transfer and then phased during the following three year after which the money will be added to the general LGES "purse". Thus, apart from its limited value, it cannot

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[26] DWAF (2006) *Provision of water for small scale multiple use systems: A guide for Municipalities.*

[27] Hazelton DG (2007) *Water resources allocation for poor households* Paper presented at the TCI WAR Conference held at the Indaba Hotel, Johannesburg,28 Feb and 1 Mar 2007

be relied on for the long-term financial sustainability of water supply infrastructure.

239. These managers must therefore rely on the larger LGES unconditional grants to achieve sustainability. But these grants are controlled by the municipal manager and are often used for other purposes. As a result WSA managers are very concerned about the sustainability of water services infrastructure.

240. Currently the total LGES grant allocations covering the basic services component related to water, sanitation, refuse removal and electricity services and institutional support component are published as a single figure for each municipality in an annexure to each year's Division of Revenue Bill. The separate amounts for each service and the value of institutional support comment are not published. This needs to be done to improve transparency and accountability. DWAF could then forward the water services allocations to the Water Services Managers.

241. Many stakeholders believe the LGES should be made conditional but this is not recommended because of the diversity of conditions prevailing in the different municipalities.

Are the LGES grants sufficient to achieve sustainable water services?

242. Treasury calculates LGES grants on the basis that only households with a 2001 income of less than R 800/mth require FBS. The following calculations are done assuming that municipalities should provide FBS to all households with a 2001 income of less than R1 100 per month in

2001 rands. In addition households with an income somewhat above the FBS targeted level will require subsidised services. This is assumed to include households in the R1 100 to R 2 544/mth income bracket, who will receive services on a reducing subsidy basis.

Figure 38: 2007/08 provincial level ES grants per poor h'hold

(Sources: DoRA2007, and demographic data for Dec 2005 boundaries supplied by StatsSA to NT for the calculation of LGES grants)

243. The above scenario is equal to supplying FBS to all households with an income of less than R 1 100/mth and half the households with an income between R 1 100 to R 2 544 per month. This in turn is approximately equal to supplying all households with an income of less than R 1 822/mth with FBS. Then based on the 2007/08 allocations, Figure 25

shows the LGES grant funds available in Rand per year to supply all households with an income of less than R 1 822 with FBS.

244. At first glance it may appear that the above funding ranging from a high of R42/mth for water supply services in the Free State to a low of R19/mth for sanitation services in Limpopo is grossly inadequate to sustain water services. However two factors need to be born in mind.

245. For the relatively rich provinces, Treasury expects the municipalities to use surplus generated by high income domestic customers to partially cross-subsidise the FBS to poor households. This is done via a revenue raising capacity correction factor in the allocation formula that applies a 'tax' to high fiscal capacity municipalities.

246. In the poorer provinces there are still sizeable backlogs. This also reduces LGES allocations because the formula distinguishes between poor households that are provided with adequate services and those with inadequate or no services. The subsidy for the latter is 1/3 that for the former. Thus the potential allocations for municipalities in these poor provinces are at least equal to the highest allocations available provinces like the FS and MP. An understanding of this fact gives low fiscal capacity municipalities an incentive to provide basic services to all its customers.

247. Other basic rules in the LGES allocation "game" are that:
o NT will only allocate funds to supply FBS or subsidised services to poor households,

o it expects municipalities to utilise its equitable revenue raising capacity to the full through a robust tariff policy and credit control,
o it expects municipalities to manage its assets and customers professionally so that UAW and long-term maintenance costs are minimised.

248. Once these capacities are in place, but only once they are in place, and if it can be shown that the actual the gap between municipalities' operating and maintenance costs and their equitable revenue capacities are higher than the current LGES allocations municipalities will find NT a reasonable negotiating partner. There are also able advocates like the Financial Fiscal Commission, SALGA and DWAF to assist with such negotiations.

249. In the meantime DWAF, as sector leader and WSAs and WSPs as frontline implementers need to work on the foundations already laid to improve their teamwork, capacity building, motivation and regulation. Then but only then will quality sustainable water services be a reality in South Africa.

Overall sector outcomes

250. The performance of the best provinces is improving but that of the worst still tends to stagnate. It is therefore recommended that the pro-poor emphasis apparent in MSB II be deepened and intensified for MSB III.

Figure 39: Book value of municipal water supply services assets for financial years ended 30 June 2001 to 2005

(Source: Surplus from StatsSA financial censuses of municipalities Publication P9114 and number of households from DWAF WS NIS website)

251. With respect to a pro-poor emphasis it can be seen that overall Limpopo and the Eastern Cape are overall the poorest with respect to the ability of municipalities to raise funds internally to sustain services to poor households. The Free State, Mpumalanga, North West, KwaZulu-Natal and the Northern Cape all need national subsidies in excess of 75% of costs for this purpose. Only Gauteng and the Western Cape can be expected to sustain basic services to poor households by providing between 50 and 65% of such funds from cross-subsidies provided by richer households. In keeping with general government policy industry is expected to pay for services in full but not to provide subsidies for domestic services.

Figure 40: Book value of municipal sanitation services assets for financial years ended 30 June 2001 to 2005

(Source: Surplus from StatsSA financial censuses of municipalities Publication P9114 and number of households from DWAF WS NIS website)

Figure 41: Gross municipal water supply services surplus income after bulk water purchases for years ended 30 June 2002 to 2006

(Source: Surplus from StatsSA financial censuses of municipalities Publication P9114 and number of households from DWAF WS NIS website)

252. DWAF's 2007/08 to 20011/12 National Water Sector Work Plan indicates the future allocated and required financial resources for the WS sector. These are reproduced in the graphic (below) and related back to the actual expenditure figures for 2006/07.

Figure 42: Gross municipal sanitation services surplus income for financial years ended 30 June 2002 to 2005

(Source: Surplus from StatsSA financial censuses of municipalities Publication P9114 and number of households from DWAF WS NIS website)

Future financing

253. The figure shows gradually rising recurrent expenditure with a small shortfall between allocated and required resources. The Work Plan's recommendation that this shortfall be made good with MSB III funding is fully supported. The spending should of course take full cognisance of the recommendations contained in this report and other stakeholder inputs.

Figure 43: Recurrent and capital analysis of WSS 2006/07 to 2011/12 allocated and required financial resources

(Sources: Water sector work plan 2007/8 to 2011/12 and volume 1 consolidated water sector report 4th quarter 2006/2007)

254. With respect to capital resources Treasury allocations show a modest increase in allocations for 2007/08 and 2008/09. Since the water supply backlog is targeted to be overcome before the end of the 2008/09 financial year, the Treasury capital resources allocations for the following years increase modestly from a much lower base figure to overcome the sanitation backlog. DWAF correctly reports that the required resources to overcome the backlogs are significantly higher and gives alternative required capital resources figures. These reflect a 50% increase over Treasury allocations for 2007/08 and 2008/09 and an 80% increase for 2009/10 and 2010/11 from the lower base figure, but a 25% decrease for 2011/12.

Health & education

255. In the beneficiary survey – sampling sites where completed projects with direct beneficiaries have been provided – we asked questions about access to schools and clinics, and followed with questions about access to water and to working toilets in those facilities. The questions were in two parts – firstly (if a clinic or school existed in/near the community) to identify if the clinic or school had an adequate water supply; and then to ask if there were *working* toilets that *patients* could use/*working* toilets that *learners* could use. This arose from case studies and experience among team members that in some instances, where working toilets exist at either a clinic or school, they are not always made available to the patients/learners.

256. Dealing first with clinics, it is important to note that just 57% of respondents have a clinic in their locale; another one in five (19%) have a mobile clinic that visits the area. This reflects the poverty of the area sampled for this survey, and as noted earlier, the robust targeting used by DWAF to identify and serve very poor communities. Lack of local clinics was most pronounced among people living in non-formal dwellings in rural (26%) and metropolitan (24%) areas; those from small towns were far less likely to have no local clinic (11% had none), as were people from formal dwellings (8% had no clinic nearby).

257. In all, three-quarters (76%) of respondents had access to a clinic of some sort in their community. Of those, another three-quarters (77%) told us that their local clinic has an adequate water supply. This was true

of 90% of respondents from peri-urban areas, 85% from metropolitan areas, and 71% from rural areas.

258. On the positive side, this is a good result, given how poor many of these communities are. On the negative side, however, clinics that lack adequate water will battle enormously to provide adequate health care; and this is clearly an area for urgent intervention, as well as more integrated planning for future delivery.

Figure 44: Clinic/water/sanitation access nexus (beneficiary survey)

259. The point is underscored when we turn to sanitation. Of those respondents with a clinic that had adequate water, almost a fifth (17%) had no toilets at all. Half (55%) had flush toilets for patients, and a

quarter (24%) had other toilets (1% reported non-working toilets). Again, this can be seen as positive or negative, depending on your perspective. On the one hand, it is positive to note that many poor, predominantly (deep) rural communities have clinics with water and flush toilets; but it is equally distressing to find that after 13 years of democracy and high-speed delivery, there are still so many poor South Africans who have to access health care compromised by the lack of water, and whose dignity is directly impaired by the lack of sanitation at health care facilities (let alone at home). This is particularly true given that we sampled areas where DWAF has delivered WS services, and yet large proportions of respondents lack these basic amenities. The need to draw the Department of Health more deeply into the planning and implementation for MSB III is self-evident.

Hand-washing and water saving begin at school

260. Three-quarters (76%) of respondents also told us that the schools in their area had 'an adequate water supply' – while a fifth (21%) told us that local schools do not have an adequate water supply (the remainder did not know). Respondents from urban areas continued to score highest – 89% said local schools had an adequate water supply – dropping to 73% of rural respondents, and on this occasion scoring lowest among those from metropolitan areas (69%).

Figure 45: School/water/sanitation/functionality nexus (beneficiary survey)

261. But the sanitation picture is less bleak, at least where supply is concerned. Schools may have water, but that does not mean learners can access toilets, particularly not flush toilets: just 14% of rural respondents said learners could access flush toilets – but another 75% said learners had other forms of sanitation. Just 2% of rural respondents whose schools had water, said learners had no sanitation at all – no respondents from metropolitan or urban areas said the same. Clearly there is a need to identify rural schools without any form of sanitation and prioritise supply.

Tap stand in the KwaNyuswa ward of Ndwedwe near Verulam. The project was built entirely by the community. Note the way a drain has been built for the waste water, which led away to a garden, the builder's own initiative.

262. But having toilets and having *working* toilets are very different issues. But there is also a need for the Department of Education to better monitor and repair sanitation. For example, 5% of rural respondents whose schools had water access, said the toilets were broken. This rose slightly to 6% among urban respondents, but jumped to 27% of metropolitan residents. So while there is limited incidence of no sanitation at schools, there is considerable incidence (varying by location) of non-functional sanitation.

HIV and AIDS[28]

263. The survey of beneficiaries conducted as part of this evaluation found that more than two thirds (71%) of respondents knew of someone in their community who had AIDS and a similar number (70%) knew of someone who had died as a result of the disease. But HIV/AIDS is not simply a health issue, it is becoming widely acknowledged in the sector that HIV and AIDS also pose a series of critical development challenges for the sector. These challenges include:

- One, it impacts on **sector staff performance** as a result of staff illness and death;
- Two, inadequate water supply has a profound effect on **the ability of caregivers to provide appropriate suppor**t whether it be in formal clinic settings or informal home based care settings (water is needed for bathing and washing, taking medicines and in feeding of infants if a mother

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[28] Ideas gleaned from Kamminga, E. and Schuringa, MW (2005) *HIV/AIDS and water, sanitation and hygiene* **Thematic Overview Paper**, Royal Tropical Institute – KIT; UN-HABITAT (2006) *HIV/AIDS Checklist for Water and Sanitation Projects*, Nairobi, Kenya; .

is HIV positive whilst nearby latrines are essential for weak patients, moreover the burden of care is exacerbated when fetching water and doing laundry is done some distance from the home);

- Three, access to safe water supply and sanitation is vital **for preventing further deterioration of those infected** (the infected are far more vulnerable to water borne diseases in areas where water quality is poor)[29]; and

- Four, **diminished economic productivity** in an LM or DM as a result of the disease will reduce the opportunities for local government to implement sustainable water service funding mechanisms.

264. The unprecedented scale and seriousness of the pandemic therefore has a profound effect on the ability of the sector to provide and maintain adequate water and sanitation services. The sector acknowledges this crisis and has therefore begun to implement an HIV and AIDS strategy and ensure that it becomes a prominent cross cutting issue in all initiatives implemented across the sector. This is clearly vital for MSB III.

265. Despite the obvious need for ensuring that the HIV and AIDS strategy remains prominent in the sector, there is also the need for those working in the sector to promote greater awareness of the important relationship between water and sanitation services and HIV and AIDS, and to tackle the large number of incorrect health beliefs present in communities which contribute to the stigmatisation of people living with HIV and AIDS. Common misconceptions include:

- People can become infected with HIV and AIDS due to groundwater pollution near graves.
- People can become infected if they share eating utensils/ crockery with an HIV positive person
- Water used in bathing an infected person can transmit the disease
- Touching a toilet seat after an HIV positive person has used it can transmit the disease.

266. Further research is urgently needed in the sector to establish how widespread these views and other myths are, and to then develop an appropriate strategy that targets these misconceptions in order to shift attitudes and behaviour towards those infected with HIV.

Accountability of service providers & authorities

267. Accountability has been assessed by looking at the following:
- Consultation with the community prior to project implementation
- The recruitment of labour and benefit to the local community
- The reporting of faults and response times during project operation

268. The objectives of job creation and local economic development during project implementation are integral to Masibambane and the MIG programme and are reported on as part of the MIG M&E reporting system. Up to September 2006, the MIG programme spent 12% of expenditure on labour and 12.74% on SMMEs[30].

269. We asked the beneficiaries what they thought of the methods used for recruiting labour and the effect on the community.

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[29] Regulating quality and ensuring effective O&M thus take on even greater significance in this context of increasing incidence of HIV and AIDS.

- Half of the beneficiaries reported that being a local resident was the main criteria for labour selection
- 66% reported that most people were satisfied with how labour was selected while 16% reported that recruitment of labour had caused tension
- 35% reported that workers had been imported into their area for the project, mostly as skilled labour (58%) but some (30%) as manual labour
- 80% of respondents reported that the project was labour intensive
- Only 10% of beneficiaries reported that local businesses had been used and 58% said that local businesses had not been used
- About half of the recipients (47%) felt that a lot of money had been paid to local people during the project while 51% thought that not much money had been paid and 2% reported that no money was paid to local people.

Figure 46: Method of selecting workers

270. Sixty two percent (62%) of project beneficiaries reported that a community meeting had been held at the beginning of the project while 21% reported that there was no meeting and 16% did not know. At the end of the project 74% of the beneficiaries felt a sense of ownership of the project.

271. Accountability during implementation is satisfactory – but drops to less than satisfactory in the operations phase. Given the centrality of accountability to communities in good development practice – where it is a key investment in ownership, O&M and sustainability – this situation needs to be improved, and continuously monitored.

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[30] DPLG , MIG KPI Report (September 2006), p22.

Figure 47: Who beneficiaries report to when there is a problem with water or sanitation

Figure 48: Time taken to repair faults

272. The municipality is operating the projects according to 39% of beneficiaries surveyed. Of interest is that 28% report that the project is run by locally based people in the following proportions, community based organisations (CBOs) 10%, local individual 19% and local contractor 8%. Furthermore 77% believe the operator is doing a good job.

273. A system to report problems with the scheme is in place for 68% of those surveyed while for 14% there is no system and 18% do not know of a system. The preceding figure shows who faults are reported to.

274. The turn around time for the repair of faults is shown in the graphic. Only half of the beneficiaries reported that repairs were done within a week and of concern is the 29% who reported that repairs are never done. On the whole, however, these figures are better than may have been expected, given the preceding observations about lack of accountability and O&M. A half (51%) of respondents have faults repaired within a week of reporting them – a very positive result. But on the negative side, a fifth (20%) will wait between 1 and 3 months, while a third (29%) will wait, seemingly, forever.

Water Sector Support

275. As per the ToR, this section provides an assessment of the management support programmes designed to strengthen administration and implementation including sector co-ordination, decentralised decision-making, institutional support and so on.

276. Much of what we have to say is to be found in different parts of this report – such as institutionalisation of the sector, sector support, and so on – reflecting the way in which our ToR and this report were constructed. This should not sound defensive: it is merely a product of choices that had to be made in assembling a large report covering an inordinate array of themes, issues and actors. The sector-wide approach is analysed from various angles in various parts of the report; this will require a little effort on the part of readers wanting to focus on the sector approach.

277. But let us be clear, given the centrality of the sector-wide approach to MSB II. Sector support was probably the most successful aspect of MSB II. The sector-wide way of working has been entrenched, and few if any respondents could envisage a return to the old 'silo' *modus operandi*. Replicating this at local level remains a key challenge for the sector generally, and for MSB III specifically.

278. Some criticisms remain, even though they have been questioned by some readers who commented on our draft report. For example, a sector programme does have to be 'owned' by all in the sector, and not seen as belonging to one sector department (albeit the sector leader), as is currently the situation. And as we show below, this is anyway an opportunity, not a threat – every sector representative we spoke to was asking for *more* sector-based planning, budgeting, implementing, M&E and so on.

279. By the same token, it is fair to note that MSB had to start somewhere, and this meant starting with water services rather than resources. That does not mitigate the fact that MSB III (we believe) *must* broaden its purview to include water resources – in all spheres. Our focus was MSB II, and during MSB Ii the limitations resulting from the absence of resources (from local to national spheres) was evident to the evaluation team.

280. It is also important to note that the evaluation team is not (at all) suggesting the WS sector be allowed inexorably to expand and include every entity that has a possible role or interest in the sector – that would be entirely unworkable and a waste of time. We believe it is important (and this has not adequately been done in the past) to identify points of purchase in *other* sectors and *other* programmes, where MSB can be represented – rather than trying to gather everyone under the MSB umbrella. MSB is a vehicle that can be used to work with others (sectors, programmes, etc.) for all-round benefit.

281. Given the importance of capacity building, the question is not what has MSB done to draw in others, but how has MSB identified key players and ensured that it is represented in and on their structures? (And, for MSB III, how will it do so in future?) The same

might apply to local government development, or provincial growth and strategy sessions, or interventions such as Project Consolidate, and so on. The sector approach means *building* the sector – by strategic alliances and partnerships – not simply *growing* it to be as large as possible. This is a matter of strategic choices and decision-making within the sector.

282. There are aspects of the sector we do not look at at all, which means the full picture is not painted: for this we can only request indulgence, given the scale and scope of the job we had to do. So, for example, there is little in here on SALGA – a direct and exemplary illustration of sector support, and a key player in building the SPW network - or on sector leadership structures like the WSSLG and so on. That these deserve attention is not questioned; and some fascinating opportunities for doing so should be explored in future, such as participative observation that could review the quality of sector collaboration, not merely count the numbers involved; panel studies that monitor sector development over time; and so on.

283. But in an evaluation of this scale, choices had to be made about inclusion and exclusion, and we feel that we have adequate coverage of the sector in the pages that follow to make a sound judgement and some useful recommendations.

The SWAP approach

284. In 2000, the World Health organisation offered the following definition of the then-emerging sector-wide approach:

A method of working that brings together government, donors and other stakeholders within any sector. It is characterised by a set of principles rather than a specific package of policies or activities. This approach involves movement over time under government leadership towards: broadening policy dialogue; developing a single sector policy (that addresses private and public sector issues) and a common realistic expenditure program; common monitoring arrangements; and more coordinated procedures for funding and procurement.[31]

285. South Africa has a considerably more robust financial management system than many developing countries, and the size of the economy ensures that the bulk of pro-poor expenditure comes from the fiscus and not from donors. This creates a very different balance of power and scenario from those obtaining in many other countries, where some donors approached SWAPs on the understanding that they had "to take a calculated degree of risk and compromise on the donor view of best practice".[32]

286. Brown, Foster *et al.* offered a detailed set of 'best practices' for SWAPs, which have been widely used in evaluating SWAPs. They included the following:
   - All activities will be under one common sector-wide programme, fully costed, and integrated into a medium-term budget framework

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[31] World Health Organisation (2000) *World Health Report*
[32] European Union Expert Group Meeting (1999), DANIDA comment on SWAPs.

- Government takes responsibility and accountability for the performance of the sector as a whole, with all projects and components consistent with and contributing to agreed sector goals; partners are responsible for supporting the planning and financing of the sector programme
- All partners synchronise their own processes to joint cycles and systems for appraisal, programming, M&E, etc.
- Reporting is harmonised towards one common report system for all activities in the sector
- Technical assistance is demand-driven
- Resources are channelled increasingly through government systems and consolidated into joint accounts, with a view towards overall budgetary support
- Common disbursement, accounting, reporting, auditing and procurement systems are defined
- Partners committed to openness and transparency and when a problem arises they use dialogue before threatening to cut support.[33]

287. It is apparent that MSB II scores well on all of these indicators, when viewed at macro level and focusing in particular on government and donors. As we noted in the opening section of the report, it ranks among the best developed SWAPs worldwide, in any sector. But, as we show below, there is considerable room to strengthen the sector representation within MSB – and within DWAF, where resources and services need to develop and strengthen a collaborative approach and draw into unity all the various units within the Department.

288. It is somewhat ironic that some of the better definitions of and approaches to sector-wide programmes have been developed by the UK Department for International Development (DfiD), as shown in the table below.[34]

The advantages of SWAPS:
- should promote greater government leadership
- greater consistency between donor activities and government sector policy
- encourage focus on sector-wide issues affecting sustainability
- encourage transparency and predictability of donor resources
- reduce transaction costs of resource transfer

The following need to be in place:
- Comprehensive sector policy and strategy
- Annual sector expenditure programme and Medium Term Sectoral Expenditure Framework
- Donor co-ordination is government led
- Major donors provide support within the agreed framework
- One of the following also needs to be in place:
  - A significant number of donors committed to moving towards greater reliance on government financial and accountability systems
  - A common approach by donors to implementation and management

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[33] Brown A., Foster M., Norton A., Naschold F. (2001) *The status of sector wide approaches* (ODI Working Paper 142, London)

[34] See *inter alia Making governments work for the poor*

289. Again, MSB scores well on all the indicators offered by DfiD as SWAP measures, and exceeds most other developing countries through vigorous public sector finance management allowing donors to go 'on budget' far more smoothly than in many other instances.[35]

290. But of course MSB also has its critics. For example, some respondents from Treasury argue that donors 'cherry pick' the projects they want to support, in their view attacking a fundamental pillar of a SWAP.[36] Our view is that this is a somewhat narrow approach: some donors do indeed indicate their support for specific initiatives that match their strategic priorities for providing Overseas Development Aid to South Africa, but this occurs within the overall sector strategy driven and largely financed by government, and in many cases is more an administrative nicety than any significant alteration to the programme itself. No separate funding vehicles (such as Financial Management Agencies, Special Accounts and the like) are involved; and, critically, no parallel reporting is demanded by donors. MSB enjoys government leadership, predictable funding, government/DWAF-led co-operation and by streamlining the reporting process, transaction costs are reduced.

291. If the purpose of a SWAP was to move donors "…from an earlier position of relatively independent decision making to one of being 'a legitimate stakeholder and partner in dialogue'"[37], then MSB has clearly been a successful vehicle for doing so. Furthermore, the most critical aspects of any SWAP are government ownership and control – incontrovertibly clear in the case of MSB. But it is important to assess SWAPs not just as donor/government vehicles – the discourse from which they emerged – but as key vehicles for breaking down silos and artificial barriers that impinge on efforts to provide an integrated set of responses to poverty.

MSB and integrated development

292. SWAPs are critical development vehicles at a different level – not that of donor/government relations, but as mechanisms for delivering integrated development and moving government departments out of the traditional silo approach to their work. It is in this area that MSB has some way to go. But it is also important to note that MSB has made enormous strides in this area. This is now a sector, not merely a department/set of departments. Moreover, a number of respondents told us that it would be inconceivable for the sector to return to the pre-MSB way of working – the sector wide approach is entrenched and valued.

293. Some respondents likened DWAF, the sector leader, to a super-tanker. Given that such tankers take days to shift even a few degrees in direction, the massive DWAF superstructure is the

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[35] See for example the Governance, Justice Law & Order SWAP in Kenya, where the move to create a Special Account in Treasury as a move to direct budget support occurred at the same time as DfiD left the programme.
[36] Interviews with officials from Treasury, May/June 2007.

[37] Collins T., Higgins L. (2000) Seminar report on 'Sector wide approaches with a focus on partnership' (Ireland Aid)

tanker; while the MSB structures create fora where all partners – government, donors, CSOs – can raise issues, argue about issues, question issues, and so on. Each of them may be small by contrast with the looming bulk of DWAF – but via the MSB structures, each is able to generate a swell of support that over time can begin to nudge the super-tanker in the desired direction.

294. In other words, SWAPs (properly managed) can create an equality among participants, and limit the dominance (or over-bearing dominance, anyway) of any one player. Moreover, SWAP structures can create space for like-minded alliances to form, regardless of sector or position. Ideally, this allows participants to focus on the issues at stake and work together for their realisation, regardless of their origins – they can act as tugs that gently nudge the super-tanker into position. This is virtually impossible without SWAP structures, as well as an environment of openness and engagement. This is extremely important, and needs to be nurtured and deepened.

295. Some respondents did complain that MSB meetings are a 'talk shop' marked by a sequence of presentations and offering limited opportunity for critical engagement and debate. Some noted that Masibambane Co-ordinating Committee meetings in particular limit space for discussion, while quarterly DWAF/WSA meetings or provincial meetings remain important and useful fora. Such criticism needs to be assessed by DWAF and is best responded to by on-going dialogue with participants about what they do and do not want from meetings, to be flexible in the form and content of

MSB meetings, and consciously nurture participation. These should be explored in more depth, and meetings, structures and systems tweaked as required.

- **Sector department participation**

296. Participation by key departments – notably the Department of Health and the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism – remains (at best) low. Given the uneven performance in the key cross-cutting area of environment (see below), this is not merely a matter of formalities – these departments should be playing a key role in MSB. It is inappropriate that the same criticisms are offered in both a MTR and summative evaluation, as is the case here, and DWAF needs to make it the responsibility of the programme manager to solicit and nurture participation from all key sector departments.

297. Part of the problem may be the way MSB is promoted and understood. Interviews with representatives from **dplg**, Education and Housing (the only departments to answer a brief set of questions about participation) – revealed that MSB is identified specifically as a DWAF programme, not a sector programme; asked if their departments identify with MSB as their own programme, respondents all replied 'no'. Furthermore, they noted that MSB that is not well known among government officials outside of DWAF; it has not been discussed internally, and is restricted to some middle-level officials. Finally, all reported that MSB is either regarded as 'extra' work (on top of the existing workload of individuals) or has nothing to do with their work at all.

298. These are fairly common complaints where SWAPs are concerned, and should not be over-blown. It is important that sector goals, targets and the like are 'owned' across the sector and government more broadly, and breaking out of small circles within participating sector departments is important in this – but also often very difficult. That should not deter the sector from seeking to broaden and deepen knowledge and ownership of MSB. Some readers have argued that this approach is misdirected and the focus should be on alignment within and across the sector. We note their view, but suggest that this is not an 'either/or' matter: MSB does need to be more deeply embedded in all sector participants, as well as better aligning with strategic plans.

299. The MSB programme manager needs to deepen the relationships with sector departments. MSB should be integrated into their planning and day-to-day work; and they should take responsibility for MSB's failure as well as its successes.

300. But these responses should not be seen as simply negative: sector departments *want* to become more involved in Masibambane. Asked 'Should there be more rigorous sector-wide planning that ties all sector departments to agreed goals, budgets and workplans?', all responded in the affirmative. All also noted that there is some discrepancy between MSB and their own departmental strategic plans. In other words, there seems to be a golden opportunity for MSB III to align itself more closely to partners' strategic plans, and draw them into more robust sector-wide planning and implementation. And let us be frank: it is not often that such positive responses do occur – public servants often shy away from adding to their workload – so it does seem that the sector has to move fast and seize the moment.

301. It is clear that MSB needs – and can achieve - effective sector wide planning at provincial level that includes water resources, water services, and the whole sector including Housing, Health, Education and drawing in DEAT and others. The key is to shift gear at provincial level from 'talk shops' (as described by some critics) to proper planning meetings. This is a key step to taking the SWAP approach lower again, to municipal level, where an organic link can be forged and facilitated between demand and supply.

302. It is also important to remember a point made earlier, namely that at local level, IDPs are frequently consulted as a means of aligning demand and supply. This is a further achievement of the programme in this area of sector-wide collaboration and integration.

303. Finally, MSB has been dominated by the water services components of DWAF and partners. This must change under MSB III – 'water for growth and development' demands an holistic approach to management of the entire cycle, from resource to service provision, and DWAF must consciously encourage active and full participation by the water resources sector in MSB. This includes Water Boards, Water Service Providers and so on. More active participation by metropolitan municipalities is also needed.

- **Civil society participation**

304. Furthermore, the participation of civil society organisations (CSOs), remains low, suggesting that key recommendations from the MTR (regarding participation by CSOs and other government departments) have not been acted on, or have been unsuccessfully implemented. This urgently needs to be improved, especially if the next phase of MSB is to take the sector wide approach down to municipal/local level, where CSOs will play a key role in social facilitation.

305. In sum, MSB has institutionalised the sector-wide approach, with positive effects. Donor support is on budget, donors rely on government reporting, and duplication costs are minimal. Some donors, such as DfiD, remain outside MSB, contradicting commitments to harmonisation and reduction of duplication and wastage. DWAF needs to facilitate broader participation – from the water resource sector, Water Boards, and so on. Sector departments have failed to bed MSB down in their departments, where it continues to be seen as a DWAF programme, and not part of their own work. Some key departments either do not participate at all or do so only intermittently. CSO participation remains weak. These weaknesses are fairly easily resolved, but must be addressed. Many were problems identified in the mid-term review, and need now to be addressed. Strengthening the sector-wide basis of MSB can only strengthen the performance of the programme.

Establishing a MIG Strategic Management Unit at Head Office

306. Evidence gathered by this evaluation suggests that despite initial problems dplg and DWAF have created a strong working relationship and one where "we in DWAF can simply pick up the phone and call dplg to resolve matters immediately". Similarly dplg officials were of the opinion that "things are working much better now that we all know where we stand".

307. Structural mechanisms have certainly helped in shaping this relationship. So regularly monthly meetings of structures such as the MIG Technical Task Team allow problems to be identified, tasks to be "actioned", and members of the team held to account for these actions. Peer pressure has created an environment where attendees are "loathe to stand up in front of their colleagues from other departments and admit they have not dealt with a task they had previously agreed to undertake.

308. This is a not inconsiderable achievement and suggests that the resources provided by this programme have been well used. However, there are practical implementation issues (such as the fact that both DWAF and the MIG unit within dplg keep separate monitoring information on the projects) which will need to be resolved over time. To resolve these implementation challenges, which, often speak to a higher level issue of who has the authority to do what, they can be dealt with at the many different joint structures that currently exist.

Disseminating programme knowledge and Knowledge Management

309. A key success of the programme has been using and creating knowledge. Definitions of knowledge have been contested since time immemorial, but for the purposes of this evaluation we used the notion of knowledge representing "a chain of increasing value whereby data can become information, which can then be transformed into knowledge" [38]. As will be shown in the next section the programme has been effective in gathering data on the ground (albeit questions remain over the validity and reliability of this data)[39], analysing it to inform managers about progress being made (e.g. towards the eradication of backlogs), and ultimately shaping this information into knowledge.

310. Knowledge Management within the sector, whilst still being contested as a concept, has largely involved two different approaches that are gradually becoming better coordinated and integrated. On the one hand there has been the high tech approach to knowledge management which has seen data, information and ultimately knowledge effectively distributed through impressive websites and vast range of other media sources (such as newsletters, pamphlets, reports, flyers, posters and so on). On the other hand a range of qualitative knowledge sharing initiatives have developed at regional level and have led to high quality exchanges

of lessons learnt (the associated documentation of the qualitative knowledge sharing initiatives can often be found on the websites discussed below).

311. In respect to knowledge management events, MSB II has hosted a multitude of learning platforms and initiatives, primarily developed from the ground up. These include:

- Creating a **learning culture** within institutions across the sector
- **Learning journeys** (e.g. one region visits another to share experiences)
- **Lessons Series** (e.g. identifying examples of best practice and sharing the lessons learnt from that experience)
- **Field Notes** (e.g. documenting experiences from the field in a systematic manner and then sharing them)
- **Peer Exchanges** (e.g. an official spends time with another authority)
- **Case Studies** (e.g. looking at the lessons that can be learnt from alternative technology pilots)
- **Learning Networks**

312. One impressive example of learning networks (and there are many) is the Northern Cape Operations and Maintenance Project. Whilst principally aimed at strengthening capacities of municipalities across the province, it also provides a central point for providing technical information with regards to different aspects of O&M for those who are part of the network.

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[38] Powell, M (2003) *Information Management* Oxford: Oxfam
[39] The most recent NBI (2007) report noted that "only 2 of the Metros and 1 LM could report data that was audited. The majority of the data sets were estimates or had a data confidence level of not stated" (p. 58).

313.   The challenge for the sector will be to ensure that the wide range of knowledge management related initiatives can be sustained and strengthened in MSB III. The anecdotal evidence gathered as part of this evaluation certainly points to their enormous value, albeit that there is a need (where applicable) to ensure greater coordination and to ensure that such initiatives enhance the goals of the sector. There is always the danger of interfering in networks that have evolved over time and which have been shaped by the direct needs of those belonging in the network.

314.   There is of course, also the danger of networks becoming exclusionary and not allowing participation of those who lack the capacities and skills to participate. At present this danger seems unlikely as those who operate within the sector seem genuinely interested in sharing lessons learnt. However, the sector will need to give some thought as to how best to nourish, sustain and strengthen existing networks to ensure they continue to play an important role in ensuring effective and efficient delivery on the ground.

315.   With regards to the data management and electronic dissemination of knowledge within the sector a knowledge depository is still under construction (which will form the main pillar of the revised Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting system as discussed below). Nevertheless within the sector there is a long history of storing data in accessible sites such as DWAF's own website, in particular the Water Services: Information Network (WSNIS), the Water Information Network – South Africa (WIN – SA) and e-WISA.

316.   WIN – SA is defined as "a knowledge management initiative designed to serve the water sector with the aim of ensuring that the body of knowledge in the sector is well-managed, readily accessible and appropriately applied" and e-WISA is "an electronic initiative undertaken by WISA in partnership with others" with the aim of providing information electronically[40].

317.   Evidence gathered by this evaluation suggests that sites such as WSNIS and WIN-SA[41] have enormous value as they provide continuously updated information on the state of the sector in terms of targets and lessons learnt thus providing probably the most informative picture of any sector across South Africa.

318.   However, what is not known, especially as much of this information is captured and disseminated electronically to municipalities (particularly those in the rural areas) where connectivity is a major issue, are the answers to the following research questions. Which the sector needs to pursue further:

- How often the information is being accessed?
- By whom?
- What are they doing with the information?

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[40] WSSS (2007), p. 39, this reference also cites several other knowledge networks with information on the programme including the SA Cities Network and dplg's Local Government Knowledge Sharing Programme.
[41] For more information visit these websites http://www.dwaf.gov.za/dir_ws/WSNIS/ and www.win-sa.org.za.

319. Moreover, there is also need within the sector to ensure that it is clear about two other critical components of any knowledge management system, namely data storage and the actual dissemination of the knowledge. In terms of data storage the essential issue is accessibility not centralisation of the data. Just as there are many different types of data, storage can take many different forms so the programme needs to develop a clear strategy that maps out:

- What users need to know?
- What data is stored?
- Where it is stored, and
- How to access it?

320. With regards to the dissemination of knowledge the programme has to ensure that knowledge is disseminated both vertically throughout the programme (information must be shared at all levels) and horizontally (information must be shared equitably across the sector) in order to build support for the conclusions and lessons drawn from information embedded within the system. Moreover, knowledge must be shared externally to the sector to ensure accountability, the building of networks and importantly with respect to Masibambane, winning political support.

The institutionalisation of the water services sector support programme

The state of knowledge concerning water sector support is scattered, uncoordinated and incomplete. Whilst there are various reports on amounts spent on support, it is difficult to find information on the programmes against which these funds were spent, let alone what was achieved through the programmes. DWAF's current reporting attempts to align progress against KFAs, however this does not facilitate a greater understanding of WSA and WSP support needs[42]

321. Notwithstanding it's own assessment of sector support, a robust regulatory framework, clearly identifying roles and responsibilities, has been created by the sector[43]. The overarching document is the Water Services Sector Support Strategy (WSSSS) finalised in March 2007, which will be operationalised in part by the wide ranging WS Provider Support Implementation Plan (which sees a significant shift towards empowering providers and gearing up for support to O&M responsibilities). The strategy draws on a multitude of other strategies and regulations, of which the Five Year Local Government Water Sector Support Plan (LGWSSP) and the previously discussed Strategic Framework for Water Services (outlines the goals and objectives for the water services sector and therefore by implication the purpose of institutional support) are critical to institutional support. From the WSSS we learn that the purpose of the support strategy is three-fold:

To ensure the establishment and functioning of capable, effective and efficient water services institutions.
To ensure the development of adequate skills and competencies required in the water services sector.
To enable all sector role-players and partners to fulfil their roles effectively

322. As sector leader DWAF's primary concern with support is to ensure the "functioning of the sector"[44] and has therefore ensured that support focussed primarily on support to municipalities but has also built capacity within key agencies in the sector such as SALGA (see box below), dplg (primarily the MIG unit) and other key stakeholders (such as local councillors) to ensure that they were able to contribute meaningfully to the transformation of the sector.

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[42] de la Harpe, J. (2006) *Concept Note No. 4: Review of Water Services Sector Support* prepared for the development of the WSSS, 2007.

[43] The development of this framework was an exhaustive process that involved identifying compliance and performance gaps by analysing the WSA checklists, a meta-evaluation of a plethora of support initiatives evaluated over time, commissioning 19 concept and implementation papers on the issue of sector support, a multitude of workshops/brainstorming sessions held over many months and so on.

[44] Jones, D. & Williamson, T. (2005) "How collaboration is shaping the water services sector in South Africa", Building Partnerships for Development Occasional Paper.

323. The problems municipalities face in delivering both water and sanitation infrastructure and water and sanitation services are well documented (see for instance the WSSS, 2007: 4, NBI Report 2007) and have been referred to earlier in the report. These challenges all speak directly to the KPIs developed by the sector in order to assess performance (e.g. meeting of access targets, ensuring safe water, protecting the environment, effective operations and maintenance and so on).

324. The WSSS (2007) outlines a streamlined/responsive organisational structure to manage and coordinate institutional support. The structure appropriately emphasises the sector-wide approach and so we find structure at the national level that include all the key role-players in the sector such as the National Joint Response Team (made up of DWAF, dplg SALGA, National Treasury) which focussed on providing section 78 support. The challenge facing the programme is to ensure a single mechanisms for coordinating all support as opposed to the myriad of structures in place at present focusing specifically on certain issues and thus creating the existing "silo approach to support".

325. The WSSS intends to overcome this problem with the appointment of a National Support Manager to ensure that national initiatives are better coordinated who in turn will provide backup to the key facilitator in this process, namely the Regional Support Mangers – "Programmatic support will be provided within the framework of regional coordination and only be undertaken through regional support managers (2007: 18). The Regional Support Managers will work locally with the already established sector coordination/ collaboration forums. At the national level both the National Support Manager and the Regional Support Managers will be members of Integrated Local Government Support Coordination Task Team which will have oversight functions with respect to sector support.

326. This sees a critical shift away from a "one type of support suits all", i.e. supply driven to a demand driven approach whereby the support will be tailored to the needs of those operating in the region. Moreover, this also will ensure a central point of contact between all local role-players. This whole support initiative will be supported by a "national resource pool" which will ensure consistent quality support, appropriate monitoring of the implementation of the support, and coordinate the support provided to different regions. All of which fits into international best practice as the following quote illustrates:

> *"These changes are relevant because they recognize that capacity building is a long-term process requiring a systemic approach to bring about both effective demand and supply for improved public sector performance"*[45]

327. Further reference will be made to other important aspects of the WSSS below. However, it is worth noting two concerns about the strategy. Firstly, although the strategy is comprehensive and cannot be faulted on its aim to integrate and coordinate support, it nevertheless fails to demonstrate how progress towards this aim will be measured in evaluated. Indicators specific to sector wide support are not present in the document. Admittedly the strategy speaks to contributing to the attainment of the indicators

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[45] World Bank (2007). *Capacity Building in Africa: An IEG Evaluation of World Bank Support*. Washington, D.C., World Bank.

embedded in Strategic Framework for Water Services, but nevertheless it has not identified a set of indicators which speak directly to sector wide support. Moreover, by embedding appropriate indicators (which could be adapted from "Critical success factors", section 5.5 of the WSSS) within the strategy, and which the strategy will shape, the sector wide support "champions" will be in a far better position to assess progress and ultimately the success of the strategy.

328. Secondly, although the document notes that DWAF is the sector leader and consequently the primary driver of sector wide support little mention is made of the means whereby existing support initiatives outside DWAF will be integrated and better coordinated. Whilst section 9.10 (p. 47) highlights the need for strengthening the sector-wide approach it remains silent on the mechanisms to be used to ensure that this approach is implemented, other than talk in general terms with regards to the sector forums, provincial sector support plans and so on.

329. Judging by the success of, for instance, the National Joint Response team, it may be worth using such a structure to oversee the role of other players who provide support in the sector rather than rely too heavily on DWAF funded regional coordinators for ensuring departments over whom they have no jurisdiction, such as dplg, health, education all "sing from the same hymn book". This would also help resolve the common complaint that support provided, especially when it is in the form of training/ capacity building

initiatives, is "poorly timed" or clashes with other municipal priorities"[46].

SALGA

The South African Local Government Association (SALGA) is probably the best example of how the sector wide programme has benefited and in turn has led to the programme being institutionalised within its structures. Evidence of this is widespread, a few examples will suffice:

- Many of the local coordinating forums once managed and run by DWAF are operated by SALGA members.
- According to SALGA officials the local level the support has empowered local government
  in many different ways such as Development of Councillor Training programme to speed up decision marking and capacity building within councils. Facilitate and brokering an interface between all stakeholders within the water sector. The development of municipal water sector plans. The fFunding of posts in the municipalities to speed up delivery. The development of Legislative Framework (assisted LG to comply with the laws governing LG).
- Jones and Williamson (2005: 4) have noted that SALGA
  has found the water sector a useful means with which to engage municipalities. Water issues have given this bilateral relationship a concrete focus and DWAF has generally been supportive of SALGA's emergence (SALGA reduces its transaction costs in dealing with 155 newly created municipalities). Supported by Masibambane (with staff members paid for at the national level and now within 6 provinces) SALGA has taken an aggressive approach to building its credibility in

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[46] Dfid (2005) *Study Report: Assessing the impact of water services support programmes provided to local government between 1999 and 2004.*

MSB 2 and the transition to the new service delivery framework

330. The new services delivery framework came into effect in April 2004 and DWAF transferred all the capital water and sanitation funding from CWSS to MIG including a significant portion of the Masibambane II funding under key focus area 10 (KFA10). We discuss transfers, and the success or otherwise thereof, elsewhere in this report.

Transferred funds	Amount
Contractual Projects	909,893,089
Non Contractual Projects	775,309,727
Total	1,685,202,816

Table 28: Transfers (totals)

331. The WSAs were already implementing the DWAF CWSS projects and there should not have been any disruption to service delivery on the ground. Many of the transferred projects had been through the business planning and technical report phase and were ready for implementation. However, the rapid implementation of MIG resulted in a lack of clarity on policies and procedures amongst WSAs and planning of new projects was initially delayed.[47]

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[47] DWAF (2004), Lessons Learning Kwazulu-Natal Cwss/Mig Transition – Initial Issues, p.5.

332. There is some concern that in the transfer of capital projects to MIG some of the experience within the sector was lost. Since 1994 DWAF had developed capacity in project appraisal, M&E and project management and much of this was lost in the transfer to MIG. Many believe that the MIG M&E systems are only now getting to the point where the DWAF M&E systems were in 2004; and as we have seen there are crucial gaps in the MIG monitoring systems.

333. DWAF had also focused on other developmental issues like capacity building and training, health & hygiene, labour intensive construction, the environment, participation of community and CBOs and sustainability. The focus in these areas was not initially part of the MIG system and some of the expertise and experience were lost. This was an unfortunate loss, and government needs to learn how to maintain a degree of continuity and lesson learning while systems and structures are being changed.

334. The overwhelming success of the new service delivery framework has been the development of local government capacity to plan and implement service delivery at the local level. Prior to the new service delivery framework the sector was largely dominated by DWAF. As one WSA manager put it, the fact that municipalities had become WSAs has resulted in a more co-operative relationship between DWAF and municipalities.

335. The sector wide approach of Masibambane has complemented the transition to the new service delivery framework in the following ways:

- Through the sector wide approach dialogue on sustainability and the developmental issues have continued and been taken up by others in the sector
- Masibambane has supported municipalities to fulfil their role as WSAs
- The information sharing functions of forums and networks.

336. Asked to score MSB II, WSA Managers surveyed for this evaluation gave the following ratings:

Good	OK	Bad
68%	23%	9%

337. In conclusion, MSB II has performed highly satisfactorily in the transition to the new services delivery framework.

Capacity building of WSAs and WSPs to fulfil their functions optimally

338. Bosen (2005) notes that "making public sector organisations work better is one of the most persistent and difficult challenges in development and development cooperation. At the same, nothing is more crucial for achieving sustained progress, growth and poverty reduction"[48]

339. A review of the literature on assessing impact of sector wide support in low-resource settings raise several issues which are pertinent to this evaluation of support within MSB II. The key one being that assessing the impact of the support has to be a multi-faceted approach as there are so many different perspectives, actors and agencies involved. The literature posits, and this is well known in the sector, that training alone is not sufficient to increase organisational effectiveness – in most situations training is a necessary but not sufficient condition for effective service delivery.

340. One also needs to consider how to determine impact, and consequently whether the performance of the beneficiaries of the support has become more effective since they received the support. A suggested approach to these issues, and which takes into account the multi-dimensional nature of the support within the sector and the view that poor performance of personnel in the public sector is not only due to lack of knowledge and skills, is to argue that the impact of training on the effectiveness of the person and on the effectiveness of the organisation is mediated by the individual's self-efficacy and the culture of the organisation.

341. Bosen (2005) adds that it is critical to examine this support within the context within which support is provided, as one respondent noted

> "providing institutional support to local government is a proverbial bottomless pit, no matter what you chuck at it it simply disappears…South Africans have an insatiable appetite for skills training".

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[48] Bosen N (2005) *Institutional Assessment and Capacity Development: Why, what and how?* Brussels: EuropeAid, European Commission.

342. The point being made here is that support provided is operating within a complex sector in which structural, institutional, social, economic and political factors are all shaping the environment. Importantly, these factors all interact dynamically and interdependently and shape present capacity, provide drivers to change as well as constraints to change. So however one performs an analysis of sector support it is essential to analyse and understand the interplay of these factors and to realise that a programme of this nature has very little control over these factors.

343. Notwithstanding the previous point, one should not stop the analysis by simply stating that the environment is complex and conveniently placing the blame for any problems on forces outside the department or even the sector. As the following assessment will demonstrate the sector has not been passive and accepted the commonly held criticism of local government that "it is dysfunctional and not worth investing in" rather what follows is clear evidence of a nuanced analysis of

   • what the precise challenges are facing water and sanitation delivery at local government level,
   • what interventions are needed, are appropriate and deliverable,
   • what needs to be prioritised, and
   • how best to deliver the support to ensure maximum impact.

344. The literature therefore suggests that for support to be effective and thereby to have an impact on the sector it will only have a positive impact, regardless of how good the support is, if the

organisational culture and the beneficiary's motivation are sufficiently conducive/responsive to the support. If the support really does have an impact this will be borne out in both the individual's and the organisation's effectiveness.

345. To put it slightly differently, assessing impact of support requires one to assess the outcome of the support – i.e. can we see visible improvement in the beneficiary who received the support and can we see visible improvement in the function of the organisation? However, and this is where the whole issue becomes complex, simply answering no to either of these questions does not necessarily imply that the support was poor. Impact of the support is also determined by the individual's capacity and competency prior to support, and impact of support is also determined by the organisation's culture/attitude towards support of this nature[49].

346. DWAF, by its own admission have already acknowledged that their own internal assessments have until now largely failed to do this as the following quote indicates

   > *The area that requires validation, critical interrogation and further investigation is the modalities, the progress made with actual capacitation of the relevant institutions, the hands on*

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[49] The literature strongly recommends that performance in the public sector requires multi-faceted interventions at the level of the individual that include training, appropriate supervision, dissemination of appropriate guidelines, appropriate feedback mechanisms, availability of equipment/supplies, and rewards and incentives.

support that is offered; and more importantly, the effectiveness of such support. The [regional] reports reflect very little of this and some offer no reflections at all as the efficacy of support modalities offered by DWAF Head Office, regional offices and other sector stakeholders…in conclusion, the reporting progress made in the fourth quarter is inconsistent, at times vague, with some reports offering very little data evidence of progress made[50].

347. With the above in mind any study that sets out to assess the impact of sector wide support will need to involve a multi-pronged strategy that explores both the efficacy of the individuals and the organisations. Moreover, the complex nature of individual and organisational behaviour will require a study that includes both qualitative (to describe contextual factors and latent influences) and quantitative (useful for establishing determinants of performance) components. Theoretically, the best source of evidence about the effect of a sector wide support intervention such as this is a randomised-controlled experiment; but for obvious ethical and practical reasons these trials are seldom conducted, particularly in low-resource settings. Nevertheless other designs can be used, and although susceptible to some bias often are more realistic in demonstrating what happens in real-life. An example of such an approach could involve many of the steps taken in this evaluation:

- ❑ Survey of trainees and their supervisors (the latter is necessary to provide an objective assessment of the trainee pre-and-post the support, to assess the environment[51] within which the trainee works and so on)
- ❑ Participant observation of, and/or in-depth-interviews with, trainees post-training (this is necessary in order to assess whether trainees are able to implement their newly acquired skills, provides a more nuanced understanding of motivation[52], shifts in behaviour and also to explore in greater depth what works well and what does not)
- ❑ Survey of the beneficiaries of the services (e.g. community members) to assess whether there is any noticeable improvement in the delivery of services

348. Whilst it was impractical to conduct any participant observation of the different types of sector wide support provided (the range, duration and nature of this support would require a dedicated team for many months to do such an exercise) this evaluation nevertheless were able to survey both the primary recipients of the support (e.g. SALGA, WSA and PMU managers and so on) and the ultimate beneficiaries of the support (i.e. those interviewed in the beneficiary survey). Thus what follows is an assessment of sector wide support using a range of different sources, but with the

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[50] DWAF (May 2006) "Analysis of water and sanitation delivery and local government suport for the fourth quarter" (January to March 2006).

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[51] Environment can be broadly defined to include professional, educational, administrative, employment, socio-cultural, economic and political. Clearly there are an enormous number of factors that shape the practices used by personnel within MSB II, which are difficult to measure by survey alone.

[52] A vast body of research suggests that although motivation is difficult to study reliably it plays a critical role in shaping performance of trainees both during training and post-training.

obvious limitation that the team could not witness at first hand the support being delivered. However, we feel confident that this limitation has been managed by using this multi-faceted approach.

Assessment

349. **Relevance**: The sector, as noted previously in this report, are extremely effective in identifying the underlying causes of problems and strategising around the development of appropriate initiatives that will be deemed relevant to the targeted participants. This can clearly be seen with regards to current support initiatives. For instance the WSSS 2007 explicitly identifies the underlying causes for performance (namely weak strategic management, insufficient financial resources, skilled staff retention difficulties, poor planning, and an incorrect focus on legislative compliance as opposed to performance). It then goes onto specify how previous attempts to provide institutional support have not realised the intended results (no coherent strategy was in place until recently, support is not prioritised nor is it coordinated, support tends to be supply driven and demand driven, the approach is not holistic, the initiatives have not been adequately monitored or evaluated, limited leadership training has been provided and so on). Other documentation also highlights that support focuses on authority/regulatory functions (e.g. s78 support) as opposed to water provision functions and that

> *Municipalities complain of the 'burden of support' where often there is duplication and support is imposed based on nationally determined priorities rather than on local needs …There is no shortage of support, but the spray and pray*

> *approach has left municipalities without the capacity and targeted support they require …" (Concept Paper No. 4)*

350. Whilst it is no doubt true that the breadth of support was extensive and that it was provided by a myriad of providers both within the sector (such as DWAF, dplg driven MIG related support and so on) and from without the sector (such as Project Consolidate) and that the depth of support was not as extensive as providers might have liked our assessment of both relevance and the other key evaluation issues suggests that DWAF is being too harsh on its self as will be demonstrated below.

351. The key support categories within KFA 12 (Institutional Support) were:
- Transfer programme
- Section 78 Assessments
- WSA Capacity Building
- Regulatory Support
- MIG Programme and provisions
- Project Consolidate interventions
- WSA Checklists
- Water Services Development Plans

352. The most common modalities used to provide this support were through
- Capacity building
- Deployment of human resources (typically in the form of consultants, consulting firms and/or retired engineers)

- Advisory serves
- The provision of tools and guidelines
- Technical assistance
- Knowledge management (e.g. WIN SA)

353. Almost two thirds (65%) of the WSA managers interviewed reported that their respective DM or LM had received some form of institutional support. Three quarters of whom (74%) agreed with the statement that the support was directly relevant to the needs of their WSA. The corollary of this was also found to support this finding, namely that only 14% of all WSA managers agreed with the statement "We didn't need support". No discernible difference could be found between LMs or DMs, the vast majority of WSA managers from both types of municipality perceived the support received to be needed and that it was therefore meeting their specific.

354. The nine most cited types of support received by respondents (in descending order of mention were:
- WSA Support
- Planning and feasibility studies
- WSDP & IDP Support
- WSA By laws
- Section 78 Studies
- Sanitation WSDP
- WSA Capacity Development Plan and Business Plan (WSACDBP)
- District Development Plan
- Human Resource Issues

Interviews conducted during a quarterly Masibambane meeting held in KwaZulu-Natal reflected both the breadth and depth of the support as the following illustrates:

355. As the graph below illustrates the majority of the respondents who received support reported that the quality was of a high standard, which suggests that MSB II has addressed many of the identified institutional problems and needs of the municipalities with respect to institutional strengthening. The figure below highlights the fact that WSA managers are well satisfied with the quality of the support they received during MSB II. They have on average scored the support higher than 7 out of 10 (7.2), with Policy and Regulatory Support receiving the highest rating (8.2 out of 10) and General Institutional Development and Support receiving the lowest rating (6.7 out of 10).

In the past three years DW'AF have assisted our organisations fulfil its role in the water and sanitation sector in the following key ways:
- *Ensuring greater coordinated multi-year planning and implementation of projects which has led to sustainable WSOP*
- *Strengthened policies and regulations*
- *provided funding for capacity building and training*
- *Supplied funding to identify and address problems facing our municipalities*
- *Quality assuring infrastructural development to RDP standards*
- *Technical support in operating within the legal framework*
- *Our organisations have been able to track the backlogs, review bylaws, improve the credit control and debt collection policy and identify indigent households*

356. The figure also highlights the fact that WSA managers are well satisfied with the quality of the support they received during MSB II. They have on average scored the support higher than 7 out of 10 (7.2), with Policy and Regulatory Support receiving the highest rating (8.2 out of 10) and General Institutional Development and Support receiving the lowest rating (6.7 out of 10).

Figure 49: Rating of Institutional Support by WSA Managers, by category of support

357. Although the ratings across the different types of support provided are generally high, within the different categories of, several clear differences can nevertheless be found. For instance within the

Capacity Development category, support provided in terms of training councillors was rated a high 7.6 out of 10, whilst support relating to Human Resource issues was scored much lower at 5.7 out of 10. A similar range of scores can be found in the Planning category. WSA mangers rated WSDP support a high 8 out of 10, whereas support for a District Development plan was rated much lower at 5.9 out of 10.

358. The category with the greatest range of ratings was the broadly defined category of General Institutional Development and Support. Within this category types of support that received high ratings included WSA support (8.7 out of 10), Project Consolidate (8.2) and Programme Management Support (7.4). Support that received far lower ratings by managers included Twinning of Public Sector Utilities (3.3 out of 10) and Civil Society Participation Programmes (5.7).

359. The implications of this finding are two fold. One it supports at a general level the widespread belief that institutional support has clearly been a key success of the programme. Two, not all areas of institutional support have been wholly successful and certain types of institutional support will need to be given careful consideration about how best it can be improved.

360. In fact the sector, again demonstrating that they have learnt their lessons well from the past, have already begun to do exactly this. The 2007 WSSS specifies 18 Key principles which should inform future support initiatives (these range from shifting the focus away

from inputs to outcomes, developing an enabling environment to building a learning culture, responding to demand and ensuring greater coordination. This leads to the development of a coherent, comprehensive strategy that will ensure programmatic support to WSAs, operational support to WSAs, the development of skills amongst the key role-players (councillors, leadership, training support managers) and a sector-wide approach that emphasises coordination, the establishment of peer networks and the creation of a knowledge management system. In so doing the strategy emphasises the need to support both the operational (e.g. infrastructure provision) functions of municipalities and the authority functions (e.g. regulatory activities).

361. *Score*: The evidence would support scoring relevance a **4 out of 4** as the sector wide support has certainly been relevant to the needs of the beneficiaries of the support

362. **Effectiveness**: The most straightforward way to assess the effectiveness of the support provided is to focus on the outputs of the direct beneficiaries of the support as "outputs are the direct products and services of an organisation and the immediate effect of organisational performance" (Bosen, 2005: 9). This does not imply that one focuses on the quantity of the outputs only, quality of the outputs is as important.

363. The data from the WSA survey strongly suggests that municipalities have benefited from the support provided. This can be seen in the graph below. The graph highlights that on average 86% of WSA managers had found that the support received had benefited from the support provided. In particular, they perceived the quality of their service delivery had improved (89% supported this view), they had received new information and skills which they could apply in their work (85%), and that ultimately the support was useful and applicable to work they did on a day-to-day basis (85%). These high ratings were found in all types of municipality and thus no discernible difference could be found between Metros, DMs or LMs in this regard.

Figure 50: Rating the effectiveness of institutional support, by WSA Managers

364. The graph above refers to institutional support in general terms (i.e. it covers the vast range of support provided to WSAs and WSPs whether it be purely financial or actual interventions such as training technical support and so on). An area that the survey focussed particularly on was the role of consultants in this support process. In part as a result of the bad press given consultants generally in the public sector and in part because of the key issue of skills transfer (a key issue in the effectiveness, efficiency and ultimately sustainability of WSAs and WSPs is going to be whether there is sufficient local capacity) between the few who have sufficient skills (typically consultants) and those who do not. The graph below clearly demonstrates the complex relationships WSAs and WSPs have had with this form of direct support.

365. The graph below shows that just over half the PMU managers reported that the WSA's capacity has improved (57%) and that the support added value (57%). However, approximately a third responded disagreed with the view that capacity improved (30%) or that the support added value (32%).

366. Moreover, nearly half were of the opinion that consultants did not build long – term support (49%). Respondents argued that a major reason for this low level of skills transfer was that consultants were primarily interested in profit and not institutional building (49%). Another possible reason, albeit one that has only limited support, is the view that consultants were given too many tasks and so could not provided focussed support (36% agreed with this statement).

367. Nevertheless, well over half of the respondents (59%) disagreed with the statement it is not necessary to use consultants for institutional support. Less that a third (30%) agreed with the statement. This suggests that whilst many have an ambivalent relationship with consultants, many of the WSAs and WSPs are of the view that in certain instances there is place for consultants, the key is to ensure they are adequately managed and that space is provided to ensure greater skills transfer.

Figure 51 How PMU Managers rated the effectiveness of support provided by consultants

368. This was certainly borne out in the interviews conducted in KwaZulu-Natal at the quarterly Masibambane meeting were respondents from 10 different WSAs noted that whilst about half now had sufficient capacity to "go it alone" the other five WSAs still felt it was necessary to "contract in appropriate consultants" and "we still need experienced operators to train the current ones and develop a succession plan"

369. The implication of the findings is that the majority of the WSA managers are of the opinion that they have benefited from the support and that, importantly, their daily functioning has improved as a result of this support. Too often support provided to institutions is of the "nice to have" variety and is seldom applicable to the day-to-day functions (e.g. public service officials given advanced IT training when offices have poor connectivity and obsolete computer equipment). Evidence from the surveys with WSA Managers and PMU suggests that this is not the case with MSB II: Respondents reported the support was not just relevant to their needs but that they could apply it and ultimately sense an improvement in their service delivery.

370. Notwithstanding the positive findings reported above, it was noted earlier that personal and organisational effectiveness are profoundly affected by self-efficacy (a measure of personal self belief that they can actually make a difference) and organisational culture. Thus without initiating a multi-prong strategy to focus on these different aspects which shape the impact support can have on an

organisation we cannot provide a definitive answer on whether or not the support is being effective and contributing to progress being made towards the achievement of the goals of MSB II.

371. It should also be noted that what is also negatively effecting the ability of anyone to make a firm statement on the role of support within the programme is lack of a systematic approach to monitoring and evaluating the support being provided[53]. Such a system could, at the very least, monitor not only which activities have been completed but also how these are contributing towards the stated objectives of the programme. Moreover, such an M&E system could provide some basic data on each support initiative. For instance, Drawing on the work of Kirkpatrick, who identified the four important levels of any evaluation of support, it should be possible to ask the coordinators of the support (or the new regional coordinators) the following four questions (i.e. these four questions could provide the basis of a simple one-page report on each support initiative:

- Reaction to the support (Did they like it?),
- Learning from the support (Did they learn?),
- Impact of support on behaviour (Did they use it?), and
- Results that can be attributed to the support (Did it make a difference?).

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[53] This particular point is well known within DWAF and is discussed in several quarterly reports such as DWAF (May 2006) "Analysis of water and sanitation

372. In addition to helping the programme get a better picture of the effectiveness of support these four questions could be used to standardize a quality assurance process within the programme. The answers to these four questions, once aggregated across WSAs, WSPs and so on, or even across the whole programme, would soon provide documented evidence on which types of support were working and which types of support were not and subsequently should no longer be implemented.

373. *Score*: Although the evidence suggests that support has been effective, there nevertheless remain areas of concern, for this reason effectiveness should be scored **3 out of 4**.

374. **Efficiency**: Typically when assessing the efficiency of sector support one would want to know unpack whether the resources provided delivered the expected results at an acceptable cost. Within the private sector many companies have come to realise that capacity building, skills training and so on is of significant benefit to the bottom line of any company. Cost effectiveness and competitive advantage are two important areas where skills development can make the difference. Moreover, linking support to strategic business goals has a clear impact on productivity and profitability. In addition, companies that target the right type of support across the whole business typically get more out of their support efforts.

375. Importantly however, there is strong evidence to suggest that increasing the amount spent on support is insufficient to improve performance but rather there has to be a clear alignment between the culture of the organisation which emphasises investment in skills and training and the overall goals of the organisation. There are two distinct approaches typically used by companies to perform a cost-benefit analysis of the training to ensure that the organisation is getting a return on its investment. Both approaches allow a business to determine whether capacity building costs can reduce operating costs (e.g. wastage or downtime) or working capital (such as inventory), and as result enhance operating profit. The first is relatively straightforward as it simply plots inputs (such as training costs) versus outputs (goods produced). The second, albeit far more complex, does at least provide a better analysis of the financial impact of training on the organisation. One example of this approach is the Economic Value Added (EVA) model[54]..

376. Unfortunately it is almost impossible to make the same calculation within the public sector for a number of obvious reasons: one, it is extremely difficult to place value on many outcomes of the public sector (e.g. can we place a realistic financial value on good governance, functioning WSAs and WSPs and so on); secondly, it is almost impossible to quantify the production costs of certain government operations; and thirdly, the complex nature of aspects

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delivery and local government suport for the fourth quarter" (January to March 2006).

[54] Simply put, EVA is the amount of money made over and above the cost of money invested in the business, including the cost of capacity building initiatives. The formula would obviously have to first isolate the other dependent variables that may have led to the reduction of production costs

of service delivery (such as the provision of water) involve so many different role players it would be extremely difficult to isolate the reasons for any improvement in productivity to a single event such as institutional support. Thus it comes as no surprise that there are few, if any, studies within the public sector which demonstrate in financial terms the benefits of empowering their staff. One is therefore left to surmise, based on experiences in the private sector, that when support meets the following objectives, it undoubtedly adds value:

- ❑ There is a clear link between support and the strategic goals of an organisation;
- ❑ The support is based on a needs analysis which takes into account the strengths, weaknesses, potential, development needs and aspirations of every employee;
- ❑ It is clear within the sector the competencies, skills and knowledge required for each job;
- ❑ There is a functioning performance management system which ensures that team and individual goals are aligned with the overall strategy and that such a system promotes ownership and accountability for the goals of the strategy; and
- ❑ There are appropriate levels of compensation and grading to reward and incentivise employees who undergo appropriate capacity building programmes.

377. What one cannot do, or certainly not without undertaking an exhaustive financial study (this study would need to include identifying the work flow in departments, providing an accurate costing of the different components that make up service delivery,

and then attaching some economic value to the deliverables) is to provide an accurate quantifiable value of support within MSB II.

378. Nevertheless, one can still arguably provide a qualitative assessment of the value-add of training, Interviews completed as part of this review, the case studies and other qualitative information gathered suggest at the very least there is a strong desire across the programme to ensure a return on the money invested in training. Moreover, the approach used emphasise the need for identifying needs prior to the conducting of the support which will certainly ensure cost efficiencies and value for money.

Figure 52 Expenditure across strategic objectives

379. Expenditure patterns for KFA 12 (Institutional Support) also provide evidence of efficiencies within the programme. An analysis of spending during MSB II informs us that R212 million was spent on this particular programme, which accounts for 16% overall MSB II expenditure. Within KFA 12 R133 million was spent on KFA 12.1[55] which accounts for 63% of KFA 12 expenditure (see graph above).

380. The two provinces where expenditure was greatest were in Limpopo (R52 million) and the Eastern Cape (R49 million), which accounts for almost half (47%) of KFA 12 expenditure. Whilst this data confirms the widespread view that where support was most needed was Limpopo and the Eastern Cape, as can be seen in the graph below, the expenditure patterns per strategic objective vary enormously. For instance, Limpopo and Mpumalanga have spent significant portions of the allocated resources on KFA 12.3[56] compared with other provinces. KwaZulu Natal has spent its portion primarily on KFA 12.2[57] and provinces such as the Western Cape and the Northern Cape have allocated their resources to KFA 12.1. Whilst some may argue that this is a positive finding as it suggests that provinces are spending on support for identified needs, it is also possible (and the WSSS hints at this) that expenditure is not following clearly identified needs and priorities within regions but is rather being implemented on an ad hoc basis and that the expenditure pattern confirms this.

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[55] To support Water Sector Institutions to fulfil their respective functions and become sustainable
[56] To determine competencies, standards and acreditation in in conjunction with LGWA, SETA and SAQA.
[57] To align and coordinate National Capacity Building and Trainiing awareness programmes.

381. Thus whilst it is difficult to provide a precise economic value to utilization of the newly acquired skills and ultimately an improvement in the services being delivered one nevertheless gets the sense that there has been an improvement, delivery is now more effective and thus the support can be seen to have added value.

Figure 53: Expenditure across provinces by strategic objectives

382. Nevertheless, the full extent to which the transfer of skills impacts on service delivery is difficult to identify. However, rather than shy

away from simply saying it is too difficult to assess whether training is providing a return on the money invested in it and therefore MSB cannot strive for efficiency, we strongly recommend instead that the series of controls as identified in the WSSS (2007) be implemented which we know will ensure that the programme derives more economic value from the support. These controls should include:

- Ensuring that the need for support is sufficiently justified and its intended outputs and impact clearly identified;

- The right trainees are recruited to attend the capacity building programmes

- Core competencies required agency-wide or across the sector may be better handled through in-house or cross sector training. This will cut down on costs incurred by each department organising a similar course e.g. M&E, Planning and Budgeting training.

- Putting in place a mechanism to limit the duplication of courses

383. *Score*: Without all the evidence to declare the programme efficient we will nevertheless score efficiency a **3 out of 4** as there are grounds for the programme to argue that support is adding considerable value to the beneficiaries of the support .

384. **Impact**: Evidence from the case studies and the surveys suggests that MSB II has achieved its stated purpose with regards to institutional support. In particular certain initiatives are seen by the managers within the WSAs and WSPs as having more impact than

others. The graph below reports on the rating provided my managers of the different initiatives

Figure 54: Rating of initiatives to support WSAs

385. Ultimately, the impact of the institutional support can be found in two sets of information already highlighted in this report. The first set speaks to the backlog issue. Whilst not wanting to repeat what

has already been discussed at length in this report. The very fact that considerable progress has been made on this issue, regardless of the political and social imperatives, strongly suggests that many previously dysfunctional municipalities have been empowered, through a plethora of institutional support initiatives, to make these substantial gains.

386. The second set of data can be found in the discussion around the beneficiary survey. The survey found that more than half the beneficiaries (56%) felt that since 1994 the level of water service had improved with only about one in ten households (13%) felt that it had got worse. In terms of sanitation service delivery, as has been noted throughout this report, far fewer respondents had seen an improvement (37%) than those who had seen an improvement in level of water service. Nevertheless, there is a big difference between those who saw an improvement in sanitation service delivery since 1994 (37%) than respondents who felt the situation had got worse (20%). This finding also suggests that the impact of institutional support is beginning to be realised as the beneficiaries of water and sanitation services have noted that service delivery is improving.

387. These two sets of data whilst highlighting the positive impact of institutional support also draw attention to challenges that the support will need to address. In particular, as discussed earlier in the report, beneficiaries of water and sanitation services remain critical of the quality of the water (20% felt is was sometimes to never clean), the supply (34% stated it was insufficient), quality

control measures (48% were not aware of their water being tested regularly), and of a range of basic sanitation services (approximately four out of five households reported that toilets were not regularly inspected, broken toilets were not repaired and so on). All of these issues speak to key operational and maintenance functions that many municipalities are not performing

388. *Score*: Evidence suggests that sector wide support has had considerable impact on service delivery, albeit that aspects of operations and maintenance remain problematic. Despite these problems we would suggest a **4 out of 4 for impact**.

389. **Sustainability**: To ensure greater sustainability and ultimately to achieve sustainability with regards to WSAs and WSPs the WSSS has outlined a comprehensive plan to attaining sustainability. Moreover, the WS Provider Support Implementation Plan seeks to ground this sustainability by outlining a comprehensive plan which will lead to the empowerment of empowering providers, particularly in their O&M roles and responsibilities.

390. However, a key aspect of any sustainable support strategy is an exit strategy[58]. Such a strategy outlines the manner in which external support and/or expertise will be withdrawn. This process helps manage the dependency that can develop amongst beneficiaries of

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[58] For a comprehensive discussion of exit strategies within the South African context see Kerscher, T., Nell, M. & Louw (December 2006). "A study to identify best practice models of ODA support to capacity development in South Africa". Unpublished final report for National Treasury.

support. The WSSS is silent on this important aspect of support, a major gap as exit strategies work best when developed at the outset rather than the end of a programme.

391. Score: The absence of an exit strategy or at least a process whereby exit strategies will be developed at regional level to signal the eventual withdrawing of support suggests a score of **3 out 4** despite the strength of the WSSS in mapping out how it will strive for sustainability.

392. **Summary and Recommendations**: A recent World Bank evaluation study of institutional support/ capacity building initiatives across Africa found the following:

Most capacity support remains fragmented. Most capacity building support is designed and managed operation by operation. This makes it difficult to capture cross-sector issues, and to learn lessons across operations. Many capacity building activities are founded on inadequate needs assessments and lack appropriate sequencing of measures aimed at institutional and organizational change and individual skill building.
Sector-specific capacity building strategies need strengthening. The sectoral challenges reflect variations in such factors as the power of interested groups, and the labor intensity and decentralization of service provision. More effort should be devoted to deriving lessons along sectoral dimensions and fostering country-led capacity building planning within sector programs.
Tools and instruments could be more effectively and fully utilized. Technical assistance and training have often proved ineffective in helping to build sustained public sector capacity. Moreover, programmatic support has been more effective in enhancing strategic planning than in improving sector management and service delivery.
Quality assurance is inadequate Although capacity building is a stated priority, most activities lack standard quality assurance processes at the design stage, and capacity building interventions are not routinely tracked, monitored, and evaluated.

393. Whilst the four key points from the World Bank study have some resonance with MSB II, the most important point to take away from the World Banks study is that the Sector Support provided within MSB II is remarkably effective in comparison with similar initiatives in other sector wide programmes in Africa. For this reason sector wide support was scored a **3.5 out of 4 overall**.

394. The findings from the World Bank study, and confirmed in this evaluation, underscore the importance of treating sector wide support as a core objective and ensuring that the support is country-owned, results-oriented, and evidence-based. The evaluation recommends that: DWAF, at the national level, should strengthen its knowledge base and amplify its capacity building framework across the sector to help WSAs and WSPs a) prioritize their own regional capacity needs and thus capacity building activities; b) link institutional, organizational, and human capacity developments; and c) transform traditional capacity building tools (such as training) to improve results.

395. It should also ensure that guidelines and processes are in place for self- and independent evaluation of sector support. Sector and thematic leadership should develop sector-specific guidance on diagnosing public sector capacity needs, enhancing incentives for sector performance improvements, and monitoring and evaluating interventions. They should also ensure that all operations that aim to build sector wide capacity are based on adequate assessments of capacity needs and have ways to monitor, and evaluate results.

396. It was beyond the scope of this review to determine the extent of organisational impact on support, other than to note that for sector wide support initiatives to have the best possible impact on the WSAs and WSPs, this factor cannot be ignored. So even though the review has found that support has for the majority had a positive impact on both the beneficiaries of the support and their relevant organisations, it alone is not sufficient to ensure skills transfer. Where the organisational culture is not conducive to receiving support, implementing newly acquired skills and so on, alternatives need to be considered to allow support to reach its full potential impact. Post-training support or addressing the lack of resources, for example, may enhance the impact of support significantly.

397. Two final suggestions that the those managing sector wide support should build upon. The first speaks to strengthening "learning communities", the second addresses the need for a coherent change management strategy. "Learning communities" is a concept that the sector already has experience in (referred to in the Water Services Sector Support Strategy as Peer Networks and the Knowledge management system discussed previously under Peer Exchanges and learning journeys), and should be given greater prominence and supported.

398. The idea behind the concept is that the familiar struggle slogan "each one teach one". Considerable recent education research has shown that peer tutoring/mentoring has two positive spin offs – the tutor/trainer learns more/understands concepts better as they lead the training, and the recipient of the training is likely to be more responsive and hence more likely to acquire skills from their peer than from an "outsider".

399. A practical way to do this in the sector is to focus initially on a few agencies who currently meet or are close to meeting existing norms and standards, and then over time create "learning communities" whereby neighbouring agencies with particular problems spend time with the "leaders in the field"[59]. Using existing regional structures provinces could be divided into geographically manageable areas[60] whereby 5 to 10 "exemplar agencies" be supported who in turn will be expected to work with agencies surrounding them.

400. DWAF, as sector leader, are well aware that a one-dimensional approach to institutional support was unlikely to succeed and hence why a multi-faceted approach was embarked upon. Moreover, the recently developed support strategy makes this

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[59] It is correctly noted in the WSSS (2007: 24) that this "twinning arrangement is not sufficient on its own" as it can lead to inconsistent approaches being used, overburdening WSPs that can barely cope and so on. But, as noted in the WSSS, if this is well coordinated and overseen by national and is part of a coordinated approach to sector support "learning communities" are likely to provide more support than hindrance to the sector.

[60] Any number of other selection criteria could also be used – e.g. ranking all agencies based on a needs analysis, or using a sample of the municipalities (ones that are both water services authorities and water services providers) Project Consolidate has prioritised. The key is to agree on a selection process upfront and one that is acceptable to all those working in the sector.

abundantly clear. However, as also noted in the MSB III proposal, there is also need for a coherent change management strategy to be put in place. Whilst there a many different ways to embarking on such change, we would argue that whatever approach is used it must have the following dimensions embedded within it.

	Focus on the "functional – rational dimension"	Focus on the "political dimension"
Focus on factors within the sector	Gets the job done (such as new structures, guidelines, technology, training and so on)	Getting the power balance right and accommodating political interests (such as hiring, promoting or even firing staff, providing targeted support and so on)
Focus on factors in the external environment	Creating an enabling environment for doing the job (such as revising existing regulations, strengthening the M&E system and so on)	Forcing change in the internal power relations (strengthening cross cutting issues such as gender, promoting staff equity, empowering CSOs and so on)

Table 29 Four key aspects of promoting change[61]

401.   The table above emphasises that a change management strategy must not focus simply on functional-rational internal aspects of the

programme. It also warns against assuming that support to "transactional changes" in a "task-work" system will have a wider impact unless the context, in particular the political terrain, is conducive to change.

> *"Change typically involves conflict about authority and power. A feasible change strategy must be based on an intimate knowledge of the arenas in which such conflicts play out as well as of allies and opponents. Change management includes managing opposition, creating and heralding quick wins, taking advantage of opportune moments, and putting together and maintaining a supportive coalition….the challenge for any change strategy is to arrive at an appropriate (context specific) balance of incentives and power in favour of change, outside and inside the organisations developing capacity"* (Bosen, 2005: 23).

402.   A final word on support. Provision needs to be not merely broadly relevant to WSAs, WSPs and others – but also identified by recipients as a current priority need. This is important to ensure that support is not 'dumped' but is targeted to areas of need and demand, the most fertile ground in which to locate it.

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[61] Adapted from Bosen (2005: 21).

Transfers

403. The programme to transfer the operation and maintenance responsibilities of DWAF water schemes from DWAF to appropriate water services institutions will be evaluated. The effectiveness of the process will be analysed including the following aspects:
   - Refurbishment of schemes to meet safety requirements and full functionality
   - Staff transfers and the impact on operation and maintenance capacity in municipalities.

404. Transfers, although dealt with specifically in this section, need to be more broadly understood in the context of asset management strategies. Given that transfers include technology and schemes inherited from pre-1994, O&M and asset management strategies need to factor in the entire gamut of assets, pre- and post-1994.

Introduction

405. The Information for this review was collected through:
   - Telephonic Interviews with 22 municipalities that are WSAs and took transfer of schemes from DWAF including 8 DMs and 14 LMs.
   - One on one interviews with relevant officials at 6 WSAs and some Provincial and National DWAF personnel involved in the management of the transfer processes.

406. The transfer of water scheme infrastructure and staff from the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) to the relevant Water Service Authorities and Water Service Providers has gathered momentum since the enactment of the "powers and functions" in July 2003. The Municipal Systems Act (32 of 2000) requires that all Water Service Authorities take ownership of water services assets and together with their own staff, transferred DWAF staff and employees currently providing the service to various communities, engage in a process of establishing Water Service Providers (WSPs) that will ensure the provision of sustainable water services in the area under their jurisdiction.

407. The scope of such transfers from DWAF to Municipalities is indicated in below:

	SCHEMES (number)	VALUE (R m)	STAFF (number)
EC	35	655	995
FS	5	416	5
GP	4	84.3	0
KZN	43	473	226
LP	184	2603	6061
MP	15	992	853
NC	4	423	46
NW	29	978	0
WC	3	42	0

Table 30: Details of DWAF transfers to municipalities (by province) (source: Mvula Trust)

408. The majority of schemes, staff and value of assets to be transferred correlate closely with the areas that previously fell under the jurisdiction of the former "homelands and self governing states" of the apartheid era.

Figure 55: Former "Homelands and Self Governing Territories"

409.   It should be noted that the "independent homelands" of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC) had nominally more governance autonomy than the Self Governing Territories and were required to be more self sufficient in matters of governance. It is notable that the current boundaries of the Eastern Cape include the largest contiguous homeland of the former Transkei as well as the former Ciskei. The reality is that after 1994 DWAF was expected to assimilate the water services of these homelands into a single National Department. At that stage, some of the departments to be assimilated were over-staffed, lacking in particular technical skills, and many schemes in the field were effectively dysfunctional.

410. It is interesting to note the distribution and scale of transfers required of the current administration.

Percentage of National Transfers

Figure 56: Provincial Transfer of Water Services from DWAF

411. Notably Limpopo has the largest number of schemes, staff and asset value to be transferred. It should however be noted that the ratio of staff to number of schemes and asset value is significantly higher than other provinces similarly receiving a significant transfer of DWAF schemes, namely Mpumalanga, Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. These four provinces receiving such large transfers correlate closely with the concentration of former homelands and Self Governing Territories shown earlier.

412. It is however suspected that the number of schemes described above excludes a large number of small stand-alone schemes that would typically be:
   - Boreholes or springs
   - Pumped by a windmill, diesel powered pump or gravity fed
   - Feeding a single reservoir
   - Few taps widely spaced within the residential area or indeed only at the reservoir.

413. A case in point is the Eastern Cape were 35 schemes are indicated as transferred whereas the single area of Intsika Yethu LM, a non-WSA LM within the Chris Hani DM, has 96 such stand-alone schemes to be transferred.

Transferring DWAF's problems?

414. It must be noted that most municipalities felt that the transfer process had been foisted on them and that it had been politically driven with only 18% of respondents in the survey disagreeing with the statement "The WSA was forced to take transfer". Asked if they thought transfers were politically driven, 59% of WSA Managers whose WSA had taken over transferred schemes, agreed or strongly agreed. This will naturally result in a less than enthusiastic approach to the process, which DWAF should predict and accommodate.

415. One of the Municipal officials interviewed even expressed sympathy with the DWAF provincial staff, noting that they were also "under pressure to make things happen". The transfer process was the logical extension of the transformation of government that placed the local sphere in the engine room of service provision, but there is a very clear – though not universal – perception that in the water sector, the process was rushed, and that DWAF transferred everything – the good, the bad and the ugly – leaving the local sphere to take care of them all.

Figure 57: 'We didn't want to take ownership of schemes but we had to do so' (WSA Managers whose WSA had taken over transfers)

416. But – some may say in typical DWAF fashion – the municipalities understand that they have been given a challenge, and many have risen to that challenge, with two-thirds (68%) indicating that the transfers have had a positive effect on them. Very few felt that the transfer had had a negative effect on the municipality. The challenge of course is ensuring that municipalities not only feel that the transfers had a positive impact on their sphere, but that they can maintain the schemes transferred.

Figure 58: 'Transfers had a positive effect on my WSA?' (WSA Managers whose WSA had taken over transfers)

Infrastructure

417. Most of the schemes that have been identified for transfer were developed under the era of the homeland governments. They are therefore old and in many cases prone to breakdowns and interruptions in service. Interviews with various respondents from DWAF and the municipalities indicated that these schemes are not performing well and have received inadequate maintenance in the past. This would imply that the transfer of schemes will place an additional - but also challenging - O&M burden on municipalities.

Figure 59: The technical status of transferred schemes (WSA Managers whose WSA had taken over transfers)

418. Most surveyed WSA's stated that "schemes were of an adequate technical standard" but agreed that there were needs for refurbishment. Given that the need for adequate (i.e. significantly improved) O&M – especially maintenance – is a core theme of this evaluation, this is no small point and must be built into planning and budgeting.

419. It has been stated elsewhere in this report, and was noted in most face-to-face interviews, that municipalities are facing onerous O&M challenges and struggling to cope with them. In the section on operations and maintenance we reproduce a report produced by Mbombela Municipality that shows how transferred schemes may be nominally operational but effectively dysfunctional in terms of the service that is rendered. In interview the municipal official indicated that he suspected that "water losses" to be of the order of 70%.[62] Other interviews indicated that repair of breakdowns at various schemes were not effected within acceptable time periods by the municipalities now providing the service.

420. Interviews also revealed that both DWAF and municipal officials were much more in touch with the circumstances of the large regional schemes whereas it was difficult to get any definitive information on the numerous stand-alone schemes that are known to exist but, that have received very little attention in the past. It is recognised that they generally have been poorly maintained, but specific information on infrastructure status was basically unavailable at a management level. This is a matter of concern.

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[62] This may not be as bad a figure as at first glance – see Still D. (2006) *Understanding real leakage rates from water reticulation: implications for the planning and design of rural water supply systems* (WISA paper, mimeo).

421. Individual DWAF field based employees probably do have information on the specific schemes but there has been no systematic reporting system in place that would enable the production of management level information reports. In some cases consultants have been appointed to survey all of the schemes and to produce reports on the refurbishment needs. It is clearly imperative that accurate status data are available on all DWAF assets.

422. It was noted by 86% of WSA Managers surveyed telephonically (whose WSA had taken ownership of transferred schemes) that sufficient funds were received from DWAF for the refurbishment of schemes. However when interviewed, most officials expressed a need for additional funding. Given the information gaps identified above, this is perhaps predictable, since the exact number of schemes and size of the total transfers remains blurry.

423. Many of the schemes are not able to provide an RDP level of service, since most of these schemes were constructed over the past 30 years. The increase in population coupled with the fact that design standards at that time were very different from the RDP guidelines of today, has resulted in the continued existence of schemes that may never be able to deliver at a currently acceptable level. This creates a situation for WSAs where a scheme may require O&M funding and support but at the same time that area is still counted as part of the backlog.

424. An official at a District Municipality in the Eastern Cape noted that they had requested DWAF to undertake the necessary refurbishment themselves and to then go through a handover process as one would do for a newly constructed project. It was significant, he felt, this request had been refused. The arrangement being that the schemes should first be transferred and DWAF would then provide the funding for refurbishment needs. Such an arrangement clearly puts a further burden on municipalities that are already challenged in terms of fulfilling their O&M responsibilities.

425. On the other hand, it is necessary that municipalities recognise the need to develop effective strategies to fulfil their ongoing operational responsibilities and depart from treating every activity as a project, with a beginning and an end. Activities, such as the transfers, should become activities functioning within an environment of sustainable operations. The methodology of project implementation will then be set by the operational requirements rather than the other way round.

426. At present the weaker municipal O&M departments are having their agenda set for them by entities such as MIG, PMUs and indeed the DWAF transfer unit.

Staffing

427. Clearly the transferring of numerous, often remotely situated, water schemes to municipalities will necessitate the rapid development of organisational capacity in terms of staff, systems, procedures, etc. Municipalities receiving transfers are also most likely to be situated in locales with vast rural areas where the service backlog is being rapidly addressed. Such municipalities therefore have a rapidly increasing operational responsibility.

428. Two-thirds (68%) of WSA Managers (whose WSA had taken over transfers) agreed that 'the staff transferred from DWAF had an adequate range of technical skills' – a fifth (18%) rejected the statement, suggesting that the process should not be regarded as 'ended' and a degree of flexibility is required to review what has been done, where the gaps still exist, and how to fill them.

Figure 60: Attitudes to staff transfers (WSA Managers whose WSA had taken over transfers)

Staffing and capacity emerged as the major challenge facing the success of the transfer process and was a recurrent theme in interviews conducted. In

429. Figure 60 there are many positive responses – but not shown are the negative responses to questions about the technical and management skills of staff transferred from DWAF, reinforcing the previously made point, that the transfer process needs on-going review and correction as required.

Figure 61: Were too many staff transferred? (WSA Managers whose WSA had taken over transfers)

430. It was identified that municipalities felt that a sufficient number of staff were transferred but that the spread of skills was not adequate. Many WSAs (54%) felt that, in fact, too many staff were being transferred which would clearly place a management as well as financial burden on them in time to come. What matters is having the right number of the right staff with the right skills – numbers alone are not a solution.

431. Telephonic interviews revealed that 25% of WSA Managers who have taken over transfers felt that the transferred employees do not have adequate technical skills and 24% felt that inadequate management skills were being made available. The temptation is to focus on the higher percentage where capacity is identified as adequate but a situation where one quarter of all areas do not receive a sustainable service is clearly unacceptable. The lack of specific technical (millwrights and electricians) and management skills was raised as a significant point of concern in the Eastern Cape by a number of municipalities and DWAF officials.

432. Interviewed officials also noted that the administration of transferring pensions, accumulated leave and the like has been a difficult challenge. Clearly staff members of any organisation will be extremely sensitive to errors on such issues. This along with the normalisation of posts and salary scales has added to the tension around transfers.

433. It was also noted in an interview that certain municipalities had not been able to accommodate the additional administrative burden of transferred staff and had to request DWAF to pay the salaries of staff on their behalf in the first month after transfer.

Operations

434. The handing over of the operational responsibility was satisfactorily handled in most areas, with municipalities expressing satisfaction with the functionality of schemes. Operational records were supplied for the majority (64%) of schemes as were drawings and manuals (77%). This is a satisfactory finding.

435. In contrast, in the Eastern Cape there was a strong feeling among municipal officials that transferred schemes were not operational - and that DWAF was aware of this but proceeding regardless. It was noted in interviews with both municipal and DWAF provincial personnel that no operational records were handed over on any of the schemes. This would indicate that DWAF themselves never really got on top of the operational challenge that they inherited after 1994. This is a highly unsatisfactory finding.

436. As indicated above there was no specified list of handover checks and inspections to be done before transfer. This will have resulted in municipalities being unsure of the functionality of schemes prior to transfer. Clearly those municipalities that did receive O&M records/reports, as well as drawings/manuals, have greater confidence in the functionality of schemes they inherited.

437. Health and safety as well as environmental concerns did not receive much attention during the transfer process. None of the interviewees was able to confirm the existence of health and safety plans, as required by legislation. This is a less than satisfactory finding. The issue of inappropriate disposal of sludge from treatment works was raised as a concern by a municipal employee.

Conclusion

438. As a result of the creation of a democratic national government in 1994, DWAF inherited a situation with many problems. Old homeland water supply schemes were already in a state of disrepair and organisations previously charged with the operation thereof were in some cases effectively dysfunctional. Unfortunately there are cases where not much improvement has taken place in the intervening period. It is therefore not surprising that WSAs feel that this process is being forced upon them and that some may even have adopted a strategy of delaying this responsibility as long as possible.

439. While DWAF offers to assist with refurbishment and is apparently providing sufficient funding for this, transferred schemes will continue to pose challenges since they are being handed over to O&M departments of municipalities that are already struggling to fulfil the function on schemes of their own as well as new MIG funded infrastructure. Former DWAF infrastructure has now to be added to the growing asset base – all requiring M&E and O&M.

440. The practical implications of transfers will be felt in terms of O&M responsibilities and the Human Resource administration by the receiving municipalities. It has however been repeatedly noted that municipalities are lacking in systems (financial, technical, HR, etc). Often the Human Resource implications of transfer are such that WSA/WSP departments will increase in size by many multiples. It is not surprising that WSAs may have reservations about taking transfer when they themselves are aware of this challenge and perhaps see it as setting themselves up for failure.

441. While the telephonic surveys and interviews with officials indicate that there are better and some worse performing municipalities, it was noted by a national DWAF official that "all municipalities were in the same boat". The problems being lack of skills, both technical and management, as well as a lack of systems and a lack of appropriate leadership.

442. The ability to continue funding the operations of transferred schemes and the salaries of transferred staff is a concern expressed by municipalities. It would appear that the financial arrangements around decreasing operating subsidies and increasing equitable share have been explained to municipalities but a sense of distrust was evident in interviews with officials. Such feelings will of course be exacerbated by the fact that while funding is provided as a subsidy it is under the control of technical departments since it is ring-fenced for water services. Once it is provided as equitable share they will have no direct control and adequate funding for O&M may not be provided. It was also raised as a concern by

municipalities – that they face similar challenges relating to 'other' transfers such as the responsibility for towns, as a result of section 78 decisions and schemes inherited from other departments (such as Public Works), parastatals (such as Transnet) and others.

443. The relevance of transfers of course scores very high, effectiveness slightly less so because of provincial and other differences. Efficiency drops again, as demonstrated. The impact has been very positive from the perspective of WSAs, but has also added to their existing O&M load. And this directly affects sustainability, which gets the lowest score of all 5 criteria, in response to the enormous O&M challenges facing WSAs and WSPs.

Gender mainstreaming

444. Gender mainstreaming is one of the cross-cutting issues in the Masibambane II programme. The terms of reference (TOR) indicate that the "gender" approach is not concerned with women per se, but with the social construction of gender and the assignment of specific roles, responsibilities and expectations to women and to men.

445. Fine sentiments – but, as this chapter shows, most people working in the sector equate gender with women; equate gender mainstreaming with women working on projects or on Project Steering Committees; little if any progress has been made since the MTR; and gender remains alive through the hard work of some dedicated individuals, but is unsustainable in the long run, without significant changes. The situation is less than satisfactory – and would be regarded as highly unsatisfactory were if not for the hard work of those committed individuals.

446. The definition of gender mainstreaming provided in the previous mid-term review was used here too, drawn from various sources:

> *To create a safe enabling environment in the water and sanitation services sector for women and men to participate equally in realising their full potential and put in place mechanisms to facilitate equal access to resources and opportunities in a fair and just manner at all levels. The emphasis must be to facilitate the full participation of women, youth, the physically challenged*

> *and the voiceless poor male, in equal and active decision making and service delivery, so that effective sustainable social and economic empowerment can take place.[63]*

447. Other literature indicates that gender mainstreaming is about unequal access to power and resources and at its core is an understanding that change is only possible if unequal power relations between women and men are transformed.[64]

448. The previous mid-term review also indicated a number of successes that had been achieved with relation to gender mainstreaming in the sector as well as a number of challenges that still had to be addressed in relation to gender mainstreaming.

449. Amongst the key challenges facing DWAF were that (1) gender mainstreaming as a concept was not well understood, (2) DWAF had no person entrusted with promoting the concept in the department but at the time of the review recruitment and appointment processes for appointing a Director were in place.

450. Key amongst the successes was the fact that at the time of the mid-term review, DWAF (through a consultant) was in the process of writing a National Implementation Strategy for

[63] Sources: South African Constitution, United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, CEDAW

[64] Plowman, P. (2001) 'From the wings to centre stage: the challenges of gender m ainstreaming' in *Development Update* Vol. 3 No. 4 July 2001, pp.167-184.

Gender Mainstreaming. The mid-term review criticised the fact that the strategy had not been finalised yet but the fact that there was a policy guideline in the pipelines was attributed as a success.

Methodology

451. In this evaluation we did not conduct a full gender analysis, which was beyond the scope and resources available to the evaluation team. Rather, the evaluation focuses on the current situation as well as in-roads that have been made in the programme in relation to gender mainstreaming. We aimed and focused on DWAF Head Office and those provinces we could access, in particular, to assess how much work had done since the last review. This was counter posed with field visits, and the surveys of WSA Managers and of beneficiaries of infrastructure with direct benefits.

452. To assess the current status of gender mainstreaming as a cross-cutting issue, we conducted face to face in-depth interviews with relevant individuals at DWAF head office as well as telephonic interviews with gender coordinators at provincial level. The WSA survey provided information on the Water Services Authorities whilst the beneficiary survey provided information on workers and sector service beneficiaries at project level.

453. There are two main limitations that we faced. The first limitation is that attempts to speak to all the gender coordinators at provincial level were unsuccessful because of the public sector strike that took place during the fieldwork phase of the evaluation, compounding generally difficult access.

The second limitation is that at head office three out of four people interviewed were new in their positions and therefore could only provide us with limited information.

Qualitative findings

454. In-depth interviews held with DWAF staff members indicate that the empowerment of women (not gender mainstreaming) has been high on the agenda in the department since the Minister came on board. Even prior to the Implementation Strategy being drawn up, DWAF required 30% female representation on decision making committees at project level. The respondent mentioned that where contractors did not apply the thirty percent rule, then DWAF applied punitive measures so that consultants would comply.

455. We were informed that the first group of Water Councillors came from "all those project steering committees"[65], which was regarded – fairly – as an indirect success of the Department. The respondent mentioned that drawing up the strategy was a major success, but also pointed to a limitation in that "it is not conclusive in that it is biased towards the water services programme".[66]

456. The previous Minister was passionate about promoting issues of gender. The current Minister has also emphasised issues of women's empowerment, and has put women high on her agenda – not the same as gender. Perhaps this is an understandable reaction to the very real challenges that seem

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[65] Interview with Rosetta Simelane, DWAF Head Office, 15 June 2007.
[66] Interview with Rosetta Simelane, DWAF Head Office, 15 June 2007.

to be in the way of realising gender equality of achieving mainstreaming.

457. The creation of the Directorate: Gender and Disability and the appointment of a Director, is also attributed to her. The Director was appointed last year and the directorate is currently staffed with two individuals, the Director and her deputy. We were informed that a third person had been appointed and would start in July 2007.

458. It appears a number of initiatives have taken place since the creation of the Gender and Disability directorate. The Director informed that since her appointment she has conducted an audit internally to identify the needs of women in particular and where women are positioned. (The results of the audit have not been finalised yet.) She has also drawn up an organogram (which is in draft form) for the Department, which is currently with the Director General for perusal. The Director for Gender and Disability mentioned that although the directorate has been in place for a year, in the first year there was no allocated budget for the unit. She also mentioned that for the current year, she had proposed a budget but was told to cut it.[67]

459. Some respondents mentioned that some training has been conducted in the past, spearheaded by former Deputy Director General (DDG) Barbara Schreiner. The former DDG is said to have played a crucial role in sensitising the Department in relation to gender mainstreaming, especially at senior levels.

We were also informed that previously there was a male forum in DWAF and the forum was established to support initiatives around gender issues. However, respondents mentioned that the forum only concentrated on issues of women abuse "which in itself was not a bad thing"[68]. The forum had ceased to exist, "it went on for two years but just died a natural death"[69]. Currently, some efforts were being made to revive the forum.

460. Respondents indicated that whilst a number of initiatives have been introduced/taken up by the Department there was still a lot to be done at national level especially the training and sensitising of senior managers. As the Director put it, the buy-in of all managers is important. This she mentioned as something very critical because without the support of senior management, all the efforts being made would fall flat. In this regard it is worth noting the widespread concern that the National Strategy has not been rolled out to provinces as yet and it has not been signed off by the Minister.

461. Targeting top management/managers and creating awareness is an important initiative; but caution needs to be exercised. Literature on gender mainstreaming indicates that selecting a few individuals to undergo training may prove inadequate especially where you have to create a shift in critical thinking regarding social relations and provide the support to achieve seismic changes in resource distribution (for example the

[67] Interview with Ntsiki Magazi, DWAF Head Office, 7 June 2007.

[68] Interview with Rosetta Simelane, DWAF Head Office, 15 June 2007.
[69] Interview with Rosetta Simelane, DWAF Head Office, 15 June 2007.

budget), hierarchies, rules and practices.[70] Training should happen across all the directorates within DWAF and the sector more broadly – those at the top need to be supported by corresponding changes at the base.

462. And these are not unimportant gains, and we do not wish to under-emphasise them at all. We note elsewhere the challenges of changing the direction of a 'super tanker' like DWAF, and all these efforts are important in helping nudge it in the right direction. But without full-scale senior support, including political support, a robust budget, a monitoring system and good indicators to measure progress and inform management accordingly, gender will permanently remain outside, knocking on the door, asking to be allowed in.

463. The Director for Gender and Disability is seen as someone who can champion gender issues within the department and to ensure that all other programmes also encompass principles of gender equality. However, some respondents mentioned that if a single individual is tasked with championing gender issues, others do not see the need and when the champion leaves then all the work done is in vain. Literature shows that mainstreaming gender in the policy formulation process requires the commitment of politicians and others in power. The Director, by herself, will not open (or knock down) the door to where power is located and key decisions made - although that is exactly where gender needs to be located.

464. Respondents mentioned that some provinces had good programmes in relation to gender mainstreaming and some provinces had drawn up their own Implementation Strategies whilst others are comfortable with using the National Strategy.

465. The assessment on initiatives by head office can be viewed as satisfactory. The initiatives by DWAF are commendable and indicate commitment on the part of the Department. Whether they are full-blown or sops thrown in the direction of political correctness we leave to the reader to decide.

466. There a number of things that still need to be addressed, if gender mainstreaming is to move forward significantly. These include formalising and the rolling out of the Strategy to Provinces. This needs to happen as a matter of urgency. The second issue is that the department needs to set out clear indicators that signal their gender-related goals, and how to measure progress towards achieving those goals; coupled to a robust monitoring system and evaluation strategy. It is deeply unfortunate to find so little progress having been made since the MTR.

The provincial picture

467. Each provincial DWAF office has a gender coordinator. In this review we tried to contact all the gender coordinators from provinces but failed to do so, as indicated earlier.

468. At provincial level, the Eastern Cape and Limpopo provinces were suggested as best practice examples of provinces that have made improvements when it comes to gender mainstreaming. For example, we were told that the Eastern

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[70] Gender, Society & Development. Revisiting gender training, the making and remaking of gender knowledge. A global sourcebook.

Cape "has had a very successful programme that even went to municipalities"[71]. In Limpopo Province we were informed that they are currently conducting a pilot on gender mainstreaming.

469. We were told that North West has developed its own strategy and has also drawn up an action plan which aims to look at all the Water Services Authorities (WSAs) that fall under their districts. This is a very positive initiative and should carefully be watched. The informant mentioned that the North audit within municipalities seeks to establish where women are placed and if they form part of the decision making structures in their municipalities. In other words, it may provide some key components of a gender analysis.

470. The gender coordinator in the Northern Cape indicated that they had drawn up a Business Plan which was largely about advocacy and awareness. They have also held workshops to raise awareness on the concept. The gender coordinator also mentioned that in the process of drawing up their Business Plan they had worked very closely with SALGA and Mvula Trust. The province was also aiming to conduct an audit within their municipalities to look at their procurement policies as well as IDPs.

471. A concern raised, however, is that provinces and some local municipalities (mis)understand the concept to focus on events such as Women's Day and Sixteen Days of Action against women and child abuse, and have taken those as gender mainstreaming. Supporting these events is important – but they

are about women, not gender. And the danger that follows is related to budget allocations, where municipalities in particular were mentioned as not spending allocation on gender mainstreaming or the involvement of civil society organisations.

472. Some of the respondents at national level felt that MIG concentrated on big infrastructure projects and ignored soft issues and reinforced this tendency. The main concern at municipal/project level is to meet MIG employment targets for women – important, of course, but not gender equality-related.

473. It appears that some provinces have done some work in relation to gender mainstreaming. Because we could not get hold of most of the provinces it is difficult to provide a fair assessment. However, it is important that as both national and provincial DWAF offices are drawing up and finalising gender strategies that they also provide guidelines to local municipalities in this regard. This can be done by ensuring that WSAs take seriously the issues of gender mainstreaming.

474. Data gathered from the case studies indicate that issues of gender mainstreaming are low on the agenda at WSA level, at least in the District Municipalities visited. The WSA survey, however, paints a different picture. The next section focuses on WSAs and beneficiary survey.

475. It seems that some provinces are well ahead in relation to their gender mainstreaming programmes in comparison to others. The North West and Northern Cape have already started conducting audits at municipal level. Some of the provinces, such as Limpopo and Eastern Cape are said to be good models

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[71] Interview with Rosetta Simelane, DWAF Head Office, 15 June 2007.

but no tangible results were provided. One respondent at DWAF head office mentioned that they were not sure if these provinces were good only on paper in relation to their strategies.

476. It appears each province is left to draw up its own strategy, using the national strategy as a guideline, though none were available to us. There seem to be weak links between DWAF head office and provincial offices, including weak monitoring links.

477. In other words, gender remains linked to certain key individuals. The strategy has not been formally adopted, and thus cannot inform indicator development, goal-setting or an evaluation strategy. That there is breath still in gender is because of the individuals keeping it breathing – but in the long run this is not sustainable, and remedial action is clearly needed, from the most senior levels downwards.

478. Examples of macro, meso and micro-level issues relevant to a Sector Programme approach include[72] the following. The examples can serve as a guideline in those dealing with gender mainstreaming.

   a. At the macro level, study of society's legal and regulatory framework in order to understand how it affects women's citizenship rights, access to land, credit and material resources, access to contracts and other protections of the legal system, freedom of movement, etc.;

   b. Also at the macro level, study of the government's budget from the point of view of how it impacts on males and females (gender budget analysis);

   c. At the meso level, patterns of paid and unpaid employment among women and men, and how they affect their respective access to services in the sector (considering both monetary and time use implications of employment);

   d. Also at meso level, how the structure of sectoral services (e.g. location of clinics, schools or extension sites; types and levels of user fees; gender composition of service deliverers and decision-makers) affects male and female access to and use of services;

   e. At the micro level, the nature of the typical household division of labour between males and females and its implications for access to resources and hence to services by male and female household members.

WSA and beneficiary surveys

479. The WSA survey was a telephonic survey of WSA Managers. The results of the survey point a far better picture at municipal level in comparison to case study information and in-depth interviews.

480. In the WSA survey we asked questions relating to the institutionalisation of gender mainstreaming within the WSAs. The first question we asked WSAs was whether gender mainstreaming was a component of all of their infrastructure programmes or just the Masibambane programme. Sixty-four percent (64%) of the WSAs mentioned that gender

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[72] Toolkit on mainstreaming gender equality in EC development cooperation.

mainstreaming is a component of all their infrastructure programmes.

481. The above seems to present a positive picture because it shows that gender mainstreaming is not only about Masibambane and does not run the risk the danger of dying once the programme is over. But caution needs to be exercised: as we show below, WSA Managers take gender mainstreaming to mean adhering to MIG female employment quotas, and gender mainstreaming, sadly, is out of the picture. This is very important, since these gender officers can (as with their provincial and national counterparts) be powerful catalysts for raising awareness and paving the way for more appropriate gender mainstreaming.

482. Our case study information confirmed our fears about what WSA Managers meant by gender mainstreaming, but also questioned the results immediately above. In the municipalities visited there was no specific person or unit for gender mainstreaming. Rather, some municipalities indicated that corporate services should deal with gender since corporate services is responsible for human resources. For example, in an interview with a PMU Director in Sisonke Municipality he indicated that "it was the responsibility of consultants to comply"[73] with employment policies and the like. The PMU clearly stated that the district municipality does not have a specific gender policy, but that most targets with relation to labour creation in MIG projects were reached.

483. We asked WSAs if they had a mechanism in place to ensure that gender mainstreaming takes place. Sixty one percent (61%) of WSAs mentioned that they had mechanisms in place to ensure that gender mainstreaming does take place in their municipalities. Case study data shows that some municipalities have no mechanisms at all to ensure that gender mainstreaming takes place and largely emphasise that the relevant quotas be adhered to in both procurement and workers. In Chris Hani district municipality for example, they mentioned that gender issues are provided for in tenders, project steering committees, labour and community based organisations (CBOs).

484. We asked WSAs whether they have a budget for gender mainstreaming training/capacity building. This came closer to the issue – gender mainstreaming, as with any policy issue, needs money to make its way in the world – and is less easily conflated with MIG requirements. Of the WSA Managers surveyed, only 38% said they had a budget for training or capacity building. This is of interest because when conducting in-depth interviews some respondents indicated that at local level allocations for gender mainstreaming are very few if at all.

485. We also asked WSAs whether any monitoring on gender mainstreaming was taking place in the municipalities. Forty two percent (42%) said they have monitoring mechanisms in place. Again, a contrast to the case study information – and anyway referring primarily to MIG data. The visited District Municipalities indicated that they did not monitor gender at all

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[73] Interview with Steve McGregor, PMU Director, Sisonke District

and that if the split on workers for example, was adhered to, that is more than enough. One respondent said "my job is deliver water, not create employment."[74]

486. It appears that adhering to the quotas required by MIG is all that some municipalities are prepared to do. Adherence to quotas is important but equally important is the sensitisation of gender mainstreaming to beneficiaries at project level. It is no secret that sanitation and water especially the fetching of water is largely a responsibility of women and girl children especially in rural settings. The failure to sensitise beneficiaries may affect the programme negatively.

487. In the beneficiary survey, we did not ask respondents about gender mainstreaming specifically; rather, the questions centred on whether women formed part of the project committee where they would have likely to influence decisions on the project – i.e. the areas WSA Managers regard as 'gender'. We asked beneficiaries whether there was a community/project committee on their water or sanitation project. Of those employed on the projects, 40% said that there was a community/project committee as opposed to 26% who said there was no community/project committee on their projects.

488. We then asked the question about whether women formed part of the community/project committee. Forty-five (45%) percent said that a few women formed part of the

community/project committee whilst twenty percent (20%) said women were more than half of the committee. This is again an interesting picture indicating that women also formed part of the decision making structure on projects. However, in some of the in-depth interviews at national level, respondents indicated that there is a concern that even if women form part of the steering committee they are just put there 'as scribes' and do not inform any decision making. This was beyond our remit to investigate.

489. The beneficiary survey indicates that 51% of respondents think that more men worked on the projects compared to 4% who responded that more women worked on the projects. A further 31% said that there was an equal split of women and men workers at project level. The higher percentage of men could be because women in some provinces are not allowed to work if they form part of the steering committee.

490. Worryingly, in one of the District Municipalities visited, the PMU Director mentioned that they try to encourage good representation of both men and women, however, if women are part of the project committee they (women) are not allowed to work on the project. This rule does not seem to apply to men. Clearly, messages about equity got severely skewed somewhere along the communication line.

491. WSAs were commended for applying quotas regarding women, but as we mentioned earlier, this does not equal gender mainstreaming. We were informed that **dplg** is working on a framework to assist WSAs in addressing issues of gender

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Municipality
[74] Interview with Danny Govender, PMU Manager Water Services, Ugu District Municipality.

mainstreaming. The framework needs to set clear indicators, budget guidelines and also address issues of monitoring and evaluation.

Case study visits

492. The case study data provides a different – and considerably less rosy - picture than the WSA survey. The same questions asked in the WSA survey were posed to respondents during the case study visits, where time allowed it. In all the visited District Municipalities, people spoken to indicated that there are no policy guidelines in relation to gender mainstreaming and no specific individual has been tasked with dealing with gender mainstreaming.

493. The case study visits show that in the District Municipalities gender issues are catered for in tenders but only with regard to the fulfilment of quotas. There is also no evidence from the projects visited that gender mainstreaming takes place on the ground. In effect, the quotas are adhered to but gender mainstreaming sensitisation and guidelines are not considered. Women are employed – but gender is ignored.

494. Most people interviewed at DWAF national raised this as a concern. For example, a respondent at DWAF national said that as a national department they have limited control over municipalities. She mentioned that DPLG has a better advantage since they work closely with municipalities. Of the six DMs visited, only OR Tambo said a gender mainstreaming unit that was being established under the mayor's office –

although they have not seen no outcome from this new initiative. In the other DMs, nothing was happening.

495. The case study results also show that some municipalities are more concerned about providing hard services than worry about soft issues. In Ugu, for example, the PMU manager felt that gender was important because it was a reporting requirement, but pointed out that targets are difficult to comply with on project as "women often not interested in working."[75] Even if it were acceptable to utter such nonsense, why not try find out why they are not interested in working. Are there conditions that can be changed that may make working easier for women - such as a crèche, or safety while travelling, and so on. We cannot generalise this across the WSAs, however, it is important for DWAF to check this, and whether it is not taking place on a larger scale.

496. As indicated it appears also that no gender mainstreaming training took place. In the beneficiary survey we listed types of training (health &hygiene training, correct use of toilets, technical, operation and maintenance and other kind of training). We did not ask respondents to specify what other kind of training was provided, however, it is interesting to note that other types of training only scored 4%. Whether gender mainstreaming is part of this or not we are not sure; but it is a fair bet that it is not.

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[75] Interview with PMU Manager water Services, Ugu District Municipality.

497. The mid-term review pointed out that beneficiary training does not include any gender sensitisation. In Mpumalanga the WSA manager at Mbombela municipality indicated that he had sent some of the village committees for training - but it was not on gender mainstreaming.

498. As we indicated earlier, the visits to municipalities show a different picture from the WSA survey. In the case study visits gender mainstreaming as a cross cutting issue is very low on the agenda. Where municipalities comply with quotas they feel comfortable that they have taken this into consideration.

499. The fact that municipalities feel that complying with quotas equals taking gender mainstreaming into consideration is of course flawed. It is imperative that at project level, gender mainstreaming form part of the training module. DWAF has to take this seriously in the next cycle especially when we consider that in most cases women and girl children bear the brunt of continued failure to adequately address gender, not just the status of women.

500. Also important is for all involved to understand that gender mainstreaming is not only about women but the access to power and resources. In the project visits we did not go to any projects that were in the implementation phase and we could not speak to any of the workers or committee members. It is therefore difficult to make an informed decision on the role of women who formed part of the committees.

501. Case study visits show a very poor (less than satisfactory) picture when it comes to gender mainstreaming. There are no policy guidelines, no monitoring mechanisms, and in some instances women are not allowed to work on projects if they form part of the steering committee. As indicated earlier, we cannot generalise this across all WSAs, however it is crucial that DWAF follows this up.

Civil society

Introduction

503. The cross-cutting areas have many of the unfortunate hallmarks of being an 'add on' to the programme. In many cases, there is a sound policy basis – but little action to back it up. Environment for example looks very good – until you visit WSAs and projects and find that it is an irritant, a bump in the road to faster and faster delivery. So too here: the policy basis is clear and progressive … but there seems to be a large gap between intention and action, with confusion and some wariness on both sides.

504. Let us state up front that the strengths of the different players have not been optimally utilised to strengthen civil society participation in the delivery of water and sanitation services and no significant progress has been made since the Masibambane 1 summative evaluation or the Mid-Term review of MSB II. The "meaningful participation" of civil society has not met the desired objectives of the Civil Society Strategy. This is a less than satisfactory finding.

505. This section of the report looks at the role of NGOs and CBOs in the delivery of water and sanitation services, the nature and functioning of CBOs within communities, and the extent to which men and women in communities were drawn into implementation, O&M and other delivery considerations. We treat NGOs and CBOs separately in instances where appropriate: for example, in the communities surveyed for the survey, CBOs were evident – but NGOs were absent. This distinction should be borne in mind.

We also look at the local, provincial and national spheres, and the roles CSOs have played.

Background

506. The right to civil society participation is enshrined in the constitution and promoted through the Strategic Framework for Water Services. It is also included in the financing agreement between the government and the European Commission for this period of support to the sector. Other government departments such as the Department of Provincial and Local Government (**dplg**) and organised local government (SALGA), have also committed themselves to achieving this goal.

> *The government of South Africa will ensure meaningful involvement of non-state (civil society) actors in the programme; it is envisaged that a minimum amount of funding equivalent to 25% of the European Commission funds (i.e. 12,5m Euros or R100m) will be channelled through the non-state (civil society) structures during the period of the programme.*[76]

507. The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry as the sector leader established the Masibambane Civil Society Support Programme (CSSP) to support the promotion of meaningful involvement of civil society so as to "entrench democratic and people-centred development" in the water and sanitation sector."[77]

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[76] Masibambane II Financing Agreement.
[77] MCSSP, 2004, p.5.

508. The strategic objectives of the CSSP are:
- Strong awareness of and participation in water and sanitation planning and delivery processes by communities and CBOs
- Increased numbers of NGOs, CBOs and community members actively engaged in local level planning process for water and sanitation services delivery
- Increased numbers of NGOs and CBOs contracted for water and sanitation services delivery
- Greater proportions of water and sanitation programme financing flowing through and being managed by NGOs and CBOs
- Increased numbers of NGOs and CBOs constructively involved in policy review and reformulation processes at provincial and national level
- High quality of service provided by NGOs and CBOs in service delivery contractual arrangements[78]

509. Masibambane CSSP defines 'civil society' in the context of the water and sanitation sector as being made up of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community-based organisations (CBOs). This is also made clear in the Finance Agreement, which although referring to Non State Actors, which includes the private as well as non-government sectors, then adds CSOs as a clarification: our focus, accordingly, is on the civil society sector, not the private sector.

510. The Masibambane CSSP defines NGOs as organisations within civil society that are autonomous from government and are committed to a stable democracy through the commitment to address poverty and unequal access to resources.

511. The Masibambane CSSP identifies the following key characteristics
- Not for profit/not self-serving
- Do not have shareholders and whose Board of Directors is a body with purely governance functions
- Independent
- Value-based
- Support government's service delivery and social development programmes
- Promote active community participation in development
- Are registered as Non Profit Organisations with the Department of Social Development

512. The MCSSP states that

CBOs are not-for-profit organizations within a particular community, with community representatives that provides a service to that community with the community's mandate or is representing the overall interests of the community, the office bearers or staff are generally people who live in the community and were elected or appointed by the community, ….. to perform certain functions[79]

513. The civil society strategy further states (at p.iii) that Ward Committees are **not** considered CBOs as they are official municipal structures and therefore lack the autonomy of other organisations within civil society. This is a critical point that the reader must bear in mind, since it comes into conflict with the

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[78] *Ibid.*, p.7.

[79] *Ibid.*, pi.

strategic framework being developed by **dplg**, although this is presumably not the intention. Moreover, as we show below, different actors have different – conflicting - rules about who does or does not comprise civil society, and who can and cannot undertake various functions.

514. The civil society strategy identifies the following roles that civil society organisations can play within the water sector:

CBOs
- Working in partnership with municipalities, directly or through ward committees, to organise communities to ensure genuinely consultative WSDP and IDP development processes
- Similarly, to design and implement projects as part of Project Steering Committees (PSCs) and also as service providers at community level
- Acting as consumer bodies to engage with municipalities around service improvements
- Being contracted as WSPs, or providing services to WSPs to manage small water supply schemes
- Other roles and functions

NGOs
- Supporting municipalities in participatory planning processes, such as IDPs
- Supporting municipalities in education campaigns to create awareness of and educate citizens in healthy living practices and the wise use of water
- Implementation of innovative water and sanitation approaches that maximise local economic benefits and build

social capital, including focus on sustainable livelihoods in support of LED
- Project planning, design and implementation
- Institutional and social development services, including training needs analysis, training and capacity building, setting up of community-based institutions, communication strategies, labour desk management, etc.
- Monitoring systems and approaches to revitalize failed or non operational projects
- Post implementation support to CBOs involved in WSP arrangements
- Gender mainstreaming, including development of policy, training and support
- Health and hygiene awareness and user education
- Environmental protection and conservation of water
- Assisting CBOs and municipalities to raise funds from donors
- Research and networking with international partners
- Policy work to deal with ongoing social and institutional problems
- Research and policy support for the development of models of best practice, monitoring and evaluation
- Other roles and functions

Overview

515. The MCSSP has been unable to increase the meaningful participation of civil society organisations in the delivery of water and sanitation services.

The Finance Agreement envisaged that 25% of the EC funds would be channelled through civil society structures. This was equivalent to R100m. Although this is regarded as a challenge to be pursued

rather than a goal to be realised in practice, the total expenditure channelled through CSO structures was reported as R42m[80].

516. Cross cutting civil-society expenditure must not be confused with the EC Finance Agreement which states that it is envisaged that a minimum equivalent to 25% of the EC funds will be channelled through non-state actor (CSO) structures. For the period of the program only R34 million of expenditure was spent on CSOs but more was channelled through CSOs.

517. There is an overlap between cross-cutting expenditure facilitating civil society participation in the water sector and expenditure channelled through CSO structures. Thus if one adds together all CSO related expenditure (including NCWSTI funding), the corresponding cumulative figure for the three year period is R42 million. This is significantly less than the envisaged R100m. This gives an indication that civil society participation did not meet expected (or hoped for) levels as indicated in the Finance Agreement. Some have argued that the figure was merely a somewhat ambitious target and its not being met is not a vexatious matter. We suggest that future targets be set at a level where – with considerable hard work – they can be met, or at least approached; not, as here, set so high as to be impossible to attain in practice, and provide a stick with which to beat the programme.

518. In addition, there have been instances where appointed NGOs, for example the Mvula Trust, sub-contracted private sector consultants. While we are not contesting the rights and wrong of the specific decisions, it is deeply questionable whether MSB should record monies as expended on civil society when they go to an NGO that in turn channels the funds to private sector consultants. This is window dressing – of which most people in MSB seem to be fully aware – and is deeply misleading. It is recommended that all funds ear-marked for CSOs carry the condition that only CSOs can be used even where sub-contracting occurs.

519. The CSO sector and the municipalities have different interpretations of who constitutes civil society and thus what can be recorded as civil society participation. This is further complicated – and will become more so over time - by the apparently imminent **dplg** legislative requirement to use ward committees as the vehicles for community participation[81] without reference to the role that CSOs can play to strengthen the voice of the community. **dplg** argue that CSOs should be represented on ward committees – a fair point, but CSOs that are not or choose not to be so represented cannot as a result be sidelined – particularly from a state-created set of structures such as ward committees. Clarity is required on this matter. The Masibambane CSSP specifically excludes ward committees from its definition of civil society. Clearly there is potential for a major policy clash here. It is therefore imperative for all stakeholders within the WS sector to reach agreement on how CSOs and ward committees can work together so as to ensure that processes are in place that allow for independent and autonomous community participation.

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[80] MSB2 database and communication with J Steyn

[81] See Department of Provincial and Local Government (2006) '5 Year Local Government Strategic Agenda'. V6.5

520. CSOs have lost some credibility by their inability to organise themselves within the sector, which has resulted in disjointed input at national and provincial forums.[82] This in turn, has had a negative impact on supporting the use CSOs at a project level, and in particular, the value that civil society participation can add to the sustainability of the projects.

521. Civil society participation has been overshadowed by divisions amongst the CSOs – particularly NGOs. Perhaps it is inappropriate to expect CSOs to speak with a single voice – they are as disparate as the constituencies they represent, and should be treated as such. That many of the NGOs (in particular) are politicised and use lobbying and advocacy to advance a particular set of perspectives is often regarded as a problem, but it is precisely what makes NGOs valuable additions to any programme.

522. Generally speaking, they bring with them robust research and a clearly formulated set of positions. These often very usefully frame the debate, even where (as in this sector) many are opposed to government's approach. For example, the work of the Municipal Services Project has been thorough, well argued, with clearly spelled out recommendations. The participants would make invaluable partners in debating the shape of MSB III, for example. And if NGOs have internal disagreements, this too should be expected (at least) and welcomed – DWAF does not speak with a single voice, and nor do WSAs – why is there an expectation that NGOs, or CSOs more broadly, should do so? If expectations can

perhaps be tweaked to match reality, the role of CSOs may be more successfully realised in practice.

523. The problem (or challenge) is not merely one of perceptions, but of roles. As a result of the emphasis on service delivery, CSOs who focused on research and advocacy around broader development issues within the water sector, initially did not feel welcome or part of the MCSSP.[83] This was further complicated by tensions between those perceived to be pro-government policies and those who were anti-government. The challenge is for CSOs to acknowledge their ideological differences and work towards the same objectives; but to be allowed to disagree as much as all other MSB players do so.

524. Equally pertinently, however, CSOs need to be clear about what they can and cannot do – and officials need to follow suit. There is a perception among officials that many CSOs want to become service providers because 'that is where the money is'[84]; while CSOs complain that they have made repeated attempts to become service providers but are not regarded as serious players by WSAs. There clearly is a set of mismatched and competing perceptions, within and about the sector, that need to be clarified and resolved. Above all, CSOs must be respected for being diverse – they are not all NGOs or CBOs; are not all community-based and automatic candidates for community-level facilitation; some are service providers, others are not; some have clearly developed ideological positions, others do not; and so on. It is precisely their

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[82] Interviews with Abri Vermeulen and Thoko Sigwaza

[83] Interview with Hameda Deedat.
[84] Interviews with various DWAF officials.

diversity that makes the CSO sector a rich partner to bring on board.

Outcomes of the Masibambane CSSP

525. The Masibambane CSSP identified 6 target areas to increase the "meaningful participation" of civil society within the water and sanitation sector.
    1. Communications programme:
    2. Community involvement
    3. NGO capacity building
    4. Contracting of NGOs
    5. Non-service delivery role of civil society
    6. Civil society co-ordination

526. The national and provincial civil society support programme Business Plans were structured around these areas. We now briefly look at some of the projects undertaken during MSB II. These are significant achievements, which the preceding commentary should not obscure. The challenge is deepening the involvement of CSOs in order to enhance the impact of MSB.

- **Projects implemented (2004 – 2007)**

527. Communications programme
    - Communication strategy implementation plan
    - CSO representation on national forums (MITT, WSSC, WSSLG).
    - Participation of DPLG and SALGA, municipalities in the National Summits and Best Practice Conferences 2005 and 2006.

528. Community involvement
    - Submission on civil society participation in MIG programme to MIT3

- Input into the SALGA CSO policy document
- Case studies of provincial meaningful involvement of civil society in the water and sanitation sector
- Conducted research and documented good practise
- Citizens Voice and Water Demand Management projects.

529. NGO capacity building
    - CSO database drawn up for each province
    - Capacity building training of CSOs as service providers – financial and project management, administration, water and sanitation policies, health and hygiene, etc.
    - ESETA accreditation of CSOs
    - CSO funding guide
    - CSO marketing tools.

530. Non-service delivery role of civil society
    - Desktop study to identify funding for NGOs to carry out non-service delivery functions
    - Study of CSOs involved with monitoring, advocacy and awareness.

531. Civil society co-ordination
    - Hosted 9 civil society summits with varying degrees of success and levels of attendance by civil society, local Government and provincial Government. Eight of the nine summits took place before the end of March 2007.
    - Provincial workshops for strengthening Provincial Steering Committee.
    - Functioning of the National Steering Committee and communication between NSC and provincial steering committees.

- Linkages between the Masibambane CSSP and the SADC NGO programme have been initiated.

The role CSOs played in the delivery of water and sanitation services

- **Municipal level**

532. CSOs have expressed concern over the lack of opportunities for participation in the delivery of water and sanitation services at a local Government level. The Masibambane I evaluation, and the Mid Term Review of MSB II highlighted a decrease in the number of CSOs participating in the water and sanitation sector.

533. This evaluation used the existence of a policy on civil society participation as an indicator of the willingness of municipalities to engage with CSOs in the delivery of water and sanitation services. We know that some WSA Managers gave politically correct answers to survey questions, which were contradicted by case study face-to-face interviews, but the data from the WSA survey indicate that 77% of all WSAs do have policies in place – slightly higher than non-WSA municipalities, 70% of whom (in the small control sample we used, anyway) said they had such policies in place. A fifth (19%) of WSAs do not have any policies in place.

534. Seen from a positive angle, 7 in 10 WSAs at least have a policy in place to encourage CSO participation. Seen from a negative perspective, after 6 years of MSB I and II, how can there still be 3 in 10 WSAs without such policies in place? Clearly this must become universally true in MSB III – and DWAF should monitor adherence to the policy, via MCCSP.

Figure 62: CSO participation in WS activities (WSA Managers)

535. The red bars indicate the areas where neither CBOs nor NGOs had any role, according to WSA Managers – as the graph makes clear, this is the highest single score across the various activities that include policy development, planning, construction, health and hygiene awareness raising, skills development and operations and maintenance – apart from health & hygiene awareness, where CSO participation just pips non-participation.

536. The graph suggests that there is a core group of WSAs that consistently make use of both NGOs and CBOs, mainly in policy development (presumably using the research NGOs here) and

planning; to a lesser extent in enskilling communities; and in awareness raising. Construction and O&M have the lowest CSO participation, although as we see below there seems to be more happening at grass-roots level than WSA Managers are aware of. But it is around the area of implementation that there seems to be most frustration, with a number of CSOs trying to be formally recognised by WSAs as service providers. This is an area where MSB can play a positive, facilitating role.

537. If we re-draw the graph to add NGOs, CBOs and the 'both' column, the data would look more positive, as shown below. As we can see, combined CSO participation is more common than non-participation in health and hygiene awareness raising and planning, and equally likely to occur in the area of policy development. But in construction and O&M, participation remains much less likely than non-participation. That there is scope of improved participation by CSOs across the board is self-evident. But this should not automatically mean that CSO representation should be equal in all spheres – hopefully, the recently completed survey of sector CSOs will provide a good guide as to the strengths and weaknesses of CSOs, and a more nuanced approach taken to targets, where targets can be set for different spheres of operation and types of work.

538. Municipalities have engaged with CSOs in different ways. In Sisonke, for example, we were told that CBOs and NGOs play no role in service delivery.[85] The Mbombela Municipality relied on village water committees to report leakages, yet there was no

budget to pay them. Nonetheless, they have been training water committee members to play a liaison and fault reporting role (see more on this below).[86] Central DM in the North West employed representatives from the beneficiary communities for the duration of the construction of the project as community liaison officers. In some areas, CSOs are seen to be most useful in helping DWAF with monitoring[87]; the lack of resources is often cited as a challenge but better planning would obviate this as a problem.

	CSO participation	CSO non-participation
Health & hygiene awareness raising	43	27
Planning	39	32
Policy development	38	38
Skills development	29	43
Construction	26	39
Operations & maintenance	21	49

Table 31: CSO participation (WSA Managers)

539. Some municipalities made use of ward committees for community participation as they regarded them as representatives of civil society. The MCSSP specifically excludes ward committees as representatives of civil society as they are municipal structures. In both instances, therefore, CSO activities may be over- or under-claimed in the programme data.

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[85] Interview with Steven McGregor, Acting PMU Manager, Sisonke DM.

[86] Interview with Leon Hallatt, WSM, Mbombela Municipality.
[87] Interview with Anton Kruger, Regional Director, DWAF, Mpumalanga.

540. Municipalities have defined civil society involvement in the broad context of community participation, whereas CSOs active in the MCSSP have voiced concerns about the decline of CSOs appointed as service providers. The formal appointment of CSOs as service providers has been very difficult at a municipal level as a result of CSOs struggling to meet stringent procurement requirements[88], and hence, they have not been engaged as service providers. This comes on top of a relatively cold relationship between government and civil society generally.

541. As we turn to look at what happens at community and project level, it is worth bearing in mind the basic distinction that the evaluation has made clear, namely that while municipalities are using CSOs in a range of areas, they are least likely to use them as direct service providers during construction or O&M.

• **Community level**

542. In these very poor communities where WS services are being delivered, there are 2 key civil society structures to which people belong, and which are key instruments for outreach, communication, dispute resolution and the like: churches and burial societies. They dominate CSO membership by an order of magnitude, reflecting exactly the situation in other poor communities around the country.[89]

[88] Interview with Alvin Lagardien, WC Working Group.
[89] See Everatt *et al* Nodal baseline survey (DSD 2007).

Figure 63: CSO membership (beneficiary survey)

543. These also seem to be highly politicised communities, with political party membership (at 21%) far higher than any comparable national sample survey. Delivery itself is politicised, as we know; moreover, a number of respondents complained to the survey fieldworkers that delivery was politically driven, and 'ANC sections' of areas received water or sanitation while others did not. We were not in a position to follow this up, but it is worth noting the politicisation

that can accompany delivery – and the key social facilitation role that NGOs and CBOS (in particular) can play.

544. So when just 18% of respondents told us that their community is kept informed about water issues, there seems little reason for this situation to obtain – CBOs are a vital channel of communication already embedded within communities, but seemingly not being used to reach those communities. Similarly, just 21% said their water was tested – and of them, just a fifth (21% again) said their communities were told the results of testing – highest in peri-urban areas, lowest in metropolitan areas. There seems no reason whatsoever for this lack of communication to persist.

545. The point at issue is that communication is a two-way process, and the well-rooted CBOs offer the sector a mechanism for hearing from the ground as well as communicating with people living in communities.

- **Implementation phase**

546. It is notable that just 4 in 10 (42%) respondents told us that there had been a project committee in place when the WS services were being implemented. The figure may be higher, since a third (31%) didn't remember; but 27% were quite definite that no project committee had been formed. This relatively low engagement of communities during implementation is deeply unfortunate, given the positive impact that participation has on ownership and O&M. Project committees should be a requirement of all implementation of infrastructure that has direct beneficiaries.

547. Project committees are not a panacea for the challenges of implementation, of course. But their performance (where they had existed) was rated more positively than contractors, community development officials/officers or municipal officials, shown below.

548. The effectiveness of the CSOs could be improved, as 49% of respondents indicated that they were satisfied with the work done by the community-based committees. This highlights an opportunity for MCSSP to lobby to improve the quality of civil society involvement and this highlights potential opportunities for other training CSOs to work with the municipalities to help develop the capacity of these structures.

Figure 64: Rating implementation phase actors

549. Looking along the bottom row, we see that project committees (also known as water committees or community committees and so on) were positively rated by a fifth of respondents, followed by municipal officials and contractors. Almost half (49%) of respondents said (where a committee had existed) the project committee had done a 'good' or 'OK' job.

550. Community meetings prior to implementation were reasonably common, but again should be universal. They were least common in peri-urban areas (44%) rising in metropolitan (51%) and rural (68%) areas. Even where they occurred, just two-thirds (62%) of respondents told us that the community had been allowed to raise objections at those meetings. These meetings should play (and can play) a pivotal role in enhancing ownership through meaningful participation (not consultation), and failing to do so is a major failing of any development project.

551. A final note: of the small number who said that meetings were held and that objections could be raised (33% of the total sample), just 41% told us that objections raised were properly dealt with. We have a situation where participation opportunities are being systematically by-passed, with unavoidable costs in terms of O&M, ownership and the like. For example, 13% of projects have been vandalised since completion, according to respondents – this often reflects lack of local ownership. More rigorous monitoring is required during the implementation phase as well as thereafter; DWAF should engage MIG about ensuring appropriate indicators are developed and monitored in this regard – ideally using community based monitoring, not merely relying on contractors to complete data sheets.

Vandalised prepayment meters at Sinthumule-Kutama (Photo: Hazelton D)

552. Better monitoring could also improve labour intensity, although this was widespread during implementation, with 79% of respondents telling us that labour intensive methods had been used. They were more common in rural (88%) and urban (77%) areas than metropolitan areas (63%), and such unevenness should be removed in future.

553. But a major area where MSB – especially in phase III – needs to focus (and ensure MIG follows suit) is using local contractors.

Figure 65: Participation in implementation and O&M (beneficiary survey)

554. Just 10% of respondents knew that local businesses were used during implementation, either to work on the project or supply goods and materials. This was consistently low across rural, urban and metropolitan areas, and represents a significant lost opportunity to inject cash into the local communities where projects are being implemented. Under the theme 'water for growth and development', and noting concerns about the second economy[90], it is vital that all development programmes engage the 'second economy' wherever possible, and using local contractors where possible is an obvious example of how to do so.

555. The same applies for post-implementation operation and maintenance. Asked who was responsible for running projects after completion, 10% said a local individual did so, 10% said a local CBO did so, and 8% said a local contractor was responsible. One in ten (10%) said 'nobody' does so, while the bulk – 39% - said the local municipality was responsible.

- **Post-implementation**

556. An obvious area where CBOs can play a key role is in facilitating communication after implementation is over. For example, CBOs can provide on-site monitoring, and report problems where these cannot be repaired locally. Positively, 68% of respondents told us they have a system for reporting problems with their water or sanitation schemes. This is most commonly done by reporting to the municipality (29%) or a locally based person (27%) or at a community meeting (23%).

557. Local people – who could be CBO members – are most commonly used in rural areas (32%), and represent an area where DWAF could encourage greater CBO participation. Community meetings are also most commonly used in rural areas, while (predictably) complaining directly to the municipality is far more common in metropolitan (62%) and urban (54%) than rural (20%) areas.

[90] See for example Department of Water Affairs & Forestry (2007) 'Sector Wide Approach for Water Services – National Water Sector Implementation Strategy'

558. In each of these different locales, CBOs can play different roles, but this will only happen if the process is built into design and facilitated during implementation.

Figure 66: Reporting WS problems

559. We asked respondents to tell us who they report to, if they have water or sanitation problems (generally). They mainly approach the municipality, although as noted previously this tends to be considerably more true in urban and metropolitan than rural areas. Ward councillors, on the other hand, are more likely to be used as a channel by rural residents, as are water committees.

- **Provincial Level**

560. CSO participation in the provincial water sector forums varied across the provinces. The inconsistent participation of CSOs in the forums resulted in disjointed debates taking place in reaction to CSO complaints, rather than constructive and structured engagement around strategic issues affecting civil society in terms of delivery of water and sanitation services.[91]

561. Civil society participation at provincial level was not achieved as a result of the PSCs of the MCSSP programme not functioning properly. Most PSCs were either dormant or malfunctioning[92], and as a result, civil society was unable to collaborate with other stakeholders at a provincial level. CSO participation in the provincial water forums varied from province to province.[93]

562. Civil society organisations were also unable to mobilise themselves at a provincial level due to funding constraints. In provinces where IAs were appointed and provision was made for the reimbursement of travel costs such as in the Eastern Cape[94], there was good CSO participation in the PSC meetings. However, since August 2006 when the funds were exhausted, the PSC has not met, and the provincial CSO summit could not take place.

563. At a provincial level, the MCSSP focussed on capacity building and skills development of CSOs as service providers to municipalities.

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[91] Interview with Alvin Lagardien, Western Cape Working Group.
[92] Free State PSC Workshop Report 26/2/07.
[93] Interview with Rosetta Simelane.
[94] Interview Lungiswa Radebe, DWAF Ecape, ISD Co-ordinator.

- **National Level**

564. The Masibambane programme created opportunities for CSOs to be heard in a structured environment through the WSSLG and other national forums. CSOs have successfully engaged with other stakeholders at national level which resulted in the **dplg** drafting a policy requiring municipalities to ensure that 1% of MIG work contracted out is awarded to CSOs, SALGA drafting a CSO participation policy and the Water Caucus provided input on the DWAF Regulation Strategy. These are considerable achievements – the challenge is for them now to be realised in practice.

Rating

565. **Relevance** is seen as 'satisfactory'. In terms of the Finance Agreement, activities supported by the Masibambane II programme were intended to result in:
   - Empowerment of CSOs to perform relevant functions in the water sector;
   - An increased awareness, particularly among water service authorities, of the capabilities of CSOs to perform services relevant to their functions and which are sensitive to the needs of the communities they serve;
   - Motivation of the CSO sector by collaborative fora and other means to play a meaningful role in the development of the water sector.

566. The strategic objectives of the MCSSP are in accordance with the objectives of the Finance Agreement. The strategic objectives are defined as follows:
   - Strong awareness of and participation in water and sanitation planning and delivery processes by communities and CBOs

- Increased numbers of NGOs, CBOs and community members actively engaged in local level planning process for water and sanitation services delivery
- Increased numbers of NGOs and CBOs contracted for water and sanitation services delivery
- Greater proportions of water and sanitation programme financing flowing through and being managed by NGOs and CBOs
- Increased numbers of NGOs and CBOs constructively involved in policy review and reformulation processes at provincial and national level
- High quality of service provided by NGOs and CBOs in service delivery contractual arrangements

567. **Effectiveness** is seen as 'less than satisfactory'. The skills development and capacity building initiatives for CSOs were unable to increase the number of CSOs actively engaged at a municipal level in the delivery of water and sanitation services. DWAF KwaZulu-Natal stated that the funds and time that DWAF KZN had invested in the CSO support programme had not produced the desired results, and as a result, the CSO support programme was not funded for the last two years of the Masibambane II programme.

568. The lack of capacity and the limited resources of CSOs continue to be barriers to their effective engagement. The Implementing Agents of the provincial support programmes experienced difficulty in the appointment and management of CSOs who had been awarded contracts.

569. CSOs did provide constructive input into the drafting of the SALGA CSO Policy document, which reflects the willingness of

municipalities to engage with CSOs in the provision of water and sanitation services.

570. **Efficiency** is regarded as less than satisfactory. The delayed appointment of Implementing Agents for the provincial civil society support programmes in the Masibambane II programme resulted in zero expenditure for in the first financial year for Free State, Gauteng, Limpopo and North West provinces. In KwaZulu-Natal, no funds were allocated for the last two financial years.

571. **Impact** is also seen to have been less than satisfactory. At an individual level, CSOs have benefited from the skills development and capacity building opportunities undertaken at a provincial level, however these opportunities did not translate into procurement opportunities for the CSOs as service providers at a municipal level.

572. The collaboration that went into the SALGA CSO Policy document had a significant impact on creating awareness of CSO participation at a municipal level. It contributed significantly to clarifying some of the roles that CSOs can play at municipal level in the provision of water and sanitation services. However as the document was only drafted in December 2006, and municipalities have not yet been able to develop the necessary institutional frameworks to implement it.

573. Finally, **sustainability** too is less than satisfactory. The different interpretations of who constitutes CSOs and the inconsistent engagement of them in the delivery of water and sanitation services resulted in the strategic objectives of the MCSSP not being fully met. Unless effective CSO engagement is implemented in the next phase of the Masibambane programme, the sustainability of the water and sanitation services delivered will be at risk.

Conclusion

574. The MCSSP has been unable to increase the meaningful participation of civil society organisations in the delivery of water and sanitation services. The CSO sector and the municipalities have different interpretations of who constitutes civil society participation. The Masibambane CSSP specifically excludes ward committees from its definition of civil society. A clash of objectives with the **dplg** strategic framework seems inevitable.

575. CSOs have lost some credibility by their inability to organise themselves within the sector, which has resulted in disjointed input at national and provincial forums.[95] This in turn has had a negative impact on supporting the use of CSOs at project level, and in particular, the value that civil society participation can add to the sustainability of projects.

576. We have already noted that CSOs should not be expected to speak with one voice, given that they cover a wide range of perspectives, communities and approaches. But they are also a sector that MSB is trying to engage, and a degree of self-discipline is required – the failure to do so directly affects the capacity of the sector to absorb the funds earmarked for it.

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[95] Interviews with Abri Vermeulen, Thoko Sigwaza.

577. By the same token, it is important that the CSO WS sector is properly understood. It is *not* made up of NGOs. There are some important NGOs, but there is a host of CBOs at grass-roots level that are not well represented if at all, but which are 'walking with the people'. MSB needs to develop a nuanced understanding of civil society participation and representation that reflects this situation appropriately.

578. Civil society participation has been overshadowed by divisions amongst CSOs. As a result of the over-emphasis on service delivery, CSOs that focused on research and advocacy around broader development issues within the sector, did not feel welcome or part of the MCSSP.[96] This was complicated by tensions between those perceived to be pro- and anti-government. The challenge is for CSOs to acknowledge their ideological differences and work towards in the same objectives where possible; but also for others to accept the diversity of CSOs as a resource, not a problem.

579. The Masibambane CSSP focussed too much on developing the capacity of CSOs as service providers and not enough resources were allocated towards developing other roles that CSOs could play within the sector, such as research, advocacy, monitoring and evaluation, community participation and so on.

580. The current systems do not allow for detailed reporting within the MCSSP. The Consolidated Sector Reports do not give a detailed breakdown of MCSSP progress against expenditure or milestones for the individual projects, and nor do they monitor progress adequately. As a result, it has not been possible to adequately measure the efficiency and cost effectiveness of the MCSSP.

581. The challenge is to monitor and evaluate CSO participation more closely so as to ensure that "meaningful participation" takes place at all levels , and that demand driven developmental processes are followed at a project level. Sector stakeholders need to provide more structured support to strengthen provincial steering committees, so that more constructive CSO participation can take place at the provincial water forums; and so that municipalities in turn can accommodate civil society participation at project level.

582. To conclude, this evaluation rates the participation of CSOs as less than satisfactory, especially at WSA level. Clarity is required on the role that CSOs can play and alternative methods to the current municipal procurement requirements need to be identified. This can only be achieved if CSOs take the lead in lobbying the sector to create conditions for participation; and if the sector wishes to make such changes happen.

583. The strengths of the different players have not been optimally utilised to strengthen civil society participation in the delivery of water and sanitation services as no significant progress has been made since the Masibambane 1 evaluation or the Mid-Term review. The 'meaningful participation' of civil society has not met the desired objectives of the Civil Society Strategy.

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[96] Interview with Hameda Deedat.

Environment

Why 'environment' in the MSB programme?

584. The environmental brief for the evaluation required an assessment of the 'integration of environmental considerations within the sector and the environmental impact of projects'. This has been done within a limited timeframe, based on survey information gathered from beneficiaries and WSAs, as well as research of relevant policy and literature, complimented by interviews with provincial and regional role-players from DWAF, WSAs, CSOs and beneficiaries.

585. The national water legislative framework is primarily based on sustainable management of the country's water resources, and the principle of environmental management is thus inextricably linked with the water service sector. DWAF Minister Hendricks stated in May this year that

> DWAF has the responsibility to monitor these water sources, and has the powers to ensure that these water resources are not polluted. Our limited availability of water means that water conservation and demand management are very important areas of work for DWAF.[97]

586. This reflects a deeply engrained and holistic environmental consideration at policy level, which needs to be carried through to project level more effectively. Throughout this chapter we encounter a large gap between intention and practice, which DWAF and WSAs *must* close during MSB III.

587. What we do to our resource base affects its ability to continue supplying the ecosystem goods and services, which sustain us and drive our livelihoods and economies. The potential impacts of water and sanitation services are included in the 'what we do' list. Importantly, and conversely, the regional and global environment, and the latter's often hotly debated potential changes, may also have impacts on how these resources may or may not continue to provide the goods and services we so often take for granted. In this context, we need to consider both what we do to the environment, for example contamination or damaging ecosystem integrity; as well as what the environment can do to our planned activities and their consequent viability and sustainability.

588. This is particularly relevant in a country where alien plant infestation has a stranglehold on many of our river systems, and will affect the continued viability of surface water sources. Globally, the alarming increase in atmospheric carbon levels, if accepted predictions are correct, could have a catastrophic effect on the water cycle as we know it and have relied upon it for centuries. This has implications for long term water use and management planning.

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[97] 2007/8 Pre-budget Vote media press briefing by Minister of Water Affairs & Forestry, Mrs LB Hendricks, 15 May 2007.

589. Environmental considerations thus have a rightful abode in a programme such as Masibambane – their incorporation to date has been underemphasised, and has raised concerns from donors, evaluators and DWAF. How to mainstream these considerations in a practical and manageable manner is the primary challenge with respect to achieving sustainable water supply management. Without sustainable quality sources, supply is doomed.

Legislative and policy framework

590. South Africa has well developed environmental and water management legislation, providing a well structured, if somewhat cumbersome policy framework for environmental considerations across the water services sector.

- **Water use legislative framework**

591. The National Water Act 36 of 1998 provides a broad framework and comprehensive legal instrument for water resource management, upon which the National Water Resource Strategy is based. The National Water Policy adopted by Cabinet in 1997 was a foundation for the Act, and was preceded by 28 Fundamental Principles and Objectives for a New South African Water Law,[98] with principle 7 of particular relevance to Masibambane:

> *The objective of managing the quantity, quality and reliability of the Nation's water resources is to achieve optimum long-term, environmentally sustainable social and economic benefit for society from their use.*

592. Section 21 of the National Water Act provides a system for licensing and registration of water use, based on certain thresholds, and covers activities including abstraction, diversion, in-stream activities such as bridge construction, recreational use and discharge. Water services are governed by these instruments, and DWAF should be commended for its comprehensive treatment of the legislative framework and actionable policy through tools such as the National Water Resource Strategy and the Groundwater protocol, both of which are critical guidelines for the integration of environmental considerations within the sector. National government, through DWAF, acts as a custodian of the nation's water resources, and its powers are exercised as a public trust.[99]

Water resource development and management in South Africa have continuously evolved over the years to meet the needs of a growing population and a vibrant economy. Considering the constraints imposed by nature these developments have largely been made possible by recognising water as a national asset, which permits its transfer from where it is available to where the greatest overall benefits for the nation can be achieved. South Africa is today recognised internationally for its progressive water legislation and its sophistication in water resources management.[100]

593. The Groundwater Protocol is another essential resource management tool, clearly outlining a set of procedures for sanitation provision within the context of protection of groundwater resources from contamination. The GW Protocol assessments are based on the principle of risk, taking three factors into consideration:

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[98] DWAF (2004), National Water Resource Strategy, chapter 1, p.7.

[99] DWAF (2004), National Water Resource Strategy, chapter 1, p.7.
[100] DWAF (2004), National Water Resources Strategy, chapter 2, p.5.

- Vulnerability of aquifers
- Contamination load from the particular sanitation system
- Strategic value of the water.

594. This approach is very well aligned with the environmental assessment process, and seeks to find the most appropriate options for sanitation location and provision. Despite being easy to apply, it does not seem to be well entrenched at WSA level. We return to this below, but it again emphasises the gap between intention and action.

595. An important role-player with respect to sector wide water management is the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT), which is responsible for ensuring compliance with the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA). The latter defines environment as[101]:

> *The surroundings within which humans exist, and that are made up of …land, water and atmosphere…plant and animal life… the interrelationships between them…the physical, chemical, aesthetic and cultural properties and conditions that influence human health and well-being.*

596. Hence the sound DWAF principle: "some for all (equity), forever (sustainability)".

- **Environmental legislation**

597. DEAT promulgated revised environmental impact assessment (EIA) regulations in July 2006 based on NEMA, which superseded the older Environmental Conservation Act EIA procedure. These NEMA regulations provide thresholds for listed activities, with two streams of assessment, namely 'basic assessment,' which covers lower impact activities listed in Government Notice R386, as well as more intensive scoping and comprehensive EIA which must be applied to activities listed in GN R387. These activities, with respect to water and sanitation delivery can be outlined as follows:

BASIC ASSESSMENT (GN R386)
Reticulation via a pipeline diameter > 0.36m
Peak throughput >120 l/s
Off-stream storage of water, including dams and reservoirs, with a capacity of 50 000 cubic metres or more
The treatment of effluent, wastewater or sewage with an annual throughput capacity of more than 2 000 cubic metres but less than 15 000 cubic metres (latter requires full EIA);
SCOPING AND FULL EIA (GN R387)
Transfer of > 20 000 cubic metres water between water catchments or impoundments per day;
Treatment of effluent, wastewater or sewage with an annual throughput capacity of 15 000 cubic metres or more
The construction of a dam where the highest part of the dam wall, as measured from the outside toe of the wall to the highest part of the wall, is 5 metres or higher or where the high-water mark of the dam covers an area of 10 hectares or more
Any process or activity identified in terms of section 53(1) of the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, 2004 (Act No. 10 of 2004).

Table 32: summary of NEMA assessment thresholds

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[101] DWAF (2004), National Water Resource Strategy, chapter 1, notes p.12.

598. It should also be noted that use of water resources in Protected Areas will also need to undergo assessment based on the Protected Areas Act, with liaison with the relevant organ of state or parastatal body responsible for such a protected area.

599. These listed activities require assessment via a process described in the regulations.[102] Should an activity fall below these thresholds, it does not legally require assessment and authorisation. This creates a loophole for environmental planning and monitoring at project level with respect to construction and delivery of the majority of rural water and sanitation activities which fall below the thresholds of pipe diameter, storage capacity and throughput which can result in the following potential impacts:
   - Poor location, design and maintenance of pit latrines, resulting in potential contamination of groundwater
   - Extraction from unsustainable sources whereby ecosystem functions may be affected
   - Erosion resulting from poor trenching and backfilling practice.

600. The larger regional bulk supplies and urban reticulation and sanitation systems fall above the thresholds and thus qualify for either basic assessment or full EIA. They also tend to be more compliant during delivery and operation based on the need for environmental auditing as a condition in the RoD.

- **Policy integration into Masibambane**

601. The MSB programme's annual reports for 2003/4 and 2005/6 outlined some commendable considerations regarding environmental protection, with reference to DWAF's Integrated Environmental Management (IEM) series for Water Resources Management, which was expanded to include an Environmental Impact Management System tool for the water services sector through the Masibambane programme.[103]

602. This expansion was a relief after the near-invisibility of environment in the MSB I Final Evaluation Report of August 2004, which had worryingly limited reference to environment other than as a cross cutting issue 'requiring more attention', with environmental planning policies not implemented due to a lack of both capacity and commitment.[104] The latter appears to be due to a lack of understanding of broader environmental functions, with a somewhat blinkered focus on political driven delivery and 'inspected' issues, rather than doing what is 'expected'.[105]

603. National water sector policy is strong with respect to environmental considerations. The extent to which these considerations have been effectively mainstreamed into the Masibambane programme however is limited insofar as this evaluation could ascertain, and our experience is that lip service is more common than real action where environmental issues are

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[102] Government Notices R385, R386 and R387, National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998, published April 2006.

[103] DWAF (2004), Masibambane Annual report 2003/4, p.63 and DWAF (2006), Masibambane Annual Report 2005/6, p.58.
[104] DWAF (2004), MSB I Final Evaluation report, p.9.
[105] Interview with Eastern Cape DWAF Water Resources Directorate official.

concerned, or when environmental questions are asked at local level.

604. DWAF officials interviewed at provincial and national gave indications that they are not entirely happy with the existing MSB programme from an environmental perspective. This could be a result of the transition DWAF has undergone and which has removed it from the point of implementation. But it seems more likely to reflect a concern with the lack of consideration afforded to environmental concerns such as the location and lining of pits, EIA compliance, the groundwater protocol and water use licensing requirements. The integration of environmental considerations at project level is even more questionable, as we see below.

605. The mid term review (MTR) noted that although there has been progress in terms of efforts to improve integration of environmental considerations at a national level, the same cannot be said of local level. This remains true. A worrying factor is the attitude towards environmental planning and practice at a local level where EIAs are often seen as "necessary evils."[106] This concern was validated by the current study, and is addressed in further detail in the section below. This is a less than satisfactory finding: the purpose of evaluations (mid-term and summative) is to identify problem areas so that they can be improved over time. This evaluation has found little evidence of such improvement.

606. The MTR findings (appendix 5 in the MTR report) are corroborated by this study, with no evidence that any marked

change has taken place. This is attributed to the lack of real teeth afforded to environmental considerations through being a somewhat homeless feature in the MSB approach, without a Key Focus Area to ensure its permanent and institutionalised presence.

607. The draft Key Focus Area 21107 had the following outline:

> o *Strategic objective: To protect the environment and ensure a healthy clean environment for consumers which is environmentally sustainable.*
> o *Outputs: Environmental policy established and adhered to.*
> o *Key activities: To effectively plan and co-ordinate environmental management strategies and policy; to effectively institutionalise environmental management activities at project level, pre and post implementation.*

608. This KFA never formally existed, and never found a home in the final KFA structure for MSB II, reflecting the tenuous consideration of environmental issues in the Masibambane approach. This is seen as a very significant failure, and the need to include and refine this KFA in MSB III is absolutely critical, as it underpins sustainable resource management.

609. However, and on a very positive note, the recent COWI appraisal study to finalise the proposal for funding MSB III made the following statements, listed below. These indicate that environmental

[106] DWAF (2005) Mid term review of Masibambane II: project evaluation report

[107] DWAF (2003) Water Services Sector and Masibambane Support Work Plan 2003/4. Final pp 18

considerations, with respect to sustainability of resources and their effective management, are finally being taken seriously and given deserved consideration. It is vital that these are carried through into MSB III, and not lost like KFA 21.

> The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry and sector stakeholders now feel that the scope of the Masibambane Programme has to change so that South Africa not only ensures the universal and efficient supply of water services to its people, but it **now needs to manage the resource to facilitate equitable and sustainable social and economic development, today and in the future**. (section 2)
>
> The theme of the Strategy was 'Water for Growth and Development' which showed an incremental move away from donor support to the development and management of water services to a focus on sustainable water resources development and management through an holistic view that would accommodate the development of multi-use objectives and the orientation of supporting services. (section 4)
>
> The Water for Growth and Development approach requires recognition about the role of water in socio-economic and environmental development of South Africa – that water and the economy are inextricably linked. With global warming being a feature of life in the coming decades, so too will be the need to conserve and use wisely the limited water resources of South Africa for its people and in some cases the neighbouring states (section 5.2).
>
> The economic, social and environmental benefits of improved water supply and sanitation and water resource management are, therefore, essential ingredients of the national strategic macro-economic decision-making. Additionally, if water for sustainable growth and development is firmly on the national agenda, it will ensure that water resources are used effectively and efficiently and are managed in a sustainable manner to be enjoyed by this and future generations. (section 5.2)

610. A healthy budget allocation for cross cutting issues, with environment receiving a 17% share, together with the above approach, would indicate that environmental concerns will finally be mainstreamed into the Masibambane approach, a decisive issue in alignment with the objectives of the Water Act and National Water Resource Strategy.

Legislation & compliance

611. Environmental legislation compliance is seen as a necessary irritant, not unlike going to the dentist. At the District Municipality level, the WSA officials interviewed for this evaluation indicated that the EIA process was a hold up for efficient delivery, and that smaller projects often commenced before an RoD was received. They acknowledged that they had to comply with the NEMA regulations and obtain authorisation, but that was as far as environmental concerns went.

> "EIAs have limited value, and getting RoDs creates hold ups for implementation. Environmental audits are too harsh."
>
> Musa Nene, OR Tambo PMU project manager

612. Interestingly though, 93% of the PMU managers surveyed for the evaluation disagreed with the statement that "water and sanitation are our business, not the environment". But as we see in a number of areas, the survey elicited 'politically correct' responses especially where cross-cutting areas are concerned – not coincidentally, these are also areas of significant weakness in MSB including environment, gender, participation of civil society, and so on. In face-to-face interviews, however, more frank answers were

forthcoming, indicating that environmental considerations are on the radar (in terms of compliance), but not emitting a strong signal (in terms of commitment).

613. But even so, the survey had some worrying findings. Only 30% of PMU managers had seen and were familiar with the new EIA 2006 NEMA regulations; although 95% indicated that they ensured that environmental authorisation was obtained for projects within their mandate, as a legal requirement. MIG funded projects did not require RoDs prior to the last financial year, and EIAs were only commissioned by a few responsible design consultants. There is a huge reliance on engineering and environmental consultants to obtain RoDs and advise WSAs accordingly as to the need for EIAs. In some cases, assessments had been done for projects below the listed thresholds, and managers need to have access to a summary of the regulations to ascertain whether a basic assessment or full EIA are in fact required.

614. Staying with the suspicion that some PC answers were being offered, 89% of the PMU managers responded positively regarding the question: '*do you see any value in EIAs or an environmental practitioner being included in the design phase?*' The respondents elaborated as follows:
   - To prevent contamination of water resources
   - People are not looking at the triple bottom line
   - For people to live healthy and safely
   - Law requires us to conform to certain standards

615. When asked about the most common environmental problems within water sector projects, PMU Managers answered across a range of categories, set out below.

Figure 67: Environmental problems (PMU Managers)

616. Larger bulk supply projects in peri-urban and metropolitan areas fall within the ambit of the NEMA listed activities and are thus easier to monitor based on their assessment and authorisation conditions, but the regulation of these conditions and compliance therewith is often the challenge. Managing the water quality

impacts of denser peri-urban settlements is a major challenge facing DWAF's Waste Discharge and Disposal directorate. Adherence to the Groundwater protocol is essential where rural sanitation is concerned, but both the GW protocol and EIA compliance appear to be overlooked on a regular basis. Licensing of water use is also problematic, and DWAF officials indicated that WSAs often try to avoid the registration and licensing process, both due to ignorance of the law, as well as seeing it as unnecessary.

> "WSA officials tend to ignore conditions imposed in RoDs and do their own thing, and it is confusing as to whether it is DWAF or DEAT's role to monitor and enforce compliance."
>
> Landile Jack, DWAF Water Resources & Quality, Eastern Cape

617. No consideration was identified, either via personal interviews or telephonic survey responses, regarding the potential long-term impacts of global warming and alien plant impacts on resources. The view appears to be only halfway to the horizon, with a focus on submitting the required reports, trying to comply with legal authorisation, and addressing a politically driven backlog. This is understandable in an environment where officials are crushed by excessive administration and reporting demands, and try to do what they can to deliver the 'inspected' goods, i.e. do what they are monitored on but no more.

618. The "inspect, expect" issue arises again – unless an item is included in a checklist for MIG reporting, it tends to be overlooked or ignored. The latter tends to focus on employment targets and appears to have limited scope for environmental considerations.

WSA officials gave an impression of administrative burnout with respect to filling in reports – in such cases very few individuals would indeed go the extra mile to pursue a moral compliance issue if it is not gong to be checked by someone else.

> "Environment is not taken seriously. It gets politically steam-rolled, and is seen as a hindrance to delivery. There are also some unscrupulous practitioners who push suspect projects through".
>
> Steve McGregor, PMU Manager, Sisonke District Municipality, KZN

619. Despite the positive response to the survey question about the value of EIAs, there appeared to be a feeling that environmental compliance is for legal purposes only, to protect the WSA through having the necessary authorisation. No evidence of real considerations for long term issues was found, apart from a few rare individuals in KZN WSAs who indicated a concern for the broader area around developing settlements, but who found very little support for their concerns from the decision-makers in councils. Delivery, in the form of addressing backlogs, seems to be the driving force, sometimes at the expense of finding technically appropriate and sustainable design solutions.

620. Some officials indicated that there was a cost to environmental and labour intensive compliance in terms of the efficiency of delivery. Labour intensive methods are notoriously difficult to manage, and can be more financially costly, but generally have a lower environmental impact and greater social impact.

> "My job is to deliver water and sanitation, not create employment. The work is mainly excavation and backfill, and is not changing people's lives the way water can. There is great compliance cost with using labour intensive methods. We could double the coverage if we were more effective."
>
> Danny Govender, PMU manager, Ugu District Municipality

621. The integration of environmental considerations at delivery level is limited, and based for the most part on the need to comply with legislation. There is a serious and urgent need for capacity building at WSA level to raise consciousness and awareness of the fundamental contribution to sustainability provided by solid environmental assessment, design and implementation.

- **Environmental considerations at beneficiary level**

622. At a beneficiary level there appears to be some appreciation for the role of environmental considerations – a Water Portfolio Committee interviewed in KZN showed a great deal of concern for issues of proper public consultation and groundwater contamination, with an interest in searching for appropriate solutions for area specific problems. The committee members had all participated in some form of awareness or training, and this was strongly reflected in their evident capacity.

623. Beneficiaries indicated the following with respect to environmental considerations in their responses to the national survey:
    - 62% of beneficiaries had been consulted via public meetings, an integral part of the EIA process, which were held prior to the project's commencement, with the opportunity to voice objections.

- Such objections included issues of tap location (61%), toilet type (67%), toilet location (70%), and work opportunities (64%).
- 40% of the respondents felt that objections and queries had been effectively dealt with.

624. From experience, community consultation during the EIA process is not merely a formality, which must be undergone to comply with NEMA. It is an ideal opportunity to identify, together with end users and service delivery role-payers, the real environmental concerns, and open up dialogue for effective awareness raising.

Impacts - the good, the bad and the downright ugly

625. These impacts are varied and broad, from social and health related to bio-physical and sustainability. Environmental concerns here can be reduced to two simple issues, namely **use/demand on resources**, as well as **management of water quality** through preventing contamination.

- **Social impacts and environmental consequences**

626. The beneficiary survey of more than 1 000 people indicated the following impacts at village level:
    - 35% of respondents had access to free communal water, with 51% less than 100m from homesteads. But 9% (1 in 10) of the respondents still collected water beyond km from their homes, taking over an hour to collect.
    - 99% use water for domestic use, while 33% also used water for gardens (35% used grey water on gardens), 12% used tap water for their livestock, and only 3% of respondents used the communal water for businesses (such as block-making).

- **Water supply and quality management**

627. In the past this has been the domain of DWAF, with recent devolution to WSAs for delivery of supply. DWAF retains a monitoring and regulatory function, but a definite common concern was picked up from a number of DWAF officials related to the lack of capacity within WSAs to deliver efficiently and compliantly.

628. Their concerns were related to poor compliance, with weak or non-existent monitoring, and ignoring RoD conditions. This is resulting in instances of extensive contamination of surface and groundwater supplies (e.g. the Umtata river), and consequent huge expense on treatment and building of new pump stations and purification plants, when it would have been more cost effective to comply with RoD conditions, plan well and monitor properly.

629. A lot of frustration was picked up from DWAF Water Resources personnel, who have a quality management function, with their chief concerns being poor capacity at WSA level. Their suggestions to province and national regarding a mentoring system for WSA officials have not been well received. The section has a wealth of experience to offer, and is in a position to offer mentoring and support to the WSAs.

> "How does Water Affairs regulate water services within a framework with no mandate for accountability to DWAF by WSAs?"
> Andrew Lucas, DWAF Waste Water Discharge

630. A major concern with respect to supply is the perceived high percentage loss from reticulation systems, where input can dramatically exceed output and losses amount to almost 70%.[108] These loss percentages must be assessed in the context of the total supply and the per capita allowance, which differs greatly between urban and rural systems. The latter is generally based on the RDP standard of 25 litres per person per day, whilst urban dwellers make use of an average 250 litres daily. If the same percentage loss is applied to both groups, the total loss in an urban area is dramatic, whilst the rural system losses are almost negligible in comparison.[109]

631. Either way, losses can be expected, but uncontrolled long term losses may have implications for depleting water sources. A case was cited where a pump station and treatment plant work at full capacity (24 hours, 7 days a week) but are unable to meet demand[110], requiring augmentation from an untreated supply – the latter is used on the assumption that some water, even untreated, is better than no water. Poorly made illegal connections, high losses and high consumption with no payment are considered the norm for the region.

632. This is a frightening situation, indicating apathy in terms of dealing with a potentially disastrous situation of unsustainable resource use, which contradicts the intent of the National Water Resources Strategy. Such high losses are unacceptable, and could be avoided

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[108] Internal report for Nsikazi project in Mbombela Municipality, 2005
[109] Still.D (2006) Understanding real leakage rates from water reticulation: implications for the planning and design of rural water supply systems. Paper presented at 2006 WISA conference
[110] Site visit to Tonga, Nkomazi Municipality, Mpumalanga

through effective monitoring, operation and maintenance, improved user awareness campaigns, and taking harsher action concerning illegal connections.

ISSUE	Affected %	IMPACT
Uncontrolled communal water use	63%	No use monitoring, can result in wastage and losses, e.g. carwashes, irrigation, business, reducing availability for domestic consumption, and increasing demand on source.
Water users controlled by meters	20%	Can monitor use in relation to input
Don't get enough water	14%	Possible poor health and hygiene; domestic constraints
Leaking taps	9%	Unplanned losses from system, unplanned demand on resource if widespread and not controlled.
Permanently muddy tap stands in village (taps left open, poor soak-away systems)	20%	Standing dirty water can attract organisms which can harbour disease, e.g. E.coli; mosquitoes
Have system to report problems, which results in repairs.	68%	Positive – one channel for local management of resources

Table 33: Environmental impacts at village level

633. The details of beneficiary water use and access are discussed elsewhere in this report. Of environmental relevance however are the following statistics from the beneficiary survey, listed with their impacts, in Table 33. They relate to how water is used, perceived and conserved, and how these practices impact on communities and their local environment, as well as on the integrity of water resources.

634. The graph below shows some of the strategies used by rural residents to augment their limited water access

Figure 68: Rural water conservation strategies (beneficiary survey)

635. A pleasing 45% of people harvest rainwater to augment their communal access. No detail was available on whether these harvesting systems were self installed or provided by the water service authority, but the former seems to be the case based on the wide variety of materials and innovative installation methods, not reflecting any uniform design.

Making a plan to harvest rainwater in Hopewell village near Umzimkuu, Sisonke District.

636. Some WSAs indicated that rainwater harvesting systems were too difficult to install on traditional thatch roofing, but were a less expensive option than reticulation through challenging topography. Appropriate designs for rainwater harvesting would be a worthwhile investigation, as the approach builds on existing local strategies.

- **Sanitation issues[111]**

637. Effective sanitation delivery and maintenance is a key factor in reducing contamination of surface and groundwater resources. The following factors have relevance for impact on the living environment and wider resource integrity, mainly through

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[111] See also the section on health & education elsewhere in this report.

contamination – poor sanitation is a primary cause of waterborne disease, and groundwater contamination.

ISSUE	Affected %	IMPACT
Hygiene training received	10%	Low percentage, with minimal impact on improving community health
Households which have received free toilets	22%	Improving delivery, but access to sanitation still a problem, resulting people using veld or poorly made latrines, with contamination of surroundings and surface water.
No hand-washing facilities near toilet	77%	Risk of transfer of E.coli bacteria, with associated health implications through impacts on surface water quality.

Table 34: Impacts of sanitation issues in rural communities

638. Training in appropriate use of sanitation facilities is seen as critical for their effectiveness and longevity. A provincial DWAF official indicated that ongoing problems with sewer blockages in the Duncan Village area near East London was resolved through a simple awareness programme for users, saving enormous expense on regular unblocking and maintenance.

> Use of hard paper in toilets was an ongoing problem. After holding an awareness campaign, people indicated their gratitude at being informed about why using hard paper is a problem – that we were not just picking on poor people who can't afford toilet paper. They felt empowered and able to control the problem once they understood the cause.
>
> Andrew Lucas, DWAF Waste Discharge & Disposal

639. Toilet inspection and maintenance statistics are cause for concern, illustrated as follows:

TOILET INSPECTION & MAINTENANCE

5.7   4   1.6   3.7

- Municipality
- Community org
- Private
- No one
- Don't know

85

Figure 69: Toilet inspection and maintenance (beneficiary survey)

640. This shows that for 85% of rural toilets, no-one is inspecting or maintaining them, resulting in poor use, lack of maintenance and decreased life-span, and contributing to possible groundwater contamination.

641. A compliance spot-check carried out by CSIR in April 2007 verified this observation, concluding that only 20% of projects were compliant with technical standards. Many of these standards have environmental relevance, such as location and lining of pits, but no quality assessment were made with respect to issues such as satisfactory backfilling. The assessment used a 95% score to define compliance, with the average compliance score in the region of 80%. Given that ideally 100% compliance with standards, norms and policy requirements should be attained, this result could be cause for concern[112]. Bulk projects showed higher proportion of compliance than

Poor slab design leading to misdirected faecal collection (alias the 'poopcatcher' syndrome)

Maintenance and waste removal is deemed to be someone else's job, but are they doing it?

household projects, both for Water and Sanitation projects.

642. It was found that household sanitation projects were generally non-compliant (based on 95% score for compliance). No major differences were found between projects in different provinces,

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[112] CSIR (2007). Spot-check assessments of MIG water and sanitation projects.

different project sizes, in different settlement types.

643. In general, the data showed that the training and reliability categories scored badly in terms of compliance, and impacted on the Overall Compliance score.

Good and bad practice

644. The few sample sites visited and officials interviewed obviously don't provide a full picture, but the following brief observations were made, upon which some recommendations can be based for best practise (and what to avoid):

- **Bad practice**

645. Some examples are highlighted below:
  - Poor toilet designs with non-existent vent pipes, shelves in the pit, and weak top structures, combined with questionable location with contamination potential. This reflects non-compliance with the Groundwater protocol, and lack of monitoring by the WSA.
  - Enormous losses from reticulated systems, whereby input exceeds output – losses are attributed to unrepaired leaks and illegal connections upstream of target group.
  - Lack of awareness, and apathy, at community level, regarding waste and contamination, where leaky communal taps and litter are ignored as 'someone else's problem'
  - Contractors charging householders for top structures provided by WSAs (householders are meant to provide the pit, not the cash). This was not picked up by the DM concerned, nor were householders reimbursed.

- Politically driven decision making, where technical issues are sidelined in favour of fast tracked popular delivery. This has implications for sustainable delivery through poor planning.

Immaculate toilet facilities, using a multi-VIP system (4 seats on single pit and pipe). Maintenance is done by the school, which is involved in the EcoSchools programme.

Homestead toilet, belonging to the' no-one maintains' group summarised earlier

- **Good practice**
  - The EcoSchools programme, an inspired, integrated and relevant intervention which assists schools to audit themselves, and take practical action to deal with local problems. Some examples cited

include initiating a community drive to upgrade the sewerage system in Katlehong, reduce contamination of village streams through clean ups, improve hygiene practises linked to use of home and public toilets, and recycling household grey water onto the school food garden.

- This initiative is driven by WESSA (Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa) and has enormous potential to support the awareness training and health and hygiene outreach from WSAs to new projects. DWAF's 2020 Vision for Water awareness campaign could link with the EcoSchools initiative as the two have some common objectives and good lessons to share.

Latrine location on a slope with minimal lining of pit can result in contamination of downslope soil and garden produce.

- The innovative Ugu sanitation project, where top structures are tested, refined, adapted and produced on tender at a rate of 30 per day, using seasonal farm workers during their 'off – season'. A team of multi-skilled technical and facilitation officers assists with location, soil inspection for lining requirements, and monitors contractor compliance and performance. A similar programme was initiated by the Alfred Nzo Municipality in the Eastern Cape, but has not had the same level of success.

- Good monitoring - the CSIR spot check assessments, which include a rigorous assessment of MIG funded delivery. Unfortunately the current checklist only assesses technical compliance, and several other factors could be incorporated, including quality assessments and environmental compliance, such as trench backfilling, use of rainwater harvesting systems and AT, etc.

Construction of pre-cast slabs for 'mark3' VIP latrines for distribution in Ugu Municipality

Mark3 (above) and mark2 in use in KZN. Note swivel steel door on new version.

- Sisonke Water Portfolio Committee, demonstrating a sound understanding of environmental issues, experience with CSO support and strong project committees.

646. The integration of environmental considerations in the Masibambane is strong at legislative and policy level, but not carried through with the same strength at implementation level, resulting in a range of undesirable impacts discussed above. There is a gap between intent and practise. Sound guidelines, based on the well-developed national water resource management policy and strategies, are in place, but somewhere between policy level and delivery, the plot goes awry, and environmental considerations are lost. The only consideration afforded environmental issues at WSA level is when authorisation must be obtained in order to proceed, and even then assessments are often perceived as a necessary evil. This is attributed to various factors:
   - Limited built in environmental policy within the MSB approach (the lost KFA…)
   - Lack of capacity and awareness at WSA level with respect to environmental legislation, procedures and general environmental functions.
   - Administrative burn-out on the part of WSA officials, who have rigorous reporting requirements focussed on financial monitoring and performance indicators which do not effectively consider issues of environmental sustainability.

- Unclarity on DWAF and DEAT roles with respect to regulatory functions and limited support to WSAs

647. The following recommendations are made:
   - Firmly entrench KFA 21 within MSB III, and build an environmental code into the MIG programme (the integration of this KFA is apparently included in the next phase);
   - Capacity building for WSA officials through the new EETDP SETA course, and complimentary custom policy and best practise workshops from DEAT and DWAF. This can be augmented by the use of the EIMS toolkit and policy guideline booklets which are available from DWAF and DEAT to enhance understanding of legislative requirements
   - Co-ordination with the WESSA EcoSchools programme to augment meaningful health and hygiene awareness in communities.
   - Clarify roles of DWAF and DEAT as environmental watchdogs, in relation to their regulatory function.

648. There is no need to break new ground – the policy is all in place. This is a case of putting it to work with a strong backbone in the form of a Key Focus Area for guidance and accountability. The challenge is to demystify the concept of environment, and provide practical easy to follow guidelines for use by officials, who are already bogged down with administration. This can only occur with the right institutional will. DWAF has a range of environmental tools and handbooks, and their Eastern Cape Licensing section has set a good example in trying to compile a handbook on Section 21

of the Water Act, which will provide a user friendly guideline for project level role-players to register and license water use.

649. Many of the findings of this summative evaluation concur with those of the MSB II mid term review – itself a matter for concern, signalling limited if any movement over the past 18 months - particularly regarding the gap between good national policy and poor integration at local level. The current focus of municipal managers appears to be on infrastructure delivery, and (arguably) maintenance, but not on enhancing institutional support, creating a challenge to bridge this gap. There is a need to identify environmental management staff in DWAF regional offices who can implement EIMS and provide the necessary support to local government. If such capacity is lacking, the system will not succeed. There needs to be adequate and appropriate consultation with municipalities regarding the implementation and integration of EIMS into their daily activities based on an improved understanding of the law and sustainable development, and why it is in place, with respect to sustainable management of the sub-continent's precious and potentially threatened water resources.

650. Unless these impact planning and mitigation considerations are effectively integrated across the sector now and over the long term, we face the risk of dwindling water sources, and increasingly serious management and conservation challenges. Without its primary resource, the sector will have little to manage and supply.

Appropriate Technology

651.   The Masibambane II financing agreement clearly sets out the intended results for appropriate technology (AT) activities of the programme as follows:

- guidelines for addressing AT, based on best practices locally and internationally
- inclusion of formal considerations of AT in the business plan/project evaluation cycle
- developing KPIs and reporting structures for monitoring and evaluating utilisation of AT.[113]

652.   While the concept of AT has been around since the 1970s and has been a development sector buzzword for much of the time since then, there are a myriad of definitions of what AT is and conflicting perceptions of what technologies it includes. The water sector in South Africa is no exception. For the purpose of this evaluation, the authors have defined their understanding of AT as follows:

To be appropriate, technology must be connected to the place, resources, economics, culture and impacts of its use.[114]

This definition implies the concept of matching a technological solution to all the requirements of the particular situation which encompasses the following:
the users' needs
the water resources
the environment
the policy framework
the budget constraints (both capital and for O&M)
the materials available locally
the construction resources available
the resources available for O&M
the capacity building needed to match the O&M resources to the technology

653.   Charles Reeve of the EU has a broader understanding of AT in the context of Masibambane, looking for appropriate solutions to a particular situations that could include institutional, management and technological solutions with the underlying objective of providing sustainable water and sanitation services.[115]

654.   Historically the main emphasis of research and development of technology has been directed to developing state of the art solutions for applications in well resourced areas. These state of the art technical solutions end up being applied to projects across the board, irrespective of the needs, skills and resources available. AT attempts to redress that imbalance, looking for creative solutions that are appropriate to local conditions.

[113] Financing Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of South Africa, p.17.
[114] Source: Development Center for Appropriate Technology

[115] Interview with Charles Reeve, 17 May 2007

Technical guidelines and AT

655.   DWAF's main technical guidance document, the technical guidelines for the development of water and sanitation infrastructure[116], makes no mention of AT.

656.   The DWAF feasibility study guidelines[117] make very brief mention of AT and the need to match technology to the situation but does not provide details or examples of AT.

657.   The DWAF document "Sanitation Technical Options" provides clear guidance on appropriate solutions and unacceptable options for basic sanitation services, and this information is reproduced in the MIG basic services guide.[118]

658.   The DWAF website pages on technical innovation and guidance decision support (TIGDS) has one document specifically on AT developed under the NORAD project.[119] This introductory guide provides a brief overview of a range of appropriate solutions for water supply, pumping, sanitation and metering and billing but is focussed primarily on groundwater and is not a comprehensive guideline on addressing AT.

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[116] DWAF (2004): *Technical guidelines for the development of water and sanitation infrastructure*, Second edition.
[117] DWAF (September 2002): *Minimum standards and guidelines for feasibility studies of water services projects.*
[118] DPLG (June 2005): *Basic Level of Services and Unit Costs: A guide for municipalities*
[119] DWAF (March 2004): *Introductory Guide to Appropriate Solutions for Water and Sanitation*

Tube well illustration from Introductory Guide to Appropriate Solutions for Water and Sanitation

659.   There is a general level of awareness of term AT, mainly arising from the DWAF AT conference in 2001 and the annual Water Institute of South Africa (WISA) conference of that title.

660.   A prevalent perception of AT in the sector is that if the technical design is done properly, the technology is appropriate. As the Masibambane regional coordinator in KZN put it,

> *What's all the fuss about appropriate technology? If the technical feasibility report has been done properly, the technology must be appropriate.[120]*

661.   This attitude would also explain the 82% of PMU managers who responded to a survey question about AT by saying that they do

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[120] Interview with Angela Masefield, May 2007.

consider appropriate technology during the planning of water and sanitation schemes – even though it is difficult to find any evidence of this when visiting projects on the ground. It is vital that DWAF spend time to develop a shared and accurate understanding of AT.

662. Technologies like hand-pumps, protected springs, wells and rainwater tanks are the water supply equivalent of household electrical generators and can provide critical access to some water for settlements that are not yet served and for served settlements when piped water supplies are not working.

663. Maintaining basic infrastructure is normally more economical than tankering water and 68% of the municipalities surveyed recognise this and allocate budgets for that purpose.

664. Currently any non-piped water supply is deemed "inappropriate" because it is politically unacceptable, so it is not seriously looked at by planners and engineers. However technologies like hand-pumps, springs, rainwater etc. can play a critical role in areas that will not be served by a formal piped scheme in the near future. DWAF has to make good on its promise that all will have water by 2008 and the only feasible way to achieve this is for there to be more of an emphasis on "basic" or "rudimentary" water supplies.

Figure 70: Municipalities that have a budget for basic (less than RDP) service level infrastructure

665. Only four appropriate technology specific projects were implemented as part of MSB2 and the combined expenditure on the projects was just over three million rand. A further two feasibility study projects (in the Northern Cape and the Free State) were classified as appropriate technology projects. One other project was planned for the Eastern Cape but never implemented and a Head Office project on AT is planned for the Masibambane III.

Project name	Province	Expenditure 2004-2007
Appropriate Technology - Urban & Peri urban Sanitation	Head Office	156,179
WSS Gender & Appropriate Technology	Gauteng	813,440
Appropriate Technology	Limpopo	489,316
Appropriate technology solutions	North West	1,674,883
	Total	3,133,817

Table 35: AT expenditure (MSB II)

666.   The water sector quarterly report acknowledges that the programme has not succeeded in the field of appropriate technology and identifies the "lack of a champion for Appropriate Technology at DWAF national, to drive the process" as one reason for lack of implementation.[121] This evaluation suggests this is one aspect, but the deeper problem is lack of appreciation of what AT is about, and the benefits it can deliver.

667.   Guidelines for appropriate basic sanitation solutions are well documented and integrated into the systems of planning. What is still often lacking is the planning for operation and maintenance of basic sanitation solutions, specifically pit emptying and the disposal of waste.

668.   The appropriate technology activities identified in the finance agreement need to be implemented. Guidelines on appropriate solutions should include both the rural and urban environments

and must have a broad focus including solutions for water demand management, efficient water use, grey water reuse, home garden food production and water resources management.

669.   There are excellent examples of applied research into appropriate solutions to municipal priorities (like the research by UKZN focussed on challenges of Ethekweni's urine diversion sanitation programme). While WRC has provided some support for research, Masibambane III must look to facilitating, strengthening and supporting applied research that address municipal priorities. Dissemination information and sharing of best practices must also be strengthened

670.   Our conclusion is that in the area of water and AT, MSB II has performed highly unsatisfactorily. Where sanitation is concerned – a welcome about turn given previous findings – the performance has been satisfactory.

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[121] DWAF (February 2007) 3rd Consolidated water sector report 3rd Quarter 2006/2007, p.33.

Rainwater harvesting at Carisbrooke School – Appropriate Technology in practice but not implemented as part of any sector programme.

Figure 71: Who chooses technology? (PMU Managers)

Who chooses technology?

671.   On the question of who has a say in the choice of technology used in new projects, most PMU managers surveyed identified the project management and technical municipal staff and their consultants. The recipient community were identified as having a say by 10% of the PMU managers.

672.   When municipalities use standard designs and technical specifications for new projects, not only does the job of quality control become easier but O&M can be standardised and streamlined and one can continuously make improvements to the standard designs. The use of technical standards amongst the surveyed PMU managers was widespread, with standard designs

and specifications in use at 69% of the respondents. While this is a satisfactory finding, it is in contrast with the municipalities visited where half the municipalities had no standard details and relied on consultants to propose project specific standard details. Municipalities must be encouraged to make use of tried and tested standard designs, details and specifications and to specify the use of these in project implementation. Where none exist, or they are outdated, standards must be reviewed, revised and disseminated as technical best practice guidelines. All-in-all, MSB III has a lot of work to do in the area of technology choices and AT.

Two tapstands, one with proper functioning drainage and the other creating a health hazard

Programme management & finances

673. The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry is the leader of the water and forestry sectors. As water sector leader, it currently performs implementation and regulatory roles. In terms of the Constitution and its legislative mandate the former is not a part of its functions. Already, through MSB II, the transfer of the potable water supply and sanitation services functions to local government is nearing completion. Thus once the National Water Resources Infrastructure Agency (NWRIA) is fully operational, the implementation of infrastructure projects and the management of infrastructure should fall away completely. Finally DWAF is currently the main manager of the country's water resources whilst this function, excluding some cross border responsibilities related to shared water resources, is the responsibility of Catchment Management Agencies (CMAs). Thus other players have core roles in ensuring that Government's sector objectives are met with DWAF's functions and responsibilities being leadership and regulation[122].

SWAP analysed from a financial perspective

674. This means that DWAF's focus must increasingly become policy development, monitoring, information management, support and regulation. With regard to MSB II, from a financial perspective, we can ask: has the programme been implemented in a sector-wide manner with respect to its water services interventions, which account for in excess of 96% of its monetary expenditure?

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[122] DWAF 2007/08 - 2009/10 Strategic Plan, Chief Directorate Communication Services

675. To be effective sector-wide the interventions must be carried out in a manner that encourages cross-sphere co-ordination and integration, deals comprehensively with single entity and cross-cutting issues and maximises community empowerment.

676. With respect to the first the programme was truly a SWAP and DWAF has shown decisive leadership in funding SALGA, DPLG, Department of Health, Education, Provincial Departments of Local Government & Housing, WSAs and CSOs.

677. WSAs have found the funding of DWAF HO, DWAF Regional Offices, SALGA and Provincial Departments of Local Government & Housing particularly helpful and have singled out these stakeholders as true team builders. They praised them for the manner in which they organise and chair water sector meetings. With respect to the Provincial Water Sector Forum Meetings frustration was expressed concerning the non-attendance of the departments of Housing, Public Works, Education and Health.

678. WSA Water services Managers and PMU staff members have also generally excelled with respect to their interaction with the first and second spheres of government. National Treasury has also been a significant player. It has made use of Provincial Treasury Departments to support and monitor local government.

679. WSAs feel the funding of DPLG has not been particularly beneficial, but with the support of DPLG and the Municipal Infrastructure Task Team, DWAF has retained responsibility

for monitoring the MIG spending of municipalities with regard to sector specific criteria123. Thus, despite weaknesses at DPLG the move from DWAF to MIG funding has gone reasonably smoothly.

680. The programme was comprehensive with respect to coverage of single entity soft issues and most were well implemented. Cross-cutting issues were all present but implementation of four of the five issues listed in the financial agreement was unsatisfactory. With respect to community empowerment the programme failed due to legislative barriers and a lack of agreement with respect to how it should be defined.

681. WSA support has become a hallmark of DWAF's operations but sometimes the very comprehensiveness of DWAF's support for MSB II has resulted in it acting in an ad hoc manner.

682. DWAF has been collecting information from WSAs using a yes/no checklist[124] to check the progress they have been making in complying with water services-related legislation and the Strategic Framework for Water Services (SFWS). WSAs have reported positively about this checklist.

683. In 2005 the results of the collected information were examined and up-loaded onto the DWAF WSDP support tool

website[125] However since then minimal updating has taken place. It is recommended that a new set of information be collected from each WSA using this simple support tool. Thereafter a sector wide team should organise a systematic and rigorous WSA institutional strengthening and capacity building programme in consultation with the WSAs.

684. To improve the environment in which the institutional strengthening and capacity building is taking place, the checklist section of the WSDP support tool website should also be made more user friendly. Firstly, all the checklist report display buttons " " that do not lead to a report because there are no records to build a report with should be removed. Secondly, after the "available years" list, add an additional display tool that leads the viewer to the latest available reports.

685. Lastly, simplify the summary graphical reports so that the output can printed on a single page for viewing. Figure 1 indicates the results of 2004/05 provincial checklist summary reports to illustrate what can be shown on a single page.

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[123] Policy framework for the introduction of the Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG). Concise version - final. Amended by the Municipal Infrastructure Task Team, 5 February 2004

[124] DWAF (2005) *Water Services Authority checklist, and purpose and explanation of information required* Version draft 29 April 2005

[125] DWAF WSA WSDP Support Tool website

Overview of annual spending per region

Figure 72: Overview of MSB II annual spending per region

(Source: Masibambane database Ver0.1 dated 2007 April 13, updated to include final 2006/07 expenditure from data supplied by Dirk Van Der Boorn Snr, DWAF)

686.   Figure 72 represents an overview of MSB II annual spending per region. Funding decreased each year. As indicated below this was due to a decrease in the funding of infrastructure projects.

- **Geographic pro-poor targeting**

687.   As illustrated below MSB II was pro-poor in that the low fiscal capacity provinces tended to receive more funding than the high fiscal capacity ones. In the figure the provinces are listed in ascending order that reflects the extent to which they can be expected to cross-subsidise basic services from internally generated revenue raised from medium to high income households.

Figure 73: Provincial share of MSB2 funding versus their share of poor households

(Sources: Masibambane database Ver0.1 dated 2007 April 13 updated to include final 2006/07 expenditure from data supplied by Dirk Van Der Boon Snrn, DWAF and demographic data for Dec 2005 boundaries supplied by StatsSA to NT for the calculation of LGES grants)

688.   The straight diagonal dashed line represents neutral funding, that is with neither pro-poor nor pro-rich targeting. The convex nature of the actual funding indicates the degree of pro-poor targeting with Limpopo and the Eastern Cape, the two poorest provinces, being the main beneficiaries.

689.   We do not believe that pro-poor spending should only target the most poor provinces – widespread poverty can be found in North West, Mpumalanga, Free State, the Northern Cape and others that fall in the middle of the rich-to-poor axis. This should inform pro-poor funding in MSB III.

- **Ability of regions to spend allocated funds**

Figure 74: Ability of regions to spend 2006/07 allocated funds

(Source: Personal communication Dirk Van Der Boon Snr DWAF)

690. The interim MSB II evaluation reported that the regions failed to spend the funds allocated to them. Figure 6 indicates that there has been an improvement. Total expenditure for the final year was 101 % of the planned expenditure with only Limpopo being significantly under spent, despite reasonable expenditure early in the year. This is a very positive finding.

691. Expenditure in the first three quarters, compared to the fourth quarter, was still low. Therefore, additional early planning is still required for MSB III to achieve even spending throughout the year. More even spending will help to improve the quality of the work performed.

- **Overview of expenditure categories**

Figure 75: Overview of expenditure categories

(Source: Masibambane database Ver0.1 dated 2007 April 13, updated to include final 2006/07 expenditure from data supplied by Dirk Van Der Boorn Snr, DWAF)

692. The main expenditure categories are shown above. As per early agreement with the EU, donor funded expenditure on infrastructure decreased from 62% in year 1 to 5% in year 3.

693. By year three, the expenditure on single entity soft issues had become robust and equalled 65% of total expenditure. This is regarded as satisfactory and should largely remain unchanged throughout MSB III.

694. The expenditure on cross-cutting themes also rose each year and by year three had risen to 30% of total expenditure. This expenditure if fully supported and perhaps may be increased marginally. However, as detailed below, the real issue is that the expenditure needs to be more balanced and made more

effective. The manner in which some of the expenditure on cross-cutting themes was managed was the only low point from a financial analysis perspective.

- **Breakdown of expenditure on capital projects**

Figure 76: Yearly breakdown of expenditure on capital projects

(Source: Masibambane database Ver0.1 dated 2007 April 13, updated to include final 2006/07 expenditure from data supplied by Dirk Van Der Boorn Snr, DWAF)

695. The graphic shows the breakdown of expenditure on capital projects. During MSB III MIG expenditure on sanitation projects needs to exceed that spent on water supply projects to overcome the greater back-logs.

- **Expenditure on general soft issue projects**

Figure 77: Yearly expenditure on general soft issues

(Source: Masibambane database Ver0.1 dated 2007 April 13, updated to include final 2006/07 expenditure from data supplied by Dirk Van Der Boorn Snr, DWAF)

696. The graphic shows the yearly breakdown of expenditure on general soft issues. The expenditure was generally well focused and prioritised. The expenditure on the regulatory portion of KFA 11 was however low and could increase during MSB III. At the same time the overall expenditure on KFA 12 could decrease although the development and implementation of skills development strategies which form a part of this KFA needs increased emphasis. Additional money may also be allocated to KFA 06.2 - effective water usage and management.

- **Expenditure on cross-cutting themes**

697. The graph below shows the breakdown of expenditure on cross cutting themes. As noted in the previous paragraph, 73 % of cross-cutting projects are ongoing and will be carried over to MSB III. This is encouraging but all these projects need to be well managed.


Figure 78: Overview of expenditure on cross-cutting themes

(Source: Masibambane database Ver0.1 dated 2007 April 13, updated to include final 2006/07 expenditure from data supplied by Dirk Van Der Boorn Snr, DWAF)

698. Of this expenditure 87% was spent on what have been classified as miscellaneous cross-cutting themes; namely MSB facilitation, project consolidate, communication and IWRM. The yearly expenditure on each of these themes and how it increased for each of them is indicated below.

Figure 79: Yearly expenditure on misc cross-cutting themes

(Source: Masibambane database Ver0.1 dated 2007 April 13, updated to include final 2006/07 expenditure from data supplied by Dirk Van Der Boorn Snr, DWAF)

699. This proportion is regarded as excessive and needs to be reviewed. Of the 87%, 67% was spent on MSB facilitation. Despite its importance, this could be better managed. Consideration needs to be given to reducing it from its 2006/07 high of R51 million to its 2004/05 level of R37 million. The effectiveness of the expenditure on communication could be improved to market sector successes.

700. The annual expenditure on core cross-cutting themes is shown in figure 12. The expenditure on these themes reached a miserable high of R13,4 million in 2006/07; 13% of the expenditure on cross-cutting themes for that year.

Figure 80: Yearly expenditure on core cross-cutting themes

(Source: Masibambane database Ver0.1 dated 2007 April 13, updated to include final 2006/07 expenditure from data supplied by Dirk Van Der Boorn Snr, DWAF)

701. This expenditure is low. Without the modest increase in funding for appropriate technology, the total funding of core themes would have decreased marginally over the three years. As recorded earlier, the expenditure that did take place was ineffective, and overall is classified as highly unsatisfactory; the only truly low point for MSB II. Thus, apart from increasing the funding for these themes, strategies need to be put in place to ensure the outputs are implemented sector wide. HIV/AIDS needs to be added as an additional core cross-cutting theme.

- **Funds channelled through CSOs**

702. Cross-cutting civil-society projects relate to expenditure facilitating CSO participation. In the MSB II database Irish Delgation funding of the National Community Water and Sanitation Training Institute (NCWSTI) was included in the civil

society cross-cutting category but this expenditure has been excluded because despite the institute's name it focuses on training municipal employees rather than facilitating CSO participation in the water sector

703. This cross cutting civil-society expenditure must not be confused with the EC Finance Agreement which states that *it is envisaged that a minimum equivalent to 25% of the EC funds will be channelled through non-state actor (CSO) structures*. For the period of the program only R 34 million of expenditure is so designated which represents less than 3% of MSB II expenditure. It is likely that in the first two years of implementation not all the expenditure channelled through CSOs was so designated, but for the 2006/07 financial year each of the regional co-ordinators was asked to report on which funds in their region were channelled through CSOs. The resulting figure is R 17,5 million and this represents just over 5% of the expenditure for 2006/07.

704. There is an overlap between the cross-cutting expenditure facilitating civil society participation in the water sector and expenditure channelled through CSO structures. Thus if one adds together all CSO related expenditure, including the previously discarded NCWSTI funding, the total CSO related expenditure reported for 2006/07 is still less than R20 million, and represents 5,5% of MSB2's expenditure over the same period. The corresponding cumulative figures for the three year period are R42 million and 3,3%[126]. The next graphic shows the yearly expenditure on civil society related expenditure. Thus no matter how one measures civil society expenditure, or the 25%, the result is that expenditure related

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[126] MSB2 database 070413 revision and personnel communication with J. Steyn

to civil society is seriously below the norm (or target) suggested in the EC Financial Agreement.

Figure 81: Yearly civil society related expenditure

(Source: Masibambane database Ver0.1 dated 2007 April 13, updated to include final 2006/07 expenditure from data supplied by Dirk Van Der Boorn Snr, DWAF and recent information on funds channeled through CSOs obtained from regional MSB Coordinators)

705. The Civil Society representatives attending the MSB II final evaluation multi stakeholder workshop recommended that the concept of funds channelled through CSOs should be merged with funds used to facilitate CSO participation and empowerment to create a single EU key result area called CSO related expenditure, since funds spent facilitating civil society participation are just as important to them as funds channelled through CSOs.

- **Recommended improvements to the MSB database**

706. Data in the MSB II database generally appears to have been captured accurately although more care could be taken when completing the columns before the financial data to make them clearer and more accurate.

707. Two columns appear to have been added to the original to record the expenditure on cross-cutting themes and EU key result areas. The former appears to have been captured accurately but reporting on the EU key result areas was not carried out so well. This needs to be improved for MSB III.

708. The MSB II database does not record the person responsible for managing the funds associated with each project. A column could be added to the database to record this information together with an additional worksheet to record full contact details of these people. This is essential for persons wishing to access the outcomes of particular projects and will be most use to future MSB evaluators.

Monitoring and evaluation

709. Monitoring and evaluating a SWAP , despite its obvious
importance, has garnered little discussion in international literature.

- *M&E units focus extensively, if not exclusively, on targets and indicators to the detriment of the grand design and broad policy.*
- *Monitoring and evaluation are typically conflated, and monitoring outcomes is often presented as also somehow constituting evaluation, almost as an afterthought.*
- *Much of the focus is on pure stocktaking of performance (were targets met?) than on probing into underlying reasons for non-performance (why were the targets not met?).*
- *The chain of hypotheses on cause-effect relationships behind programmes and policies are seemingly absent.*
- *The absence of attention to evaluation also means that the trade-off that normally exists in all M&E systems between feedback and independence and impartiality is most of the time obfuscated*
- *Systematic reporting, dissemination of M&E results and feedback loops are seldom integrated into mainstream management functions.*
- *M&E is often not aligned with budgetting and planning cycles., thus combining M&E results into budget and planning cycles in most SWAPs remains highly problematic.*
- *Monitoring and particularly evaluation capacity constraints are widely acknowledged in development literature and thus a formidable mismatch will continue for some time between the demands of a SWAP and national M&E capacity.*
- *The role of CSOs as independent watchdogs is seldom acknowledged as an important function within a SWAP M&E system.*

710. In part this is because of the relative novelty of SWAPs, but in part, and importantly, because practitioners have found it extremely

difficult to efficiently and effectively monitor progress within a SWAP. The table above illustrates common challenges faced by those designing M&E systems for SWAPS[127].

711. What follows is an assessment of the existing M & E system(s) within the programme and we provide evidence that suggests (when compared with other sector wide programmes as we do at the end of this section of the report) that the existing approach to monitoring and evaluation is largely effective and in a generally healthy state. Moreover, despite some obvious weaknesses in the existing monitoring and evaluation procedures, these have largely been recognised and initiatives are under way to deal with these challenges.

712. The development of M&E system can take many routes. An approach commonly used would follow these six broad steps:
- **Step 1**: Establishing the purpose and scope – why does the programme need M&E and how comprehensive should the M&E system be?
- **Step 2**: Identifying performance questions, information needs and indicators – what do managers need to know to monitor and evaluate the programme in order to manage it well?
- **Step 3**:Planning information gathering and organization – how will the required information be gathered and organized?
- **Step 4**: Planning critical reflection processes and events – how will management make sense of the information gathered and use it to make improvements?

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[127] Holvoet N & Renard R (2007) Monitoring and evaluation under the PRSP, *Evaluation and Programme Planning* (30): 66 – 81.

- **Step 5:** Planning for quality communication and reporting – how and to whom does they system want to communicate what in terms of programme activities and processes?
- **Step 6**: Planning for the necessary conditions and capacities – what is needed to ensure the programme's M&E system actually works?

713. How one goes about it all depends on what M&E system try to achieve viz. better planning, performance improvement, improved accountability, promoting Learning processes or all of them with specific focus on one particular element. Needless to say, that an effective M&E system is about information generated and analysed in order to benefit the users of the information. M&E is not only about formats but also about mechanisms, tools and methods employed to generate, analyse and use knowledge at various levels of a project. For that purpose, not only reporting but also reflection and study related methods can be used to make M&E more effective.

714. The evidence gathered during this evaluation suggests that the above mentioned issues are exactly those that the sector is grappling with at present. The *Water Services Sector Monitoring and Evaluation Process Document* (Draft) for instance, notes that DWAF

Has new dynamic information needs brought on by its changing role from being actively involved in management at an operational level to one of National Regulator and Sector Support… DWAF, as the sector leader and regulator of water supply and sanitation services is still legally mandated to

report on the state of the sector and to monitor regulatory compliance[128]

715. DWAF, as sector leader, are currently engaged in a comprehensive process to ensure that the redesigned and revamped Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting (M,E & R) system will ensure that the system provide the appropriate information DWAF now requires in order to fulfil its revised mandate. Whilst the shift to regulatory monitoring required the existing systems (more on this below) to be revised, the revision of its current approach to monitoring, evaluation and reporting was grounded in an extensive review of the performance of existing systems. Among the many challenges exposed by the review, the following are key[129]
- The quality of information (e.g. inconsistent methodology used, targets not quantified and so on)[130]
- Data not analysed locally in order to shape interventions to identified problems
- Weak M,E & R capacity within regions and local authorities
- Duplication of reporting procedures to different national authorities working in the sector.
- Limited alignment with planning

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[128] Scheepers, E. (January 2007) *Water Services Sector Monitoring and Evaluation Process Document*. Draft document prepared by M&E Unit, Water Services Support Directorate, DWAF.

[129] Drawn from a presentation by Elma Scheepers (24 May 2007) entitled "Overview of Water Sector: Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting" to a national M&E workshop hosted by the Presidency, National Treasury and DPSA.

[130] Scheepers (May, 2007) notes that in the most recent provincial 4th Quarter Regional report provinces, on average, only reported on 8 of the 14 Key Focus areas they are meant to be regularly reporting on.

- Rules within existing data bases not enforced (e.g. it is possible to make un-authorised data entries)
- Data systems not aligned (e.g. DWAF systems used different field names to those used by dplg).

716. The proposed M, E & R system is predicated on the existing 19 targets embedded within the Strategic Framework for Water Services (2003). As noted earlier in this report these targets focus on access to services (6 of the 19 indicators), education and health (2 indicators), free basic services (2 indicators) and institutional development and performance (the remaining 9 indicators). Moreover, as has been noted previously, these targets are at different levels, many of which are not at the higher outcome level one would have expected for a sector wide programme[131]. The implication here is that whilst a revised, strengthened, and in all likelihood effective, M,E & R system that is being designed to "facilitate information flow in the water sector" (Scheepers, January 2007: 14) might continue to focus on outputs rather than outcomes, simply because the existing flawed targets have been retained.

717. The emphasis on outcomes is an important one as by measuring outcomes (defined as "changes in the behaviour, relationships, activities, or actions of the people, groups, and organizations with whom a program works directly" [132]) one is better placed to understand whether the programme is achieving its stated objective by means of the activities the different components of the programme are engage in. By retaining the current set of indicators, there is a real concern that the newly developed "Dynamic Information Acquisition Model" (DIAM) will not achieve what its architects' hope it will:

> *The Information Acquisition Model (DIAM) initiative is to set in place a mechanism that will automate the collection, consolidation and dissemination of decision supporting information and knowledge in the Water Services Sector... The key to the Dynamic Information Acquisition Model (DIAM) methodology is the involvement of WSA's in defining a practical, common data set based on day to day information used to manage their functions (i.e. information relating to project implementation, operation and maintenance). ...It is based on a single point of data capture at the highest resolution (the WSA/P or other Service Delivery Institution). This operational dataset is then made dynamically available through a "Knowledge Bank", a web-enabled system rolling-up to the higher level perspectives (regional and National DWAF structures as well as other Sector-players). This model will be used to align reporting throughout the Water Services Sector with each key sector-player depositing their input and commentary, according to their perspective, for feedback to*

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[131] For instance target no. 11 "a national institutional reform strategy is developed by June 2004" is clearly an output, as is Indicator no. 19 "DWAF reports on sector development and progress annually"

[132] Earl, S. Carden, F. & Smutylo T. (2001). Outcome Mapping: Building Learning and Reflection into Development Programs. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre .

the WSA's and the Water Services Sector as a whole (Scheepers, January 2007: 35).

718. The DIAM certainly demonstrates considerable expertise of cutting edge M&E/ICT literature, including an impressive sector information and reporting process, detailed data reporting templates, consolidated financial information, a comprehensive training plan to empower regional teams, spot checks to validate data capture at the local level and so on but unless the system is geared to measuring outcomes rather than just outputs the system will be over powered for its needs. The point being made here is not to question the value of this water sector data depository but rather to question what it will be measuring. This point has also been noted by some within the programme as the following illustrates:

While a KPI-based reporting system has been established to monitor the performance of WSAs and WSPs, it is recognised that the means to measure performance meaningfully and accurately will evolve over time. There is currently no formal reporting system in place, and the only source of information on WSA performance against these KPIs currently has been obtained through a variety of surveys…. More work is also required to refine definitions and create the systems required to measure, monitor and verify. Certain of these aspects are being addressed in the regulation strategy….WSA level information should ultimately feed upwards into other sector-wide indicators. Future annual reports could also include an

appendix of performance for each individual WSA in the country on this and other KPIs, to promote benchmarking.[133]

719. Linked to the point made above is that although no one can question the strength of the reporting tools and processes already in place in this programme the real issue is the value all this data is adding to the decision making process on the ground. For instance, the National Benchmarking Initiative (NBI) has already noted several concerns with regards to validity and the reliability of the data being used to help measure the 9 performance indicators provided in the National Water Services Regulation Strategy"[134].

720. Readers familiar with this pilot study will know that the NBI study focuses on the following measures:
   - Access to basic water supply
   - Access to basic sanitation supply
   - Quality of services: Potable water quality
   - Quality of services: Continuity of supply
   - Access to free basic services (water)
   - Access to free basic services (sanitation)
   - Financial performance: Affordability and debtor management
   - Asset management: Metering coverage and unaccounted-for water
   - Protection of the environment: Effluent discharge quality

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[133] Concept Note No 1 "Sector Targets and Performance" (2006) prepared for the the development of the WSSS (2007)
[134] National Water Services Benchmarking Initiative (2007) Promoting Best Practice Benchmarking Outcomes for 2005/2006.

Figure 82: KPIs monitored by municipalities

721. Our own survey of WSA and PMU managers found additional verification problems. When managers were asked in the survey what they monitored and therefore emphasised in their reporting they reported that Access to free basic services (water) and Quality of services were the KPIs most commonly assessed (84%). Whilst the KPIs least likely to be monitored by municipalities were Access to free basic services (sanitation) (43%) and Asset management (55%).

722. The implication here is that whilst more than eight out of ten managers are monitoring three of the nine key measures, the remaining measures are not monitored as consistently. In other words despite a vast array of regulations and guidelines managers there are not sufficient incentives to monitor all and so they have prioritised three measures which they see as more important than other.

723. More disturbingly, the figure above highlights that municipalities are far more likely to monitor KPIs related to backlog targets as opposed to aspects that are crucial to sustainability (metering efficiency and financial performance and affordability). This suggests that despite the rhetoric in the sector, municipalities continue to prioritise backlogs and have yet to give much consideration to how to garner sufficient funds to sustain facilities once they have been paid for.

Assessment

724. **Relevance**: The graph below reflects the perceptions of both WSA and PMU mangers with regards to the relevance of the existing M&E system. Importantly nearly three out of four managers (72%) agreed with the statement that the data produced by the system allowed them to verify the quality of delivery. However far fewer managers agreed with the view that the data was analysed promptly (57% agreed), that they were given relevant feedback on the data (57% agreed) and that once the data was supplied to the WSA or WSP that it was in a format that could easily be disseminated (55%).

Figure 83: Rating the relevance of M&E, by WSA and PMU Managers

725. As the graph denotes roughly a third of respondents were critical of the M&E system as it presently functions (29% felt the data is not analysed promptly, 30% do not feel they get sufficient feedback and 31% felt that the data is not disseminated in format which makes the data readily accessible). This data supports some of the common problems associated with SWAPs and so should be understood in that context. The suggestion being made here is that ensuring relevance to all role-players in a SWAP is well nigh impossible and realistically any system that addresses the key aspects of the SWAP is doing well. Nevertheless the findings from both the survey and interviews do suggest that there are areas that need attention

726. Regardless of whether one accepts the criticisms made by managers of the existing M&E system, it is fair to state the in terms of relevance the M&E system was generally more concerned with performance management, input and output monitoring and that the higher-order policy relevant issues have largely been neglected.

727. *Score*: The evidence suggests that a proportion of the users do not believe the existing system meets their needs, for this reason relevance is scored **2 out of 4**.

728. **Effectiveness**: The data from the surveys suggests that municipalities have mixed feelings about the effectiveness of the monitoring system This can be seen in the following graph.

729. The overwhelming view amongst WSA and PMU managers is that they are over burdened with reporting demands. Eight out of ten (81%) agreed with this statement, with only one out of ten disagreeing (10%). Interviews conducted at the KZN quarterly meeting of Masibambane found an even stronger opinion on this matter when all 10 managers endorsed the view that "there seems

to be no end of surveys that we have to fill in or respond to. We seldom see any feedback from these surveys and they waste our time".

Figure 84: Rating the effectiveness of M&E within Masibambane

730.   In terms of M&E specifically (and in many instances M&E is often seen as indistinguishable from reporting) only four out of ten WSA and PMU managers (45%) agreed with the statement "M&E is a burden not a help", but still an even smaller number disagreed with

the statement (42%). This finding suggests that there is certainly some disquiet regarding the M&E system

731.   Two reasons for this disillusionment with the system, apart from the previously mentioned factor that reporting demands are simply overwhelming for many on the ground can also be found by examining the graph. Firstly, less than half the respondents (47%) agreed with the statement that the guidelines and data capture tools are simple. This suggests that the remainder of the respondents do not clearly understand what is expected of them nor do they understand fully the tools they are using to record and report the data. A point that will be returned to below as it has implications for the quality of the data flowing into the system.

732.   Secondly, just over a third of all respondents (38%) felt that their staff had been adequately trained to comply with reporting requirements. Without appropriate training it is not surprising that many WSA and PMU managers are battling to understand the guidelines and tools provided. This too must have implications for the quality of the data entering the system.

733.   An important implication of the graph discussed above is that any capacity building initiatives must not only focus on the supply side (i.e. the ability of WSAs and WSPs to gather reliable and valid data) but they must also focus on the demand side (i.e. WSAs and WSPs are instructed on how to analyse and ultimately use the data locally).

734. *Score*: The effectiveness of the existing M&E processes in the programme are being marred by the ability of the users to make proper sense of the information being gathered for this reason we would **score effectiveness 3 out of 4**.

735. **Efficiency**: Evidence from the interviews and DWAF's own reports reveal a duplication of efforts, considerable overlap between functions, roles and responsibilities within the programme:.

> *There are two reporting channels currently, via Masibambane M&E, and the Water Services Planning and Information division. These channels need to be simplified and streamlined. This may also help to improve WSA reporting, as the current information requirements and survey requests are seen as too onerous, resulting in low compliance levels.[135]*

736. Our findings confirm this view that there are rival, almost competing M&E initiatives within the sector, with one system feeding directly into Masibambane management structures in order to shape the SWAP's different strategies and tactics. Whereas the other system feeds directly into the reporting needs of DWAF, in particular ensuring that DWAF is both transparent with its data on issues such as backlogs, and is accountable to its mandate.

737. The significance of this duplication is multifaceted and the following points need to be highlighted. One, by not creating a well-established structure for coordinating, oversight and feedback of monitoring results is more often than not likely to lead to complex power issues related to the relationships between different providers and users. Thus a vacuum of authority and initiative from the centre exacerbates the problems. Whilst this may not surprise anyone as control over monitoring often conveys power over resources (in particular the MIG) and other agencies (such as municipalities, WSAs and WSPs) the comprehensiveness of Masibambane does require some degree of coordination and oversight.

738. Two, duplication means that different actors are involved in the systems and in different phases of the data collection. In some instances the different systems assign them different and even conflicting roles and responsibilities in the system thus creating confusion on the ground and worryingly reporting becomes a "tick the box exercise" and no thought is given by those doing the reporting to the quality or the value of the data they are collecting. The well known "garbage in garbage out" syndrome tends to thrive in these situations.

739. Therefore, as noted in Concept Note No 1 (2006) to ensure greater efficiency there has to be a "streamlining of reporting requirements" and a "reduction in the number of monitoring and evaluation initiatives".

740. Score: The duplication of monitoring and evaluation activities, against a background of confusion surrounding roles and responsibilities suggests that efficiency should be scored a **2 out of 4.**

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[135] Concept Note No 1 "Sector Targets and Performance" (2006).

Figure 85: Rating the impact of M&E within Masibambane

741.   **Impact**: Evidence from the case studies suggests that MSB II has not fully achieved its stated purpose with regards to M&E. Nevertheless, and despite the view that mangers are over burdened with reporting needs, many WSA and PMU managers reported that the knowledge gleaned from the system is having an impact on their work. For instance, seven out of ten managers (70%) reported that their plans are adapted or modified in response to M&E findings. A similar number of managers (70%) also agreed with the statement that operational decisions about project implementation are informed by findings from the M&E system. Thus whilst many mangers are critical about the "endless forms we have to fill in" very few are not using the data (14% said they do not modify their plans based on M&E data and 12% claimed that operational decisions were not informed by data from the system).

742.   Despite previously identified challenges with the existing M,E, and R system the data gathered is having a profound impact on those working in the sector. This is a very positive finding and suggests that whilst they have misgivings they are using the system and it is having a positive impact on their ability to manage (plans are being adapted based on analysed data, operational decisions are made in response to data identifying gaps and problems and so on).

743.   Score: The existing system is having a demonstrable impact on the programme and is consequently scored **4 out of 4 for impact**.

744.   **Sustainability**: To ensure greater sustainability and ultimately to achieve sustainability with regards to M&E a comprehensive strategy for M,E & R is currently being rolled out in the regions. The key challenges facing the nascent M&E system based on our assessment and which need to be prioritised include:
   • Being clear about the causal relationships between variables that can explain the impact of the programme.
   • Diminishing the negative perception of monitoring, evaluation and reporting at local level, primarily through eradicating the duplication of data collection and assigning appropriate roles and responsibilities.

- Ensuring that lessons learnt are shared appropriately across the sector (both vertically and horizontally)
- Emphasising the value of valid and reliable data, particularly the consistent manner in which data must be captured locally
- Aligning the proposed M&E system to all aspects of the sector wide programme (including, for instance, the revised sector support initiatives) and thereby measuring performance of these different components (e.g. effective delivery and provision of water and sanitation services, sustainable operation and maintenance aspects, environmental and other regulatory aspects, sustainability issues and so on) in order to integrate the findings into existing budget and planning cycles.

745. Ultimately a sustainable monitoring system must be simple to grasp, be light to implement, provide useful information for learning, and help meet reporting requirements. Monitoring should help the program see its work more holistically[136].

746. Score: Sustainability of the proposed system is predicated on implementing the detailed and thorough strategy that the M&E unit has developed and resolving the duplication issues referred to in the discussion on efficiency for this reason we would **score sustainability 3 out of 4**.

747. **Conclusion**: The following table provides a readiness assessment[137] of the existing M&E system, taking into account the proposed changes, as outlined in the *Water Services Sector: Monitoring and Evaluation Process Document* (Scheepers, 2007). The purpose of this assessment is demonstrate the solid foundation that already exists within the programme and to signal areas where work still needs to be done to ensure greater effectiveness and efficiency.

Topic	Component	DWAF M&E
Policy	Comprehensive plan for M&E	√
	Difference and relationship between M & E spelt out	√
	Autonomy and impartiality explicitly mentioned	√
	Consistent approach to reporting, dissemination and reporting	√
	Evidence of M&E results integrated into planning and budget cycle	To some extent
Methodology	List of indicators supplied	√
	Criteria for selection of indicators provided	√
	Indicators prioritised and limits set on number of indicators to be monitored	√
	Causality chain explicit[138]	To some extent

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[136] Earl, S. Carden, F. & Smutylo T. (2001). Outcome Mapping: Building Learning and Reflection into Development Programs. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre

[137] The assessment is adapted from adapted from Holvoet & Renard, 2007 who in turn have relied heavily on an assessment tool to be found in Kusek, J.Z. & Rist, R.C. (2004) *Ten steps to a results-based monitoring and evaluation system.* Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

[138] In other words are different levels (input-output-outcome-impact) within the programme linked.

Topic	Component	DWAF M&E
	Monitoring and evaluation methodologies identified and explained	√
	Sources have data have been clearly identified	√
Organisation	Appropriate institutional structure for coordination, support, central oversight and feedback established	Requires attention
	M&E units within different agencies linked to central M&E unit within SWAP	Requires attention
	Roles and responsibilities clearly identified	Requires attention
	Data flow between projects, regional coordinators and central M&E unit clearly mapped out	√
Capacity	Current needs and weaknesses in system have been identified	√
	Capacity build plan in place	
Actors outside agencies	Role of the legislature properly recognised	√
	Alignment with Parliament's control and oversight functions	√
	Policies and procedures in place to systematise role of CSOs	Requires attention
	Clear procedures for the participation of donors	√
Quality	M&E data analysed to ensure appropriate actions with regards to progress	To some extent
	M&E data is verified independently	Being addressed

748. The table signals why we have given an overall score of **3 out of 4** for the existing system and it also summarise why we have concluded that whilst there are challenges facing the existing/ proposed M&E system the system is a) robust enough to overcome these challenges and b) could well become an exemplar model/ best practice example of how to conduct M&E in any SWAP.

749. Whatever M&E "model" is selected for ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the SWAP it is important to remember that such systems do not operate in isolation and that there are certain critical factors that will influence whether or not the organisation is ready for the system. Positive factors include accepting the monitoring data and system by managers, ensuring that the organisation has an M&E champion, that there are adequate internal resources (time and people) to do the monitoring and a defined use for the monitoring data.

750. Past experience with monitoring can provide either negative or positive feelings, as can the incentives for monitoring and demonstrating learning (e.g. some managers might find it useful for their activities to be tracked to demonstrate their worth, others who are under performing may prefer not to have their poor performance tracked). If monitoring systems become overly complicated and burdensome and require additional financial resources to support the monitoring and disseminate the findings then this too can influence a willingness to engage with a proposed system. Other inhibitors include past failures and frustrations with monitoring and superficial or undefined motives for utilising an

M&E system. All of these factors will need to be well managed in order that they do not pose any fatal risk to an M&E system.

751.   It is appropriate to end with the following quote:

> *The SWAP rationale of broad based participation of state and non-state stakeholders and comprehensiveness with all its emphasis on blending qualitative and quantitative dimensions with its urge to go beyond inputs and capture all levels of an intervention chain requires M&E systems that are multi-stakeholder, multi-purpose multi-dimensional, multi-method, multi-layer and finally multi-criteria. Such requirements are challenging for even sophisticated M&E systems and may well stifle rather than boost the fledgling M&E systems of most SWAPs*[139].

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[139] Adapted from Holvoet & Renard, 2007, p.77.

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Appendix B: List of respondents

Baai, Nelly	Department of Health
Bellinger, Sue	Ecoschools co-ordinator, Gauteng region
Bolton, Marnus	MIG Monitoring, dplg
van der Boon, Dirk	Finance
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Cawood, Fred	Senior Manager Engineering, Bophirima DM
Chenevard, Richard	Swiss Development Cooperation
Colvin, Louise	MSB support
Crawford, Charlie	DWAF
Damons, Cindy	dplg
Davies, J	MSB support
Deedat, Hameda	Water Caucus
Duncker, Louiza	CSIR, Spot Check Audit
Dungu, M	Director: technical Services, Chris Hani
van Dyk, Paula	IDC, National Treasury
Evans, Jenny	DWAF Local Government Support
Eberhardt, Rolfe	National Benchmarking Initiative
Fourie, Lizna	DWAF Water Licensing Section, East London
Gibbs, Joy	CSO (W Cape)
Govender, Danny	Manager of Water Reticulation, Ugu PMU
Hallatt, Leon	WSP Manager for Mbombela
Hlatswayo, Lindela	DWAF HO, Dir: Water Services Regulation, Tariff Specialist
Husband, Robin	MCSSP
Jack, Landile	DWAF Resource Management Directorate, East London
Jili, J	Councillor, Sisonke Council water & sanitation sub-committee
Kalinga, Pelpola	MSB Programme Manager
Kalvitha, Kassie	DWAF Head Office; Deputy Director Economic Regulation
Katsana, A	PMU Manager, O R Tambo
Kings, John	MCSSP
Kuhn, Kobus	Project Manager: Water Services Water Services Planning and Information
Klarenberg, Geraldine	Mvula Trust
Klopper, Danie	Raising the Citizens Voice Project, City of Cape Town
Kula, Senza	CSO (W Cape)
Kruger, Anton	DWAF regional manager, Mpumalanga

Kruger, John	Department of Education
Kruger, Richard	MIG Senior Manager
Lagardien, Alvin	Strategic support MSBII programme, W Cape
Lawry, N	Transfer Manager, Eastern Cape
Ledwaba, Thomas	Manager O&M, Greater Sekhukhune DM
Lithole, Freddy	Principal Officer, Water Sector Support)
Lucas, Andrew	DWAF East London office; Waste water management, Resources section
Luzulane, NP	Councillor, Sisonke Council water & sanitation sub-committee
Mafa, DE	Councillor, Sisonke Council water & sanitation sub-committee
Magazi, Ntsiki	Director - Director Gender and Disability Directorate
Malovhele, Lutendo Patrick	dplg
Maqoko M	Transfer Manager, O R Tambo
Masakona, Tshifhiwa	Manager Water Services, Vhembe DM
Masefield, Angela	DWAF (KZN)
Mashaba, Richard	DWAF transfer manager
Mashaba, Sello	Equitable Share
Mashidi, Sizani	Chief Development Expert
McCully, Alet	Water Services Planning and Information
McGregor, Steven	Acting PMU Manager, Sisonke DM
Mills, Steve	Manager UGU sanitation production yards
Mlandu, Xola	CSO (W Cape)
Mogamisi, Matshidiso	Gender coordinator (Northern Cape)
Mojanaga, Yul	Executive Manager Technical Services, Central DM
Molefe, Goodenough	Mvula Trust
Moraka, William	SALGA
Moremong, Helen	Social Development and crosscutting issues
Moshidi, Sizani	DWAF HO, Dir: Water Services Regulation, CDE: Financial Analyst
MovMavhusha, Munzhedzi	Social Development and crosscutting issues
Msiya, WM	Deputy Mayor and Chairperson, Sisonke Council water & sanitation sub-committee
Mukosi, David	DWAF LIM; seconded to Machado LM WSP,
Nene, M	PMU Project Manager, O R Tambo
Ngcobo, Jabulani	Water Services Manager, Sisonke DM
Nkadimeng, Jackson	Manager, Water Services, Greater Sekhukhune DM
Nkosi, Isaiah	Chief Water Technician, Nkomazi Municipality
Nzimande, BL	Councillor, Sisonke Council water & sanitation sub-committee
Oosthuizen, George	DWAF, Appropriate Technology
Paliso, Qondile	Department of Environmental Affairs & Tourism deputy director, OR Tambo

Pawandiwa, Max	General Manager Water Services, Ugu Municipality
Pillay, Pregan	Manager MIG Monitoring, dplg
Pohl, Sanet	Department of Housing
Poshwana, Motlatso	Former Rural Support Services member
Reeve, Charles	European Commission
Radebe, Lungiswa	ISD Manager, DWAF Eastern Cape
Ramagaga, George	Technician with PMU, Central DM WSA
Ramanyimi Ben	Technician DWAF, LIM; seconded to Vhembe DM
Ramunenyiwa, Petunia	Water Sector Services Development
van Rooyen, Esmaralda	DWAF Water Licensing Section, East London
Rossouw, Elsabe	Equitable Share
Scheepers, Elma	Manager, M&E, Water Sector Development
Sigwaza, Thoko	Chief Director, Sector Collaboration, DWAF
Simelane, Rosetta	WSS Special Programmes
Sosibo,T	Councillor, Sisonke Council water & sanitation sub-committee
Steyn, Johan	DWAF Head Office; Finance
Sussens Hugh	DWAF HO, Dir: Water Services
Tompkins, Robyn	Consultant, developed Regulatory Performance Management System
Themba, Frans	Operation Hunger
Tshivungu, S	Director: Technical Services, O R Tambo
Venter, Elaine	Manager, International Development Cooperation, National Treasury
Watson, Paul	WSA Manager, Ugu Municipality
Wensley, Allestair	Senior Specialist Engineer, Water Services Planning & Information
Wilkinson, Mel	CSIR, Spot Check Audi
Wilson, A	MSB support
Vermeulen, Abri	Former WSSLG
White, Malcolm	Irish Aid

Appendix C: Methodology

Sampling

- ### Creating a sample frame

In the absence of a Masibambane database, we used the Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) database as our starting point. Since one is also unable to extract Masibambane projects from this database, we extracted 995 completed water and sanitation projects across the country. Our team of water experts then went through these projects and, given the nature and focus of the survey, identified 433 projects likely to have direct beneficiaries.

From this list of 433 projects, we then excluded provinces that had less than 5% of the total number of projects. This resulted in excluding projects from Gauteng, North West, Northern Cape and Western Cape from the sample frame. Our final sample frame consisted of 392 water and sanitation projects, distributed as follows:

	Sanitation	Water	Total
Eastern Cape	5	40	45
Free State	13	13	26
KwaZulu Natal	73	110	183
Limpopo	6	64	70
Mpumalanga	20	48	68
Total	117	275	392

Table 36: Sample frame for beneficiary survey

- ### Drawing the sample

Stratifying the sample by province and project typology (as per Table 36), we then drew a random sample of 100 projects proportional to the number of projects per category – 26% of the total number of projects – with 10 further projects sampled as substitutes.

The list of 110 projects was then submitted to DWAF in order for maps to be drawn of the areas in which these projects were situated. However, the co-ordinates for a number of these projects were found to be incorrect during this process and maps for only 83 projects were generated. While in field, a few additional projects (from the original list of 110 projects) were identified. As a result, we were left with a final sample of 85 projects, distributed as follows:

	Sanitation	Water	Total
Eastern Cape	1	9	10
Free State	3	4	7
KwaZulu Natal	17	20	37
Limpopo	2	13	15
Mpumalanga	5	11	16
Total	28	57	85

Table 37: Sample of projects for beneficiary survey

Fieldwork

Fieldworkers from Field Focus were trained on May 21, 2007 and fieldwork began the following day. The maps were used as a starting point as they identified the location of the project. We were also unable to establish the exact beneficiaries of each project and so, using a 2km radius around the project, we thus identified potential beneficiary communities. Where possible, fieldworkers first identified the actual location of the project before commencing with household and respondent selection procedures.

In each of the identified communities within the 2km radius, 3 starting points were identified – these were either a school/crèche, a church or a business/shebeen. Fieldworkers then walked toward the centre of the community and stopped at the 5th dwelling in order to conduct the first interview. Thereafter, every fifth dwelling was selected for interviewing until 4 interviews had been conducted at each starting point.

At each identified dwelling, fieldworkers were instructed to conduct the interview with the head of household or, failing that, with a randomly selected adult. Where substitutions were required, the dwelling to the immediate left of the selected dwelling was used.

Fieldwork was completed on 10 June 2007 and a total of 1 025 interviews were conducted:

	Total
Eastern Cape	120
Free State	84
KwaZulu Natal	445
Limpopo	183
Mpumalanga	193
Total	1 025

Table 38: Distribution of respondents of beneficiary survey by province

Data processing

The information from each interview was then coded and captured on computer. The absence of a rigorous sample frame resulted in a decision not to weight the realised sample back to the sample frame. The created sample frame was deemed not to be rigorous due not only to the decisions we were forced to take during its creation, but also because when in field it was established that a number of the supposed completed projects (as per the MIG database) were far from complete – in one instance, the project had not even started although fieldworkers did identify a board that indicated that the project would take place.

Furthermore, the realised sample is fairly close to being self-weighting as the initial list of projects was randomly drawn proportional to the number of different projects in each of the selected provinces. In this way, the data should be seen as representative of the population living within a 2km radius of completed water and sanitation projects (as per the MIG database) with direct beneficiaries.

A sample of 1 025 respondents has an associated margin of sampling error of ±3.1%.

Photo: Julia Cain

Appendix D: List of team members

Name	Company	Role
Nobayethi Dube	Strategy & Tactics	Gender
David Everatt	Strategy & Tactics	Team leader
Jim Gibson	Maluti GSM Consulting	Transfers
Derek Hazelton	TSE Water Services cc	Finances, Free Basic Services
Cindy Illing	Maluti GSM Consulting	Civil society
Ross Jennings	African Essentials	Sampling and statistical analysis
Junior Khanyi	Consultant	Projects (North West, Limpopo)
Patrick Mbanjwa	Consultant	Projects (KZN)
Enency Mbatha	Field Focus	Beneficiary survey
Nicky McLeod	Environmental and Rural Solutions	Environment
Phillip Ravenscroft	Maluti GSM Consulting	Appropriate technology, water services
Matthew Smith	Strategy & Tactics	Monitoring & Evaluation, institutional strengthening
Sharon Snyman	Q&A	WSA and PMU Manager surveys
Dave Still	Partners in Development	Backlog eradication, O&M

Appendix E: Inception Report

Inception note: Masibambane II summative evaluation

Overview

The Department of Water Affairs & Forestry (DWAF) is commissioning an independent, external, summative evaluation of Phase II of the water services sector support programme, known as Masibambane (referred to as MSB II). The terms of reference (ToR) call for an evaluation of "the effectiveness and efficiency of the programme to determine whether the EU support should be redirected if necessary." The evaluation will cover the period April 2004 to end March 2007, and will measure the extent to which the programme succeeded in meeting the objectives set out in the water sector strategy. The evaluation is both summative – looking back at the efficiency and effectiveness of MSB II – and forward-looking, seeking to develop recommendations for improved performance in phase III of Masibambane.

Our approach to this evaluation, as in all our evaluative work, is heavily driven by the need for evidence-based reporting, informed by fieldwork on the ground where we can see and try better to understand the realities and challenges of implementation, how this impacts on meeting the needs of users, the management and oversight challenges it throws up, and how these in turn reflect back on capacity building strategies, decentralisation, transfers and the like.

In brief, we propose the following:
1. A national sample survey of beneficiary communities where MSB projects have been delivered, with a sample of 1000 community members
2. A telephonic survey of all Water Service Authorities, interviewing 3 key officials at each WSA
3. In-depth interviews at national and provincial to tease out policy, programme, institutional and related issues
4. Analysis of financial, programme management and related issues
5. Analysis of relevant programme documentation
6. Qualitative, in-depth assessments of a small sample of projects and WSAs, 10 in all, covering a wide range of issues from impact and local participation through cross-cutting issues to policy, sector-wide approach, transfers and government grants, capacity building and so on.

The evaluation will move in cycles, starting inevitably with a review of documents and national-level interviews, then going down to projects in six provinces, and then expanding upwards – using what we learn on the ground – to provincial and back to the national sphere. Running parallel to these cycles will be the WSA survey and survey of beneficiary communities. The point is not to valorise one sphere above another, but to test and measure efficacy on the ground as a priority, and then cross-check that with provincial and finally national developments and challenges. This iterative approach includes regular feedback sessions with DWAF and appropriate structures.

Objectives

According to the ToR, the objectives of the evaluation are as follows:

"The overall objective of this study is to assess the progress of the programme against the Strategic Framework for Water Services on the basis of the indicators formulated by the sector and to make recommendations for improvement. The final review will review the situation with regard to the MIG and CBG to re-orient programme procedures if required.

To do this it will be necessary to critically evaluate:

- The effectiveness of sector collaboration & coordination and the implications of the Sector Wide or SWAP approach (first of its kind)
- The institutionalization of Masibambane (its approach, objectives and modus operandi) and the effectiveness and strategic impact of Masibambane (as a whole)
- Achievement of outputs and progress in meeting strategic objectives as outlined in the Strategic Framework for Water Services, including the extent to which cross cutting issues have been considered.
- Appropriateness of approach and strategies including the appropriateness of the approach and strategies taken for the above sub points.
- Review the effectiveness of special development initiatives aligning IDPs and WSDPs with the PGDS.
- Review of strategy - within the context - and appropriateness of the changes made in order to make recommendations for future implementation of the program
- To what extent has the program results been entrenched on a sustainable basis
- Review the situation with regard to the support from Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) and Capacity Building Grant(CBG) to the water services sector and re-orient the programme procedures if required.
- The extent to which the capacity building initiatives of DWAF and the sector have been successful."

The ToR do not propose a concrete relationship between this summative evaluation and the mid-term review (MTR) that preceded it. We would suggest that a useful approach may be to ensure that 50% of our project sample is drawn from the sample used in the MTR and 50% is made up of projects not evaluated before. This will allow us to track progress in specific project contexts, as well as at broader, programme level.

By the same token, it is important that the work of the evaluation team is synergised with that being done for MSB by the consulting firm COWI. We need to avoid research or interview fatigue on the part of respondents, as well as sharing findings with each other wherever this may help. We look to DWAF to facilitate this relationship.

Finally, evaluations work when there is openness about the process, information sharing, and confidence on the part of respondents that they should participate in an evaluation (whether by being interviewed, in a focus group, or other ways) because it will be in the medium and long-terms interests of the programme. Frank, honest answers – positive or negative – are the bedrock of an evaluation. We rely on DWAF to disseminate information about the evaluation to all the regions; and we shall try to build in small-scale introductory sessions where we can further this process, time and budget permitting.

Focus

The evaluation will focus on 5 key issues, listed below, with some initial ideas around each:

1. **Relevance** – has Masibambane targeted the priorities of its beneficiaries? If yes, how far has it come since the beginning of MSB I in doing so? How can this be deepened (or corrected, as appropriate) so that a phase III of MSB is both justified and more sure of dealing with capacity issues, provision backlogs, a changing inter-governmental environment, and the like?
    a. For on the ground water and sanitation projects:- have the project outcomes addressed the priorities of the communities? Was the project implemented in a way that maximised benefits to the beneficiaries? Were the projects the municipal priority? Do the projects conform to the municipality's standards and systems for operation and maintenance?
    b. For municipal and civil society support projects:- did the projects target the support priorities of the municipality?
2. **Effectiveness** – have the planned objectives, results and activities of Masibambane been achieved? If yes, how was this achieved, if no what were the challenges that prevented this? Do those problems still exist, and how can they be overcome during MSB III?
3. **Efficiency** - were inputs (resources and time) used in the best possible way to achieve the objectives of MSB II? If yes, how was this efficiency achieved, if no what were the reasons for this inefficiency? What could have been done to improve efficiency? How can further efficiencies be achieved in the 3rd phase of MSB? Can targets be set in this regard, with a view (for example) to lowering administrative overheads and maximising investment in delivery? Are structures and institutions equipped to manage transfers within time and legal parameters? If not, what can be done to resolve the situation? How is efficiency affected (and is it positive or negative) by decentralisation and related capacity challenges? Should these be linked in future targets?
4. **Impact** – How has the intervention contributed to the longer terms goals of MSB II? Were there any unanticipated consequences of MSB? To what extent has MSB contributed to both expanding water and sanitation service delivery and backlog eradication as well as capacity building in a sector-wide fashion? Is the notion of a SWAP understood, accepted, and functioning? How does MSB relate to broader government initiatives geared at integrated service delivery?
5. **Sustainability** – how sustainable is MSB at local level in particular, and at provincial level? Does management capacity exist to manage the funds that will be sourced via government grants (MIG et al) and target it appropriately by type of activity and area/beneficiary group? Are the goals of the water sector strategy attainable in the long-term and if reliant only on government funds? And if the supply side is working, what about demand – education around water and sanitation, the participation of civil society generally, community members (as individuals as well as via water committees), and the participation of women in particular – as users and as decision-makers about service provision? On the same issue, commingling demand and supply issues, what of the local and provincial sphere – have they fully bought into the changed legislative and policy environments, as well as the core elements of a SWAP? Sustainability will have to cover all these as well as more basic project-level questions dealing with appropriate technology, cost, availability of skills and resources (such as money to pay for diesel for a pump or generator) and so on.

These 5 criteria will be used *in each of the following* core programme areas:

1. Policy & sector orientation
2. Service delivery
3. Institutional development
4. Programme management
5. Sustainability (including cross-cutters)

Furthermore, cross-cutting issues – gender, civil society participation, technology and so on – will be assessed *within* each of these 5 core areas and as stand-alone items in their own right. Thus gender, for example, needs to be assessed within policy/sector orientation, within delivery, within institutional development and capacity building and programme management, and separately assessed as a deliverable in its own right.

The objectives of the evaluation need to be clearly spelled out. This is critical because the ToR iterate an extremely wide range of issues, from micro to macro, that the evaluation should report on – but which are (taken together) far beyond the time and budget available. The key to making the evaluation work well for the Department is to narrow its focus rather than broaden it too much. To help in this process, we have clustered and ranked what seem to be priority issues in the table below.

Main Issues for Evaluation	Priority
Service delivery	
Water and Sanitation Services: Assessment of the water and sanitation service delivery programme will include a review of the following:	
Projects in line with municipal and community priorities	1
Quality of end-products	1
Water & Sanitation backlog reduction	1
Project costs in relation sector norms,	2
Choice of technology,	2
Operation and maintenance considerations	1
Participation of women and men of the communities involved.	1
Developing municipal capacity in health and hygiene outreach.	2
The effectiveness of the Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) in the implementation of water and sanitation projects.	1
Sector/policy development	
An assessment of the management support programmes, designed to strengthen the administration and implementation activities of DWAF. Specific emphasis will be placed on the sector co-ordination structures and the quality of involvement of other sector stakeholders in terms of ownership and joint (or decentralised) decision-making. The extent to which the following have been implemented and their effectiveness and efficiency will be analysed:	
The impact and implications of the sector wide approach including an assessment of the appropriateness of the approach and strategies employed	1
The water services sector is efficiently co-ordinated and organised in the study provinces.	2

SALGA and municipal structures supported to effectively participate in water sector policy development and implementation.	2
An effective regulatory framework & performance monitoring system established that will enable DWAF to measure, regulate and report on the performance of WSAs and WSPs.	1
A sound and enabling policy framework for all key issues in water services sector clarified and implemented.	3
DPLG supported to establish a MIG Strategic Management Unit at Head Office and perform its role as manager of MIG.	2
Activities of the programme effectively disseminated through knowledge management and lesson learning documentation.	2
Training courses and training materials for capacity building through training of trainers.	3
The programme to transfer the operation and maintenance responsibilities of DWAF water schemes from DWAF to appropriate water services institutions will be evaluated.	
The effectiveness of the process will be analysed including the following aspects:	
Refurbishment of schemes to meet safety requirements and full functionality	2
Staff transfers and the impact on operation and maintenance capacity in municipalities	1
Institutional development	
An assessment of the institutional development and support activities and the results achieved. Specific emphasis will be given to the support and the appropriateness of approach taken to the support provided to local authorities.	
An analysis of the institutionalisation of the water services sector support programme.	2
An assessment of whether or not the strengths of the different players (i.e. Government, NGO's and the private sector) have been optimally utilised in order to achieve maximum benefits and strategies to strengthen participation of the NGO/CBO sector.	1
Evaluate the extent to which the MSB 2 programme has contributed to managing the transition in relation to the new service delivery framework.	2
Assess the effectiveness of the programme in capacity building of WSA's and WSPs to fulfil their functions optimally.	1
Evaluate the role played by the current collaborative structures within MSB in advancing the intent and spirit of the SWAP approach.	2
Sustainability (including cross cutting Issues)	
The assessment of cross-cutting issues will include analysis of the following:	
Integration of gender sensitivity	2
The role of civil society and the level of municipal willingness to partner with civil society organisations in delivery of water and sanitation services	2
Integration of environmental considerations within the sector and the environmental impacts of projects	2

The use of appropriate technology and the integration of appropriate technology in systems of planning, design and M&E	2
Programme management	
The effectiveness of the programme management systems, tools and processes and their implementation will be evaluated, including the following	
The monitoring and evaluation systems	2
The reporting tools and processes	2
The project and programme management techniques and tools utilised	2
Financial issues, specifically including:	
The impact on the programme of the consolidation of financing programmes (MIG, CBG and equitable share)	1
The impact on the programme of the implementation of free basic services and equitable share funding	1
Integration of planning systems and approaches	2
Analysis of the programme management systems utilised and their effectiveness	2

Approach and sampling

The evaluation, operating within time and cost restraints, seeks to balance the need to work at local level, where projects are implemented; at municipal level; at provincial level, and at national level. It is not possible to cover all projects, or all provinces, and so the issue of sampling becomes particularly important. Below we provide a draft sample. This is indicative, since inputs are needed from DWAF in finalising the actual sample at all levels as well as identifying key respondents.

However, the emphasis remains on a bottom-up approach, where the aims and objectives of the centre are tested in field at local level. Inputs from DWAF and national sector structures are welcomed, but it is critical that we sample across what are regarded as 'good' and 'bad' projects, municipalities and provinces, precisely to learn what works and whether or not it can be replicated; and what does not work, and why. The team will not assume to visit all projects together – rather, we will break into units and travel to different sites and work there in smaller units: this avoids projects or government municipalities or departments trying to cope with 8 – 10 researchers each with a battery of questions to ask. It should also allow greater coverage. Finally, there is an inevitable trade-off between the desire for robust coverage and time and cost restraints, which will inform sampling and fieldwork.

The starting point in the provinces must be the quarterly meetings (DWAF regions and HO, water services authorities). These are important meetings to attend and observe and gain inputs from, assuming all or many WSAs are present. But province is a sphere 'higher' than we wish to focus.

The survey of project beneficiaries will prove to be an extremely powerful mechanism for understanding the implementation and impact of the programme, based on our considerable experience in this area for multiple government departments and programmes. It allows those who participated directly in the programme

and those who should be seeing its benefits to describe their experiences. It also allows them to focus on key issues such as community participation, the design and location of assets, and the impact of MSB on themselves and their communities. We recommend a 1000 sample survey stratified by project category and province. The sample frame will have to be finalised with DWAF but should include projects transferred from Head Office during MSB II.

The key point is that we will have measurably accurate data about the perceptions and experiences of beneficiary/recipient communities, the ultimate key arbiters of quality and success; and will complete an audit of WSAs, with multiple respondents at each WSA. This will be an invaluable pair of datasets; combined with in-depth interviews and documentary analysis, we will go beyond triangulation and secure accurate, robust findings.

We would sample a set of WSAs to visit, and at each we would interview some or all of the following (depending on availability): the municipal manager, technical services director, PMU manager (who manages MIG-funded projects), manager of water services (for O&M), staff in positions funded by MSB, as well as staff specifically targeted (like GIS experts and retired engineers), and consultants. The interviews would focus on all or some of the projects funded in the WSA.

Assuming that a basic categorisation covers actual infrastructure (sub-divided into water projects and sanitation projects) and capacity building (covering a wide range of activities), as well as programme management and cross-cutting issues; and that the evaluation needs to look at a range of projects that make up a representative sample, a rough sample frame is as below.

	Water Supply and Sanitation projects	Water Sector Support	Institutional Development	Transfers cross cutting and management support	TOTAL
MSB provinces	KFA10	KFA11	KFA12	KFA13+18	
Eastern Cape	1	1			2
Kwa-Zulu Natal	1		1		2
Limpopo Province	1			1	2
Other Provinces					
Northwest	1		1		2
Gauteng		1			1
Mpumalanga				1	1
Total	4	2	2	2	10

Ideally, of course, we would visit more projects – but the trade-off is spending less time worrying about the provincial and national spheres. This balance that needs to be struck will need guidance from DWAF and appropriate structures.

The following project areas are seen as key for evaluation based upon the allocated budgets and on widespread implementation:
- Water and sanitation infrastructure
- Bucket system eradication,
- Implementation of free basic services,
- WSA capacity building and business plan development
- Support (management, planning and M&E)

The process of implementing MSB II will thus be evaluated through a range of methodologies, which in turn give 'voice' to different constituencies – programme managers, project-level players and beneficiaries. The evaluation team leader then plays a key role in merging the findings of these different methods into a single, cohesive and readable report.

Team

We are in the process of assembling a powerful team of sector experts, set out below. The team will be led by a social scientist (Everatt) and an engineer (Ravenscroft) to strike an appropriate balance between the socio-political and technical aspects of MSB.

	Position
Dr David Everatt	Team leader (oversight, instrument design, management, writing, recommendation development, etc.)
Phillip Ravenscroft	Water & sanitation delivery, appropriate technology, policy and regulations
Dave Still	Water & sanitation delivery, appropriate technology, policy and regulations esp. KZN
Matthew J Smith	Local strengthening, institutional development and M&E
Nobayethi Dube	Civil society involvement and gender
Patrick Mbanjwa	Civil society involvement/project assessment
Derek Hazelton	Finance & programme analysis
Nicky McLeod	Environment
Basitsana Khathali	Environment
Jim Gibson	Transfers
Enency Mbatha	National survey of beneficiaries
Ross Jennings	Sampling and statistical analysis
Sharon Snyman	Telephone survey of WSAs

Roles for international experts:
- **Finance & programme analysis:** continuing the relationship with World Bank experts would be extremely useful.
- **Gender mainstreaming**: an international expert would complement the team since the area needs an injection of fresh thinking
- **Institutional development**: another important area that the international person would complement the team.
- **Sector collaboration** is another area where some international comparative input would be useful.

In addition, we propose a project advisory panel – who have no formal status but are there to bounce ideas off, help with critical comments and steer, etc., made up of the following:

- Rolfe Eberhard - overall strategic issues
- Julia Middleton - environment
- Batsetwana Khatali - environment
- Cindy Illing - institutional development

Finally, if DWAF requires additional experts to join the team, as has been suggested, the department will find additional funds to meet these unexpected costs.

Process/timeline

Given the need to refine the focus of the evaluation and the considerable amount of planning needed, we set out a revised timeframe below.

	Activity	Schedule
I	Putting team in place	February to 15 March
	Contracting	
	Finalise international experts	Partially done
	Gather data (published, official, M&E data, etc.)	
	Deliverables:	Done
	• Inception report (scope, schedule, methods, roles and responsibilities, outputs etc)	Done
	• Focus ToR on core set of items	Done
	• Contract	
II	Task Team of MCC approve/amend/sign off Inception Report	16 March to 17 April
	Local and international experts contracted, sign off instruments and approach	
	Literature and documentation review begins for all core areas – transfers, finance, capacity building, environment, logframe analysis, SWAP approach, etc.	Begun
	Initial in-depth interviews	
	Deliverables	

	Activity	Schedule
	• Qualitative instruments finalised • Initial interviews • Literature/documentation review under way	
III	Full, accurate list of all MSB II projects for sampling – by type, location and status – submitted to Team Draw sample for surveys DWAF to supply maps for starting points Design research instruments Train fieldworkers, begin fieldwork WSA survey instrument designed (x3) WSA respondents identified and contacted re survey Literature review completed - review programme proposal, financing proposals and agreements, work plans, project business plans, progress reports and other programme reports at national level. Projects for team visits selected Interviews with stakeholders at national level and EU officials from the Delegation in Pretoria. **Deliverables:** • Sample frame (beneficiary survey) • Research instruments (WSA and beneficiary surveys) • Literature/documentation review • Projects for qualitative assessment selected • WSA sample and instrument finalised	18th to 30th April
IV	Survey fieldwork & beck-checking 21st – fieldwork ends 28th – coding completed 4th June – data coded and cleaned	May

	Activity	Schedule
	WSA survey fieldwork underway	
	Review provincial strategies, work plans, project business plans	
	Other project reports	
	Other relevant documents, at a provincial level	
	Interviews with stakeholders in the provinces	
	Field visits in the provinces, including interviews with representatives of local government, members of water committees	
	beneficiaries, other relevant interviews	
	Qualitative project assessment in field	
	Fieldwork mopping up for WSA survey	June
	WSA survey data available by 15th June	
	Beneficiary survey data tables available by 15th June	
	Deliverables:	
	• Draft topline survey report – beneficiaries	25th June
	• WSA survey – data analysed by experts in different fields (O&M, transfers, capacity, etc.)	
	• Drafting report	
V	**Reporting**	
	Preparation of first draft report to the project steering committee.	6th July
	Deliverables:	
	Draft report	
	Presentation at workshop with Steercom	
VI	**Draft report**	
	Prepare final draft report in line with comments from Steercom	20th July

	Activity	Schedule
	(assuming it takes a week to get comments and a week to re-write)	
	Submit to Steercom c/o Kalinga Pelpola	
	(DWAF will distribute reports to stakeholders)	
VII	**Presentation and second draft final report**	
	Workshop final draft report findings with Masibambane National and Regional Programme Management Teams	27th July
VIII	Finalise report by incorporating workshop comments	
IX	Submit final report	3rd August

The timeline is tight, and manageable because we have the opportunity in advance to finalise the ToR, identify and source documents and data, refine instruments and so on. It is critical that we are given support by DWAF in accessing people, timetables for sector committee and other meetings, letters of introduction and the like.

Budget

The cost of the project is R2 416.00 including VAT. The cost of professional time for all international evaluators will be paid by development partners and will not be taken from this budget. Payment will be broken down into 5 stages as below.